

THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRUJILLO
DICTATORSHIP
THE EMERGENCE OF A PLURALIST POLITICAL
SYSTEM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

By

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PREFACE

Democracy and totalitarianism are the most prevalent systems of government in the world today. Much is now known of the ways in which these two systems function. There has also been some study of the transformation of democracy into totalitarianism, the most prominent example being Weimar Germany and its conversion into the Nazi regime. But there has been almost no analysis of the reverse process, the transition from a totalitarian state into democracy.

This study explores the political aspects of the transition in one country, the Dominican Republic. It is organized around the thesis that in a totalitarian system there are no independent intermediate organizations--such as political parties, labor unions, business associations--while in a democratic system there is a plurality of such groups. In the Dominican Republic of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo the intermediate organizations were either non-existent or tightly controlled by the regime. Following the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship, these intermediaries began to develop and the outlines of a pluralist democracy began to emerge.

For a pluralist democracy to function effectively, however, the intermediate groups active in politics must be similar enough in strength to generate genuine competition and yet prevent any one group, or any alliance of groups, from wholly dominating the society. In the Dominican Republic the more traditional groups--the armed forces, the Church, the business-professional-landholding elite--were considerably stronger and better organized than the more "modern" sectors of the population--the

political parties, the labor organizations, the peasantry. When the traditional groups worked together, they were able to completely dominate the country. This imbalance ultimately caused the failure of the first attempt to build a pluralist democracy, represented by the overthrow of the democratically elected and constitutional government of Juan Bosch; and the breakup of the system into a dysfunctional pattern of morbid politics which led ultimately to a chaotic revolution.

The major sources of information in support of these hypotheses were the literature of the groups involved and interviews with their members. Most of the groups with which this study is concerned articulate their interests in their own magazines, newspapers, and news sheets or in communiqués published in the independent newspapers. In addition to an exploration of these written materials, the author did extensive interviewing. A more complete summary of the interviewing techniques, the method of choosing samples, and the questionnaire is found in Appendix I.

This does not pretend to be the definitive study of politics in the Dominican Republic. Even within the confines of the theoretical structure here presented, more questions are raised than answered. The Dominican Republic is becoming an increasingly more complex political society with the result that it is now impossible for any single student to completely investigate all its aspects. It is hoped that some of the hypotheses here suggested may open new avenues for other researchers and that some of the generalizations here put forth may be tested by empirical methods.

A writer owes it to his readers to state his prejudices at the beginning. This is particularly true when the subject matter is controversial.

as is the case with politics in the Dominican Republic. This writer is sympathetic with the attempt of the Dominican Republic to build a pluralist democracy and to effect social change and reform following the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship. He believes that the government of Juan Bosch was oriented in this direction.

It is hoped that this sympathy has not interfered with the objectivity of the study. The author is fully aware of the limitations and errors of both President Bosch and his government. He, nevertheless, concludes that the Bosch government was more sinned against than sinning and that its overthrow was a setback for the Dominican Republic, for the United States, and for all Latin America.

This study is the result of three years' concern with politics in the Dominican Republic. The author has been in the country three times during this period. He was there during August and September, 1962, under a grant from the Caribbean Research Institute of the University of Florida. In February, 1964, he spent some time in the country in preparation for a Peace Corps lectureship on the Dominican Republic. From May, 1964, to February, 1965, at which time most of the basic research was done, he lived there on a Fulbright-Hays fellowship from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. During this last period the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems also provided financial assistance. A debt of gratitude is owed to these sponsoring organizations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Among the major struggles in world history in the past thirty years have been those between the forces of democracy and the forces of totalitarianism. During the late 1930's and early 1940's the struggle was waged with totalitarianism of the Right, represented by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Since that time the conflicts have involved totalitarianism of the Left, represented by Soviet Russia, her satellites, and, more recently, Communist China. In terms of totalitarian theory and practice, it matters little whether these regimes are of the Right or Left; they are all totalitarian and exhibit many of the same characteristics.¹

In many of the developing countries, in addition, authoritarian rule seems to be becoming increasingly prevalent. While it would be inaccurate, for example, to classify Nkrumah's Ghana, Nasser's Egypt, Sukarno's Indonesia, or Ben Bella's Algeria as totalitarian states, it is nevertheless true that these rulers have utilized some totalitarian techniques--such as single mass parties, government control of communications, official labor organizations, etc. It has even been argued by some scholars that given the economic and social aspirations of the people in the developing areas, some form of totalitarian control is extremely likely to develop.²

¹Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1962).

²Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," World Politics, IX (October, 1956), 55-75. See also Rupert Emerson, "The Erosion of Democracy in the New States," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds),

Since the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy has been so important in recent times and since some form of authoritarian control has become prevalent in many of the developing countries, it seems worthwhile to ask: What happens when a totalitarian or near-totalitarian system is overthrown? How is it possible to build a functioning democracy in the wake of such a regime? How can a pluralist system be developed in a country which had previously been under the monolithic control of one man or a small elite?

These questions have not been answered because there have been few cases to study. The Italian system under Mussolini was not a full-fledged totalitarianism. The overthrow of Naziism in Germany was followed by a partition of the country and a military occupation, thereby disqualifying it as a good case for comparative analysis. None of the communist totalitarian states have as yet been overthrown. The most prominent strong men in the New States--Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno, Ben Bella--were still in power in 1965.

For the apologists of totalitarianism, the problem of its possible overthrow does not even arise. Mussolini, Rocco, Gentile, and other Italian theorists envisioned a revived Roman Empire which would never fall. The Third Reich, based on the Hegelian ideas of duty and obedience and transformed by Hitler into National Socialism, was supposed to last 1,000 years. In communist theory, the achievement of the socialist state meant

(Footnote 2 continued from preceding page)

Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 635-644; and the section entitled "Totalitarianism and the Future of Politics in the Developing Countries," in the closely reasoned examination by John H. Kautsky, "An Essay in the Politics of Development," in Kautsky (ed), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 90-119.

the end of the class struggle and hence the end of political change. In the developing countries modernization, industrialization, and intense nationalism are supposed to provide the keys to the achievement of the millennium.

The Dominican Republic provides a good laboratory in which to examine the questions of what happens when a totalitarian or near-totalitarian regime is overthrown and whether it is possible to achieve a functioning pluralist democratic system in its wake. It is an isolated country and for a long time was almost immune from outside influences. The Dominican Republic thus provides the only known example in the modern world of a people who, without outside military intervention, have been able to successfully overthrow a state in which the full apparatus of totalitarian controls had been firmly established.³ Trujillo's totalitarian techniques were technologically modern, thereby making his regime comparable, in these respects, to Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. At the same time the Dominican Republic is a developing country--like most of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Finally, there was a concerted effort in the Dominican Republic to establish a democracy following the overthrow of the dictatorship. It is hoped that for these reasons, some of what occurred in that country may be applicable elsewhere.

In this chapter an attempt is made to provide the theoretical structure and the physical setting for the remainder of the study.

³The Hungarians in 1956 also overthrew their totalitarian regime, but they were quickly crushed and the controls reestablished.

The Theoretical Structure

The Dominican Republic under the nearly absolute control of Generalissimo Trujillo, 1930-1961, was, until the Cuba of Fidel Castro, the most totalitarian regime in the history of Latin America. The Latin American countries have often been subjected to arbitrary and dictatorial rule, but the controls these past dictators exercised over the ruled were not total. Dictatorship in Latin America has traditionally been formless rather than systematic. Only in the mid-20th century has systematic totalitarianism come to the Western Hemisphere. The totalitarian techniques only became possible with ever-improving means of transportation and communication, and they awaited a dictator of Trujillo's ilk to put them into operation.⁴

During the 1930's and early 1940's the Trujillo regime was similar to the more traditional kind of Latin American dictatorship. R. A. Gómez in his Government and Politics in Latin America provides a model of dictatorial types in which Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, Tiburcio Carías Andino of Honduras, Juan Vicente Gómez of Venezuela, and Trujillo are classified as "paternalistic caudillos." The country under a paternalist caudillo resembles a large hacienda and the leader a national patrón. He usually possesses large land holdings and controls many essential industries. Nepotism is prevalent and family and friends typically share the wealth that accrues with the possession of political power. Authority is thought of as a concession, and the concessionaire takes advantage of his office to enrich himself. He is viewed as a great national father who will take care of his children; ideology

⁴Robin A. Humphreys, The Evolution of Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 82-83.

is confined to an indication that he is exercising tutelage over his ignorant people. The armed forces serve as the backbone of his regime since there is no other political power base in the country. Gómez concludes, significantly, that the paternalistic caudillo was more prevalent in the 19th century before the onset of industrialism and its accompanying effects.⁵

Trujillo was indeed a paternalistic caudillo, at least at the beginning of his lengthy rule. But his regime eventually went far beyond the type of traditional dictatorship described by Gómez. In maintaining himself in power for thirty-one years and following the examples of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia, Trujillo employed technicians which were more characteristic of 20th century totalitarianism than of the old-style caudillo dictatorship. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* provide a model of a totalitarian state and give it the following characteristics: an official ideology; a single mass party; a system of terroristic police control; a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly over all means of communications; a central control and direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination of its formerly independent corporate entities, typically including most other associations and group activities.⁶

Trujillo's regime may be considered as a combination of traditional, 19th century dictatorship and modern 20th century totalitarianism. These two models may be neatly combined chronologically. Trujillo had gained power by enlisting in the Dominican National Constabulary and by rising to

⁵R. A. Gómez, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 97-99.

⁶Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

a position of preeminence as commander-in-chief of the National Army. With his Army, he assumed the presidency. Control of the armed forces and of the governmental machinery enabled him to turn the entire national economy into his private fief. These are all still essential characteristics of the traditional paternalistic caudillo dictatorship. But during the late 1940's and 1950's he established his ascendancy in communications and education, ran a single-party state, employed an official ideology, coordinated the economy into a corporate structure, used a technological system of terroristic police control, and subjected all intermediate organizations to his control. The Dominican Republic increasingly came to resemble a totalitarian state.⁷

Why did this transformation from caudillismo to totalitarianism take place in the middle of Trujillo's rule? The most important cause was probably economic. In the early years of the Trujillo era the Dominican Republic remained, for the most part, an agrarian, pre-industrial society. In this type of society there was no need for totalitarian control. The vast mass of the population was isolated and unorganized and, as such, constituted no potential threat to the regime; while the traditional aristocracy, among whom political power had historically been rotated, was unable to overthrow Trujillo because the only organized power in the country, the armed forces, was loyal to and under the control of its caudillo leader.

Industrialization, which began largely as a result of the demand for Dominican products during World War II and which continued into the post

⁷For a more complete working out of the traditional dictatorship and modern totalitarianism models, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujillo's Dominican Republic: A Case Study in the Methods of Control" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1962).

War years, provided the spark which set off a process that ultimately led the regime to become totalitarian. Industrialization, though still quite limited, gave rise to trade unions and several other kinds of associational groups whose members became conscious of their different interests and of their collective strength--a development which potentially threatened the survival of Trujillo. Not only did industrialization create groups which threatened the regime, but it also made the regime increasingly dependent on these same groups--and hence made the threat even greater. Totalitarianism in the Dominican Republic grew out of Trujillo's attempt to make the acceleration of industrialization compatible with the prevention of the growth of groups and organizations which industrialization spawned, or to suppress them where they had already grown. The totalitarian techniques which he employed served to break up and destroy the units which tend to emerge in an industrializing society--political parties, labor organizations, professional and trade associations, communications media, clubs and fraternal groups, and even families--as potential centers of resistance.⁸

Trujillo's control over the Dominican Republic was more nearly totalitarian than that of other recent Latin American strong men. Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, Manuel Odría of Peru, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia were military guardians who employed some totalitarian techniques but never gained near-total control. The rule of Getulio Vargas in Brazil was on the whole a mild authoritarianism in keeping with the traditional easy-going approach which Brazilians have to politics.

⁸This analysis follows the theoretical presentation of Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 91-94.

Juan Perón in Argentina succeeded in "coordinating" many sectors with his regime but he never succeeded in establishing ascendancy over all groups. Only in Castro's Cuba have the full controls of the totalitarian state approached the level reached by Trujillo.⁹

Totalitarianism is of course a matter of degree; in some dictatorships the controls are more total than in others. Further, no dictatorship can exercise absolutely total control; pockets of resistance have existed in every totalitarian state. With these considerations in mind, it seems accurate to characterize Trujillo's Dominican Republic as at least a "near-totalitarian" regime.

What seems to be most characteristic of such a near-totalitarian regime as Trujillo's is the almost-total control which it exercises over all groups and associations. In a pluralist society there are strong groups and associations which can compete with the authority of the government; political parties, armed forces, organizations of farmers, workers, and businessmen tend to limit the power of the state. In a totalitarian society, in contrast, these groups are subordinated to the regime; no organization functions independently of the government. No struggle is thus possible between the state and the various sectors of which it is composed, and the state acquires absolute power. Private associations, organized interests, societal groups are all subordinated to the totalitarian ruler; no independent source of strength which might offer competition or even a challenge to the all-powerful state is allowed to exist.

⁹See Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 145-146.

This concept is not new in political science. Aristotle suggested that a plurality of independent groups in a society is a great deterrent to tyranny. The competition among these associations and organizations, Aristotle wrote, prevents the accumulation of oppressive power in the hands of any single person or ruling elite. Eventually, practically all political thinkers accepted the idea that a pluralist society was essential for the functioning of a free and democratic system. This was the view of Burke, Hegel, and de Tocqueville, and many others, in addition to Aristotle.

Thomas Hobbes discussed the same problem from quite a different perspective. Whereas Aristotle was in favor of a pluralist and hence free political system, Hobbes sought to justify the absolute power of the sovereign. He recognized that loyalty and political allegiance drawn off by private groups is loyalty lost to the sovereign. "Factions," as he called them, were bound to sap the strength of the absolute state by diverting citizens from their obligations of political obedience. Hobbes never trusted the motives of independent organizations; he saw in them a dangerous potential threat to absolutism. He fully recognized that religious, fraternal, and economic groups were often political in character and pointed to the dangers for the sovereign in such a system of competing allegiances.

Students of modern totalitarianism have employed many of the same concepts which Aristotle and Hobbes used to describe the old-style authoritarianism. Friedrich and Brzezinski have stressed the importance of control over all associations and group activities as being essential to totalitarianism.¹⁰ Karl Mannheim cites the key role that independent

¹⁰Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 10.

"secondary groups"--that is, political parties, labor federations, businessmen's associations, etc--play in a functioning pluralist democracy and states that these are wholly absent in totalitarian systems.¹¹

Hannah Arendt in her Origins of Totalitarianism uses the concept of "atomization" to describe the same characteristic. By atomization, Arendt means the isolation of all individuals in the society. The process of atomization, she writes, has as its aim the destruction of all personal allegiances, groupings, or solidarity at any point in the system. She suggests that the "isolation of individuals provides not only the mass basis for totalitarian rule, but is carried through at the very top of the whole structure." According to Arendt, then, atomization is both a technique and a characteristic of totalitarian control.¹²

In The Politics of Mass Society William Kornhauser emphasizes a similar theme. Kornhauser's model dictates that a near-totalitarian regime like Trujillo's requires accessible elites and available non-elites. Such a structure means that the members of the society are connected only by direct ties to the state: "intermediate organizations" (the same as Mannheim's "secondary groups") are either non-existent or tightly controlled by the regime. The lack of these intermediate organizations increases mass availability to the ruler and thus the likelihood of totalitarian control. For in the absence of intermediaries, Kornhauser writes, participation in the society must be direct rather than filtered

¹¹Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 241-242.

¹²Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 389.

through intervening relationships. Without these intervening intermediate groups, direct control and totalitarianism become extremely likely.¹³

The absence of intermediate organizations or secondary groups provides the key to totalitarian control. Alex Inkeles has written.

Totalitarianism does not merely subordinate the individual to 'the state,' but it also, indeed preeminently, subordinates human as-
sociations, the organizations and institutions that man creates to meet his social needs. Neglect of the prime importance that totalitarianism gives to the subordination of institutions as such, may lead to neglect of some of the most important structural features of totalitarian social organizations. Traditional liberalism because of its emphasis on the individual, his rights and needs, naturally tends to see first in totalitarianism its direct impact on the individual, in particular his subordination to state purposes. But totalitarianism, in contrast to liberalism and pluralism, leaps over the individual to give full recognition and weight to the role of social institutions in the structure and functioning of society. It recognizes that one of the important aspects of social organization in the large-scale society is that the individual is related to the total social system primarily through the institutional networks in which he is enmeshed. And it has therefore given special and primary emphasis to the subordination of the traditional human associations, the organizations and institutions of which the individual is a member. This becomes the chief tool¹⁴ for its ultimate subordination of the individual to the state.

Trujillo succeeded in subordinating all intermediate organizations to his regime. With those groups he could not absolutely control (most notably the Church), he worked out a mutually supporting arrangement. He engaged in a continuing series of political struggles with every sector of Dominican society until he ruled alone and unchallenged. In successive skirmishes he brought the armed forces, the business-professional-landholding elite, the bureaucracy, the political parties, the communications

¹³William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 74-76.

¹⁴Alex Inkeles, "Totalitarianism and Ideology," in Carl Friedrich (ed), Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 90. The emphasis is Inkeles'.

system, the labor organizations, the communists, the peasantry, and the Church under his hegemony. No group, no association, no societal class was allowed to function independently of the regime; all were subordinated to the near-totalitarian control of Trujillo.

The reason why a weak intermediate or secondary group system may lead to totalitarian control helps explain why the strength of such intermediaries characterizes pluralist democracy. A strong intermediate structure, as Kornhauser states, consists of relatively stable and independent groups which represent diverse interests. These groups need not necessarily be confined exclusively to the more conventional interest groups but may include broad societal differentiations as well. The opposition of one group to another serves as a restraint on the power of both; a system of checks and balances among many diverse groups, associations, and forces is established. Absolute power is thereby eliminated and total control of the political system becomes impossible. Indeed, Kornhauser concludes, the major guarantee against totalitarianism and for pluralist democracy is the existence of a wide number of independent secondary organizations that are equivalent enough in strength to be truly competitive and yet keep any single organization or group from gaining overwhelming predominance.¹⁵

Following the overthrow of the near-totalitarian Trujillo regime, the outlines of a pluralist democracy began to emerge in the Dominican Republic. Many independent groups were formed and began to vie for political power. This study is concerned primarily with these developments: the attempt of the Dominican Republic to bridge the transition to a pluralist

¹⁵Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 236. The emphasis is Kornhauser's.

democracy in the wake of the overthrow of a near-totalitarian dictatorship in which all sectors of the society were tightly controlled. The specific sectors, groups, associations, and societal differentiations with which this work is concerned are the armed forces, the business-professional-landholding elite, the Church, the bureaucracy, the political parties, the labor organizations, the peasantry, communications, the U.S., and the communists.

It should not be thought that this theoretical framework--the transition from the near-totalitarian Trujillo regime in which all intermediate groups were under the control of the regime to a pluralist democracy in which a wide variety of independent intermediate groups competed in the political realm--can serve to explain all Dominican politics in the Trujillo and post-Trujillo periods. There are obviously other features beside the absence or control of intermediate groups which characterize totalitarianism and, similarly, other features beside the presence of independent intermediate groups which characterize pluralist democracy.

The theoretical structure, nevertheless, cannot be lightly disregarded. Several of the scholars cited feel that the presence or absence of independent intermediate groups is the major key to both totalitarianism and pluralist democracy. Other scholars argue that the study of groups, classes, sectors, castes, societal differentiations, etc., provides the central ordering concept for all politics--and especially for politics in Latin America.¹⁶

¹⁶The author does not share the "extreme group position" of, for example, Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study of Basing Point Legislation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). Excellent statements for the value of group analyses may be found in David Truman,

While this theoretical structure does not encompass all that occurred in the political realm during the era of the dictatorship and its aftermath, it does shed light on much of what happened. It helps place the Dominican experience in perspective. It makes possible, further, the use of comparative materials. The theory, finally, provides a convenient and logical framework for the ordering and analysis of a large mass of materials and events, all related to the overall theme of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

With this theoretical framework in mind, it is useful to look next at the physical setting in which these events took place.

(Footnote 16 continued from preceding page)

The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public Opinion (New York: A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 3-106; and Douglas E. Ashford, "Patterns of Group Development in a New Nation: Morocco," American Political Science Review, LV (June, 1961), 321-332. On the importance of group, sector, and societal differentiation studies in Latin America see L.N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (August, 1963), 349-370; and Robert L. Peterson, "Social Structure and the Political Process in Latin America: A Methodological Analysis," Western Political Quarterly, XVI (December, 1963), 885-896.

Democracy may also be defined in terms of groups. Following the discussion of John H. Kautsky, democracy is here considered to be a "political system in which all or most significant groups in the population participate in the political process or, to say the same thing somewhat differently, in which all or most significant interests have access to effective representation in the process of making governmental decisions, i. e., of allocating scarce resources." Thus defined in terms of group or interest participation or representation, democracy is related to the more substantive aspects of political conflict and clash of interest rather than to the more institutional characteristics by which it has traditionally been defined. One need not necessarily accept this definition of democracy, but he should keep in mind that this is what is implied when the term appears throughout this study. See Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

The Physical Setting

The Dominican Republic is located midway in that great chain of Caribbean islands that stretches from Florida to Venezuela. Occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island traditionally known as Hispaniola, between Cuba and Puerto Rico, it is bounded on the north by the Atlantic Ocean and on the south by the Caribbean Sea. Its 19,000 square miles make it comparable in size to the states of Vermont and New Hampshire combined.

While in terms of area the Dominican Republic takes up two-thirds and neighboring Haiti one-third of the island, in terms of population the ratio is exactly reversed. The most recent census estimates place the population of the Dominican Republic at slightly over three million, while that of Haiti is close to five million. The Dominican Republic is closing the gap, however; its growth rate of 3.5 per cent per year is among the highest in the world.¹⁷

The two countries which evolved on Hispaniola have dissimilar cultural patterns but they share many of the same basic dilemmas. The Dominican Republic is Spanish-speaking, while Haiti is French- or patois-speaking. The Haitian culture is derived primarily from Africa while that of the Dominican Republic is basically Latin. Haiti is black, while the Dominican Republic is dominated by whites. Despite these contrasts, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are both characterized by grinding poverty, tempestuous

¹⁷United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1961, Table 4; and Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, República Dominicana en Cifras (Santo Domingo: Sección de Publicaciones, 1964), Cuadro 2. See also Donald R. Dyer, "Distribution of Population on Hispaniola," Economic Geography, XXX (October, 1954), 337-346.

political histories, the absence of democratic or constitutional traditions, and enormous economic and social problems.¹⁸

It has been estimated that about 10 per cent of the Dominican Republic's three million population is white, another 20 per cent is negro, and the remaining 70 per cent mulatto in varying degrees.¹⁹ There are isolated pockets of other peoples scattered around the country. In Samaná, for example, live the English-speaking descendents of ex-slaves from Baltimore and Philadelphia who sought refuge on Hispaniola in the early 19th century. At Sosúa, on the north coast, there is a settlement of Jews, refugees from Europe of the 1930's, whose ranks have been reduced from 125 to about 25 families but who have remained famous for the manufacture of sausage and cheese. Near Constanza is a large Japanese colony with its own vigilante system, formed after several unhappy experiences with Dominican justice. In most major cities the Chinese run almost all the bars and restaurants while in Santo Domingo, the capital, Arabs are active in many businesses. Toward the east are some English-speaking West Indians while toward the west are many patois-speaking Haitians. Very few strains of the area's original Indian inhabitants, the Quisqueyans, remain. Prejudice is more social and economic than racial, though it is notable that the country's traditional ruling class is almost exclusively white and that in some areas the lines between the several shades of mulatto are sharply drawn.

¹⁸Raymond E. Crist, "Cultural Dichotomy in the Island of Hispaniola," Economic Geography, XXVIII (April, 1952), 105-121.

¹⁹William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), p. 17. These estimates are probably more accurate than the official figures of 28.1 per cent white, 11.5 per cent negro, and 60.4 per cent mixed. See Statistical Abstract of Latin America (University of California at Los Angeles: Center of Latin American Studies, 1963), p. 23.

The Dominican Republic is 98.2 per cent Roman Catholic, 1.4 per cent Protestant, and .4 per cent other. Though Catholicism has traditionally been the official state religion, there is religious freedom; and, though the country is overwhelmingly Catholic, religion does not seem to be as strong a force as it is in many Latin American countries.²⁰

Most Dominicans are rural; only 30 per cent live in towns of 1,000 or more while the remaining 70 per cent are classified as rural. Of the 30 per cent urban, fully 37 per cent live in the capital city of Santo Domingo de Guzmán (formerly Ciudad Trujillo). The population of the capital is approaching 400,000 while that of Santiago de los Caballeros, the country's second largest city and the center of its traditional "first families," is close to 125,000. There are no other metropolitan centers in the Dominican Republic; beneath these two cities are a whole host of small towns with populations ranging from 15,000 to 35,000. These include Azua, Baní, Barahona, San Juan de la Maguana, La Romana, San Francisco de Macorís, San Pedro de Macorís, La Vega, Montecristi, Puerto Plata, and Moca.²¹ In recent years many rural peasants (campesinos) have poured into the urban areas, especially Santo Domingo, with the result that the capital's population has skyrocketed, its slums have mushroomed, and an entirely new set of social and economic problems have been created.²²

²⁰Statistical Abstract . . ., op. cit., p. 22; and J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934), p. 354.

²¹Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, op. cit., Cuadro 2; and Dyer, op. cit., pp. 341-342.

²²Miguel Angel Presto, "El Exodo Campesino: Sus Causas y Consecuencias," Ahora, III (September 12, 1964), 5-7.

While Santo Domingo is the most populous city in the country, the primary nucleus of population concentration is still in the rich Cibao Valley between Santiago and San Francisco where the maximum densities reach 600 people per square mile. Together with the adjoining north coast, this area contains over half the total population of the country. Another one-third is found in the metropolitan area of the capital and the southern coastal plain from San Cristobal to La Romana. Most of the rest are scattered along the southwest coast, in the extreme northeast and northwest, and in the geographical center. The overall population density is 140 people per square mile--low for the West Indies, but high in comparison with the rest of Latin America.²³

Four principal mountain ranges, running parallel from southeast to northwest, cross the Dominican Republic. The southernmost is the Baoruco Range, the eastern extension of the chain that forms Haiti's southern peninsula. The Sierra de Neiba runs parallel to the Baoruco and only slightly to the north of it. Stretching across the middle of the island is the giant Cordillera Central, containing Pico Duarte (formerly Pico Trujillo), the highest mountain (10,300 feet) in the West Indies. The Cordillera breaks up into several smaller ranges, some running toward the Caribbean and one, the Cordillera Oriental, stretching all the way to the island's eastern tip. The northernmost range is the Cordillera Septentrional which parallels the Atlantic Coast and concludes in the Semaná Peninsula in a series of rugged hills.²⁴

²³John P. Augelli, "The Dominican Republic," Focus, X (February, 1960), 5.

²⁴See the appendix entitled "Quisqueya: A Physical Description," in Selden Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 175-176.

Because the landforms are the most complex in the Antillean chain, the Dominican Republic has a wide variety of climatic patterns. It is a tropical country, but the conditions stemming from its location are moderated by high elevations, the trade winds, and insularity. In low-land areas, such as the capital city, it is hot all year around; mean annual temperatures are about 73° F. and it rarely gets below 70°. Winter temperatures in the mountains near Constanza, by way of contrast, may drop to below freezing. Rainfall is also widely varied: where the trades sweep in from the ocean, such as at Samaná, more than 100 inches of precipitation will fall each year; while at Barahona and Montecristi it is desert-dry. Natural vegetation likewise varies from the tropical rain-forests and savannas of the valleys to the pine forests of the Cordillera Central to the cactus of the Southwest.²⁵

The Dominican Republic has a wide variety of mostly untapped mineral deposits. Though a few nuggets may still be found, gold mining ceased almost entirely after the discovery of richer deposits in Mexico and Peru in the early 16th century. Some petroleum is produced at Azua, some iron at Hatillo-Maimon, bauxite at Pedernales, marble at Samaná, and some nickel, gold, sulphur, and copper in scattered places around the country. Salt is taken from the sea at Azua, Baní, and Montecristi; while the ten-mile mountain of rock salt at Neiba provides an almost inexhaustible supply. Juan Bosch kept small bottles of samples of these minerals in his home and planned to begin a campaign to find and exploit the untapped mineral wealth of the country; but he was overthrown before the project could be initiated.²⁶

²⁵Augelli, op. cit., p. 2.

²⁶Juan Bosch, personal interview, Santo Domingo, September 1, 1962.

The outstanding resource of the Dominican Republic, however, is an abundance of good agricultural land. Between the mountain ranges lie some of the most fertile valleys to be found in the Americas. Chief of these are the Vega Real in the center of the island; the eastern plateau with mile after mile of rich sugar and grazing lands; and the northern Cibao Valley, 140 miles long and 9-28 miles wide, whose soils, particularly the coal-black varieties which occur between Moca and San Francisco, make it the agricultural heartland of the nation. Throughout the island there are many smaller, but no less fertile, oases of rich land. Estimates indicate that about 25 per cent of the country's total area is being cultivated and an additional 12 per cent is in pasture.²⁷

In the midst of all this natural wealth, the Dominican people are fantastically poor. As compared with a per capita income for all of Latin America of \$325 per year, that of the Dominican Republic is variously estimated at between \$189 and \$235 annually.²⁸ The statistics do not tell the full story, for most of this wealth is concentrated in a very few hands. The rest of the population lives in abysmal poverty nearly equal to that of proverbially underdeveloped Haiti. Especially toward the west, Dominicans live as close to the animal level as anyone to be seen in the remotest areas of Central America. They are without adequate food, water, and housing, with no medical or health facilities, with no educational or recreational opportunities, with no electricity, insufficient

²⁷Augelli, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁸United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, XVII (June, 1963), Table 53. See also "Report on the Dominican Republic," Latin American Report, V (September, 1963), 7. The entire issue of the Report was devoted to the Dominican Republic.

land, and--above all--no hope. The results of the grinding poverty may be seen in the bloated bellies of the children and the deformed bodies of many of the adults.

The nation's poverty is also manifested in its educational system. Though the official figures place the illiteracy rate at 60 per cent, in the countryside it may run as high as 80-90 per cent. There are few teachers, and most of these have little more than a high school education. Cheating is rampant and student strikes, even at the high school level, waste many days of learning time. From the primary level to the national University, the schools have inadequate staff, books, and other teaching aids. Little in the way of practical vocational training is available. All of this may be partially explained by the fact that in 1963, for example, only \$16,000,000 (10 per cent of the national budget) was devoted to education.²⁹

Though the country is overwhelmingly agricultural, it has been forced to import basic foodstuffs. The major reason for this is that the best lands are dedicated to producing for the world market rather than for local consumption. The Dominican economy is thus tied intimately to the world economy, and fluctuations in the international market have made and unmade Dominican governments for a century. Another result has been that prices for such staples as beans, rice, and plantains have skyrocketed and the many poor have found it increasingly difficult to feed themselves.

The cornerstone of the cash economy is sugar cane. Sugar, by value, supplies more than half of the country's exports. It is produced on large

²⁹Statistics on education were published in a series of articles in El Caribe (November 3, 1964), p. 1; (November 8, 1964), p. 1-A; and (November 9, 1964), p. 1. See also Listín Diario (November 2, 1964), p. 14.

plantations, most of which were formerly owned by Trujillo and taken over by the government after his dictatorship was overthrown. One of the largest independents is the U.S.- owned South Puerto Rico Sugar Company, centered at La Romana, which controls most of the land in the fertile East. Though wages in the sugar mills improved by 100 per cent in the three years after Trujillo was killed, they barely kept pace with the rising cost of living; and many Dominicans in 1965 were still earning less than a dollar per day-- when they could find employment.

Though the country is primarily dependent on a single agricultural product, it is not wholly a one-crop economy. Cacao and coffee follow sugar as major export crops. Cacao is grown in the rich soils of the Cibao while coffee is grown on hillsides throughout the country. Rice, tobacco, and bananas have also been produced for the world market. Expansion in rice has been made possible largely by irrigation projects. A substantial percentage of the bananas is produced by the Grenada Company, a branch of the U.S.- owned United Fruit Company. Some beef is also being raised for export.³⁰

There has been some industrial development in recent years. Most of the industry, however, is confined to the processing of the country's agricultural products. The major industry is the milling of sugar cane and the production of its major by-product, rum; but chocolate, cigarettes, and vegetable oils are also produced. The manufacture of shoes, textiles, flour, cement, and beer has brought a few industrial plants, but industry is still at the pre-take-off stage.³¹

³⁰ Augelli, op. cit., pp. 1-6.

³¹ Ibid., p. 4.

The Dominican Republic's share of the Caribbean tourists' dollars is small; in comparison with Puerto Rico and Jamaica and, until recently, Cuba and Haiti, few visitors bother to stop. It has three large and modern hotels in the capital city and a series of smaller, but no less modern, hotels scattered throughout the country. But the tourist attractions are underdeveloped, the prices are beyond all but the most lavish expense account budgets, and the service is almost non-existent. Most important, there is little to do in the country--the casinos have been intermittently closed, the nightclubs offer tasteless and artless shows, and Dominican culture (in contrast to Haiti's or Mexico's, for example) has not yet been identified.³²

Transportation improved greatly during the Trujillo era. Other than the private lines used for hauling cane on the large plantations, there is only a single railroad--connecting the rich farm lands of the Cibao with the port of Sánchez on Samaná Bay--and this has fallen into disuse; but the primary and secondary road system is excellent. Three major highways fan out from Santo Domingo to the East, West, and North which connect all the major cities with the capital. Paved secondary roads feed into these three major highways, thus creating an effective web over most of the country. Along the Haitian border and across the rugged Cordillera Central a road network is still largely absent. And because the need for farm-to-market roads is great, many perishable agricultural products cannot as yet be sold in a large market. Finally, some of the roads were built leading only to Trujillo properties. Despite these drawbacks, however,

³²See Hans Koningsberger, "Santo Domingo: Slush in the Pools," Show, IV (March, 1964), 12-15; Horace Sutton, "Santo Domingo: Rich in History and Color," Miami Herald (April 21, 1963), p. 5-J; and Richard Joseph, "Hispaniola Could Use Some Tourist Dollars," Miami Herald (March 21, 1965), p. 4-J.

transportation in the Dominican Republic is probably better than in any country in Central America.³³

While in many respects nature has been bountiful to Hispaniola, history has been considerably less kind. This was well stated by the distinguished U.S. writer, Washington Irving, who in 1828 wrote that this was "one of the most beautiful islands in the world and doomed to be one of the most unfortunate."³⁴

Hispanida has had many firsts. The island was discovered by Columbus on his first voyage. When gold was reported found on the southern coast, Santo Domingo, the first permanent city in the New World, was founded. The earliest experiments in Spanish colonial government were conducted here. In Santo Domingo the first viceregal court and first Audiencia were established and the first university chartered. The colony was also the scene of Latin America's first political revolution, and the pattern of revolution and upheaval has persisted into modern Dominican history.³⁵

From the beginning a rigid hierarchical society was established. Patterning the colony on the model of the Spanish court, Columbus' brother Bartolomé and son Diego established themselves and a few others as the nobility, artisans and soldiers as the small middle class, and the natives as servants. The pattern persisted into the modern era with the only change being the substitution of African slaves for the native Quisqueyan Indians.

³³ Augelli, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

³⁴ Quoted in H.P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1936), p. 7.

³⁵ See Lewis Hanke, The First Social Experiments in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935).

Class lines were tightly drawn; very few moved from one socio-economic level to another. Juan Bosch persuasively argues that the rigid stratification provided the psychological foundation for the rise to power of Trujillo, who was born in the middle sector and aspired to nobility, and also for the overthrow of his own government, which suffered the concerted opposition of the aristocracy by attempting to bring the lower classes into the national political-social-economic life.³⁶

During the first half century of Spanish rule Hispaniola flourished, for it served as a base for the expeditions of Pizarro, Balboa, Córtez, and other conquistadores to other islands and to the mainland. But the more lucrative conquests of Mexico and Peru soon turned the island into a poor way-station. The indigenous population had all but been exterminated by the disease the Spaniards carried;³⁷ and the Europeans had emigrated to the more attractive mainland. By 1550 it had been almost abandoned; there was little gold or silver and hence the colony was of little value to the crown. Though it experienced a resurgence of prosperity in the 18th century, this was slight; and Hispaniola remained the neglected, poverty-ridden tail-end of the vast Spanish empire for the better part of three centuries of colonial rule.

³⁶ Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo (Caracas: Grabados Nacionales, 1959), p. 21; "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 3-4; and Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964). This same theme was taken up by Víctor Alba, "Why Bosch Fell," The New Republic, CXLIX (October 12, 1963), 12-14.

³⁷ Santo Domingo provided Hans Zinser with a major example to prove his thesis in Rats, Lice, and History (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., 1935).

Because of the poverty and neglect, paradoxically, Hispaniola experienced much of the Spanish colonial heritage in superlatives. A slave society developed in the 16th century and evolved into a rigid class-caste feudal structure in the 18th and 19th centuries. The political structure was one of autocracy, of a monolithic type of government, of a hierarchy of despots all of whom exercised absolute power within their respective spheres. The Church served as an arm of the government and was characterized by an authoritarianism that paralleled the state concept. The economy was one of exploitation. Indeed, Spanish Hispaniola throughout its colonial period provides a particularly vivid illustration of the way in which an exploitive imperialist government can be an instrument of ruin. Perhaps nowhere in the Americas was there a history of greater continuous spoilation and destruction of human life and material resources. The dissolution of the colonial system in the early 19th century left the country with no native tradition. The colonial era bequeathed a legacy which the Dominican Republic is still attempting to overcome.

Throughout Hispaniola's history her geographic location at a strategic point of approach to the Caribbean Sea and to the whole of Central America has caused the island to be subjected to successive changes of ownership, outside influences, and foreign occupation. Its government has often been determined by the interplay of the great powers, and the covetousness with which these powers have looked upon the island was symbolized in the title of Sumner Welles' classic history of the Dominican Republic, Naboth's Vineyard.³⁸ French buccaneers settled in the western end of the island

³⁸Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, 2 vols (New York: Payson and Clarke, Ltd., 1928).

in the 16th century. British swashbucklers invaded the colony in 1586 and 1655 (a cannonball from one of Sir Francis Drake's ships is said to be still lodged in the roof of the Cathedral). Dutch pirates also sought a conquest. By the Treaty of Ryswick in 1695, French claims to the western one-third of the island were recognized.

After three centuries of Spanish rule, the eastern two-thirds of the island was also ceded to France in 1795. Due to the more pressing needs of her European wars, France was not able to effectively occupy the island; and under Toussant L'Overture and Jean Jacques Dessalines the French colony successfully revolted against Napoleon's rule and declared its independence. In 1805 Dessalines, Henry Christophe ("Emperor Jones" in the Eugene O'Neill play), and their black army invaded the Spanish-speaking end of the island instilling terror in the white ruling class. With the aid of the English fleet, however, the Haitians were driven out and in 1809 the colony was reunited with Spain.³⁹

In 1821 the Spanish colony declared its independence from the mother country. But before help could be secured from Simón Bolívar's Gran Colombia, Haitian columns under Jean Pierre Boyer again overran the island. Haitian occupation, 1822-1844, was cruel and barbarous. Haitians held the highest offices, closed the University, severed the Church's ties with Rome, disrupted the economy, forced out the traditional ruling class, and came near to exterminating all the whites. Welles feels that the basic cause of the anarchy, unrest, chaos, and dictatorship which characterized Dominican independent history should be attributed to the obliteration of European civilization during the twenty-two-year Haitian domination.⁴⁰

³⁹Rodman, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴⁰Welles, op. cit., pp. 900-901.

The Dominican Republic's struggle for independence lasted for half a century; and when independence finally came, Dominicans were ill-prepared for it. Juan Pablo Duarte, the George Washington of the Dominican Republic, organized a secret society, La Trinitaria, which led the struggle; and finally in 1844 the Haitians were driven out. From that date until 1899 three dictators--Pedro Santana, Buenaventura Báez, and Ulises Heureaux--dominated Dominican history. The Latin America historian Hubert Herring calls all three "brazen opportunists, ready to betray their country for their own ends" and states that "Nowhere else has personalismo--the rule of the boss--been more persistent than in this weak nation."⁴¹

Santana and Báez emerged as the two most prominent leaders in the new republic, alternating in power for many years and in the process almost destroying the infant country. Santana became convinced that the nation could not defend itself against Haiti's continuous assaults and in 1861 the Dominican Republic was again placed under the control of Spain, Santana being named governor-general. Spanish rule proved inept and unprofitable; and in 1865 Isabella II, with a timely push from Dominican forces, withdrew her troops. The idea of a protectorate remained, however, and Báez approached the U.S. with a plan; but the questionable involvement in the matter of a U.S. land-speculating company came out and the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the treaty.⁴²

During the 1870's the country passed through a period of instability, which included the return of Báez to the presidency for the fifth time and

⁴¹Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America, from the Beginnings to the Present, 1st ed (New York: A. Knopf, 1957), pp. 425-426.

⁴²Dexter Perkins, La Cuestión de Santo Domingo, 1849-1865 (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1955).

the coming to power of the country's first, but short-lived, democratic government. The chaos culminated in the emergence of a strong man, Heureaux, in 1882. He ruled the country as a dictator for seventeen years, described as "perhaps the most pitiless tyranny in the history of Latin America."⁴³ Selden Rodman writes that "Only by looking ahead to the equally ruthless and 'successful' career of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina in our time can any accurate comparison be found for the method and madness of Ulises Heureaux." He bought up most of his rivals and subjected the rest to villification, exile, or murder; employed an army of spies; sent assassins abroad; and enriched himself, his friends, and his relatives at the expense of the people. Rodman concludes:

Only in respect to the techniques of the modern totalitarian state, still to be invented by Hitler and Stalin--the single party, the mass rallies, the propaganda mills, the rewriting of history, the indoctrination of children, the racial persecution, the military juggernaut--did Ulises Heureaux yield⁴⁴ anything in refinements of despotism to his infamous successor.

Following Heureaux's death in 1899, the country returned to the chaos which had gone before. Four revolutions took place and five presidents gained office in six years. Heureaux's ruinous foreign loans had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy; and the foreign creditors were threatening to use force to collect. In 1905 the U.S. took over the administration of the customs receivership in the hope of preventing European intervention, but this did not prevent the political situation from degenerating still further into anarchy. After ten years of continuous upheaval--which included the ascension of the archbishop to the presidency--

⁴³Herring, op. cit., p. 426.

⁴⁴Rodman, op. cit., p. 92.

President Wilson in 1916 authorized the U.S. Marines already in the country to take control.⁴⁵

During the U.S. occupation, 1916-1924, the Dominican Congress was suspended, the Supreme Court stripped of its authority, and the military governor granted power to rule by decree. Roads were built and sanitation, communications, and education improved; but the Marines assumed arbitrary power and often abused their authority. Perhaps the major historical effect was the creation of a modern, unified Constabulary, for it was through the Constabulary that Trujillo rose to power and took over the country. Noel Henríquez called him "the bastard son of the occupation forces," and it is for this reason that the U.S. is still often held accountable by Dominicans for the entire Trujillo era.⁴⁶

A new constitution was promulgated in 1924 and Horacio Vásquez was elected president. During his presidency a combination of relative freedom and order existed for the first time in two decades. But Vásquez alienated his friends and enemies alike by stuffing the government with relatives and by extending his tenure from four to six years. In 1929 he became ill, and the world depression critically hurt the all-important Dominican sugar industry. The following year a revolution, led by Rafael Estrella Ureña, was launched against the tottering government. The National Army, by this time under the firm control of Trujillo, refused to defend the regime and it quickly fell. In 1930 Trujillo himself gained the presidency and his thirty-one-year, near-totalitarian reign began.

⁴⁵ Enrique Apolinar Henríquez, Episodios Imperialistas (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1958), pp. 270-290.

⁴⁶ Noel Henríquez, La Verdad sobre Trujillo: Capítulos que se le Olvidaron a Salíndez (La Habana: Imprenta Económica en General, S.A., 1959), pp. 92-93.

The history of the Dominican Republic had been characterized by successive dictatorships and revolutions, anarchy and civil wars, foreign interventions that drained its meager wealth, and economic and social problems that appeared insoluble. Trujillo's own remark is revealing:

In 1930 our situation was still at its starting point. After eighty-six years of bloody warfare, social unrest, poverty and want we had failed to solve any of our problems. There were still no schools, no hospitals, no employment, no boundary, no roads, no banks, no agriculture, no industry (except the sugar latifundium), no public buildings, no social security, no electric power, no university, no irrigation system, no bridges, no money, no appreciable production.⁴⁷

The Dominican pattern had been one of recurrent periods of utter chaos and of absolutist despotism; its leadership, correspondingly, had alternated between ineffectual poets and bloodthirsty tyrants. It was a poor and underdeveloped country. The lines of cleavage in the political society were deep. During its independent history, between 1844 and 1930, the country had had fifty presidents (one every 1.7 years) and thirty revolutions (one every 2.9 years). It has had more constitutions (twenty-eight) than any other country in Latin America. This spectacle caused Miguel Angel Monclús in his El Caudillismo en la República Dominicana to cry out, "Where will it stop?"⁴⁸ It stopped--at least temporarily--with the coming to power of Trujillo in 1930.

⁴⁷ Rafael Trujillo, The Evolution of Democracy in Santo Domingo; trans. Otto Vega (Ciudad Trujillo: Official Publication of the Dominican Government, 1950), p. 12.

⁴⁸ Miguel Angel Monclús, El Caudillismo en la República Dominicana (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1948), p. 157.

CHAPTER II

THE TRUJILLO REGIME¹

"Few Latin American dictatorships become totalitarian," writes the Latin America specialist Martin Needler, "in recent years probably only those of Trujillo and Castro could be enumerated, with Perón failing in the attempt."² The essence of totalitarianism, as the theoretical structure of this study has stressed, is total control over every sector of the population; no individual, group, or organization can be permitted an existence independent of the regime. Trujillo came closer to attaining this total control over every source of potential opposition than any previous Latin American dictator. He attempted to secure absolute master over every political and social institution--the armed forces, the Church, the business-professional-landholding elite, the government bureaucracy, the political parties, the labor unions, the peasantry, the communications system, and all foreign influences.

Trujillo's control over some of these organizations and forces was more absolute than over others. The organizations which were most independently strong were precisely the same organizations which in the last two years of his rule began to oppose the dictatorship. These same organizations were, similarly, the strongest sectors in Dominican politics

¹For a more complete working out of the themes presented in this chapter see Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujillo's Dominican Republic: A Case Study in the Methods of Control" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1962).

²Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), p. 146.

in the post-Trujillo period. Correspondingly, those organizations which were most totally controlled during the dictatorship were also the weakest sectors in Dominican politics after it was overthrown.

The imbalance between the relatively strong and unified armed forces, Church, and business-professional-landholding elite and the relatively weak and atomized political parties, labor unions, and peasantry accounts in large measure for the failure of the Dominican Republic to emerge as a pluralist democracy in the wake of the overthrow of the dictatorship. Because this imbalance began during the Trujillo era, it is essential that a study of the post-Trujillo period begin with a consideration of the previous period.

Trujillo's Early Life

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina was born in San Cristobal, a poverty-ridden agricultural village on the Dominican Republic's southern coast, on October 24, 1891. He was the fourth of eleven children of José Trujillo Valdez, a minor postal clerk, and Julia Molina de Trujillo. Like their community, the Trujillo family was poor; and Trujillo's father is reputed to have occasionally resorted to cattle rustling to supplement his insufficient income.³

Little is known of Trujillo's early years. The official accounts say that he was taught to read by his maternal grandmother and there is a record of his having attended grammar school.⁴ It is more likely that

³Germán Ornes, Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1958), p. 29.

⁴The best of the official biographies is Abelardo R. Nanita, Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1951).

Trujillo received most of his early education in the streets of San Cristobal. He worked as the chief of a private police force on one of the large sugar plantations in which capacity he is supposed to have received his indoctrination in cruel and oppressive methods. Albert C. Hicks characterizes young Trujillo as a hoodlum, cattle rustler, forger, torturer, informer, and murderer;⁵ and Ernest Gruening claims that he had been convicted on two occasions and only escaped punishment for other offenses by fleeing.⁶ The validity of these charges cannot be ascertained since a fire in the Supreme Court building in 1927 destroyed the criminal records. It is probable that this fire was providential for the official biographers who later wrote laudatory accounts of the early Trujillo years.

Trujillo was twenty-four when the U.S. Marines occupied the Dominican Republic in 1916. His uncle introduced him to some of the officers of the occupation forces and he soon joined the U.S.-created Dominican National Constabulary. In 1919 he received a commission and thereafter his rise was meteoric. He was promoted to captain in 1922 and to major in 1924. As the new administrator of the North, Trujillo distinguished himself by being efficient and hard-working and attracted the favorable attention of President Vásquez. In 1926 he was advanced to lieutenant colonel and by 1928 was promoted to chief-of-staff of the newly renamed National Army.⁷

⁵Albert C. Hicks, Blood in the Streets: The Life and Rule of Trujillo (New York: Creative Age Press Inc., 1946), pp. 27-30.

⁶Ernest Gruening, "Dictatorship in Santo Domingo: A Joint Concern," The Nation, CXXXVIII (May 23, 1934), 584.

⁷Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of United States Intervention (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 14.

Through adroit maneuvering and handling of promotions and appointments, Trujillo turned the Army into his personal instrument and became the most powerful man in the country. When, in 1930, Rafael Estrella Ureña led a rebellion against the Vásquez government, Trujillo's troops, instead of coming to the defense of the President, remained in their barracks. After Vásquez had resigned, Trujillo collected the arms from Estrella Ureña's rebel forces. He secured the nomination of the several political parties which had opposed the ousted President, forced the withdrawal of the opposition candidates by means of terror and oppression, and was elected president of the Republic.⁸ From 1930 until his assassination on May 30, 1961, Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic with an iron hand.

The Dictatorship

Once in the presidency Trujillo attempted to secure his absolute control over every sector of the political society. No group, no organization, no institution was allowed to remain independent from his near-totalitarian regime.

The armed forces

The first and most important instrument of Trujillo's control over the Dominican Republic was the armed forces. It was through the National Constabulary and, later, the National Army that he rose to power and primarily by military authority that he checked the opposition and maintained his lengthy rule. The armed forces were the most powerful institution in the country and the ultimate source of Trujillo's authority.

⁸ Luis F. Mejía, De Lilís a Trujillo: Historia Contemporánea de la República Dominicana (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1944), p. 147.

Prior to 1916 the Dominican armed forces had been weak and divided. Its recruits were untrained, its weapons obsolete, its ranks disorganized and mutinous, and its officers too numerous. The U.S. Marines created the first standing Dominican armed force organized along professional lines. Previously the military had been fragmented and inept; after the U.S. occupation it was centralized and efficient.⁹ Trujillo carried the work of the Marines forward, equipping his army with modern weapons and techniques; and by the early 1930's the Dominican military was one of the strongest in the Caribbean area.¹⁰

The exact size of the armed forces was always a well-kept secret. Official estimates showed a standing army of 12,000;¹¹ but an additional 60,000 had received a basic course in military training and Trujillo himself boasted that he could field an army of 100,000 men.¹² The Dominican Navy in 1957 was estimated at 4,000 men and had 39 combat and auxiliary vessels, thus making it a stronger naval force than Mexico's, for example, and second only to that of Venezuela in the Caribbean.¹³ On top of these, the Dominican air force in the 1950's became the most powerful of the services. It was composed of an elite corps of some 3,000 men, had sixteen airports and 132 training and combat planes, and, by a strange quirk,

⁹Goldwert, op. cit., p. 48. See also Edwin Leuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 182.

¹⁰Ernesto Vega y Pagan, Historia de las Fuerzas Armadas, II (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1955), 236-247.

¹¹S. H. Steinberg (ed), The Statesman's Year Book, 1961-1962 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), p. 957.

¹²Ornes, op. cit., p. 132.

¹³Jane's Fighting Ships (London: Jane's Fighting Ships Publishing Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 170-174.

controlled the infantry tanks.¹⁴ This huge force was the primary pillar upon which Trujillo's control rested.

The mere presence of the powerful Dominican military machine, loyal to and under the control of Trujillo, was sufficient to discourage all opposition; but he used the armed forces, not for national defense, but to impose an all-pervasive terror on the population. Secret police and espionage agencies were created and rendered any deviation from the official line dangerous. By such means as those previously developed in Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany a vigilant and unremitting surveillance was maintained over every aspect of the Dominican existence.¹⁵

Throughout the country one was never far from the secret police. They were suspected of being present at every gathering, whether represented in the flesh or by a hidden microphone. The mail was censored, as well as all public information media. Indifference toward the regime was considered opposition; no one was allowed to remain neutral. It was a classic cloak-and-dagger regime complete with spies, informers, the mysterious "missing" persons, and the "accidents" that strained credibility. Those who failed to conform were subjected to a technologically efficient brainwashing which ensured their future collaboration with the regime.¹⁶

The terror was not confined to the Dominican Republic nor was the list of those disposed of limited exclusively to Dominican citizens. Mauricio

¹⁴Vega y Pagan, op. cit., pp. 497-498.

¹⁵Charles O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 149.

¹⁶Hicks, op. cit., passim; Ornes, op. cit., pp. 120-130; Noel Henriquez, La Verdad sobre Trujillo: Capítulos que se le Olvidaron a Galíndez (La Habana: Imprenta Económica en General, 1959), chapters V, VII, VIII, X, and XI; and Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón, Un Gestapo en América (La Habana: Editorial LEX, 1946), p. 17.

Báez, a prominent exiled labor leader, "disappeared" from the streets of Havana. Andres Requeña, editor of an anti-Trujillo newspaper, was shot in New York. The exiled Basque scholar, Jesús de Galíndez, author of La era de Trujillo, a vigorous indictment of the regime, was kidnapped in New York, flown to the Dominican Republic, and tortured until he died. Galíndez's disappearance was later linked to that of Gerald Murphy, a U.S. aviator. These were only some of the most prominent victims of Trujillo's terror; the total number killed numbered in the thousands.¹⁷

Realizing that the armed forces were the final source of his power and also the greatest potential threat to his continued rule, Trujillo attempted to maintain an absolute personal control over them. He employed both the carrot and the stick. Initially all those officers not completely loyal to the regime were purged. The purges were later replaced by the more refined technique of constantly shuffling personnel. No officer was allowed to remain in a command long enough to build up a personal following that might pose a threat to the regime; all were transferred or replaced every few months to prevent them from gaining too much power.¹⁸ By these methods the armed forces were kept atomized.

But Trujillo could not hope to keep the loyalty of the ever-more-powerful armed forces by constant harassment, and he turned instead to the technique of the carrot. Elaborate pension and insurance plans were worked out. Comfortable quarters and health and entertainment facilities were provided. Trujillo favored the armed forces by granting them bonuses and by using the proceeds from the National Lottery to build houses for the

¹⁷Hicks, op. cit., pp. 227-230; and Arturo Espaillat, Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), pp. 112-125.

¹⁸Porter and Alexander, op. cit., pp. 147-148.

enlisted men. Other economic advantages accrued to members of the armed forces; their incomes were supplemented by illegal business activities and "protection" rackets which the regime preferred to ignore. An esprit de corps was carefully nurtured; the military was pampered and granted special fueros.¹⁹

The granting of all these special privileges to the armed forces made it somewhat independent of the regime. The military came to think of itself as an elite element above the rest of society, and the possession of special privileges enhanced its sense of uniqueness and superiority. Eventually the armed forces, as the strongest institution in the country, became an entity unto itself and powerful enough to extract concessions from the government of Trujillo. It acquired bargaining power vis à vis the regime. For a long time it remained loyal to Trujillo because it was dependent on him; but as its power increased, it tended to become somewhat independent.²⁰ The monolithic structure of the dictatorship began to break up.

The opposition in the armed forces to Trujillo started to build up in the late 1950's--at precisely the same time that the military reached the height of its power. The initial impetus to the movement came from a group of 30-40 air force officers who began meeting clandestinely to discuss how the dictatorship might be overthrown.²¹ They were joined by a nucleus

¹⁹Vega y Pagan, op. cit., pp. 193-198; and Nanita, op. cit., p. 191.

²⁰Vega y Pagan, op. cit., p. 200; and Jesús de Galíndez, La era de Trujillo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacífico, 1956), p. 307.

²¹Raymundo Cuevas Sena "Gesta Contra la Tiranía: Complot de los Sargentos Técnicos ASD," El 14, 1 (February 28, 1962), 4.

of National Police officers who plotted to kill Trujillo.²² Other anti-Trujillo activities took place or were plotted in the two remaining services, the Navy and the National Army.²³

Armed forces opposition continued to grow. On June 14, 1959, an invasion attempt was launched against the Dominican Republic by a group of exiles. Instead of repelling the invaders, some military men joined them while others attempted to sabotage the effort against the guerrillas by slowing up men and equipment sent to crush them.²⁴ A plot was discovered in January, 1960, at which time some 47 officers and an unknown number of enlisted men were arrested.²⁵ Only two and a half weeks before Trujillo was assassinated, there were persistent rumors that military elements were planning a rebellion.²⁶ When the assassination actually did take place, military officers, including Armed Forces Secretary, Gen. José Román Fernández, were among the leaders.²⁷

The armed forces in the Trujillo era were the strongest institution in the country. They were not totally atomized like, for example, the political parties or labor since Trujillo needed the military to support his regime. Though the dictator long exercised control over them, the

²²Eladio Guaroa Pepín Soto, "Gestas Contra la Tiranía: Complot de los ex-Policías de Tránsito," El 1J4, I (March 17, 1962), 7.

²³Murray Kempton, "The Vault Cracks," New York Post (February 10, 1960), reprinted in New York Times (February 11, 1960), p. 29.

²⁴Carlos M. Nolasco, "Gestas Contra la Tiranía: Complot de los Sargentos Técnicos ASD," El 1J4, I (March 7, 1962), 2.

²⁵New York Times (January 31, 1960), p. 9.

²⁶New York Times (May 14, 1961), p. 27.

²⁷Norman Gall, "How Trujillo Died," The New Republic, CXLVIII (April 13, 1963), 19-20.

armed forces eventually began to assert their independence, especially in the last two years of his rule. After Trujillo was killed the military remained the dominant force in Dominican politics.

The Church

Trujillo never established control over the Roman Catholic Church, as he did over other sectors of the population, for the simple reason that it was not necessary for him to do so. Church and State during most of the Trujillo era were mutually supporting institutions; the dictator favored the Church and it, in turn, supported his regime. Because of this mutual support, the Church was the institution which remained most independent of Trujillo's near-totalitarian control.

The Generalissimo sought to project the image of a devout Catholic in whom religiosity was natural. His political philosophy was couched in moral and religious terms and his belief in God formed the basis of this theory.²⁸ The Church, as a result of the many favors he showered upon it, was very pro-Trujillo; Archbishop Pittini, especially, was outspoken in his praise of the dictator.

Some of the measures which Trujillo enacted in favor of the Church may be briefly listed. In 1931 his congress enacted a bill restoring the juridical personality of the Church.²⁹ In 1936 the Jesuit Order was permitted to return to the country for the first time since it had been expelled from Spanish America in 1767. The government financed and the

²⁸See Joaquín Balaguer, El pensamiento vivo de Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1955).

²⁹Vetilio J. Alfau Durán, Trujillo and the Roman Catholic Church in Santo Domingo (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Handicap, 1960), pp. 11-14.

official Dominican Party administered the construction of many churches.³⁰ Trujillo's favoritism to the Church culminated in 1954 with the signing of a Concordat between the Dominican Republic and the Holy See. In the Concordat the Church was given full patronage privileges, Catholicism was recognized as the religion of the Dominican Republic, the Church's property was made tax-free, the Church was given the right to minister to the armed forces and in welfare institutions, and most of the educational system was turned over to the Church.³¹ These and other benefits were implemented by measures subsequently passed by the Congress.³²

In return for these favors, the Church supported his regime and showered its praise on Trujillo. Archbishop Pittini wrote:

On the twentieth year of Monseñor Pittini's consecration as a bishop, the Church in the Dominican Republic has reached a degree of splendor it had never known before. It owes its present favorable status to the Catholic-political genius of Generalissimo Dr. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.³³

Trujillo was equated with God. Christ's love for his apostles was likened to Trujillo's love for the Church, and he was referred to as the "Benefactor of the Church." Vetilio J. Alfau Durán in his Trujillo and the Roman Catholic Church in Santo Domingo wrote:

³⁰ José F. Pensón, El Partido Dominicano (Ciudad Trujillo: Imprenta Arte y Cine, 1957), p. 48. Because the Dominican Republic is so overwhelming Roman Catholic, Trujillo concentrated his efforts on controlling that Church. But he did not neglect other religious group. The Trujillo government constructed a synagogue for the Jewish community and allowed Protestants to freely carry on their religious activities. These favors came at a price: Trujillo did not allow any of these religious bodies to forget that he was their benefactor and they agreed to refrain from all political matters.

³¹ The text of the Concordat is in Zenón Castillo de Aza, Trujillo y otros benefactores de la iglesia (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Handicap, 1961), pp. 239-257.

³² Ibid., pp. 257-307.

³³ The text is in A Look at the Dominican Republic, I (July, 1956), 21.

Trujillo has justly been called the "Benefactor of the Church." Truly he is the Benefactor of the Church in as high a degree as he is that of the country. For this reason, as well as his boundless generosity in protecting and promoting the progress of Catholicism in Santo Domingo, the grateful sons of the one and eternal Church who wisely seek to be gathered in one flock under the guidance of one Shepherd, beg that the blessings of heaven be showered upon their illustrious leader.³⁴

Eventually Trujillo was equated with the great Church and State leaders of history. The most fantastic claim was contained in Zenón Castillo de Aza's Trujillo y otros benefactores de la iglesia in which the "other benefactors"--Constantine, Justinian, and Charlemagne--were dismissed in the first ninety-five pages and Trujillo discussed in the remaining 242.³⁵ This mutual support prevailed throughout most of the Trujillo era.

The Church, however, was never subjected to the totalitarian controls of the regime and maintained its independence. It remained unified and strong. It was this unity and strength which enabled the Church to be an effective voice when it joined the anti-Trujillo movement in 1960-1961. And because it, like the armed forces, had not suffered the planned atomization that other sectors in the Dominican political system had, the Church emerged as one of the most unified and powerful groups in the post-Trujillo period.

The business-professional-landholding community

The business-professional-landholding community, in contrast to the armed forces and the Church, was kept atomized by the Trujillo regime; but it nevertheless emerged, like the other sectors previously considered, as

³⁴Alfau Durán, op. cit., p. 17.

³⁵Castillo de Aza, op. cit.

one of the most powerful groups in the period after Trujillo was assassinated. As we shall see, this fact does not negate the theory of this study, but it does introduce a new variable.

Most businessmen attempted to abstain from becoming active collaborators with the regime. They were of course obliged to join the official Dominican Party and they were dependent on the government for the issuance of passports, imports and exports, and the granting of business licenses. In many cases, further, Trujillo forced prospering enterprises to cede a share of the profits to him or he might have sold them "protection" or "labor peace." For fear their licenses might be taken away, the businessmen did not criticize the government; yet, they tried not to actively collaborate with Trujillo and sought to maintain a degree of individual independence.³⁶

The great majority of the professionals also exercised extreme caution in their dealings with the regime. Some worked closely with the government and rose to occupy high positions; but most of the lawyers, for example, confined their activities to joining the official Party and occupying lesser government posts so as not to be accused of being enemies of the regime. The doctors, because of the nature of their profession, were more independent and their collaboration was usually limited to being professors at the National University or serving in the Ministry of Health. The engineers and architects were more involved with the activities of the regime since its public works and construction programs offered almost the only employment, but they too hesitated to accept government positions. Few professionals became legislators, ministers, or governors.³⁷

³⁶Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 334-338.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 338-339.

The business and professional elements were caught on the horns of a dilemma. While many of them did not wish to become vocal and active supporters of the regime, they were often forced to do so in order to get ahead. The nature of Trujillo's system was such that almost everyone was compelled, in some degree, to be a collaborator. The Generalissimo's long control over all aspects of Dominican existence, especially his monopoly of the national economy, ultimately forced most of the businessmen, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and architects, however, unwillingly, to become at least partial champions of him and his government. In order to succeed and prosper in Trujillo's Dominican Republic, one had to back the regime.

Trujillo's dealings with the traditional landholding elite were characterized more by personal rancor than anything else. The elite had refused to accept him as one of their own and he responded with an effort to humiliate them in every conceivable way. He destroyed their exclusive clubs by forcing the admission of himself and his fellow military hoodlums and continued to retaliate against the upper strata. In the 1940's and 1950's he took over the old haciendas until he became the greatest landowner in the country. Few of the elite accepted Trujillo, however, and most maintained a passive indifference to the regime.³⁸

Though Trujillo could not force the active collaboration of most of the business-professional-landholding community, he did control their organizations. Formerly respected civic groups like the Rotary were turned into Trujillo fronts. Before enacting any measures business conferences elected him honorary chairman. He presented himself as the "First Doctor" and "First Lawyer" and was made president of the Medical Association and

³⁸Ornes, op. cit., p. 42.

the Lawyers Club. He destroyed the aristocratic Union Club and kept tight reins on the Country Club and the Club de la Juventud.³⁹

Though the business-professional-landowning community, like the peasantry and labor organizations, was tightly controlled and highly atomized, it, unlike these other two socio-economic sectors, joined the opposition to Trujillo during his last two years and emerged as a powerful and unified force in the post-dictatorship years. Why this difference? The major reason is that most everyone in the elite knows everyone else or is interrelated. The business-professional-landholding community built a strong and unified organization because theirs was a face-to-face group whose members had long had a close, if informal, relationship; while such groups as labor federations and peasant organizations, by way of contrast, emerged as weak and disunified because theirs were non-face-to-face, or distal, organizations whose members had never known each other before.

The bureaucracy

Once in power and with the support of the armed forces, Trujillo assumed control of the entire governmental apparatus. The machinery of the state was employed to maintain the regime and Trujillo personally. All branches of the government were dominated by him, every function of the state received its ultimate authority from his office, and every government official was dependent on him for his position. The governmental structure was monolithic and all power was concentrated in the dictator's personage.

Trujillo's principal method of controlling the government machinery was the constant shuffling and reshuffling of political officeholders.

³⁹ ibid., pp. 14, 17, 241; and Galíndez, op. cit., p. 337n.

All government employees had to submit a signed but undated resignation before being appointed to their posts. One could never be certain of his position since Trujillo frequently demanded his resignation or appointed him to another post. The system was not confined to the bureaucracy proper but included congressmen, judges, and local officials as well. Germán Ornes summed it up well when he wrote: "No place in the pyramid of command is for keeps and no authority except Trujillo's is more than provisional."⁴⁰ In this way the government was kept in a perpetual state of flux.

There were many other technicians by which Trujillo controlled the bureaucracy and kept it atomized. The dictator frequently made unannounced visits to the various departments and dismissed anyone whom he thought was not working hard. All government employees were required to join the official Party. Neither an effective civil service law nor a government workers organization was allowed. Distrust and suspicion were sowed throughout the public service, even to the extent of breaking up personal friendships. Elaborate loyalty checks and security measures were required. Almost all applicants for subordinate posts were forced to sign a sworn affidavit of eternal loyalty to the Generalissimo. At the top of the hierarchy only personal friends or relatives of the dictator were allowed to serve. Subordinates were never informed about the full nature of the measures on which they worked but were told just enough to allow them to carry out their particular part of the job. Only Trujillo and a few trusted aides knew the full extent of the government's programs.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ornes, op. cit., p. 260.

⁴¹Theodore Draper, "Trujillo's Dynasty," The Reporter, V (November 27, 1951), 23; and Ornes, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

The legacy of these practices proved difficult for the post-Trujillo governments to overcome. Graft and corruption, family favoritism, appointments and dismissals for purely political reasons, and inefficiency had become the norm rather than the exception. Because only a small number of able people had been willing to serve, there was a severe shortage of trained personnel. Only Trujillo and his cronies had gained experience in administration; and after he was overthrown a very small number of capable administrators remained. Finally, the atomization of the public service during the Trujillo years prevented it from emerging as a strong force in the period after he was overthrown.

The political parties

Political parties are among the strongest intermediate organizations in a pluralist democracy. But during the entire Trujillo era no political parties were permitted to exist independent of the regime. It was only after Trujillo was killed that independent parties began to emerge in the country. The comparative youth of the parties, in contrast to the older and more established armed forces, Church, and business-professional-landholding community, is the major reason why they were so weak and fluid after the dictator was assassinated.

Immediately after taking office in 1930 Trujillo suppressed all the opposition parties and created his own Dominican Party. Thereafter the Dominican Republic became, for all practical purposes, a single party state. Other "opposition" parties were occasionally fomented by the regime, but it was clear that these too were subservient to Trujillo. In 1941, for example, the Trujillo Party was founded and in the 1942 elections the dictator was the presidential candidate of both this and the Dominican

Party. He received 100 per cent of the votes cast. In deference to the wave of democratic sentiment which swept Latin America following World War II, Trujillo allowed two parties, the National Democratic Party and the Labor Party, to oppose his own machine. The nature of the "opposition" was revealed, however, when the presidential candidate of the Labor Party, Francisco Prats Ramírez, signed a petition favoring Trujillo's reelection. These parties disappeared immediately after the 1947 campaign.⁴² In 1960, again under pressure to democratize his regime, Trujillo once more fomented an artificial opposition and even allowed it to win a few minor posts; but it was evident that this too was subservient to the regime.

The Dominican Party served Trujillo as a personal political apparatus to assist him in controlling the government machinery. The Party did not have a genuine popular foundation and never became an independent political organization; rather, it was used by Trujillo to implement his programs and rubberstamp his decisions. One of its duties was to present a slate of candidates, first approved in the National Palace, who always received 100 per cent of the vote. It disseminated Trujillista propaganda, rounded up gigantic crowds to yell "Viva!" when the dictator appeared in public, and dispensed charity--always in the name of its chief. Another of its more important functions was to gather information on every Dominican citizen to insure that no one deviated from the official dogma.⁴³

⁴²Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

⁴³On the Dominican Party see Max Uribe, Función del Partido Dominicano en la era de Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1961); Pensón, op. cit.; Partido Dominicano, Acción y obra del Partido Dominicano (Ciudad Trujillo: sus publicaciones, 1956); and Partido Dominicano, Declaración de Principios y Estatutos del Partido Dominicano (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1945).

This analysis of the Dominican political party scene under Trujillo throws light on the present-day politics of the country. A single party, under the total control of a single man, dominated politics for thirty years. An entire generation had grown up knowing nothing but one-party rule and the distorted uses to which the Party was put. The Dominican Republic had had no experience with a functioning party system and no conception of the nature or functions of a political party. Dominicans had received no training in campaigning, electing, or governing by political parties. The new parties which emerged had to begin practically from scratch. These factors help account for the immaturity and fluidity of the political parties in the post-Trujillo years and also help explain why the parties were so weak in comparison with the more traditional sectors of the political society.

The labor sector

Like political parties, organized labor may serve as one of the strongest intermediate organizations in a functioning pluralist democratic state. But in the Dominican Republic of Trujillo, labor was highly atomized and the few labor organizations which existed were tightly controlled by the regime. Again like the political parties, labor had to begin from scratch after the dictatorship was overthrown, which also helps account for its weakness. The fact that labor, unlike the business community, is a non-face-to-face group further contributed to its disunity and lack of strength.

Trujillo's major means of control over labor came from his control of the national economic life. Under his rule the Dominican Republic was turned into a giant corporate enterprise with Trujillo as the single stockholder.

He was the biggest businessman, industrialist, and landowner. Juan Bosch estimated that some 80 per cent of the country's gainfully employed worked for Trujillo--35 per cent as government employees and 45 per cent as employees of his commercial, industrial, or agricultural enterprises. Most everyone was thus absolutely dependent on him for the basic necessities of his everyday livelihood, and the dictator hired and fired whom he pleased.⁴⁴

The Dominican Confederation of Workers was the official mechanism by which Trujillo controlled the labor movement. It had been organized in the 1920's as an independent labor federation; but after Trujillo came to power, it was coordinated with the regime and its programs. There were some independent unions, made up mostly of small craftsmen, but these were closely scrutinized and never permitted to organize nationally. In Trujillo's private enterprises, particularly the all-important sugar industry, even the government-controlled unions were not allowed to function.⁴⁵

Only one major strike occurred during the entire thirty-one-year Trujillo era. This occurred in January, 1946, when the sugar workers struck for higher wages. The government took no action against the workers and even acceded to some of their demands, but repressive measures were later taken against the strike's leaders. One of them, Mauricio Báez, now considered the father of the Dominican labor movement, was forced into exile, later disappeared, and was presumed killed by the regime.⁴⁶ Three

⁴⁴See Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo (Caracas: Grabados Nacionales, 1959), especially pp. 147-148.

⁴⁵See Miguel Jorrín, Governments of Latin America (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1953), p. 286; and Galíndez, op. cit., p. 294.

⁴⁶Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 301-304.

months later Trujillo declared that "in no case can the workers decide to stop work or declare a strike."⁴⁷ Thereafter no more strikes occurred.

Subsequent to the 1946 work stoppage, various measures were enacted which brought the trade unions under the total control of the government. Labor legislation was authored which provided for minimum wages, social security, and paid vacations.⁴⁸ The legislation was a cruel hoax on the workers who received none of the benefits but were brought under even tighter supervision. The movement culminated in 1951 with the promulgation of the celebrated Trujillo Labor Code by which all the labor organizations in the country were enlisted in the official CDT. From that time on, absolutely no independent labor activities were permitted.⁴⁹

When Daniel Benedict of the AFL-CIO and Raúl Valdivia of the Cuban Sugar Workers Federation visited the Dominican Republic as a delegation representing the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, they reported that there was no freedom of association in the country, that the trade unions were not independent and were tightly controlled by the government, that there was no collective bargaining, and that forced labor was practiced in many Trujillo-owned enterprises.⁵⁰ These conditions prevailed throughout the Trujillo era.

⁴⁷Rafael Trujillo, Discurso pronunciado por el Excmo. Sr. Pres. de la República Dr. Rafael L. Trujillo Molina al inaugurar el Barrio de Mejoramiento Social, el día 20 de abril de 1946 (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1946), p. 15.

⁴⁸Narciso Elio Bautista y de Oleo, "La protección de la clase obrera en la era de Trujillo" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Santo Domingo, 1961).

⁴⁹"El régimen de Trujillo y los sindicatos," Combate, I (Julio-Agosto, 1958), pp. 53-54.

⁵⁰Inter-American Labor Bulletin, IX (May, 1958), 1.

The rural peasantry

The rural peasantry was (and is) the most atomized of any of the sectors of Dominican society with which this study is concerned. In the case of the peasantry, however, atomization was not accomplished through a conscious policy on the part of the regime. The peasants had traditionally lived isolated lives without any contact with national politics, and Trujillo simply continued this neglect. The Dominican peasantry was not a revolutionary force and posed no threat to the dictatorship. Trujillo, hence, seldom bothered with it.

Because of its isolation and non-revolutionary character, Trujillo made little attempt to enlist the peasantry in a mass movement in support of his regime. If the peasants went to school, they received the same Trujillista indoctrination as other school children; but few attended school. Under the Trujillo agrarian reform, much of the less fertile land in the countryside was distributed to landless peasants. The program was accompanied by widespread publicity and the Trujillo propaganda machine was cranked up to broadcast the benefits supposedly accruing to the peasantry, but this never reached the dimensions of a wholesale mass movement.⁵¹ Some rural campesinos were appointed to minor government posts in the countryside, but their numbers were insignificant. The regime did little to improve rural roads or communications which would have facilitated peasant participation in the governmental process; it ignored the campesinos because it recognized that no potential threat could come from such a diffuse and unorganized mass. Most peasants thus remained isolated and unintegrated

⁵¹ Manuel Valldeperes, Acción y Pensamiento de Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1955), p. 160.

in the national life; and Trujillo, for the most part, preferred to leave them that way.⁵²

After the overthrow of the dictatorship, an attempt was made to organize the peasantry and integrate this sector into the national existence. Even more than the post-Trujillo political parties and labor federations, however, the peasant organizations were weak and ineffective. The primary reason was not that Trujillo had atomized them; it was simply that they were isolated and had always been so.

Communications

A unique feature of 20th century totalitarianism, in contrast to the old-style caudillo dictatorship, is its imposition of a system of thought control. Prior to the advent of modern communications, totalitarianism was not possible; the dictator could not compel the acceptance of an official dogma. Trujillo gained a monopoly over the press, radio, and television, and used these media to force a system of thought control that permeated almost every aspect of Dominican existence.

The few newspapers in the Dominican Republic were conveyors of Trujillo's propaganda and served as instruments of his control. Articles, news stories, and editorials were in strict compliance with the official line. Reporters were told how and when to write a story and independent checks on the factual information supplied were prohibited. The letters-to-the-editor column, the famed "Foro Público," was used for character assassination, and everyone knew that the letters were written in the National Palace. Censorship of both national and international news was

⁵²Informe . . ., op. cit., p. 10.

common. One of the main tasks of the press was to heap lavish praise on the dictator and dwell at great length on his accomplishments. Writers vied to express his praise in an original manner, which prompted Galíndez to remark that "the only difficulty for the Dominican newspaperman is to coin a new adjective."⁵³

When Trujillo came to power Listín Diario and La Opinión in the capital city and La Información in Santiago gave their readers a wide variety of political slants. Trujillo was soon able to coerce, cajole, or bribe most of the journalistic community into collaboration with him; but he was not satisfied. In 1939 he created his own newspaper, La Nación, to serve as a mouthpiece for the government since he had found it impossible to completely control the other newspapers. Government officials were forced to subscribe to La Nación and advertising was diverted to it from the other papers. Without advertising Listín Diario was forced to close in 1942. La Opinión and La Información continued to publish, though they followed the Trujillo line or remained apolitical.⁵⁴

In the face of the democratic wave which surged over Latin America following World War II, Trujillo conceived a maneuver to absolve himself from criticism by creating a "free press" of his own. He proposed that La Opinión conduct a "moderate opposition campaign" on the condition that it refrain from attacking himself or the armed forces. La Opinión took its charge seriously and began a vigorous campaign in favor of improved living conditions and democracy. The campaign eventually involved Trujillo,

⁵³Galíndez, op. cit., p. 320.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 317-318.

and he reacted with a stream of slanderous villification against the newspaper and its owners and editors. Several months later La Opinión was merged with La Nación.⁵⁵

For a short while in 1947 Ciudad Trujillo was a single-newspaper town; but in April, 1948, El Caribe was founded to serve as another voice for the regime. Throughout the rest of the Trujillo period La Información in Santiago, now wholly subservient to the government, and El Caribe and La Nación in the capital provided the dictatorship with a completely controlled press. A few periodicals were published elsewhere in the country, but they were concerned almost exclusively with local news. No periodical openly and freely discussed anything of a public nature.⁵⁶

The radio and television stations transmitted propaganda similar to that of the newspapers. Brother Arismendi Trujillo had a near monopoly in these media. The news broadcasts featured handouts from the national palace or were confined to the reading of the opening lines from the newspaper stories--also based on official handouts. Entertainers from other Latin American countries were hired to sing the praises of the Generalissimo and lead the listening public in expressions of thanks for the benefits he had showered on the country. Broadcasts from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela were frequently scrambled.⁵⁷ The result was that communications in the Dominican Republic were almost exclusively confined to what the government wanted the people to read and hear.

⁵⁵Partido Revolucionario Dominicano y Movimiento Popular Dominicano, Libertad de Prensa para Santo Domingo (La Habana: Editorial La Verdad, 1959), pp. 5-6.

⁵⁶Ornes, op. cit., p. 189.

⁵⁷Hicks, op. cit., p. 196; and Galíndez, op. cit., p. 321.

In the post-Trujillo years the Dominican Republic made great strides toward the development of a free and independent system of communications. In terms of the theory of this study, the press, radio, and television were among the most effective and strong of the emerging intermediate sectors.

External forces: the United States
and the communists

Another means by which Trujillo kept control of the Dominican Republic was to keep it isolated from all external influences. No news from the outside was allowed to filter in unless it was first approved by the regime. Only articles or speeches praising the Generalissimo were reprinted in the country; nothing of a critical nature was permitted to circulate. Pass-ports and visas were difficult to obtain--Dominicans could not freely leave and return and foreign observers only saw what the dictator wanted them to see.

Because of such factors as increased economic interdependence among nations, expanding communication and transportation networks, and especially the emerging Cold War, it has become impossible for a country like the Dominican Republic to remain a closed political system, isolated from the rest of the world. For this reason this study devotes a chapter each to the role of the principal external forces, the U.S. and the communists. These two sectors must be treated as comparable in importance to the other major groups active within Dominican politics. Their importance was especially evident after 1959 when the Cold War was accelerated in Latin America.

The U.S. had been active in Dominican politics throughout the Trujillo era. Many U.S. officials--congressmen, senators, a chief justice of the

Supreme Court, a vice president--were open and vocal admirers of Trujillo's administration. U.S. ambassadors sang the praises of his regime. Public relations firms in the U.S. cranked out Trujillo propaganda, and favorable treatment in the U.S. sugar market enabled the Generalissimo to become among the richest men in the world. But these activities were minor compared to the deep involvement of the U.S. in Dominican affairs in more recent years.

The communists had also been active in Dominican politics in the earlier years of Trujillo's rule. The movement began in the 1940's and grew steadily until by 1947 it counted a membership of 20,000. When it reached this level and seemed to pose a potential threat to the regime, the communist movement was harshly suppressed.⁵⁸ Thereafter Trujillo prided himself on being the "foremost anti-communist of the hemisphere."⁵⁹

Beginning in 1959 the Dominican Republic became more intimately involved in the Cold War. The emergence of Fidel Castro and the subsequent cooling of relations between Cuba and the U.S. prompted many to wonder whether the U.S. would be as critical of a dictatorship of the Right as it was of a dictatorship of the Left. This mounting criticism, plus the desire to secure the Organization of American States' condemnation of Castro's Cuba, motivated the U.S. to go along with the rest of Latin America in imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions on the Dominican Republic.⁶⁰ When Trujillo became an even greater embarrassment to U.S.

⁵⁸Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (Rutgers, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 298-303.

⁵⁹White Book of Communism in the Dominican Republic (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1958).

⁶⁰John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 97-101; J. Lloyd Meacham, The

policy in the Caribbean, the U.S. helped arrange his assassination.⁶¹ Similarly, as opposition to the dictatorship built up within the country during the last two years of the Trujillo era, the communists began to emerge from their twelve-year hiding.

Only in 1961, however, with the overthrow of the Trujillo regime, did the full extent of the Cold War come to the Dominican Republic. The U.S. sought to convert the country into a "Showcase for the Alliance for Progress" and an "Alternative to Castroism in the Caribbean." At the same time several pro-Castro and communist groups organized and gained in strength. The struggle then began in earnest. Both sides were active and important enough in internal Dominican politics that they must be considered as equivalent to the other, purely internal sectors of the Dominican population.

The Overthrow of the Trujillo Regime

Trujillo was assassinated on May 30, 1961. The assassination was the end result of a complex set of causes, both external and internal.

(Footnote 60 continued from preceding page)

United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 419-421; Francis R. Grant, "Hemisphere Repudiates Trujillo," Hemisphérica, IX (October, 1960), 1-2; Serafino Romualdi, "Trujillo on the Carpet," Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XI (March, 1960), 1; and Carleton Beals, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," National Guardian, XIV (December 11, 1961), 4.

⁶¹ Though it is difficult to document, there is little doubt that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helped arrange Trujillo's assassination. The best source for this assertion is Gall, op. cit., pp. 19-20. Tidbits of the story may be pieced together from Peter Maas, "Boswell of the Jet Set," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXVI (January 19, 1963), 28-33; Igor Cassini, "When the Sweet Life Turns Sour: A Farewell to Scandal," Esquire, LXI (April, 1964), 94ff; Selden Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 152-158; Rafael César Hoepelmán, "Las Armas para Ajusticiar a Trujillo Fueron Proporciónadas por Wimpy," La Nación (December 7, 1961), p. 4; and Espaillet, op. cit., pp. 7-22.

The first of the external causes was psychological, prompted by a resurgence of democratic sentiment in Latin America during the 1950's which carried several of the hemisphere's most imposing dictators out of power. The morale of the opposition to Trujillo was strengthened by the success of the liberation movements in these other countries and stimulated it to new efforts against the dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. In 1956 Trujillo had Jesús de Galíndez, one of his most articulate and well-known critics, killed. Galíndez was an internationally known figure, and his murder resulted in a rash of criticism directed at the Trujillo regime. Trujillo sought to diminish the increased hostility by attempting to overthrow the government of his severest critic, Rómulo Betancourt, in Venezuela. Trujillo's plot against Betancourt's life resulted in the O.A.S. voting diplomatic and economic sanctions against his dictatorship in 1959. Sensing an anti-Trujillo trend in Latin America, the U.S. too eventually began to apply pressure.⁶²

All these factors combined to produce an internal opposition. Some elements in the armed forces, influenced by exposure to the criticism of the dictatorship, began to plot against the regime. Because of Trujillo's renewed use of terror, the Church condemned him. On the other hand, the economic sanctions hurt the businessmen.

When the external and the internal forces coalesced, the regime was overthrown. The U.S. supplied the arms and alienated armed forces and business elements the conspirators. Trujillo was ambushed on a lonely stretch of highway just west of Santo Domingo. A monument now marks the spot.

⁶² Harry Kantor, "The Destruction of Trujillo's Empire" (Mimeographed copy of lecture delivered to Peace Corps contingent in training at Seattle, Washington, December, 1962), pp. 1-6.

The Trujillo regime was the most totalitarian in Latin America up to the Cuba of Fidel Castro. The dictator attempted to exercise total control over every aspect of Dominican existence. Beginning as a typical Latin American paternalistic caudillo, Trujillo eventually learned to use most of the techniques of modern totalitarianism. In his thirty-one-year rule he subjugated every sector of Dominican society to his absolute power; he ruled alone and, until the last two years of his lengthy tenure, unchallenged.

This chapter has concentrated on the basic groups and forces operating in Dominican politics during the Trujillo era. It has stressed that not all these groups had the same relationship with the dictatorship, that some were more controlled than others. The armed forces, the Church, the business-professional-landholding elite, the bureaucracy, the political parties, the labor movement, the peasantry, communications, the U.S. and the communists all emerged from the Trujillo era with different organizational strengths, different perspectives, different problems.⁶³ The remainder of this study is concerned with the evolution of these groups in the post Trujillo period. Would the country be able to bridge the transition from near-totalitarianism to some form of functioning democracy?

⁶³See Roberto Marchant, "El legado de Trujillo," Cuadernos, No. 54 (November, 1961), pp. 71-75; and Víctor Alba, "República Dominicana: La Herencia del 'Benefactor,'" Cuadernos, Num. 63 (August, 1962), pp. 62-72.

CHAPTER III

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In the chapters that follow each of the major sectors active in Dominican politics is treated, for theoretical as well as practical organizational reasons, as a separate entity, isolated unto itself, and with few contacts in or lines of communications to the other political groups. Though there were, of course, many connections and interrelationships between some of these groups--for example, the ties between several of the political parties and the various labor organizations were often very close--there were few ties and little harmony within the society as a whole. Before beginning this dissection, however, it is appropriate to review the historical flow of events as they developed in the period after Generalissimo Trujillo was assassinated.

The original plan of the conspirators against Trujillo had been to kill the dictator, form a provisional government which would receive the prompt recognition of the U.S., and hold speedy elections in which the assassins would be the candidates. The scheme was frustrated, however, when Secretary of the Armed Forces, General José Román Fernández, was unable to carry out his assignment in the plot. Román was responsible for getting rid of the rest of the Trujillo family, but he had been sent outside the capital city by Trujillo on the afternoon of the assassination, with the result that the other Trujillos went unmolested. This slight hitch in the plans enabled the dictatorship to be reestablished; and the failure of the entire conspiracy to function smoothly paved the way for the anarchy and chaos of

the succeeding post-Trujillo years rather than a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.¹

The Trujillo dictatorship, then, did not collapse with the assassination of the Generalissimo on the night of May 30, 1961. Rather, constitutional authority passed into the hands of the puppet, Joaquín Balaguer, whom Trujillo had placed in the vice presidency in 1957 and who was allowed to inherit the presidency on August 2, 1960, following the resignation of brother Héctor Trujillo. The real power in the country, however, rested with the slain dictator's son and heir, Rafael Jr. ("Ramfis"), who, when he heard of his father's death, hurried home from Paris and assumed control of the armed forces.²

Though the much-hated Generalissimo had been killed, the Trujillo family dictatorship thus continued. With the exception of the slain Jefe Supremo, the entire apparatus remained intact. The vast Trujillo family still controlled the bulk of the powerful armed forces and maintained its monopoly over the national economy. The press, radio, and television printed or broadcast only the official propaganda; the national educational system continued to indoctrinate the youth in the cult of the official family; labor remained under the control of the official trade union apparatus; the Church, for the most part, backed the regime. Though Balaguer was in nominal charge of the governmental machinery, it was clear that only the Trujillos made all the important decisions.³

¹ Norman Gall, "How Trujillo Died," The New Republic, CXLVIII (April 13, 1963), 19-20; and Arturo Espaillat, Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), pp. 19-20.

² Robert J. Alexander, "After Trujillo, What?," The New Leader, XLIV (June 12, 1961), 3-4; and "Trujillo Land Without Trujillo," Commonweal, LXXIV (June 16, 1961), 293.

³ Rayford Logan, "Dominican Republic: Struggle for Tomorrow," The Nation, CXCI (December 16, 1961), 488-490.

Those who had inherited the reins of government from the slain Trujillo, however, had neither the talent nor the inclination of the wily tyrant. Nor had his system of absolute personal control prepared any person, including his son, or group or class to wear the dictatorial mantle. The dictatorship began to disintegrate almost immediately.

The Trujillos were caught on the horns of an irreconcilable dilemma and they were unable to manage its several aspects. On the one hand, the diplomatic and economic sanctions voted against the Trujillo regime by the Organization of American States in 1960 remained in effect after the Generalissimo's death. The cut in the amount of sugar which the Dominican Republic was permitted to sell in the U.S. market especially hurt. The result was that precisely the same elements which had organized to assassinate Trujillo, the upper class businessmen, professionals, and landowners, whose profit-making had been curtailed by the economic sanctions, now put pressure on Ramfis to end the excesses of the tyranny.⁴

Cautiously Ramfis began to instigate a few reforms in the hope that the O.A.S. would lift the sanctions. For not only did the sanctions hurt the businessmen but they also severely cut into the profits of the chief proprietors in the Dominican Republic, the Trujillos themselves. In successive moves to have the sanctions lifted, then, Ramfis began to curb police brutality, allowed opposition political movements and parties to organize, relaxed the terror, permitted a non-government-controlled labor federation to form, turned some of the vast family properties over to the clamoring citizens, and forced a few of the most oppressive collaborators

⁴Harry Kantor, "The Destruction of Trujillo's Empire" (Mimeographed copy of lecture delivered to Peace Corps contingent, Seattle, Washington, December, 1962).

of the former regime, including two of the slain dictator's brothers, to leave the country.⁵

This "democratization" of the dictatorship impaled the regime on the other horn of the dilemma. By allowing an opposition to form, Ramfis and the Trujillo family threatened their own long-secure position. As the opposition became more powerful and more vociferous, this threat became even more real. To add another dimension to the dilemma, the growing opposition insisted that the O.A.S. sanctions remain in effect until all the Trujillos had left the country.

For nearly half a year an uneasy balance was maintained between these conflicting pressures. The Trujillos continued to instigate reforms in the hope that the O.A.S. would lift the sanctions, but the O.A.S. was reluctant to do so. The only way to get the sanctions lifted was increased democratization, but too much democratization would mean the end of power for the first family. The business community, caught in the pinch between democratization and the sanctions, which were continuing to drive both the country and individual businessmen toward bankruptcy, pressed Balaguer and the Trujillos to grant further concessions. As more concessions were granted, the emerging opposition political parties and labor federation grew larger, became better organized, and began to represent a distinct threat to the regime.

Events came to a climax in November, 1961. The U.S., which had been active in persuading Balaguer and Ramfis to carry out some limited reforms, went before the O.A.S. and requested that some of the economic sanctions

⁵Thomas P. Whitney, "In the Wake of Trujillo," The New Republic, CXLV (December 11, 1961), 6-8.

against the Dominican Republic be removed.⁶ The U.S. proposal to have only some of the sanctions lifted brought a cry of "double cross" from the Trujillos. They felt that they had carried out their end of the bargain by permitting some democratization but that the U.S. had not fulfilled its end of the agreement. Ramfis had expected that all the sanctions would be removed and was hoping especially that the U.S. would grant the Dominican Republic a larger sugar quota. Two brothers of the slain Generalissimo, Héctor and Arismendi, were even more infuriated, for they felt that Ramfis had been giving away the family fortune and jeopardizing the Trujillos' traditional rule, and now they saw no prospect for a large return on the democratization, which had included their own voluntary exile. At this point Ramfis' uncles returned to their country.⁷

It was clear that the return of Héctor and Arismendi Trujillo meant the family intended to establish a replica of the old dictatorship. This implied the near-total control of the national military, governmental, economic, intellectual, and religious life after the pattern of the late Generalissimo's regime and the abolition of the democratization, however limited, which had occurred since his death. At the height of this crisis Ramfis resigned his position as chief of the armed forces and fled the country.⁸

⁶"United States Seeks Withdrawal of O.A.S. Action," Department of State Bulletin, XLV (December 4, 1961), 929-932.

⁷Hispanic American Report, XIV (January, 1962), 995; and New York Times (November 18, 1961), p. 24.

⁸For stories of the blow-by-blow account of these events see New York Times (November 19-26, 1961); The Economist, CCII (January 27, 1962), 30ff; and Hispanic American Report, XIV (January, 1962), 994. Extensive articles, more colorful but less accurate, also appeared in Time, LXXVII (November 24, 1961), 28 and (December 1, 1961), 36-37; Life, LI (December 1, 1961), 98ff; Newsweek, LVIII (December 4, 1961), 49-51; and U.S. News and World Report, LI (December 4, 1961), 32-33.

The resignation of Ramfis left a power vacuum in the country. Balaguer, the puppet president, remained in nominal charge; but he was without an independent power base. The Trujillo brothers attempted to fill the vacuum; they sought to line up a group of armed forces officers who had long been loyal to the old dictatorship. It appeared as though the liberalization which had occurred in the past few months would be erased and that the Dominican Republic would return to a form of near-totalitarianism.

With the imminent threat of a reestablishment of an absolute dictatorship, the U.S. decided to act. It recommended that the request for a lifting of the O.A.S. sanctions be delayed. Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a strongly worded statement of warning.⁹ When these measures failed to deter the Trujillos, stronger action was taken. Part of the Atlantic Fleet was sent to maneuver three miles off Santo Domingo, jet fighters buzzed overhead, and the threat of a new Marine occupation was raised. The U.S. made it clear that it did not wish the reestablishment of the Trujillo dictatorship.¹⁰

At the same time the U.S. was making its show of force, elements in the Dominican armed forces refused to go along with the power grab by the Trujillos. Air Force Brigadier General Pedro R. Rodríguez Echevarría, ordered by Héctor and Arismendi to bomb Santiago, the country's second largest city where students were rioting against the Trujillo's return, deserted instead. Along with most of the Air Force, the most powerful of the services, he declared his allegiance to Balaguer. Quickly pro-

⁹The text is in Department of State Bulletin, XLV (December 4, 1961), 931.

¹⁰Carleton Beals, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," National Guardian (December 11, 1961), p. 1; V. Levin, "The USA Uses

Trujillo armed forces officers were rounded up and stripped of their authority.

With both the U.S. and the most powerful elements in the Dominican armed forces aligned on his side, along with widespread popular demonstrations against the Trujillos, Balaguer could operate from a position of strength as the showdown came. When the two brothers appeared at the National Palace to assume control, they found themselves surrounded by pro-Balaguer and anti-Trujillo cabinet officials, military men, and the U.S. Consul. Confronted with this array of forces lined up against them, the Trujillos decided to leave the country. The next day, November 20, 1961, Héctor and Arismendi, together with other members of the family, close collaborators, cronies, and henchmen boarded a Pan American plane which had been chartered for them and flew into exile. The thirty-one-year Trujillo era had come to an end!¹¹

With the Trujillos gone from the country, Balaguer, now for the first time, became president in fact as well as in name. He announced that he was personally taking command of the armed forces and placing only those loyal to him in command of the services. He declared martial law. Shortly

(Footnote 10 continued from preceding page)

the 'Big Stick,'" International Affairs [Moscow] (January, 1962), pp. 94-95; John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 96-101; and "Climax to a Caribbean Crisis," Senior Scholastic (December 6, 1961), p. 7.

¹¹ At the same time the body of the late dictator, Rafael Trujillo, was shipped to Paris for interment in the Père Lachaise cemetery in the unlikely company of Abelard and Heloise, Chopin, and Balzac. See Francis Grant, "Dominican Ordeal Ending," Hemisphere, X (November-December, 1961), 1-3; and Hispanic American Report, XIV (January, 1962), 994.

after his dramatic triumph over the Trujillos Balaguer spoke to a nation-wide radio audience. His speech was a ringing plan for national unity in a time of great danger. He appealed to all Dominicans to support the legitimate authority and to have complete confidence in the men in charge of the national destiny.¹²

Most Dominicans paid little attention to Balaguer's appeal. It took the populace a day to realize that the departure of the Trujillos was neither a hoax nor temporary. On November 21 the capital erupted in a wild victory celebration. Its citizens poured into the streets by the tens of thousands carrying defaced effigies of Trujillo and waving banners proclaiming "Liberty." Crowds of students raced through the streets shouting "Freedom by Christmas" and beeping their little plastic whistles beep-beep-beep beep beep-beep-beep (for "Navidad con libertad"). Drivers tooted their automobile horns in the same rhythm and one person climbed the tower of the Cathedral to pound the bell with a hammer, bong-bong-bong bong bong-bong-bong.

In the midst of a week of laxity of any public order, mobs began to loot the many houses of the Trujillos and of close associates of the regime. Santo Domingo became a forest of headless statues as the rampaging populace destroyed the many monuments to Trujillo. One group looted the farm of brother Arismendi, stealing his livestock and dismantling his barn board by board. In the capital the home of a sister of Ramfis was stripped even of its plumbing, while throughout the country up to fifty poor families moved into each former Trujillo mansion and remained as squatters. The armed forces also joined the looting; in Trujillo's own

¹²The text is in La Nación (November 19, 1961), p. 1.

palatial residence in Santo Domingo the guards cut a hole just large enough for an arm and rifled the floor safe in the anteroom just off the slain dictator's bedchamber.

Having stripped many of the former Trujillo properties the jubilant crowds sought revenge against some of the former agents of the dictatorship who had not yet fled the country. One of these was chased, cornered, and beaten by a mob of students screaming "assassin, assassin." By the end of the week most every visible symbol of the old regime was gone. Only a few pedestals remained where once there had been statues of the late dictator and the engravings had been chipped away. Car owners had even painted "Era of Trujillo" out of their license plates.¹³

With the most obvious reminders of the Trujillo period now erased, the mobs turned on President Balaguer himself. He, after all, had served as a Trujillo puppet; and though he had managed to remain aloof from the worst atrocities of the regime, he was nevertheless considered a Trujillista. On November 28, only a week after the Trujillos had been forced from the country, a general strike, the first in Dominican history, was launched against Balaguer's continuance in office. The call for the President's resignation had come first from the increasingly Castro-leaning 14th of June Movement but the cry was soon picked up by the moderate Unión Cívica Nacional (UCN). For eleven days the striking citizens frustrated all efforts of the government to get them back to work. The strike failed to achieve its immediate goal, the toppling of Balaguer, but it had succeeded in galvanizing public opinion and clearly demonstrated the increased strength of the opposition groups.

¹³One of the better eye-witness accounts is Harold Levine, "Dominican Success: Power, Policy and People," Newsweek, LVIII (December 4, 1961), 49-51. See also Whitney, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

In the face of mounting pressure to resign, Balaguer, seeking to prolong his term of office, began to cultivate a popular following. The government had inherited the vast Trujillo properties following the ouster of the former ruling family, and Balaguer now began to give these properties away. The fleet of taxicabs, for example, once run as a Trujillo private business, was given to the drivers. Part of the immense Trujillo estates were handed over to landless peasants. The major newspaper in the capital city, El Caribe, which had served as an official mouthpiece for the regime, was awarded to its former owner, Germán Ornes. By these giveaways the President hoped to gain a mass following and influential support.¹⁴

But Balaguer's efforts to maintain himself in power were not sufficient. The ever-stronger opposition continued to pressure him to step down. But instead of resorting to mob action and a general strike, the opposition now began to maneuver through more diplomatic techniques. When the weight of the U.S. was thrown behind the opposition, Balaguer was persuaded to share power with a Council of State.¹⁵

The Council of State took power on January 1, 1962. It was composed of Balaguer (President); three prominent business and professional men; Rafael F. Bonnelly (First Vice President); Eduardo Read Barreras (Second Vice President); and Nicolás Pichardo; a priest who had been active in the anti-Trujillo movement, Eliseo Pérez Sánchez; and the two survivors of the group which had assassinated Trujillo, Antonio Imbert Barreras and

¹⁴Thomas P. Whitney, "The U.S. and the Dominicans: What Will be Done with the Trujillo Properties?," The New Republic, CXLVI (February 12, 1962), 13-14.

¹⁵For an account of these maneuverings see Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa Amic, 1964), pp. 50-59.

Luis Amiana Tió. It was felt that the inclusion of these individuals in the government would make it somewhat more representative.

The major power in the country, however, remained the huge military apparatus which Trujillo had assembled. The position of armed forces secretary had been given to General Rodríguez Echevarría, who had played a key role in the final ouster of the Trujillos; and it soon became apparent that Rodríguez had political ambitions. He began to place members of his family in key positions and to find political plots which no one else could discover. Many became convinced that he was planning to reintroduce another dictatorship with himself as the new Trujillo.¹⁶

The Council of State had been in power only sixteen days when Rodríguez staged a coup d'état. Balaguer was forced to resign and took refuge in the residence of the papal nuncio. Council members Bonnelly, Read, and Pichardo were imprisoned along with opposition leaders Viriato Fiallo of the UCN, Manuel Tavárez Justo of the 14th of June Movement, and Juan Bosch of the Dominican Revolutionary Party. The press was censored and it appeared as though a new military dictatorship would be established.

In place of Balaguer and the Council Rodríguez set up his own civil-military junta. The junta was composed of Huberto Bogaert (President), Armando Oscar Pacheco, Enrique Valdez Vidaurre, Wilfredo Medina Natalio, Neit R. Nivar Seijas, and two holdovers from the previous Council, Amiana and Imbert. There was little doubt that the junta was no more than a front and that authority was exclusively vested in the armed forces secretary.

¹⁶For a biography of Rodríguez see New York Times (December 20, 1961), p. 16. The armed forces secretary's own statement of his position is in La Nación (December 17, 1961), p. 12.

In an effort to get popular support, junta president Bogaert went on national television to explain the purposes of the revolution. The government change had been made, he said, to foil an "international conspiracy" aimed at making the Dominican Republic a "second Cuba." While the exiled Trujillos prepared their return, Bogaert stated that the new regime would prevent "by all means" a repetition of the "Cuban drama."¹⁷

The reaction to the coup in the Dominican Republic and in Washington was almost entirely negative. Businesses closed in protest, judges resigned, government employees refused to work, students rioted, and the U.S. expressed disapproval and cut off all promised aid. In the face of these protests Rodríguez went to the San Isidro Air Force base to negotiate a compromise with the imprisoned Council members. Upon his arrival Air Force officers placed their own secretary under arrest and released the Councilmen. Rodríguez Echevarría's rule had lasted for only forty-eight hours.¹⁸

With Rodríguez out of the way (he was soon sent into exile), the Council of State was reorganized and reinstituted, this time without Balaguer (who was also sent into exile). Rafael F. Bonnelly moved up from First Vice President to President, Eduardo Read Barreras from Second to First Vice President, and Nicolás Pichardo to Second Vice President. Mons. Eliseo Pérez Sánchez was again included as were the two survivors of the group which had assassinated Trujillo, Amiana and Imbert. The only newcomer to the Council was Donald J. Reid Cabral, the owner of an automobile agency and the son of a Scottish bank clerk who had married into

¹⁷El Caribe (January 18, 1962), p. 1.

¹⁸"Dominica's Slow Awakening," The Economist, CCII (January 27, 1962) 30ff.

one of the Dominican Republic's most prominent families. The Council proved to be the most stable of the many Dominican governments in the immediate post-Trujillo years; it ruled for fourteen months until the inauguration of an elected and constitutional administration on February 27, 1963.

The major purpose of the Council of State was to preside over the interim period from the near-totalitarianism of the Trujillo until a more democratic system could be established. In terms of this overriding goal the Council was remarkably successful.

With the installation of this Council a new stage may be considered to have begun. All the Trujillos and the most vicious of their henchmen were now out of the country. The former Trujillo properties, not previously confiscated, were seized and made the trust of the government. The U.S. initially extended a \$25 million credit and thereafter poured in enormous amounts of money, men, and know-how in an effort to help the Council bridge the transition. Various international organizations assisted in tackling the many difficult problems facing the country.¹⁹

It was during the Council's rule that a flowering of political activity occurred; new "intermediate organizations" and "secondary groups" were formed which had never existed before. The press, radio, and television, emerged as free, critical, and educational communications media. The first attempts at agrarian reform and at integrating the peasantry into national decision-making were made. A number of political parties came into existence. Several independent labor federations were founded and began to educate and

¹⁹Robert J. Alexander, "Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy," New America, 11 (February 23, 1963), 3.

organize the workers. Business and professional organizations began vying for political advantage. The government workers were organized in every ministry and an attempt was made to enact a civil service law. The Church now came out strongly in favor of democracy and social reform, and an effort was made to reorient the armed forces along more democratic lines.

The problems to be overcome if the Dominican Republic was to achieve a functioning and democratic system were enormous. Some of these problems were unsolvable--for example, the effort to de-Trujilloize the public service. To purge all those in the governmental apparatus who had, in one way or another, collaborated with the Trujillos would have meant the dismissal of almost the entire bureaucracy. The Dominican government could not have been run without those who had been faithful errand boys for Trujillo; to disqualify those few who had the necessary training to staff a government for their past connections with the dictatorship would have left no one capable of running the governmental machinery.

Not only was the Council limited in what it could do but it was also limited in what it wanted to do. Its members were not interested in carrying out genuinely revolutionary social and economic reforms that would lead to the establishment of a full-fledged social and economic democracy. The Council's programs, though positive for the most part, were often confined more to slogans than to substance. A well-publicized plan to retrain the armed forces to engage in constructive civic action programs rather than in often-oppressive political activities met with little success. Another program, the agrarian reform, which likewise received a great deal of publicity was promulgated; but the amount of land given to the poor was extremely limited and the entire project generated little excitement.²⁰

²⁰Tad Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum," New York Times Magazine (September 2, 1962), 9ff.

~~Perhaps the major reason~~ why the reforms of the government were limited and half-hearted was the social composition of the Council itself. It was composed primarily of representatives of the Dominican Republic's "first families," its traditional ruling elite. Not only was the Council composed almost exclusively of representatives of the Dominican oligarchy but the entire government hierarchy--cabinet members, agency and department chiefs, autonomous corporations heads--was infused with these same wealthy or propertied elements. The Council was simply not prepared to carry out measures which would be detrimental to the interests of its own class.

The Council did, however, make some noble attempts to smooth over the difficult legacy bequeathed it by 31 years of Trujillo's absolutism. It held on to most of the Trujillo properties as the national patrimony despite unceasing efforts by international carpetbaggers to make a fast dollar and took steps to reorganize these properties into a functioning economic system. The Council's efforts to proceed slowly and to antagonize as few people as possible were probably beneficial during this period of intense crisis politics. It succeeded in establishing a degree of law and order which stood in marked contrast to the chaos and riotousness of the first few months following the ouster of the Trujillos. It was successful in warding off attacks from the extreme Left, represented by several Castro-oriented and communist organizations, and from the Right, represented by extreme conservatives who thought even the limited reforms the Council had instigated went too far and by the armed forces who feared their traditional special privileges would be reduced.²¹

²¹ James Buchanan, "Dominican '71 Caught in Crossfire," Miami Herald (May 12, 1962), p. 1-A.

The Council was never a popular government. It was not representative of the major groups that were emerging in the country. The largest political party was not represented on the Council and the emerging labor and peasant sectors had no voice in decisions that affected them most intimately. The business-professional-landowning sector, with which all but one of the seven Councilmen were associated, was no longer the only political force in the country.

Despite its efforts, often dedicated to steer the country in new directions, to change an entire value system, and to help fill Trujillo's legacy of a democratic vacuum, the Council failed to gain widespread support. Its contacts with the people were confined to an occasional television appearance or dedication ceremony. Its programs failed to evoke a favorable response, even from those who benefitted from them. The overall impression was that the country tolerated the Council only because no one could think of a better alternative.²²

This negative image of the Council, its members, and its programs had a major effect on the outcome of the elections. Several of its members were closely associated with the National Civic Union (UCN) Party headed by Viriato Fiallo. This close identification became an albatross around Fiallo's and the UCN's neck. Many Dominicans, especially among the lower classes where the election would be decided, condemned the Council as a collection of do-nothings and they felt that the election of Fiallo would only perpetuate this inaction. The interim government was held responsible for the country's widespread unemployment, for its rising cost of living, and for its failure to distribute the huge windfall of the Trujillo

²²See Szulc, op. cit., p. 40.

properties. It was well known by the poor that the Council was dominated by the oligarchic elements which had traditionally kept them subjugated; and the close relations between the Council and the UCN earned that party the damning epithet, "The Party of the Rich."²³

The Council, nevertheless, accomplished its major purpose: it succeeded in setting up an election for December 20, 1962, despite the nation's almost total lack of prior experience in such procedures. The interim government presided over the amending of the Trujillo constitution so that the most glaring undemocratic legacies of the dictatorship were eliminated and so that fair and honest elections could be arranged. Several pre-election crises nearly torpedoed the entire effort, but the government survived them all. The Council then presided over the holding of the first really free elections in the country's history and peacefully handed over political authority to a democratically elected government; it successfully supervised and directed the transition from near-totalitarian dictatorship to political democracy. The major work of building a genuinely democratic society, however, remained to be accomplished.²⁴

The election of Juan Bosch signalled what many thought would be the beginning of a new and democratic era in the Dominican Republic. Bosch himself had left the country early in the Trujillo era and had not returned until after the dictator had been slain. He was considered to be free of any compromising ties or collaboration with the hated regime.

²³Dom Bonafede, "Freedom After Trujillo: The Dominican Elections," The Nation, CXCVI (January 12, 1963), 28-30.

²⁴Rowland Evans Jr., "First Steps in Dominican Democracy," The Reporter, XXVIII (January 3, 1963), 21-23.

Bosch was a purist in other respects. He was an idealist, a writer, a teacher, and a moralist. His was a humanistic rather than a pragmatic political approach. He felt himself to be a missionary armed with the task of entirely transforming his country. Bosch came to office with a philosophy of government and a faith in freedom that is extremely rare in present-day politics. He believed that absolute justice, absolute honesty, and absolute liberty were essential to democracy and as president he acted on these idealistic beliefs.

Bosch carried the hopes of most Dominicans with him into office. In an election which most observers thought would be very close, he won by a 2-1 majority. With this mandate Bosch felt himself to be a crusader charged with an almost holy cause. His cause was to build a free and democratic nation on the ruins of a dictatorship. The overwhelming victory in the election was interpreted as a vote to cast out the old system of privileged interests, governmental favoritism, and high level corruption left over from Trujillo and to launch a peaceful revolution.²⁵

Bosch and his PRD promised not only political democracy but social, economic, and moral democracy as well. Bosch was closely identified with the democratic-Left popular or Aprista-like parties in Latin America. "I belong to the family of democratic revolutionary parties," he said. "We are democratic because we want to preserve and expand political freedoms. We are revolutionary because we want to initiate a society of justice."²⁶ He intended to work a fundamental transformation in all aspects of Dominican

²⁵Howard J. Wiarda, "Juan Bosch: Portrait of a President," New Orange Peel, 1 (Spring, 1963), 18ff.

²⁶Quoted in Bonafede, op. cit., p. 29.

existence. He had just completed a biography of King David whom he described as several men in one--poet, warrior, ecclesiastic. Bosch might easily have been writing of himself. Like David, he represented an almost mystical image to his followers. Bosch was, to many Dominicans, the incarnation of "good" just as Trujillo was now considered the incarnation of "bad."

The Party and its leader were pledged to a wide range of reforms. Agrarian reform became the cornerstone of the administration. For Bosch agrarian reform meant much more than the simple distribution of the former Trujillo lands; it meant dignity for the peasant and a voice in national affairs from which he had always been excluded. The PRD's platform called for absolute freedom for all groups in the society, though it was particularly partial to labor, the unemployed, the peasantry, and other traditionally down-trodden elements.²⁷

Bosch, indeed, had gained his greatest election support from just these same sectors. His party was established as a peasant and workers' organization and he was known as the candidate of the have-nots. Venom was heaped upon his richer and more aristocratic opponent; he talked with the poor as if he were in communion with them. He shared their aches and hopes, spoke their language, and won their trust.²⁸

Bosch was faced with enormous obstacles in his hope to lead the Dominican Republic along the route to full democracy. For thirty-one years the people of the country had been held in the bondage of the Trujillo tyranny. This had been followed by a year of limited reform under the transitional

²⁷Robert J. Alexander, "Democratic Victory in Dominican Republic," New America, III (January 15, 1963), 3.

²⁸Max Freedman, "Interview with President Bosch: Rebuilding a Free Dominican Republic," St. Petersburg Times (June 9, 1963), p. 2-D.

Council of State. Bosch aimed to establish democracy in a country which had had almost no experience in democratic practices. His tasks included a revitalization of the stagnant economy after its monopolization by the Trujillo family, the finding of jobs for the many unemployed (up to 40 per cent of the work force), the warding off of attacks from both Left and Right, the staffing of a large bureaucratic apparatus to carry out his many programs, the education of the illiterates, the development of industrialization and the improvement of agriculture, the establishment of civilian control over the military, the strengthening of the peasant and labor organizations, and the mollification of the many dangerously divisive forces in the country. All these major tasks--and more--had to be accomplished if a genuinely democratic system was to be established.

Immediately following the election Bosch travelled to the U.S. After visiting a son, a student in a South Bend, Indiana, high school, he went to Washington, where he conferred with President Kennedy, labor leaders, and foreign aid administrators. Bosch felt that the Alliance for Progress was too slow and too bogged down in red tape to meet the pressing and immediate needs of the Dominican Republic. He then went to Europe, where he lined up other assurances of economic help.²⁹

Bosch finally returned to the Dominican Republic on February 17 after an absence of seven weeks. He received a tumultuous welcome, but the seeds of discontent had already been planted. Conservative groups closely associated with the outgoing Council of State and with the defeated UCN were already conspiring against him. In alliance with certain armed forces and

²⁹Germán Arciniegas, "Con Juan Bosch en Londres," El Tiempo [Bogotá] (March 3, 1963), p. 5.

Church elements, the Dominican oligarchy had determined to rid themselves of the president-elect. In the days before taking office Bosch made overtures to the opposition to join him in a national unity government to work for the betterment of the entire country and all its component sectors, but this invitation was icily rejected by the opposition.

Despite these ominous forebodings, Bosch was inaugurated on February 27, 1963, with the hopes of most of the Dominican people--and of much of Latin America and the U.S.--riding on his shoulders. To emphasize the importance of the occasion, the high level U.S. delegation was headed by then vice president Lyndon Johnson and then-senator Hubert Humphrey. Presidents and dignitaries from all over the Americas came to wish Bosch well.

Bosch at first attempted to smooth over the antagonisms which had been generated by the election campaign and to allay the fears of those who felt threatened by his revolutionary programs. He made a series of pronouncements and took a series of actions which demonstrated to the business community his fiscal conservativeness. He refused to tamper with the armed forces and attempted to conciliate his opponents in the oligarchy and the Church.

At the same time that he attempted a national reconciliation, Bosch began to develop his revolutionary programs. Scores of experts were brought in to help launch the Dominican Republic on the road to economic and political modernity. The labor movement closely associated with the PRD was put to work organizing the workers. U.S. men and money poured in in even greater amounts than had occurred during the rule of the Council. The peasants were organized and a revitalized agrarian reform was launched. Public works projects provided jobs for the unemployed and a mass literacy

drive was begun. Plans for industrialization were drawn up. An attempt was made to introduce honesty in the public service and to rid it of nepotism and favoritism. In keeping with his conception of a democratic society, Bosch allowed absolute freedom for all groups--including the communists.

As Bosch's programs were developed, however, the antagonisms within the political society became deeper. He antagonized the U.S. by failing to go along entirely with the Alliance for Progress. His attempt to change the traditional habits of behavior in the bureaucracy alienated the civil servants. The organization of the peasants led the armed forces, the Church, and the business community to fear that a militia, just like in Castro's Cuba, was being formed. The new constitution failed to recognize Catholicism as the official state religion, and the social welfare provisions written into the supreme law frightened employers.³⁰

The issue which united the most powerful of these groups opposed to Bosch was the charge of communism in government. The Church, the armed forces, and the oligarchy were in agreement that the government's policies would result in the Dominican Republic being converted into another Cuba. Though there was actually no threat of a communist takeover,³¹ conservative elements believed that pro-Castro sympathizers were gaining the upper hand in Bosch's revolutionary regime.

In the face of mounting criticism, Bosch refused to take action that would alleviate these fears. When armed forces officers met with the

³⁰Al Burt, "Bosch the Giant Killer Moves Fast," Miami Herald (May 27, 1963), p. 1-A.

³¹Theodore Draper, "Bosch and Communism," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 9-14; and Max Freedman, "Juan Bosch, Castro: A Study in Contrast," Miami Herald (June 16, 1963), p. 8-C.

the President in a showdown and demanded that he curb the free and open activities of the extreme Leftists, Bosch refused and then embarrassed the officers by proceeding to lecture them on the proper role of the military in a democratic society. When the Church issued a statement condemning the growth of communism, Bosch viciously attacked the Church and some of its most popular clergymen. At a time when businessmen and landowners were becoming increasingly critical of his program, he proposed the notorious "law of confiscations" which was so vague that it threatened all private property. Bosch failed to take any action to conciliate the only sectors in the society which had the power to overthrow him.

On September 25, 1963, after only seven months in office, Bosch and his government were overthrown. Though the armed forces staged the coup, they acted with the urging of some Churchmen and almost the entire business-professional-landowning elite. Bosch and the principal PRD chieftains were sent into exile and the Party and its affiliate labor and peasant organizations raided and closed down. The "Showcase for the Alliance" became empty. Most important, the Dominican Republic's attempt to bridge the transition from the Trujillo dictatorship to a political, economic, and social democracy was severely set back.³²

³²See Leoncio Ramos, "El Golpe de Estado del 25 de Septiembre," Lev y Justicia, I (October 25, 1963), 16-30; Victor Alba, "Why Bosch Fell," The New Republic, CXLIX (October 19, 1963), 12-14; Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón, "El Golpe de Estado Militar de 1963," Listín Diario (September 25, 1964), p. 7; Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a Coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, CXCVII (October 26, 1963), 253-256; and the special issue of The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), containing articles by Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," John P. Roche, "Return of the Syndicate," Theodore Draper, "Bosch and Communism," and Karl E. Meyer, "The Lesser Evil Doctrine."

Immediately after Bosch was overthrown, the armed forces turned power over to a civilian Triumvirate composed of Emilio de los Santos (President), Ramón Tapia Espinal, and Manuel Enrique Tavárez Espaillat. All the Triumvirate members had worked in the Council of State government and the entire government was restaffed with those same elements which Bosch had beaten 2-1 in the 1962 elections. In the first two months of the Triumvirate's rule, several attempts were made by PRD sympathizers to force a return to the constitutional order; but these efforts were rejected by the Dominican Republic's rulers and the country drifted toward chaos. Without any effective leadership, the various sectors in Dominican politics began to fly off in various unrelated directions; the Dominican Republic came to resemble not a single nation but a system of warring sub-nations.

The initial climax to this degenerative period came in December, 1963, when a small group of pro-Castro sympathizers were needlessly slaughtered by armed forces elements--after they had surrendered. The incident so shocked Triumvirate President Emilio de los Santos, whose nephew had been one of those killed, that he resigned.³³

Remaining Triumvirate members Tapia Espinal and Tavárez Espaillat, after conferring with military and political leaders, picked Donald Reid Cabral to replace de los Santos. Eventually all of the original Triumvirate, feeling powerless in the face of the disruptive and disintegrative forces at work, left their positions: Tapia resigned and was replaced by Ramón Cáceres Troncoso on April 8, 1964, and Tavárez resigned on June 27, 1964.

³³ Norman Gall, "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again," The Nation, CXCVIII (February 17, 1964), 159-161.

Under Reid the country began to take some slow and halting steps to lift itself up from the rock bottom where it had fallen following the ouster of Bosch. New elections were scheduled and some limited social and economic reforms were begun. A second attempt was being made to bridge the transition from the near-totalitarian Trujillo regime to the establishment of a genuinely democratic society. But just as the attempt began, a chaotic revolution threatened to wipe out the limited gains which Reid had made.

Many of these political changes are summarized in the accompanying chart, a chronology of post-Trujillo governments. With this overview in mind, it is possible to begin to dissect the Dominican political system into its component parts.

Chart 1

Chronology of Post-Trujillo Governments

1. Joaquín Balaguer, President, and Rafael Trujillo Jr., Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, May 30, 1961-November 18, 1961.

Balaguer had been a puppet president under Trujillo from August 2, 1960; and, after Trujillo's assassination, he continued as a puppet of the son and heir, Ramfis, and of the other Trujillo family members.

2. Joaquín Balaguer, President, November 18, 1961-January 1, 1962.
Balaguer attempted to rule alone following the ouster of the rest of the Trujillo family and the final overthrow of the dictatorship, but was persuaded to share power with a Council of State.

3. Council of State, January 1, 1962-January 16, 1962.

The Council, made up of Joaquín Balaguer (President), Rafael F. Bonnelly (First Vice President), Eduardo Read Barreras (Second Vice President), Nicolás Pichardo, Mons. Eliseo Pérez Sánchez, Luis Amiana Tió, and Antonio Imbert Barreras, was set up in an attempt to make the government more representative. This first Council was overthrown by the armed forces chief after it had been in office only sixteen days.

4. Civilian-Military Junta, January 16, 1962-January 18, 1962.

The Junta was composed of Huberto Bogaert (President), Armando Oscar Pachecho, Luis Amiama Tió, Antonio Imbert Barreras, Enrique Valdez Vidaurre, Wilfredo Medina Natalio, and Neit R. Nivar Seijas; but the real power rested with Secretary of the Armed Forces, General Pedro R. Rodríguez Echavarría. The Junta and Rodríguez were overthrown by the armed forces after forty-eight hours in power and the Council of State, now without Balaguer, was reinstated.

5. Council of State, January 18, 1962-February 27, 1963.

The Council, composed of Rafael F. Bonnelly (President), Eduardo Read Barreras (First Vice President), Nicolás Pichardo (Second Vice President), Mons. Eliseo Pérez Sánchez, Luis Amiama Tió, Antonio Imbert Barreras, and Donald Reid Cabral, presided over free elections on December 20, 1962, and ruled until the inauguration of the elected government.

6. Juan Bosch, President, February 27, 1963-September 25, 1963.

Bosch, the elected constitutional president, and his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) government were overthrown by a military coup after seven months in office.

7. Triumvirate, September 26, 1963-December 22, 1963.

Immediately following the overthrow of the Bosch government, the armed forces turned power over to a civilian Triumvirate composed of Emilio de los Santos (President), Ramón Tapia Espinal, and Manuel Enrique Tavárez Espaillat.

8. Triumvirate, December 22, 1963-April 24, 1965.

Emilio de los Santos resigned as President of the Triumvirate on December 22, 1963, and was replaced by Donald Reid Cabral. Ramón Tapia Espinal was replaced on April 8, 1964, by Ramón Cáceres Troncoso. Manuel Enrique Tavárez Espaillat resigned on June 21, 1964. Reid and Cáceres were themselves later ousted by civilian and military elements sympathetic to the restoration of the constitutional government of Bosch.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The strongest--and perhaps most important--component of the Dominican political system is the armed forces. The armed forces had been the vehicle through which Trujillo rose to power and remained the ultimate pillar of his authority throughout his lengthy dictatorship. Despite the totalitarian controls which he established in other areas of Dominican society, the Generalissimo's regime continued to rest primarily on a military base. Only in the last two years of his rule did some elements in the armed forces begin to turn against him, but these were few in number and isolated from the main stream of military support. The armed forces, so important during the Trujillo era, continued as one of the most important actors in the political play during the post-Trujillo years. The importance of the military in the overall attempt to restructure the Dominican Republic along more democratic lines in the wake of the overthrow of the dictatorship was recognized by one student immediately after Trujillo was killed:

I am sure that they [the enemies of the regime] know that to destroy the other works of Trujillo, they have first to destroy his major work, the armed forces and the national police; and that is impossible because Trujillo lives and will live forever in the heart of the elements that compose them and that each day they feel themselves more closely bound with his memory.

¹Rafael Martínez Hiciano, "La Creación de las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional: Obra de Trujillo" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Santo Domingo, 1961), p. 37.

The Ouster of the Trujillista Top Command

Under Ramfis Trujillo, who had assumed control upon the death of his father, the Dominican armed forces remained much the same as they had been under the old dictatorship. Ramfis immediately proclaimed that the military was "totally a-political" and that its sole purpose was to help the civilian government of President Joaquín Balaguer.² While making this pious pronouncement, Ramfis used the armed forces to round up and massacre all but two of those implicated in the plot against Rafael Sr. and imposed a new wave of terror on the country. Military attacks on the emerging opposition groups and the imprisonment of their leaders soon took place.³

That the armed forces under Ramfis continued as the ultimate authority in the country came out clearly during the October, 1961 talks between Balaguer and the opposition to form a coalition government. At the height of the talks Trujillo Jr. issued a statement that the position of the armed forces "could not be discussed in any negotiation to create a new government." He stated that "this is a definitive position that is not subject to change and that should not even be mentioned. That is that and nothing more."⁴ The statement demonstrated that the civilian government of Balaguer was subject to the military and that the Dominican Republic remained a police state under Trujillo family control.

The armed forces, nevertheless, were no longer the monolithic force that they had once been under the elder Trujillo. In July there had been

²The text is in La Nación (June 3, 1961), p. 24.

³Norman Gall, "How Trujillo Died," The New Republic, CXLVIII (April 13, 1963), 19-20.

⁴The text is in El Caribe (October 13, 1961), p. 1.

persistent reports of an uprising by Air Force officers at the San Isidro base. The rebellion was immediately put down and the rebels purged. The presence of tanks in the streets of Ciudad Trujillo the following day, however, attested to the severity of the threat. Other rumblings of revolt were occasionally heard during these months. Many of the military personnel were increasingly sympathetic to the opposition; indeed, one observer commented that most armed forces men sympathized with the opposition programs except the most die-hard assassins from the Trujillo era.⁵

Ramfis was also under pressure to "liberalize" his regime and give it a more democratic appearance. One aspect of this liberalization was the reduction of the massive Trujillo armed forces. In early August the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the disbanding of three auxiliary forces--the Cocuyos de la Cordillera led by the late dictator's brother General José Arismendi Trujillo, the Legión Extranjera, and the Jinetes del Este--which had been formed to protect the dictatorship against the increasing threat of invasion during the last years of the Trujillo era. It was reported that 5,000 men were involved in the disbanding, though the units had had much greater strength in the past.⁶ On November 7 Ramfis announced that he was beginning a program to reduce the three regular armed forces, but the size of the reductions was not disclosed.⁷

Another part of the Ramfis "democratization" program was to remove some of the Trujillo family members from their positions in the regime and

⁵Federico Henríquez Gatereaux, "La Situación de los Militares," Unión Cívica, I (November 11, 1961), 6.

⁶Hispanic American Report, XIV (October, 1961), 699.

⁷The text of Ramfis' statement is in El Caribe (November 8, 1961), p. 13.

to send some of the most notorious into exile. Two of the slain dictator's brothers--Héctor and Arismendi--both generals, who had been among the chief opponents of the liberalization, were thus persuaded to leave the country. Ramfis' uncles did not stay away long; on November 15 they returned to the Dominican Republic and attempted to reestablish the absolute dictatorship of the old Trujillo days. Unwilling to challenge the authority of his uncles, Ramfis, at this point, resigned his position as commander-in-chief, and fled to Europe.

The resignation of Ramfis left not only a political vacuum in the country, but it also meant that the armed forces were without a head. The two Trujillo brothers attempted to fill that role. They were openly directing armed forces and police officers without consulting the man in nominal charge, President Balaguer. Most of the top-ranking officers had long been loyal to the Trujillos and were convinced that their best interests lay with a restored military dictatorship.

The showdown between Balaguer and Héctor and Arismendi Trujillo has been considered from an overall political point of view in the preceding chapter. Underlying the political change, however, was a military shift in allegiance. Important elements in the armed forces were against a re-establishment of the Trujillo dictatorship. Led by Air Force Brigadier General Pedro R. Rodríguez Echavarría, they declared their allegiance to the civil authority and had many Trujillo supporters arrested. When the brothers met with the President in the National Palace, they found themselves surrounded by anti-Trujillo military men. Realizing that they did not have enough armed forces support to stage a golpe, Héctor and Arismendi decided to leave the country. With them into exile went the rest of the

Trujillo family and the closest collaborators of the regime. This exodus signalled the end of the long dictatorship.⁸

The departure of the Trujillos resulted in a large-scale shakeup at the top of the military hierarchy since family members had occupied most of the high-ranking positions. Ramfis, as chief of staff, had commanded the National Police as well as the armed forces, but there were many other Trujillo generals who left the country at this time. Major General Virgilio García Trujillo, a nephew of the dictator, had been chief of staff of the Army while brother Héctor, José Arismendi, and Pedro Trujillo had all been generals. General Fernando Sánchez, who had been chief of staff of the Air Force and a key figure in the attempted move to reestablish the Trujillo dictatorship, as well as other major figures in top command, also went into exile.

President Balaguer now, for the first time, assumed control of the armed forces. He abolished the post of chief of staff, which Ramfis had held, and announced that all matters concerning the military services would be channeled constitutionally through the secretary of state for the armed forces to his own office.⁹ General Rodríguez Echavarría, who had been instrumental in preventing the coup by the Trujillo brothers, was named to fill the post.

⁸See Carleton Beals, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," National Guardian (December 11, 1961), 1ff; "Dominica's Slow Awakening," The Economist, CCII (January 27, 1962), 330ff; Francis Grant, "Dominican Ordeal Ending," Hemisphérica, X (November-December, 1961), 1-3; V. Levin, "The USA Uses the Big Stick," International Affairs (January, 1962), pp. 94-95; Rayford Logan, "Dominican Republic: Struggle for Tomorrow," The Nation, CXCI (December 16, 1961), 488-496; and Thomas P. Whitney, "In the Wake of Trujillo," The New Republic, CXLV (December 11, 1961), 6-8.

⁹The text is in La Nación (November 19, 1961), p. 1.

Rodríguez Echavarría soon emerged as the strong man behind Balaguer. During the general strike which ensued after the ouster of the Trujillos, he attempted to consolidate his hold on the armed forces. "I am not a politician. I am a soldier and I support the constitutional order," he frequently said and scoffed at suggestions that he wanted to replace Balaguer. "The armed forces could have taken power. We don't want it. We support the President," he stated. Despite these a-political pronouncements, however, Rodríguez Echavarría had a soldier's mistrust of politicians; and it became apparent that he had political ambitions.¹⁰

The Dominican military, for its part, was not united in support of Balaguer or the armed forces secretary. Early in December, thirteen Air Force pilots asked Balaguer to replace Rodríguez in order to prevent the establishment of a "new military dictatorship." They claimed that he had "betrayed the ideals of the Air Force" and that they "wanted to be on the side of the people." The pilots were led by Lt. Col. Raimundo Polanco Alegría, commander of the Barahona air force base, and Lt. Col. José Nelson González, deputy chief of staff of the Air Force. Both resigned their commissions.¹¹

Brigadier General Andrés A. Rodríguez Méndez, who had also served as commander of the Barahona base, soon left for Puerto Rico in protest against the policies of Rodríguez Echavarría. Though officially appointed military attaché to the embassy in Ottawa, the position amounted to exile.

¹⁰ See the biography of Rodríguez Echavarría in the New York Times (December 20, 1961), p. 16; and the General's own statement of his position in La Nación (December 17, 1961), p. 12.

¹¹ New York Times (December 3, 1961); and Hispanic American Report, XIV (February, 1962), 1096.

Other military officials were becoming disenchanted with the government. Many of these were sympathetic to the increasingly vociferous and powerful opposition political movements which advocated the resignation of Balaguer.¹²

These conflicts came to a head in mid-January, 1962, after Balaguer had been persuaded to share power with a Council of State. A schism between the National Civic Union (UCN) members of the Council and Balaguer, manipulated by Rodríguez Echavarría, became apparent at once. The UCN, which in the month following the ouster of the Trujillos had been the most influential of the opposition groups, was irritated by the armed forces secretary's discovery of plots invisible to any other eye. On January 8 he had detected a supposedly Castro-inspired conspiracy at the San Isidro base where three pilots had resigned after accusing Rodríguez of aspiring to become a dictator. On January 12 another "plot" was discovered, this time in the Navy and allegedly aimed at restoring the Trujillos to power.¹³

In the following days a storm of protest blew up over Rodríguez's charges. The UCN denounced what it termed the "poorly disguised totalitarian ambitions" of the armed forces chief. The Navy officers supposedly involved in the conspiracy called the accusations "absurd." Five cabinet officers said they would resign. The UCN supporters staged a demonstration outside their headquarters in downtown Santo Domingo. Even Balaguer admitted that the plot was "of no real significance."¹⁴ This last desertion was too much for the armed forces secretary.

¹²Federico Henríquez Gatereaux, "División en las Fuerzas Armadas," Unión Cívica, I (December 12, 1961), 3.

¹³New York Times (January 14, 1962), p. 1; and Hispanic American Report, XV (March, 1962), 36. The text of the pilot's letter is in El Caribe (January 10, 1962), p. 7.

¹⁴New York Times (January 15, 1962), p. 4. The text of the UCN statement is in El Caribe (January 14, 1962), p. 9.

On January 16, Rodríguez Echavarría staged a short-lived coup. Several members of the Council and the major opposition leaders were arrested. A seven-man civil-military junta was set up, though it was clear that Rodríguez was the real power behind the junta.¹⁵

The opposition to this coup came from many of the same groups which had frustrated the attempted Trujillo takeover two months previously. And once again it was the armed forces which tipped the balance and prevented the reestablishment of another dictatorship. Rodríguez was placed under arrest by some of his own military officers after only two days in power.¹⁶

The ouster of Rodríguez--and the corresponding restoration of the Council of State, now under Rafael Bonnelly--marked the end of the first phase of post-Trujillo civil-military relations in the Dominican Republic. The worst Trujillistas were by this time out of power and out of the country. Attempts were now made to instigate reforms in the armed forces, to make the military an integral part of the emerging democratic society.

Attempts at Reform

The coming to power of the second Council of State, which ruled the country for the next fourteen months, meant what the armed forces review called "the initiation of a new period" for the military. An editorial in the Revista said that the "new" armed forces were to be nationalistic and patriotic above all else. National unity was seen as the greatest need of the Dominican Republic in order to prevent the divisive forces then working from causing disintegration. The armed forces' role was to be to sustain

¹⁵El Caribe (January 18, 1962), p. 1.

¹⁶"Dominica's . . . ," op. cit., p. 333.

order, protect democracy, and serve as the "guardians of the patria."¹⁷

The problems which had to be overcome if the Dominican military was to become a useful and integral part of the "new period" of democracy, after existing under thirty-one years of absolute dictatorship, were enormous. One writer said that the armed forces had inherited two major characteristics from its past history: a political orientation and an oppressive nature. He listed a few of the chief problems to be solved: Lack of confidence by the people in the armed forces after the previous oppression, an artificial rivalry fomented by Trujillo between the services, lack of esprit de corps in the military, lack of patriotism and sense of nationalism, instability in the chain of command, no confidence by the enlisted men in their officers, lack of professionalism, dedication to terror instead of constructive works, lack of equipment, and no education.¹⁸ Much of the lack of success in the attempt to reorient the armed forces in the post-Trujillo years may be attributed to the enormity of the difficulties involved.

One of the first reforms was the attempt to achieve stability in the military command. Trujillo's principal means of controlling the armed forces had been to keep them atomized by constantly shuffling personnel up and down the hierarchy to prevent anyone from establishing his own independent power base. These constant shifts were now stopped. Changes

¹⁷Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1962), 2.

¹⁸R. Alberto Arvelo González, "Las Fuerzas Armadas Dominicanas," Unión Cívica, I (November 8, 1961), 2; (November 11, 1961), 3; (November 15, 1961), 6; and (November 21, 1961), 2. See also Leurís Oviedo y Oviedo, "Ojalá Fuerzas Armadas Lleguen a ser Apolítica," El LJ4, I (January 31, 1962), 9.

in command continued to take place occasionally, but these were not nearly so frequent nor for the same political reasons. Armed Forces Secretary Víctor Elby Viñas Román, for instance, was appointed by the Council of State in one of its first moves, served through the Bosch government, and continued in his position during the successive shufflings of the first year and a half of the post-Bosch period, at which time he was replaced in what was described as a "routine alteration." Viñas attributed the longevity of his tenure to his a-political stance.¹⁹

The attempt to achieve a degree of stability in military leadership was not an overwhelming success. One aspect of this reform was to grant autonomy to the National Police. Under the autonomy the Police chief became practically immune from removal. While this was theoretically a laudable idea, it did not work out in practice. The chief of Police was the corrupt and oppressive Belisario Peguero Guerrero, and all attempts to remove him over a span of two years met with failure.²⁰

Reminiscent of the Nazi purge after World War II, an attempt was also made to "de-Trujilloize" the armed forces. But despite the call for action from some elements in the society, the campaign had little effect. The removal of the Trujillos and their closest collaborators had rid the services of their most oppressive elements and the ousting of Rodríguez Echavarría had resulted in the removal of a few more; but beyond this there was little effort to purge Trujillistas. Isolated cases did occur. One such involved the ouster of Colonel Carlos Rafael Herrand Blyden, accused

¹⁹Víctor Elby Viñas Román, personal interview, Santo Domingo, January 3, 1965.

²⁰See El LJ4, 11 (May 17, 1963), 1.

of "crimes committed during the past tyranny."²¹ But Herrand's case was not often repeated and in general the armed forces remained immune from de-Trujilloization. The Council of State was reluctant to press the purge because it feared this would trigger a military coup.²²

Closely related to the de-Trujilloization campaign was another effort to simply reduce the size of the armed forces. The Dominican Republic, many politicians were arguing, had little use for the huge military apparatus which Trujillo had assembled. There was no threat of a foreign invasion and only a small force was needed to preserve internal order. The difficulty here was the same met in the attempt to de-Trujilloize: if the Council made a move to reduce the size of the armed forces, it ran the chance of provoking a military takeover.²³ As a result, nothing was done.

Rather than reducing the size of the armed forces, indeed, they were actually increased. Under the urging of the U.S. military mission, the National Police force was increased from 3,000 to 10,000 members. It was thought that a stronger Police could regain control of the streets from the rampaging mobs which burned, looted, and stoned in the downtown area during late 1961 and early 1962. It was thought, further, that the Police which would be U.S.-trained and indoctrinated, would serve as staunch

²¹El Caribe (September 9, 1962), p. 13.

²²Ramón Alberto Ferreras, "Conjura Trujillista Continúa en las Fuerzas Armadas," Claridad, I (June 30, 1962), 1; and Tad Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum," New York Times Magazine (September 2, 1962), p. 40.

²³Juan José Ayuso, "El Gran Problema: La Reducción y Depuración de las Fuerzas Armadas," Ahora, I (Julio 20, 1962), 43-46.

defenders of democracy and as a counterweight to the other Trujillista-dominated armed forces.²⁴

Though the dangers of a new armed force were recognized by the U.S. planners, it was hoped that the Police could be kept under civilian control and remain a-political. The program was a success in that the Police were able to prevent the constant disorders of past months, but the hope of a non-political force was naive. Like the "a-political" Constabulary created during the 1916-1924 Marine occupation through which Trujillo rose to power, the National Police also turned into a political instrument. In addition, the Police became the most oppressive, most corrupt, and most Trujillista of all the armed forces.²⁵

If the Dominican military could not be de-Trujilloized of even the worst of the former collaborators of the Trujillos and if it could not be reduced in size, it could at least be reoriented. Here again the U.S. played a major role. The program had both a political and a military objective. Politically the forty-four-man military mission under the command of Lt. Col. David C. Wolfe of the U.S. Marine Corps aimed at facilitating the adjustment of the Dominican military in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Indoctrination lectures were given to soldiers and their officers

²⁴Abraham Lowenthal, "U.S. Aid to the Dominican Republic: The Politics of Foreign Aid," (Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 1964).

²⁵Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 5-6. One article by a Lieutenant colonel in the Police unintentionally made it appear that the U.S. Alliance for Progress was responsible for the oppression and corruption in the Police. See Rafael Morel Tineo, "El General Peguero y la Alianza para el Progreso en la Policía Nacional," Avance, I (January, 1964), 9.

were invited to U.S. military schools in Washington and the Panama Canal Zone.²⁶

Militarily, the U.S. effort was aimed at training Dominican troops in special anti-guerrilla activities and riot control in anticipation of possible subversive action by ultra-Leftist forces. An expert from Miami and two Los Angeles detectives were brought in to train the Police in riot control--with emphasis on using long clubs on disorderly crowds rather than the traditional bullets. The U.S. Information Service provided films. Colonels Pablo Turza Concha and Gastón Rivera Mannheim, members of the Chilean caribeneros, taught cavalry techniques to the Mounted Police Squadrons.²⁷

Neither of the objectives of the program could be considered a resounding success. In the political realm, the indoctrination of the armed forces, under the direction of Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin, was concentrated primarily on simple anti-communism to the exclusion of almost all else. The materials used for this instruction were comparable to the Birchite literature employed by General Edwin Walker.²⁸ It resulted in the armed forces seeing the spectre of communism in all reform proposals and ultimately contributed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch. In the military realm, the

²⁶Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (February 12, 1962), 258-259; New York Times (June 9, 1962), p. 10; and Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Octubre-Diciembre, 1962), 56.

²⁷Szulc, op. cit., p. 41; and El Caribe (April 28, 1963), p. 9. For the rationale behind the U.S. effort see Michael J. Francis, "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VI (July, 1964), 389-404.

²⁸See, for example, the booklet Conozca lo que le ocurrirá a nuestro país si el comunismo logra adueñarse del poder (Santo Domingo: Centro de Enseñanza de las Fuerzas Armadas, 1963).

Dominicano became an efficient anti-guerrilla and counter-insurgency force. Indeed, many came to believe it was too efficient. The few guerrillas who took to the hills after Bosch was overthrown were needlessly massacred after they had surrendered. In the cities the Police began to jail or shoot indiscriminately anyone who even looked suspicious.

An editorial in the newspaper of the sometimes pro-Castro but always intensely nationalistic Revolutionary Nationalist Party expressed what most Dominican democrats felt. It asked the U.S. military mission, "Don't you think our Trujillista armed forces are strong enough already?" The editorial argued that the U.S. was only perfecting an already oppressive military apparatus. We don't need more tanks and machineguns, it said; our problems are not a lack of weapons but a lack of food, housing, education, and medical facilities. "We don't want military help," the editorial concluded, "What we need is just and well intentioned economic help."²⁹

The effort to get the armed forces engaged in constructive civic action projects was still another of the attempts at reorientation. Most of these were small-scale and symbolic projects. In an expression of solidarity with the citizens, for example, Secretary of the Armed Forces Vinas Román and the chiefs and sub-chiefs of the three services cut cane for a morning. Ten Army trucks were once loaned to the Banco Agrícola to transport 125,000 sacks of U.S.-provided rice to the interior. Chocolate and candy were distributed to needy children, band instruments to a school, and a wheelchair to a crippled child.³⁰

²⁹"Misión Militar Norteamericana," PNR, I (February 2, 1962), 12.

³⁰R.E. Saldana J., "Acción Civil en las Fuerzas Armadas y su Razón de Ser," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Octubre-Diciembre, 1962), 35-36. Each subsequent issue of the Revista contained one or two pages devoted to military civic action programs.

These projects were reminiscent of the charity efforts under Trujillo. They represented an effort on the part of the armed forces to win back a measure of the public confidence in the military which had dwindled to the vanishing point under the Generalissimo's terroristic police state. They were calculated to convince the people that the armed forces should not be destroyed or severely crippled, as most of the politicians then engaged in the election campaign were advocating, but should be given useful functions. Each giveaway received much favorable publicity. But these measures, however laudable, were mostly symbolic; and, in fact, large-scale and constructive projects were few. Despite an extensive propaganda campaign concerning the work of the armed forces in building highways, for example, the first five kilometers of road were only completed in late 1964. The civic action program of the military, notwithstanding the publicity to the contrary, was insignificant.³¹

The Legacy of the Trujillo Era

The legacy of the Trujillo dictatorship could not be easily erased. Under the old regime military checkpoints had been established throughout the countryside and all travelers were required to show their cédulas (identification cards) and state their destination. In the isolated area along the Haitian border, this practice continued in the post-Trujillo era. The traveler would frequently come across a military barracks where he was required to give his name and destination. Once this information had been written down, however, the military was at a loss as to what to do with the form. Old habits and new procedures were coming in conflict.

³¹ See El Caribe (August 28, 1964), p. 9.

Not only was the Trujillo legacy difficult to erase, but the new professionalism was not easy to implant. Near the military bases were clusters of shanties. In these shanties the soldiers lived--with their families. When asked what the soldiers did with their families when they were transferred to another post, an officer replied that the families tagged along and put up another shack at the new post.

Nor were the armed forces immune from dabbling in politics. Though the military was generally happy with the behavior of the Council of State, there were constant rumblings of a coup. In early February, 1962, it was reported that General Santiago Rodríguez Echavarría, former Air Force chief of staff and brother of the ousted armed forces secretary, was planning to overthrow the government. The report resulted in the General's departure for New York, described by a Council spokesman as "banishment in the interest of public safety."³² Two months later the government announced that it had uncovered a plot by four former Air Force officers--including General Rodríguez Méndez, who had been one of the most prominent participants in both the ouster of the Trujillos and the overthrow of Rodríguez Echavarría--to take control of the country.³³ In September, 1962, seven more Air Force officers were "retired" for allegedly planning a Trujillista coup. Air Force Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Miguel Atila Luna Pérez, while recognizing the authority of the civilian government over the armed forces, warned the Council that "it would not be wise to intervene in military affairs."³⁴

³²Hispanic American Report, XV (April, 1962), 133-134.

³³New York Times (April 19, 1962), p. 15; and El Caribe (April 18, 1962), p. 1.

³⁴Roberto Julián Holguín Hache, "Teniente Desenmascara Trama Trujillista," El U4, II (September 6, 1962), 1; and Hispanic American Report, XV (November, 1962), 810.

Probably the most serious military threat to the civilian government came from Antonio Imbert Barreras and Luis Amiana Tió, the two survivors of the group which assassinated Trujillo and who were themselves members of the Council. Soon-to-be-elected Juan Bosch felt that Imbert was the real power in the government and predicted that he would attempt a coup before the scheduled elections.³⁵ In a move to prevent this occurrence, the Council, on November 1, appointed them generals, effective February 27, 1963, when their positions as members of the Council would terminate. Imbert then went on national radio and television to say that he would not use his new position as general to further his own political ambitions. At the same time he remarked darkly that the armed forces would stay out of politics just so long as the civil authorities refrained from interference in military matters.³⁶

But this intensely ambitious man, who wanted more than anything else to rule the Dominican Republic, could not refrain from using his influential position to political ends. At one time he attempted to establish a foothold in the 14th of June Movement and use this party as a catapult to the presidency. When this failed, he tried, only a few weeks before the December 20 elections, to rally the Army and the Police to his cause. It was reported that President Bonnelly blocked the move, but the situation provided some tense moments and Imbert almost succeeded.³⁷

³⁵Juan Bosch, personal interview, Santo Domingo, September 1, 1962.

³⁶The text is in El Caribe (November 4, 1962), p. 16.

³⁷Rowland Evans, Jr., "First Steps in Dominican Democracy," The Reporter, XXVIII (January 3, 1963), 23.

The Armed Forces and the Bosch Government

The oft-rumored military coup never occurred and the country prepared for the elections. The official position of the armed forces was strict neutrality and it acted as the a-political guardians of peace and order to make the elections possible.³⁸

Considering the traditional political orientation of the armed forces, their neutrality in the elections came as a surprise. Nevertheless, three major political positions seem to have been present in the military at this time. Most of the officer corps, left over from the days of Trujillo, favored the more conservative National Civic Union Party. A large segment of the enlisted men, recruited from the lower class after the overthrow of the dictatorship, was sympathetic to the Castro-leaning 14th of June Movement. Most of the enlisted men and a sizable proportion of the officers, especially those in the rural areas, sided with the Dominican Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch.³⁹

When Bosch was elected the armed forces, at least officially, welcomed him as its new commander-in-chief. An editorial in the armed forces Revista stated:

The Dominican armed forces warmly salutes its new commander-in-chief, the new president of the Republic, Professor Juan Bosch, wishing him well in his governmental program. In this manner the military offers its help to the government in securing the social, political, economic stability of the country.⁴⁰

³⁸"Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 20 de Diciembre," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1963), 9.

³⁹Evidence for this three-way split comes from observations and interviews by the author during the election campaign. See also Robert J. Alexander, "Democracy Victory in Dominican Republic," New Americas, III (January 15, 1963), 3, 8; and El LJ4, II (April 26, 1963), 1.

⁴⁰Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1963), 2.

Early in January an Army major published an article entitled "That all should work for the common good," which expressed similar sentiments. The article proclaimed the enthusiasm with which the armed forces had accepted the results of the election and pointed to it as the initiation of a democratic system in the Dominican Republic. The writer also exhorted the civic virtues of the people and called for harmony.⁴¹ Armed Forces Secretary Viñas is reported to have said: "I think that he is loyal, that he wishes stability for the country, and that he constitutes an efficient brake against the aspirations of some of his companions."⁴²

Despite these official statements, it was well known that all was not well between Bosch and the armed forces. Some of his campaign pronouncements had seriously frightened the military. Bosch himself wrote that even before he was inaugurated on February 27, he was aware that Dominican military commanders were conspiring to prevent his taking office. The president-elect claimed that he had to meet with the officers of the three services plus the Police to prevent a coup from taking place.⁴³

One observer has written that "it was perfectly clear from the outset--that painfully brilliant day of February 27 when Bosch took the oath as 'Constitutional President' of the Dominican Republic--that the new government lived by the sufferance of the military." He reports that the armed forces--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police--were in evidence everywhere.

⁴¹Rafael E. Saldana Jiménez, "A trabajar todos por el bienestar general," El Caribe (January 5, 1963), p. 6.

⁴²Quoted in Víctor Alba, "Historia de una iniquidad: Los generales y los personajillos contra el pueblo dominicano," Suplemento al Num. 6 de PANORAMAS (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1963), p. 5.

⁴³Juan Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 3-4.

The men who controlled this military machine held the civilian government in bondage. The same thought struck then-Senator Hubert Humphrey, a guest at the inauguration, who remarked that Bosch should have ended the military parade on a ramp leading into the Caribbean.⁴⁴

The author-President's efforts to "do something" about the armed forces were largely futile, and most of his measures regarding the military only increased its antagonism to his government. One of the most futile gestures, which nevertheless was well publicized, was the donation of some of his books to the military library in the hope that they might help reorient the largely illiterate soldiers.

Bosch made no effort to reduce the size of the armed forces or to reorganize them. For public consumption he said that he kept the military intact because a reduction would only add to the huge number of unemployed; but, in fact, the President feared that any attempt to tamper with the armed forces would result in his immediate overthrow.⁴⁵

Bosch did make an effort to reduce the budget of the military. The Dominican budget for 1963, as approved by the Council of State, totaled \$167,866,605. Of this the armed forces were budgeted to receive \$32,849,869 and the Ministry of Interior (which meant the National Police) \$29,280,101. The total of \$62,129,971 for the military amounted to slightly more than 37 per cent of the national budget.⁴⁶ One reporter claimed that with its

⁴⁴John P. Roche, "Return of the Syndicate," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 5-8.

⁴⁵See Tomás Guerrero Martínez, "Que no se Reduzcan las Fuerzas Armadas," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1963), 8.

⁴⁶The budget is in El Caribe (January 4, 1963), p. 1.

income from other government sources the funds allotted to the armed forces might have amounted to some 45 per cent of the total budget, not much less, proportionately, than the defense budget of the U.S. Bosch attempted to drastically reduce this figure but with no apparent success.⁴⁷

The Dominican President also made a move to reduce the graft in the armed forces. At one time General Luna Pérez of the Air Force planned to purchase twelve Hawker Hunter jet planes from England. As in the Trujillo era the General expected a 10 per cent rakeoff for himself which would have amounted to nearly \$1 million. The Dominicans had no use for the jets and Bosch stopped the deal. Luna Pérez was furious. Bosch claimed that his refusal to allow the purchase was one of the immediate causes of his overthrow.⁴⁸

Military corruption was not confined to the Air Force, however. In each of the three services and in the National Police, a corps of intendants was especially appointed to help their chiefs--colonels and above--administer the collection of illegal commissions. The system became institutionalized; the intendants were regularly rotated to make sure that everyone had a chance at the graft and that no one was dissatisfied. Bosch attempted unsuccessfully to stop the practice.⁴⁹

⁴⁷The journalist Thayer Waldo says that Bosch informed him of this move when he interviewed the President for an article he was writing. Waldo states that Bosch asked him not to write this in his piece. Thayer Waldo, personal interview, Gainesville, Florida, May 22, 1963.

⁴⁸Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase," The Reporter, XXIX (December 5, 1963), p. 30; and Drew Pearson, "Washington Merrygoround," Miami Herald (October 11, 1963), p. 7-A.

⁴⁹Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 184-185.

While on the one hand attempting to curtail military graft, on the other Bosch gave the armed forces an opportunity for more illegal enrichment. As a concession, he granted them the right to import goods tax-free through their military canteens. Though these practices were kept under control during Bosch's administration, they quickly mushroomed after his overthrow. Military cargo planes began arriving at the San Isidro base with liquor, clothing, medicines, jewelry, and household goods with the frequency of arrivals at the international airport. Some of these items went directly to armed forces personnel, but most of it found its way into the black market at enormous profits to the officers. With these profits the armed forces chiefs, using enlisted men as laborers, built a string of palatial mansions on both sides of a boulevard leading to Santo Domingo's leading hotel. Other high-ranking officers began flying in prostitutes from Miami and other Caribbean hot spots and entertained them at some of the government-owned retreats of the former dictator.⁵⁰

Bosch next attempted to praise the armed forces. When a shipment of military equipment from the U.S. arrived, he called the attention of newspapermen to it. "These are not tanks of war nor military combat equipment," he said. "The majority will be used in the construction of roads and other works of social good." Army Chief of Staff Brigadier General Renato Hungria Morrell stated that the U.S. "could be sure that this equipment will be used only for beneficial works, both military and civilian." Bosch concluded "The Army is working for the people."⁵¹

⁵⁰Allan, op. cit., p. 30; Wiarda, op. cit., pp. 5-6; and Hal Hendrix, "Dominicans Criticize 'Colonels' Row." Miami Herald (June 12, 1964), p. 1-A.

⁵¹El Caribe (June 6, 1963), p. 16.

Despite all his efforts--and sometimes because of them--the President never gained the allegiance or support of the armed forces. Eventually the military found the issue that could unite all those among its ranks who opposed Bosch. That issue was the alleged growing communist infiltration in the government.

The campaign began early, and its growth may be traced through successive issues of the armed forces Revista. In a series of articles the rise of communism under Bosch was described and the armed forces were pictured as the sole saviors of the country. The first appeared even before Bosch took office. It exhorted:

Dominican soldiers, in the great and important moments in which the Republic now lives, the armed forces have a great responsibility on their shoulders and a sacred right to prevent, without thought of the sacrifice involved, the malign hordes of atheistic communism from planting its seeds in our beloved country.⁵²

Only a few months after Bosch was inaugurated Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin, who would later play a prominent role in the overthrow, addressed an article to all his brothers-in-arms. Wessin said that the principal objective of communism was to destroy the armed forces. This is what happened in Cuba, he wrote, but in the Dominican Republic it was the duty of the armed forces to say "Traitors will not pass." "The time of Waterloo is near," he concluded, "Will it be us or them?"⁵³

Another armed forces officer wrote that the "open tentacles of communism" were beckoning to Dominicans and urged that the people rise up and

⁵²Augustin Ant. Cruz Domínguez, "Exhortación a mis Compañeros de Armas," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1963), 25.

⁵³Elías Wessin y Wessin, "A Todos mis Hermanos de Armas," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIV (Mayo-Junio, 1963), 13.

resist.⁵⁴ Still another article severely attacked Bosch and referred to the growing influence of the "moral pest" of communism in his regime.⁵⁵ These articles, all by military officers, verged on being open invitations to the armed forces to rebel against the constitutional authority.

The point was not that there were actually few communists in the country.⁵⁶ but that the armed forces believed that communism was a growing threat. This view was stated by a veteran observer of the Dominican political scene. He argued that the Dominican armed forces were, on the whole, in favor of constitutionality; but, he wrote, if they detected an increase in extreme Leftist activity, constitutional government would be quickly overthrown. It was unimportant that communism was not really on the increase; what was important was that the armed forces thought that it was.⁵⁷

In the face of the growing armed forces fears Bosch refused to act. He would not, he said, preside over the curtailment of freedom for any group. While this stand might have been laudable from an idealistic point of view, in the realm of practical politics it proved disastrous. It is reported that such highly placed and sympathetic fellow democrats as Governor Luis Munoz Marín of Puerto Rico, former president José Figueres

⁵⁴ José de Jesús Curiel Mejía, "Así Actúa el Comunismo," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIV (Julio-Agosto, 1963), 23.

⁵⁵ Manuel de Jesús Suero Cedeno, "El Comunismo: Peste Moral," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIV (Septiembre-Octubre, 1963), 29.

⁵⁶ The role of communism is discussed in Chapter XIII.

⁵⁷ Mario Bobea Billini, "Cómo Están las Relaciones entre el Presidente y las Fuerzas Armadas?," Ahora, II (2da. quincena de Mayo, 1963), 8-9; and Miguel A. Hernández, "Infiltración Comunista en las Fuerzas Armadas?," Ahora, II (2da. quincena de Julio, 1963), 51.

of Costa Rica, President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and ex-president Carlos Prío Socarrús of Cuba were among those who urged the Dominican President to toughen his stand on the Leftists. But Bosch--the poet, writer, and intellectual who had no experience in the give-and-take that is politics--failed to heed the advice of his more politically experienced friends and refused to clamp down. This failure was among the principal reasons for his overthrow.⁵⁸

The conflict between Bosch and the armed forces produced a series of crises which grew steadily more severe. The first came in June, 1963, when, in the face of widespread rumors of a planned attempt on the President's life, Armed Forces Secretary Viñas found it necessary to reiterate military support for the Bosch government. Viñas called Bosch's policies with respect to the internal functioning of the armed forces "correct" and stated that "the armed forces reiterate their firm backing for the constitutional government of Bosch."⁵⁹

In early July Police Chief Peguero was forced to deny rumors circulating in the capital that he had been replaced and jailed. Peguero, too, pledged allegiance to the President, recognizing his authority as commander-in-chief over the Police.⁶⁰ The day following Peguero's statement, however, the Dominican Revolutionary Party's Rafael Casimiro Castro introduced a bill in the Senate which provided for the curtailment of the Police Chief's

⁵⁸See Sam Halper, "The Inside Story of the Dominican Republic Grab," Life, LV (October 18, 1963), 49-50; and Dom Bonafede, "Lexness on Reds Blamed," Miami Herald (September 26, 1963), p. 1-A.

⁵⁹El Caribe (June 9, 1963), p. 1. See also H. Reyes Quiroga, "Bosch ante graves problemas," El Expreso [Lima] (June 16, 1963), p. 1.

⁶⁰The text is in El Caribe (July 9, 1963), p. 9.

nearly absolute, autonomous power. A day later Peguero called on Bosch at the National Palace. Both refused to comment later on the nature of the secret meeting but it was clear that the Chief was not happy with the Casimiro proposal.⁶¹

Only a few days after the Police crisis, another more severe crisis between Bosch and the military developed. Several observers feel that this conflict generated so much bad feeling that the overthrow of the government was from then on only a matter of time.

The crisis grew out of the general fear in the armed forces that communists were gaining a strong foothold in the government. The immediate cause was the government's loan of the Padre Billini day school in Santo Domingo for evening use by the Instituto de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, among whose faculty were Pedro Antonio Pérez Cabral of the Revolutionary Nationalist Party, Miguel Angel Mendoza of the Dominican Popular Movement, and Alfredo Manzano and Ramón Pina Acevedo of the 14th of June Movement. All these groups were Castro-oriented. The military officers were also disturbed by the welcome given three alleged communists who had recently been allowed to return from exile: Juan and Félix Decoudray of the Popular Socialist Party and the poet Pedro Mir and by the permission given Dominican Leftists to travel to Cuba for the 26th of July celebration.

Certain elements in the armed forces reacted to this "evidence of communist infiltration" by openly advocating Bosch's ouster. They were led

⁶¹Rafael Casimiro Castro, personal interview, Santo Domingo, November 28, 1964. See El Caribe (July 10, 1963), p. 1 for the proposal and (July 11, 1963) for the reaction; and also Thelma Frías de Rodríguez, "Bosch se Opuso a la Modificación de la Ley Orgánica de la Policía," Ahora, III (December 12, 1964), 10-11ff.

by Air Force Major Rolando Roberto Hache and Air Force chaplain Father Marcial Silva. On July 13 Bosch was presented with an ultimatum in which the military elements conditioned their support of his government on the President's adoption of a vigorous anti-communist policy. For his part, Bosch demanded the removal of Hache and Silva. To the ultimatum he replied belligerently that he was the commander-in-chief and that the armed forces had better obey his commands. He lectured the officers of the San Isidro base on the role of the military in a democratic society and told them he would not brook the idea of the armed forces telling him what action he should take.⁶²

On the night of July 16 Bosch discussed the matter on national television. In the articulate Spanish of which he was a master, Bosch heaped venom on the popular Father Silva and the Air Force officers. He stressed that a greatly majority of officers remained loyal to the constitutional government and gave a coup no better chance than a "cucaracha in a chicken coop."⁶³ But the President absolutely refused to crack down on the Leftists.

Armed Forces Secretary Viñas announced the dismissal of Silva and Hache the next day. The military then issued a statement which was signed by Viñas and the heads of the three services. The communiqué said that "In the face of the insistent rumors that are circulating in relation to the supposed coup that members of the armed forces are seeking to carry

⁶²See Norman Gall, "Bosch Rejects Army Threat," San Juan Star (July 18, 1963), p. 1; New York Times (July 17, 1963), p. 10; and Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Un Informe: Seis Meses de Gobierno. 27 de Febrero-27 de Agosto, 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), pp. 35-37.

⁶³The text is in El Caribe (July 17, 1963), p. 10.

out . . . we wish to make public knowledge that complete normality reigns in the military institutions." The statement concluded by pledging the armed forces to the preservation of constitutionality.⁶⁴

Though Bosch had succeeded in having Silva and Hache removed, this was only a surface victory. By his highhanded manner and speech, he had needlessly embarrassed the military chiefs and alienated many of those who would have otherwise been prone to support him. His failure to take any action, if only symbolic, confirmed what many officers already felt: that he himself might be a communist. From this day forward Bosch's downfall was eminent. The President knew this and yet intractably refused to take any steps to prevent it and, as time went by, became even more impervious to advice. It was obvious to most everyone that the coup was now only a matter of time. The 14th of June Movement, recognizing this, called on all Dominicans to form a "National Front for the Defense of the Constitution and Against the Military Coup d'état." But it was already too late.⁶⁵

Colonel Wessin y Wessin, author of the article in the armed forces Revista which exhorted the military to resist communism and one of the prime movers in the coup of September 25, 1963, claims, indeed, that the plan to oust Bosch had been put together as early as mid-July and that the officers decided to put it into action when they felt the country could wait no longer.⁶⁶ Whether such a plan had actually been worked out so

⁶⁴The text is in La Nación (July 18, 1963), p. 8.

⁶⁵See Leoncio Ramos, "La Crisis Política de San Isidro," Lev y Justicia, I (August 18, 1963), 3-11; and Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 35.

⁶⁶See the interview with Wessin reported by Al Burt, "I Started Coup Says General, 39," Miami Herald (September 29, 1963), p. 1-A.

far in advance cannot be ascertained, but it seems apparent that the armed forces had been long prepared for the move.

In the week prior to the coup many military leaders were absent from their usual haunts. On September 24 the officer in charge of guarding the National Palace was replaced without Bosch's knowledge. That night high-ranking armed forces personnel avoided a reception for U.S. Admiral William E. Ferrall. Near midnight they appeared at the Palace and called for Bosch. The discussion lasted some time. The President insisted on the dismissal of a colonel whom he felt was engaging in irresponsible activity, but the assembled military chiefs refused to accept the dismissal. The officers then demanded for the last time that Bosch put an end to "communist activity," but he refused. Shortly thereafter Secretary Viñas informed the President that he was a prisoner.⁶⁷

The decree that announced Bosch's deposition was signed by the Armed Forces Secretary, the heads of the three services, the Police Chief, and also Generals Imbert and Amiana who joined the anti-Bosch movement late. Their statement cited as reasons for the golpe the chaotic state of the country, the abuse of power by the President, the government's failure to live up to pre-election promises, widespread corruption, attacks on freedom of expression, the provocation of international incidents for political reasons (the case of the May conflict with Haiti), and the growth of communism and communist influence. With the "precarious state of health of the nation," the armed forces communiqué said, "we have decided to intervene

⁶⁷See Juan Bosch, "La Gramática parda del golpismo," Life en Español (November 11, 1963), pp. 14-17; El Caribe (October 4, 1963), p. 10; Hispanic American Report, XVI (November, 1963), 872; and Peter Nehemkis, Latin America: Myth and Reality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 141-143.

to bring order out of the chaos and to contain the revolutionarianism of communism."⁶⁸ The armed forces were not motivated by love of power, one military leader wrote, but by love of country.⁶⁹ All these charges and claims were later "Documented" in a 486-page "White Book."⁷⁰

In their first acts after the coup the military annulled the Bosch-PRD constitution, dissolved the Congress, declared a state of siege, and turned power over to a civilian triumvirate which was to be "advised" by the armed forces. In the days that followed many were exiled or sent to jail and many organizations--labor, peasant, political parties--which had worked closely with the Bosch government were raided, their equipment broken up or confiscated, and their headquarters padlocked by the military. The Dominican Republic's first attempt at a democratic and constitutional government after thirty-one years of the Trujillo dictatorship had ended, and the armed forces reverted to much the same style of terror and oppression as had existed in the previous era.

To all these activities on the part of the military there was little organized opposition from other sectors of the population. This was primarily because these other sectors were still weak and fluid in comparison with the armed forces' might. Some sporadic protests were made and several minor and disorganized uprisings occurred, but those elements who were more

⁶⁸The text is in Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIV (Septiembre-Octubre, 1963), 4-5.

⁶⁹Pedro Cházaro Mimendi, "Los Militares y la Dominicana," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, XIV (Septiembre-Octubre, 1963), 17.

⁷⁰Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional de la República Dominicana: Estudios y pruebas documentales de las causas del Movimiento Reivindicador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964).

favorably disposed to the Bosch government recognized their comparative weakness and few saw any sense in martyrdom. The armed forces had an overwhelming predominance among the groups that emerged in the post-Trujillo years.

The reason Bosch himself gave for his overthrow was the intransigence of the Dominican oligarchy, the unwillingness of the "first families" in the country to accept his regime. But these elements, he argues, do not have the power to overthrow a government and hence have allied themselves with the armed forces:

The existence of these oligarchies would not represent a mortal danger for democracy in Latin America if they did not have at their disposal armed forces supplied by irresponsible military chieftains who have no political education and who, for that very reason, are incapable of realizing where they are leading their own people's destiny. In the majority of Latin American countries, the military chiefs represent the proverbial gun in the hands of a child.⁷¹

Bosch's statement is undoubtedly an oversimplification, for part of the reason for the golpe was his own incompetence as a politician.⁷² Most interesting is his recognition that the Dominican military is not a monolith, as evidenced by his stress on "military cliques" and "irresponsible military chieftains," thereby implying that there are some responsible elements.

The group which continued to have the most influence in the armed forces were those officers left over from the old Trujillo days, the most notorious of which are known as the "San Cristobal crowd."⁷³ The top

⁷¹Juan Bosch, "Why . . . ," op. cit., p. 4.

⁷²Leoncio Ramos, "El Golpe de Estado del 25 de Septiembre," Lev y Justicia, I (October 25, 1963), 16-30.

⁷³Arthur Daron, "Dominican Military Never Lost Power," The Militant (October 21, 1963), p. 5.

echelon of Trujillo family members had forfeited control of the military when they left the country in November, 1961, with the result that only two of the generals who had served under Trujillo were still around at the time Bosch was overthrown. But below the top level there was little change. The de-Trujilloization of the armed forces never occurred. All those who occupied important military posts in the period after the dictatorship was overthrown had served Trujillo for at least ten years. The following statistics are revealing: Chief Peguero of the Police was a veteran of twenty-three years of military service under Trujillo. The four colonels who served under him had averaged eighteen years of service under Trujillo (see Table 1). Much the same was true in the regular armed forces. Secretary Viñas had been in the military during eighteen years of the Trujillo era. Of the six chiefs of staff who served in the post-Trujillo era about whom information could be obtained, the average length of service to Trujillo was 14 1/2 years. Of seven sub-chiefs of staff about whom statistics could be found, the average number of years spent under Trujillo was fifteen (see Table 2). Of the fact that Trujillista influences were prevalent in the upper echelons of the armed forces in the post-Trujillo years there can be little doubt.

Table 1

Years of Service to Trujillo:
National Police

<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Entry in Service</u>	<u>Years under Trujillo</u>
Brig. Gen. Belisario Peguero G.	1938	23
Col. Antonio de los Santos	1948	13
Col. Germán Despradel Brache	1939	22
Col. Rubén González Nuñez	1939	22
Col. José Morilla López	1947	14

Source: Avance, official organ of the National Police.

Table 2
Years of Service to Trujillo:
Armed Forces

<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Entry in Service</u>	<u>Years under Trujillo</u>
<u>Secretary</u>		
Brig. Gen. V.E. Viñas R.	1943	18
<u>Chiefs of Staff</u>		
Brig. Gen. M.A.J. Moreno	1950	11 (Army)
Brig. Gen. M.A. Luna Pérez	1947	14 (A.F.)
Com. F. Rivera Caminero	1949	12 (Navy)
Brig. Gen. M.A. Rivera C.	1943	18 (Army)
Com. J.A. Rib Santamaría	1947	14 (Navy)
Brig. Gen. R. Hungría M.	1943	18 (Army)
<u>Sub-chiefs of Staff</u>		
Col. M.R. Pagan M.	1943	18 (Army)
Cap. F.A. Marte V.	1948	13 (Navy)
Col. J. de los Santos C.	1945	16 (A.F.)
Col. R.E. Cruzado P.	1948	13 (A.F.)
Cap. L. Adújar M.	1948	13 (Navy)
Cap. S. Díaz T.	1948	13 (Navy)
Col. R.A. Tapia C.	1944	17 (Army)

Source: Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas.

If the Dominican armed forces are to be reoriented along more democratic lines, the leaders must be found among the lesser officers and enlisted men--i.e., from the rank of captain down. Interviews with thirty-one armed forces members revealed that these elements were considerably more favorably disposed to the Bosch government than the higher officers (see Table 3).

Table 3⁷⁴

Armed Forces Reaction to Bosch
Government, by Rank

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused</u> <u>to Answer</u>
Colonel and Above	13	2	1	8	2
Captain and Below	18	9	2	6	1

These are men who have had little involvement with the graft of Trujillo-ism and who have been indoctrinated in the democratic sentiments which swept the country after the dictator's death. Many of them have received training in U.S. military schools and they shared the belief that the military should be professional and a-political. These younger elements are frustrated by the top-heavy corps of Trujillistas in command who have no intention of retiring from or being replaced in their lucrative positions. They are appalled at the widespread graft among their leaders.

Many of these younger men openly supported Bosch and the PRD in defiance of their officers--such as the pilot who defected to Puerto Rico when he was ordered to strafe a group of guerrillas who had taken to the hills in protest against the overthrow of the constitutional government. The pilot said he "did not want to attack my fellow countrymen." Another PRD-oriented group staged an abortive uprising shortly after Bosch was overthrown.⁷⁵ And the full-scale revolt which began in April, 1965,

⁷⁴Bosch himself recognized that he had support among the lower officers and enlisted men and that the highest ranking officers were his major opponents. See Juan Bosch, Crisis . . ., op. cit., p. 205.

⁷⁵Florangel Cárdenas, "Three Coups: One Successful, One Aborted, One Yet to Come," The San Juan Review, 1 (February, 1964), 4, 6; and New York Times (November 2, 1963), p. 8.

most clearly demonstrated the democratic inclinations of the younger officers and enlisted men.

There are also divisions between the armed forces. From the sample it appeared that the Navy and the Air Force were slightly more pro-Bosch than the Army or the Police (see Table 4).

Table 4⁷⁶

Armed Forces Reaction to Bosch
Government, by Service

<u>Service</u>	<u>Number interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused to Answer</u>
Navy	6	4	1	1	0
Air Force	7	3	1	2	1
Police	10	3	0	5	2
Army	8	2	1	5	0

The Dominican armed forces--13,000 in the Army, 3,500 in the Navy, 4,000 in the Air Force, and 10,000 in the National Police--remain the most important elements in the nation's politics. Most politicians recognized this fact with the result that political interference in the military is almost as frequent as armed forces interference in politics. This immense military machine--among the strongest in the entire Caribbean area--cannot be wished away; it is a force with which political leaders must deal realistically if they wish their programs to succeed.

It would be inaccurate to say that the Dominican armed forces have not changed at all since Trujillo was overthrown. In fact, the changes

⁷⁶See also Guillermo Perallón, "Existe Unidad Militar?," Ahora, III (December 5, 1964), 13-14.

have been many and profound. A new sense of nationalism, patriotism, and responsibility has been implanted. Especially among the younger elements, the beginnings of a civic action program have been made. Most are convinced that a professional, a-political military is essential.⁷⁷

The problems remained nevertheless. Many of those at the top had few moral or intellectual capabilities and no sense of responsibility. They were appointed by Trujillo because they were his close friends or cronies and rose through the ranks by faithfully serving the dictatorship. They built immense mansions on the outskirts of Santo Domingo from the rake-offs and speculation which accrued from a high military officership. Under the control of these elements the armed forces used its immense power to limit or crush the more atomized and weaker sectors of the society and to prevent the establishment of a democratic system. It seems likely that the bloody civil war which followed the ouster of Donald Reid and in which rival military elements played the major role signalled the end of Trujillista dominance of the armed forces. No matter the outcome of the conflict, the monolithic control of the military by Trujillistas, it became evident, was no longer possible.

⁷⁷On the changing role of the military in Latin America and its implications see John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH¹

Though the armed forces were the most powerful and unified element in Dominican politics in the post-Trujillo years, the Roman Catholic Church was equally cohesive and only slightly less powerful. The Church had been among the strongest supporters of the Trujillo regime. Only in the last two years of his rule had some elements in the Church begun to oppose the dictatorship. At the time of Trujillo's death the Church was facing in two directions at once: several individual priests continued to attack the regime while the official Church position was to seek a rapprochement with it.

The Church was, among the groups and organizations this study is considering, changed least by the assassination of Trujillo and the subsequent overthrow of his regime. In terms of personnel, the archbishop and bishops who had occupied their posts during the last years of the Trujillo era all continued through the first three years of the post-Trujillo period. Politically, the Church, at least officially, continued a policy of moderation and conciliation with regard to all sectors of Dominican society except the communist, to which it was steadfastly opposed. It was this issue of communism and, more importantly, the question of who was or was not a communist, which provided the most spectacular fireworks on the part of the Church in the period following the overthrow of the dictatorship.

¹An earlier version of this chapter appeared as "The Changing Political Orientation of the Church in the Dominican Republic," A Journal of Church and State, forthcoming.

The strength of the Dominican Church may be measured in several ways. As of 1963 there were some 390 priests in the country, or one priest for every 7,800 persons.² Of the 390 only fifty, or 14 per cent, were native-born. Though the exact figures are not available, the majority of the priests serving in the Dominican Republic come from Canada, Spain, and the U.S. The conflicts between the native- and foreign-born or between the more authoritarian-oriented Spanish priests and the more democratically oriented Canadian and U.S. priests account for many of the political differences within the Dominican Church.

There are thirty orders working in the country. Of these the Jesuits are by far the largest single group with fifty-two members, followed by the Don Bosco Salesians with thirty-five, the Scarboros with twenty-eight, and the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart with twenty-three (see Table 5). The intervention of many of the militantly anti-communist Jesuits in politics was the spark that set off the major fireworks.

Table 5

Church Orders and Number of
Affiliates

<u>Order</u>	<u>Number of Affiliates</u>
Jesuits	52
Don Bosco Salesians	35
Scarboros	28
Missionaries of the Sacred Heart	23
Franciscans	15
Missionary Children of the Immaculate Heart of Mary	12
Others	80
No Affiliation	<u>145</u>
Total	390

²In terms of number of priests per capita, the Dominican Republic ranks third lowest in Latin America, behind only Honduras and Guatemala. See United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1961, Table 4; and World Horizon Reports, Basic Ecclesiastical Statistics for Latin America, 1960, No. 25.

The Dominican hierarchy is composed of an archbishop and four bishops. Of the five, three are native-born while one is Spanish-born but has lived in the Dominican Republic for nearly fifty years, and the other is U.S.-born. It is a relatively young hierarchy; counting the influential papal nuncio its average age is fifty-five. With the exception of Bishop Francisco Panal Ramírez who is seventy-one, all are in their 40's or 50's (see Table 6). Perhaps the relative youth of the Dominican hierarchy helps account for its comparative liberalism.

Table 6
The Dominican Hierarchy

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Birth Date</u>	<u>Place of Birth</u>
Mons. Emmanuele Clarizo	Papal Nuncio	1911	Italy
Mons. Octavio A. Beras	Archbishop	1906	D.R.
Mons. Hugo Polanco Brito	Bishop	1918	D.R.
Mons. Francisco Panal R.	Bishop	1893	Spain
Mons. Juan F. Pepén S.	Bishop	1920	D.R.
Mons. Thomas F. Reilly	Bishop	1908	U.S.

The Church's influence may be measured also by its role in social services. There were some 900 nuns in twenty-two sisterhoods in the Dominican Republic at the time of writing, plus numerous trainees who worked as teachers and nurses. The Church itself runs thirty-seven schools, seven hospitals, and an unknown number of social centers, cooperatives, and relief stations. Through "Caritas" it distributes food to thousands of hungry Dominicans. Clerics serve as chaplains in public schools and

in the armed forces. In addition, such lay groups as Catholic Action, the Legion of Merit, the Apostles of Prayer, and the Marianos are active.³

The Church, finally, may exercise political influence through the several organizations which derive their inspiration from Christian principles. In the Dominican Republic these include the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), the Democratic Christian Party (PDC), and the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Syndicates (CASC). It must be emphasized that these two political parties and the labor federation have no formal ties with the Church and their policies do not represent the official Church line. Indeed, their political perspectives are often at wide variance with those of the hierarchy. The PRSC, PDC, and CASC are only connected with the Church in the sense that they derived their operating principles from immutable Christian ethics and Church doctrine as set forth, for example in papal encyclicals. These organizations deserve mention in this context, but a more complete analysis of their political roles is reserved for other chapters.

Despite all these influences, the Church does not play an overwhelmingly powerful role in the political realm. It is not a large property-owner, has no latifundia or industry and therefore cannot back up its pronouncements with economic force. Because it has traditionally been relatively weak, the Dominican Republic, unlike Mexico, for example, has not had a history of violent anti-clericalism; there has been no need for Dominican politicians to wage a civil war against Church power. Then too,

³These statistics on the number of priests, orders, etc. were all taken from Guía Eclesiástica de la República Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Escuela Salesiana de Artes y Oficios, "María Auxiliadora," 1963).

the Dominican Republic and its people are not as strongly Roman Catholic as, for example, Colombia. Though the country is supposed to be 98 per cent Catholic, most Dominicans are only nominally religious. The Church is thus limited to the moral suasion which its political pronouncements carry. Though this suasion is considerable, it is only decisive when it can join with other sectors of the population.⁴ Such was the case with regard to the government of Juan Bosch.

The Evolution of the Church's Political Position

The Church began its political life in the post-Trujillo period with a discreet silence. It had little of a political nature to say concerning the Ramfis takeover. The official Church paper, Fides, exhorted against communism and Fidelismo but it did nothing to antagonize the new government of the son and heir. While the Church remained silent, Ramfis massacred many of those implicated in the plot against his father. For its silence at this time, the Church was severely criticized.⁵

As if stung by the criticism, the Church began again to take a more active part in the country's political life. As opposition groups began to be formed, the Church stated that, with the exception of the communists, Dominicans were free to join the political party of their choice. Bishop Hugo E. Polanco Brito of Santiago said membership in any non-communist political organization was a matter of choice and in no way contrary

⁴On the historical political role of the Church see Juan F. Pepén, La Cruz Señaló el Camino: Influencia de la Iglesia en la Formación y Conservación de la Nacionalidad Dominicana (Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Duarte, 1954).

⁵"El Silencio del Clero," Tribuna Libre, I (September 13, 1961), 1.

to religion or "good customs."⁶ Polanco's statement, printed in the opposition 14th of June Movement's newspaper, was undoubtedly influential in causing many to resign from Trujillo's old official Dominican Party and affiliate with the new groups.

The Church continued in its new political role by tardily pronouncing against the violence and terrorism of the Ramfis government. Father Marcial Silva, who would later play a prominent role in the overthrow of Bosch, delivered a sermon in the National Cathedral in which he said that "here a chicken is killed with more ceremony than a person." The priest spoke against the "assassination of brothers by brothers" and called for an end to the oppression. Other clerics echoed Silva's statements.⁷

In the chaotic month that followed the final overthrow of the dictatorship in November, 1961, at which time Ramfis and the rest of the Trujillo family were forced from the country, the Church took another step toward the reversal of its policy of only a few years back. From official support of the dictatorship, the Church had entered a period in which individual priests attacked the regime. This was followed by a period in which other individual priests pronounced against the terror of the Ramfis government and in which a bishop had said that Dominicans were free to join any non-communist political organization. Now, however, the Church went even further; in accord with the tidal wave of sentiment in favor of democracy which began to sweep the Dominican Republic, it too began to speak in favor of reform and democracy.

⁶The text is in E1 1J4, 1 (September 9, 1961), 4.

⁷See E1 1J4 (September 23, 1961), p. 2.

The first hint that the Church was in the process of reversing its official position was a pastoral letter of December, 1961. Signed by Archbishop Octavio Beras and the other four bishops, the letter was read in all the Catholic churches in the country. It called for safeguards against a "violent and blind revolution," unification of the country, and a government based on "social justice."⁸

The Church soon began to take an increasingly liberal stand on a wide range of social, political, and economic issues. Bishop Polanco typified the new emphasis. He issued a message calling on the rich to recognize the just aspirations of the poor. "Our men of commerce and industry," he wrote, "must have a concept of the social function of property, knowing that the wealth of the country is for all." He, too, called for a new era of social justice in which the workers would participate in the benefits of their labor. Polanco pointed to the latifundia problem in his own area, the rich Cibao Valley, and urged government action to make a more equitable division of the land. Finally, he called for the establishment of cooperatives and for technical assistance from the government to help labor.⁹

These were revolutionary statements coming from the traditionally conservative Church, but Polanco was not an isolated example of the new liberalism. Fides, the weekly newspaper of the Church hailed 1962 as the beginning of a new "democratic era" for the country and, recognizing the need for reform, began to carry columns on such diverse topics as labor unions, agrarian reform, freedom of the press, and the nature of democracy. On

⁸The text is in La Nación (December 11, 1961), p. 3.

⁹The text is in El 114, I (January 31, 1962), 1.

May Day Archbishop Beras addressed a warm and encouraging letter to the workers. The Trujillo era was now officially referred to as "the tyranny." The Church officially called for a program of social, political, and economic justice; and often, citing the papal encyclicals of Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, and Mater et Magister, urged reform, social change, and the establishment of a democratic government.¹⁰

The Church's role during most of the period of the Interim Council of State might, in Dominican terms, be considered a-political. The Church occasionally published statements of a political nature in the press or in its own publications; but these were by and large confined to exhortations to love of country, warnings against communism, the need for reform and democracy, and praise of peace and order. The Church, of course, participated in many official and unofficial state functions such as receptions and dedications; while the government leaders, by the same token, frequently attended Te deums of the Church. Though their functions often, of necessity, overlapped, Church and State were neither separated nor joined. Rather they mutually cooperated. Nineteen sixty two saw almost a full year of relatively peaceful harmony between the two: the Council refrained from interfering in matters that might touch on matters of deep concern to the Church such as education, the rights of illegitimate children, and divorce; while the Church also refrained from overt intervention in the nation's political affairs.¹¹

¹⁰The Church's evolving position may be followed in successive issues of Fides during 1962.

¹¹Although a priest, Mons. Eliseo Pérez Sánchez, was one of the seven members of the Council of State, he did not have much influence on decision-making. Pérez Sánchez had been included on the Council because of his open defiance of Trujillo; he was not an important power-wielder but only a symbol of anti-Trujilloism.

The Church and the Bosch Regime

In keeping with its new democratic spirit, the Church issued a statement defining its position with regard to the upcoming December 20 elections. It favored the development and formation of political parties, the Church reiterated, but cautioned that Catholics make certain that the principles of the parties to which they belonged were in accord with Christian principles. The statement, which was signed by Archbishop Beras and Bishops Polanco, Francisco Panal R., Juan F. Pepén S., and Thomas F. Reilly, said that voting was both a right and a duty but that voters should exercise caution in their choices in the face of deceptive communist and Fidelista propaganda. It called on Catholics to vote according to their individual conscience, but at the same time urged them, ambiguously, to "strike a blow against the enemies of God."¹²

In harmony with the prevailing sentiment of the time, the Church had thus officially shifted its position to the point where it was officially advocating democracy for the country. But that it was not in favor of the particular democratic government which was about to be elected soon became apparent. The question of the Church's relations with Juan Bosch, both during the election campaign and after he had become President, cast doubt on the Church's sincerity with regard to the stand it had taken in favor of democracy. The success of the Church in weathering this crisis, which represented the most dangerous threat to its traditional prestige and status in the society that it had yet faced, should be considered at some length.

¹²The text is in El Caribe (November 16, 1962), p. 1; and Fides, III (November 18, 1962), 1.

The instigator of the Church's attack against Bosch, then emerging as the front-runner in the presidential campaign, was Laútico García, a Spanish Jesuit and a frequent contributor to Dominican newspapers on religious and political matters. Only a week before the elections, when it had become clear that Bosch would be the winner, García published an article entitled "Juan Bosch: Marxista-Leninista?" in the government-owned newspaper. García's article analyzed an article which Bosch had written entitled "Gobierno y Revolución" in which he had called for a social revolution and mentioned Lenin in passing. García pointed to the closeness of Bosch's title to Lenin's State and Revolution and concluded that the PRD leader was a communist. The Jesuit's article was written in such a way that the issue of Bosch's Marxist-Leninist leanings was not a question, as the title indicated, but a definite fact.¹³

Radio Santa María, a Catholic station which broadcasts from the Santo Cerro and which could be heard throughout the entire valley of the Vega Real, used García's article as a basis for its own attack on Bosch. Father Faustino García said over the air that Bosch was indeed a Marxist-Leninist and urged his listeners not to vote for him. He compared Bosch to the great dictators of all times and especially to Fidel Castro.¹⁴

¹³The full references are as follows: Juan Bosch, "Gobierno y Revolución," Renovación, XXVI (July 10-16), 1; and Laútico García, "Juan Bosch: Marxista-Leninista?" La Nación (December 12, 1962), p. 5.

¹⁴Much of this analysis of Bosch's difficulties with the Church in the week before the elections is based on straight news stories published in Santo Domingo's two daily newspapers, El Caribe and La Nación during this period. See also Carlos Esteban Deive, "La Iglesia, Los Curas, y la Política," La Nación (December 15, 1962), p. 4.

Radio Santa María was not alone in making these accusations. Another Catholic station, Radio Sol of Higüey, had broadcast a similar message accusing Bosch of being a communist. The same had occurred in the form of sermons from various pulpits in the country.

In the following days the Church tried to disassociate itself from these statements of some of its individual members. The Papal Nuncio, Emmanuele Clarizo, in the face of widespread rumors that the Church was preparing a pastoral letter against Bosch and the PRD, promised that the hierarchy would remain neutral in the election campaign. The bishops of the dioceses of La Vega and La Altagracia, in which the two offending radio stations were located, declared that they had not authorized the political activities of the priests under their jurisdictions. The archbishop's office followed with an official statement in which it restated the position of the Church, that of "strict neutrality in the present circumstances." Its communiqué said that individual priests could not speak officially for the Church--only the bishops were authorized to do so.¹⁵

Bosch himself had made a last-minute attempt to get the Church to withdraw the statements made by some clerics that he was a Marxist-Leninist. He paid a midnight visit to the residence of the Nuncio and spent over an hour with Clarizo, the Vatican's emissary to the Dominican Republic. Bosch was again told that some individual priests speaking against him did not mean that the entire Church officially shared these sentiments. The PRD candidate then suggested that the hierarchy reaffirm its neutrality in a special mass, but this was rejected as superfluous.

¹⁵The text of the official pronouncement is in El Caribe (December 16, 1962), p. 24.

Bosch left; and then issued the statement that stunned the country: he and his party would not participate in the elections because of the "illegal interference" of the Church in political affairs. He charged that certain priests were telling the rural electorate not to vote for him because he was a communist. The rural priests' charges especially hurt his chances because Bosch's PRD, a peasants and workers party, found much of its support among the rural campesinos.

The Party immediately sent statements of its position with regard to the Church and religion to the hierarchy. The statements pointed out that the great majority of the PRD members were Catholics, that neither the Party nor its leaders were opposed to the Church, and that Bosch was not a Marxist-Leninist.¹⁶

Bosch then announced that he had invited Father Laútico García to discuss his now-famous article on television and to offer proof of his alleged Marxist-Leninist leanings. The debate was held on the evening of December 17, three days before the scheduled elections, and gained the rapt attention of the entire nation. Voters saw in Bosch an articulate, unemotional, and sincere intellectual who continuously placed himself on the side of the people. His opponent--thin, balding, ineffectual, and a foreigner--was unable to prove his charges. The most telling statement of the three-hour marathon was García's final admission that he had "no proof" that Bosch was a Marxist-Leninist. The consensus of those who watched the program was that Bosch had demolished the arguments of the

¹⁶The text is in El Caribe (December 14, 1962), p. 24.

priest.¹⁷ The PRD, as a result, moved back into the electoral race and became an easy winner. The overwhelming victory of Bosch in the television debate presaged his and the Party's landslide in the elections.

How may one fairly assess the role of the Church in this, the most controversial intrusion of the Church in politics of the post-Trujillo period? It seems apparent that the statements of some individual clergymen did not coincide with the official position of the Church. The Church's official view was that voting was a matter of individual conscience, though the Church reserved the right to speak out against communists and "extremists." The ambiguity of this last term was exploited by certain priests to pin the extremist--i.e., Marxist-Leninist--i.e., communist label on Bosch.

Once the issue had been raised, Bosch capitalized on the attacks and used them to political advantage. It seems clear that he employed the issue as a red herring to gain sympathy and votes. Papal Nuncio Clarizo is reported to have commented that "He could not come to a more open house. We have been as accommodating as possible." The Church hierarchy was apparently not a party to labeling Bosch a communist; rather, he used the hostility of individual priests to accomplish a shrewd political maneuver. The television debate with García provided a forum and a dramatic issue to attract the attention of the entire nation in the last, flagging days of the campaign. It is generally conceded that the debate won many votes for Bosch, including many Catholic votes that would otherwise have gone to his opponents.¹⁸

¹⁷See J.R. Hernández, "Bosch, Laúfico, y el Juicio de Dios," La Nación (December 19, 1962), p. 4; Guido Feliz, "Sacerdote Admite Juan Bosch No es Un Marxista-Leninista," La Nación (December 18, 1962), p. 16; and El Caribe (December 18, 1962), p. 1.

¹⁸On the political ramifications of the issue see Dom Bonafede,

The Church's opposition to Bosch, however, did not end with the celebrated television debate. It was well known that the new president, despite his now-frequent attendance at masses and other Church functions, was not a very religious man; and to have a free-thinker or agnostic in the nation's highest office seriously frightened the Church. One indicator of this fright was the nature of the materials now published in the official Church organ, Fides. Whereas previously this periodical had expressed reform, social justice, and democracy, its emphasis now was on anti-communism, the "rights of the Church," and the evils of anti-clericalism.¹⁹

The promulgation of the Bosch-PRD constitution in April, 1963, seemed to give credence to the Church's worst fears. The new supreme law sanctioned divorce, common law marriage, and state inspection of religious schools. It provided for the state protection of illegitimate children. From the point of view of the Church, these measures represented an attack on the Christian family and Christian marriage and, perhaps eventually, the abolishment of religious instruction in the schools.

Bishop Reilly, speaking for all the nation's clerics, objected to the treatment of matrimony in the constitution. He claimed that it condoned polygamy and concubinage. The bishop expressed concern that the constitution seemed to be a completely secular document and stated that in a

(Footnote 18 continued from preceding page)

"Freedom After Trujillo: The Dominican Election," The Nation, CXCVI (January 12, 1963), 28-30; Víctor Alba, "La República Dominicana a la escuela de la libertad," Cuadernos, LXX (March, 1963), 74; and Bernardo Pichardo, Resumen de la Historia Patria, 4th ed. (Santo Domingo: Librería Dominicana, 1964), p. 384.

¹⁹See the issues of Fides during the early months of 1963.

Catholic country like the Dominican Republic the Church could not be excluded from public life.²⁰

On April 25 the episcopate released a communiqué which criticized the constitution for its "total disregard of the rights of God and of the Church." The supreme law contained no specific statement that the Dominican Republic was a Catholic country, as had been the case in the old constitution. The new constitution, the Church's statement said, was therefore contrary to Dominican historical traditions. The bishops' message cited the "notable intranquility reigning in the country" and pointed to the "ideologies contrary to Christ" which, it claimed, had gained predominance. The constitution, finally, failed to mention the 1954 Concordat between the country and the Vatican. The bishops concluded that the PRD ought to revise the offending articles and submit the finished product to a popular referendum.²¹

When the Constitution was promulgated on April 29, the Church did not send a representative to the ceremonies. For the hierarchy, the Constitution did not have validity and was not legitimate. The Church did not refuse to obey it: they simply ignored it. Bosch called it an "act of rebellion."²²

²⁰The text is in El Caribe (April 24, 1963), p. 18.

²¹The text of the bishop's message is in Fides, V (May 5, 1963), 3. On one aspect of the new constitution and its implications in the political realm see Jottin Cury, "El divorcio en la Constitución del PRD," El Caribe (February 12, 1963), p. 6. On the entire issue raised by the promulgation of the constitution see Jorge Losada, "Juan Bosch entre dos fuegos," Visión, XXV (May 31, 1963), 21-24.

²²Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), p. 125.

The government soon responded to the Church's stand with even stronger revolutionary pronouncements. It accused the clergy of being allied with the oligarchy and stated that it had not expected the Church to approve of such democratic principles as secular schools and intellectual freedom, but that the government would go ahead with these measures despite the opposition. Bosch himself defended the constitution when he said, 'The people voted for a democratic revolution. The people want the revolution to progress in this country among all classes. And this revolution cannot begin if we don't have a revolutionary constitution.'²³ The President refused even to consider the Church's suggestions.

Bosch had thus come through two skirmishes with the Church the apparent winner. He had made Father García admit he had no proof of Bosch's alleged Marxism-Leninism in the television debate and his party had adopted a new constitution despite the Church's protests. Both battles had left a residue of bad feeling toward the President on the part of the Church. The new constitution especially rankled the clergy. Bosch's highhanded and holier-than-thou attitude, his refusal to listen to any suggestions, and his failure to compromise lost him the support of those churchmen who before had looked with favor on his government. The result was steadily increasing anti-Bosch movement within the Church which eventually lost him the war and contributed to his overthrow.

A good illustration of the Church's increased opposition to Bosch is provided by the Bishop of Higüey, Mons. Pepén. Like many prelates in the Dominican Republic, Pepén was a moderate liberal. He saw the need for change and social reform, education, and the rising of living standards

²³Quoted by Losada, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

among the masses. Church-building in his district was not confined to ornamental showcases to be used once a week. Rather, his churches were used for services on Sundays, as schools during the weekdays, and as community centers by night. Despite his progressive outlook, Pepén was deathly afraid of Bosch. His great fear was that the government might confiscate the Church's property and interfere in its educational activities. Fear of the Bosch government ultimately paralyzed Pepén's activities and increased his opposition to the regime.²⁴

The Church's relations with Bosch thus continued to deteriorate. One of the President's proposals, which called for the recognition of only the majority labor federation in any collective bargaining situation, would have meant a threat to the continued existence of the minority social-Christian labor federation. The attempt of Bosch to have air force chaplain Father Marcial Silva dismissed for allegedly conspiring with armed forces officers to overthrow the government further antagonized the Church. As the days passed and both sides remained intransigent, Bosch and other PRD leaders made impassioned speeches attacking the Church. The President had by this time, in one way or another, alienated almost all elements in the clergy.²⁵

By July, 1963, the Church had found the issue that would unite all those who had opposed Bosch for diverse reasons: the fear of communism. The bishop of Santiago, Hugo Polanco, charged that communism was infiltrating

²⁴Mons. Juan F. Pepén, personal interview, Higüey, December 15, 1964.

²⁵The nuncio's statement is in El Caribe (July 27, 1963), p. 1. For an overall view of the Father Silva issue see Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Un Informe: Seis Meses de Gobierno, 27 de Febrero-27 de Agosto, 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), pp. 36-37.

Dominican youth and that perhaps it was already too late to be counter-acted. "The forces of evil, though dressed in the skin of lamb," are multiplying," he said. (This was an obvious reference to Bosch who, with his white hair, was often called "the lamb") Polanco continued, "No one now speaks of liberty, of right, of constitution, of order, but only of the triumph of communism in the country."²⁶

Only a week later the episcopate officially joined the attack against communism in the government. The bishops expressed a "profound preoccupation" for what they called the "moment of uncertainty and mistrust" that existed in Dominican society. Their missive said that this was a "grave hour" for all Dominicans and called on the citizenry to resolve their differences. These charges were leveled especially at the government. The Church's communiqué denied that it was intervening in politics but stated that it was only concerned with the love of man for his fellow man. The message concluded by warning against what it called the "ever-growing threat of communism" to the country.²⁷

The Church's position was not so simplistic as to brand Bosch a communist and his government communistic. Rather, the clergy stressed the increasing "communist influence"--the free and open activities of Fidelista-leaning political parties and the ring of presidential advisers whom the Church considered "Leftists." Laútico García, for example, claimed that the government had been taken over by the radicals and ultra-leftists. Bishop Polanco said that the growing presence of communism

²⁶The text is in El Caribe (July 25, 1963), p. 1. See also Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, CXCVI (October 26, 1963), 255.

²⁷The text is in Listín Diario (August 3, 1963), p. 2.

and national turmoil was not the fault of Bosch but that the President was the only one who could counter it. He called this a matter of "maximum urgency" and exhorted the government to act with all speed.²⁸

Much of the Church was thus enlisted in the anti-communist and, eventually, the anti-Bosch movement. Although the papal nuncio, who was of a more liberal persuasion, tried to disassociate the Church from the campaign against Bosch, many priests--especially a group of militantly anti-communist Spanish Jesuits--regularly attacked him. Concentrating especially on the business and professional elements, as well as the armed forces, these clergymen continued to press the communist issue and pictured Bosch as the agent of communist penetration. These charges were not confined to pulpits of the churches, but were also preached in the parochial schools and by the chaplains in the armed forces. In this manner the most powerful groups in the country's politics tended to coalesce in opposition to the Bosch regime; and on September 25, 1963, the Dominican Republic's first constitutional and democratic government in thirty-three years was overthrown.²⁹

One further aspect of the Church's political role in the post-Trujillo years must be discussed before attempting an assessment. This was the series of emotional "Christian Reaffirmation" rallies staged during the late summer of 1963 in many of the Dominican Republic's principal cities. These mass

²⁸Laútico García, "Crisis Revolucionaria?" El Caribe (August 1, 1963), p. 11. The text of Polanco's speech is in El Caribe (August 14, 1963), p. 11. See also Mons. Eliseo Pérez Sánchez, "Cristiana Exhortación al Pueblo Dominicano," El Caribe (August 14, 1963), p. 11.

²⁹See Manuel Maldonado Denis, "La caída de Juan Bosch y la política en la República Dominicana," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 1 (November 1, 1963), 11.

demonstrations were sponsored by the Committee of Christian Reaffirmation, an ultra-Rightist organization which, in style and outlook, bore a close resemblance to the Christian anti-communist crusades in the U.S. Because the committee proclaimed itself a "Christian" organization and because its ties with certain clerics was close, it should be here considered.

The president of the Committee was Enrique J. Alfau, an engineer. In early August, at about the same time that the Church itself had begun to raise the communists-in-government issue, Alfau issued a statement saying that it was time that the country began to combat the anti-patriotic and anti-Christian forces of communism. The communiqué stated that communism, with its false lies and promises, was taking charge in all sectors of the society--political, economic, and social. Alfau said that "we Dominicans have the obligation of defending our Christian country" against these divisive and destructive elements. For that reason the Committee was calling a meeting for the coming Sunday.³⁰

On the following day the conservative and business-oriented National Civic Union Party purchased a full-page advertisement in El Caribe, Santo Domingo's leading newspaper. Under a banner headline reading "Down with Communism," the UCN invited all its militants and sympathizers to join with the Committee of Christian Reaffirmation in its rally.

On Sunday, with thundering shouts of "Cristo sí, Comunismo no," some 12,000-15,000 people gathered in front of the Altar de la Patria in Independence Park to reaffirm their Christianity. The anti-Bosch reactionary Rafael Bonilla Aybar, editor of Prensa Libre, was the principal speaker. The name of President Bosch brought loud jeers. Chief of the

³⁰The text is in El Caribe (August 2, 1962), p. 13.

National Police Brigadier General Belisario Peguero was received with much enthusiasm. Also in attendance was Mario Read Vittini, president of the Democratic Christian Party. But more importantly, Father Marcial Silva, who two weeks earlier had been dismissed from his post as Air Force chaplain for conspiring with Air Force officers to overthrow the government, was also one of the speakers.³¹

Another rally was held the same day in Santiago, the country's second largest city. On the following Sundays similar meetings were held in the cities of La Vega, San Pedro de Macorís, and Higüey. As in the Santo Domingo rally, all classes of people were present; and observers reported that these demonstrations were as successful as those held in the capital. At the La Vega rally seven speakers warned the Dominican people not to submit to the doctrines of communism. Bonilla Aybar, speaking again, declared that the communists in the government were trying to convert the Dominican Republic into "another Cuba."

The Committee of Christian Reaffirmation was soon reorganized into the Civic Anti-Communist Committee, again headed by Enrique Alfau. As such, it began buying full-page advertisements in Listín Diario every day during the month of August warning against communism and accusing Bosch of being the agent of its growth. One of its communiqués, printed in El Caribe, came right out and called the government communistic and promised that all commercial activity in Santo Domingo, as well as in San Francisco, Moca, Puerto Plata, Barahona, Santiago, Azua, and La Vega would be closed until

³¹ Mario Bobea Billini, "La Concentración de Afirmación Cristiana y sus Consecuencias en la Crisis Política Actual," El Caribe (August 6, 1963), p. 11.

communism was eradicated from the government.³² It was this strike of the merchants which probably was the final straw which prompted the military to overthrow Bosch only a few days later.

Official reactions to these activities among the Church's various organizations were mixed. The Revolutionary Social Christian Party and the trade union Autonomous Confederation of Christian Syndicates did not support the demonstrations, while Read Vittini's Democratic Christian Party declared its approval. Though Silva and other individual priests participated in or sympathized with the Committee's activities, the official Church hierarchy declined to comment. The Committee itself admitted that it had no formal ties with the Church.³³

How may one evaluate the conflicting currents which characterized Bosch's relations with the Church? From exile in Puerto Rico the ousted president stated that many priests were the instigators of the coup against him. He said that the Catholic clergy participated in the anti-Bosch movement because "they considered the constitution not in accord with the Holy See" and because the withholding of certain privileges from the clergy was to the Church a sign that the government was communistic.³⁴

The Church, on the other hand, denied having contributed in any way to Bosch's overthrow. In response to an article written by Drew Pearson, Archbishop Beras and Bishops Pepén, Polanco, and Reilly issued a statement in which they said that they had not participated in the anti-Bosch move-

³²The text is in El Caribe (September 21, 1963), p. 9.

³³See Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase," The Reporter, XX:1 (December 5, 1963), 30; and Hispanic American Report, XVI (November, 1963), 773.

³⁴El Caribe (October 4, 1963), p. 1.

ment and that Pearson's charges of their allying with the armed forces "lacked any foundation."³⁵

Both Bosch's claim and the Church's rebuttal have some validity. It is undoubtedly true, as Bosch states, that the Church did not look with favor on the PRD constitution and that it did fear that communism was increasing during his administration. It is also true, as the Church claimed, that it did not participate officially in the anti-Bosch movement (though it did so indirectly by its official criticism of the constitution) and there is no evidence that the episcopate ever officially urged the armed forces to oust the president. Though the Church never officially did these things, it is nevertheless true that unofficially a large number of priests, acting as individuals, opposed Bosch from the start, thought he and his government were communistic, and sought to convince the military to intervene.

The position of most Churchmen, however, was probably best summed up in a statement by Bishop Thomas F. Reilly, himself a participant in many of these events. Reilly wrote:

Dr. Bosch, a most astute campaigner, proved himself as president to be hypersensitive, doctrinaire, contemptuous of many elements devoted to democracy and strangely out of touch with the traditions of his country. I feared that his government would fall in the last week of July and spoke strongly in an effort to save it. At the same time, the Apostolic Nuncio Emmanuele Clarizo and other Bishops in friendly talks with Bosch and members of his government indicated what must be done to regain some measure of lost popular support.

I regret the coup d'état and have a deep compassion for Dr. Bosch, who had reason to consider himself a hard-working, honest president bent upon establishing his personal notions of democracy and social justice in the Dominican Republic. Yet it is undeniable that responsible civilian groups were disturbed by the open smuggling of small arms

³⁵Fides, VI (October 27, 1963), 1.

to the little communist groups, the bland tolerance of communism, the formation of a Bosch-directed militia ostensibly to protect the cane field.

There was widespread determination that the Dominican Republic would not permit itself to become another Cuba. Dr. Bosch obstinately refused any gesture to the nation to show that he shared this determination.³⁶

The point is not whether Reilly's statement is accurate or not. Indeed, in several respects it is inaccurate. The formation of a "Bosch-directed militia," for example, was only a figment of the coup-makers' imagination; there was no such militia. But the point is that most clerics believed such a militia did exist and they were fearful that the Dominican Republic would be converted into "another Cuba." Bosch did little to allay the Church's fears.

Not all churchmen had this attitude toward the Bosch government. The hierarchy was slightly less unfavorably disposed toward his administration than the priests (see Table 7).

Table 7

Church Reaction to Bosch
Government, by Rank

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused</u> <u>to Answer</u>
Hierarchy	4	1	0	2	1
Priests	16	3	1	12	0

It was also interesting that of the sample the native-born clerics were more favorably disposed to the Bosch government than the foreign born (see Table 8).

³⁶Thomas F. Reilly, C.S.S.R., Bishop of San Juan de la Maguana, Dominican Republic, "Why Bosch was Ousted: Dominicans were Apprehensive of Another Cuba--Prelate Says," letter to New York Times (October 27, 1963), IV, 8.

Table 8

Church Reaction to Bosch's
Government, by Birthplace

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused</u> <u>to Answer</u>
Native-born	3	2	1	0	0
Foreign-born	17	2	0	14	1

Finally, though the sample was too small to warrant a definite conclusion, the Jesuit order seemed to be more opposed to the Bosch government than the other orders or the unaffiliated (see Table 9).

Table 9

Church Reaction to Bosch's
Government, by Order

<u>Order</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u> <u>to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused</u> <u>to Answer</u>
Jesuits	4	0	0	4	0
Other Orders	6	2	0	4	0
Unaffiliated	10	2	1	6	1

Though individual clerics were not all opposed to the Bosch government, the overwhelming majority (70 per cent of the sample) were. This percentage is roughly the same as that of the armed forces command (colonel and above). The Church, further, because of the nature of its organization, did not often present a disunited front in public. In this respect, too, it was like the armed forces. Unlike some of the other groups in the society, both the armed forces and the Church were able to operate from positions of unity and strength.

The Church's political strength did not suffer from its opposition to Bosch and its contribution to his overthrow. Bosch had been elected by an almost 2-1 majority over his nearest competitor, and his election had been an expression of genuinely popular support. But during his seven months in office he had antagonized the most important power centers in Dominican society. When the Church opposed him, then it was merely reflecting what was becoming widespread public sentiment. The Church, like these other sectors active in politics, was still in favor of democracy; it was only opposed to the particular form democracy had taken under Bosch.

The Roman Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic had changed its political orientation a great deal in a few short years. Its official position had evolved from the support of an extremely oppressive dictatorship to the support of democracy. This transition had not always been smooth, but, from the Church's point of view, it had been eminently successful. During the last two years of the Trujillo era, individual churchmen had severely attacked the dictatorship while the official Church policy was to work for conciliation and a rapprochement. This ambiguous stand meant that when the Trujillos were overthrown, the Church was not discredited by its former close ties with the much-hated dictatorship; it could cite the many examples of its own opposition.

Following the assassination of Trujillo and the subsequent crumbling of the entire Trujillo family dictatorship, a wave of democratic sentiment swept the Dominican Republic. The Church, too, came out enthusiastically in favor of democracy and social reform. That it did not approve of the particular democratic government which ensued or the social reformer who

led it did not harm its position, for the Church's opposition to the Bosch government coincided with the views of the most influential elements in the political society. The Church had weathered a complete reversal in its official political position without being more than minimally damaged in the process. Little ill will toward the Church, little anti-clericalism, had been generated in this transition; and the Church continued as one of the most unified and most powerful forces in Dominican politics.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS-PROFESSIONAL- LANDHOLDING ELITE

The spiritual arm of the Church had thus been united with the military might of the armed forces in opposition to the Bosch government. To this combination was added the economic power of the business-professional-landholding elite.

The final overthrow of Trujillo had been organized under the leadership of a group of professionals and businessmen who were chafing at the uncertainties and barriers to advancement and wealth under the shaking dictatorship. Few of the business-professional-landholding upper class had been willing to jump from passive opposition to Trujillo to active resistance; most of them feared that a revolution would lead to a Castro-like takeover and violent measures against themselves.

Those of the Dominican elite who had continued to live in the country during the Trujillo era planned little change in the workings of the social, economic, or political order after the dictator was assassinated. Indeed, it had been because Trujillo's policies began to interfere with their activities and their profits in the last years of the regime that these same elements had killed him. While they did not, subsequently, favor a return to another dictatorship like Trujillo's, they did hope for a new government in which their privileges and prerogatives would not be usurped. It was the businessmen and the professionals who led the opposition to the continued Trujillo family dictatorship under Ramfis, who manned the interim

Council of State, and who hoped to continue their rule after the conservative National Civic Union Party won the 1962 elections. They did not intend a wholesale about-face from former times; rather, they stressed peace, order, and the need for a regime in which their lofty position would be maintained.¹

The election of Juan Bosch thus came as a profound shock to the middle and upper "best" elements. They had simply assumed that because all their friends favored the National Civic Union, it would therefore win. They failed to consider the overwhelming majorities that Bosch and his Dominican Revolutionary Party would pile up among the rural campesinos and urban workers. Now they were terror stricken at the prospect of what a reformist government might do and what this "Jacobin" might accomplish.

Bosch had often openly expressed his distaste for the elite of Santo Domingo who had, in one way or another, achieved some sort of working arrangement with the Trujillo regime.² He treated them as moral lepers with whom he wanted no contact and refused to consider them as possible political allies. To these people, in turn, Bosch's very existence was anathema. In a society where class and social standing are most important, no matter the political party affiliation, Bosch didn't fit.

¹See Carleton Beals, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," National Guardian, XIV (December 11, 1961), 4.

²One writer has called this element, along with the Trujillista generals who overthrew Bosch, the "syndicate," implying that they represented the gangsters of the Trujillo era. See John P. Roche, "Return of the Syndicate," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 5-8.

The Dominican Republic has traditionally been a two-class society composed of the rich and the poor. There is no landed nobility in Santo Domingo as there is in Europe or even Peru. Rather, it is the lower-upper or upper-middle class "first families"--big businessmen, prominent professionals, landholders, and big industrialists--who have created their own aristocracy and who dictate the modes of the society and condition the social rhythm of its existence. This group constitutes no more than a very small percentage of the population; it was estimated by Bosch himself at 5,000 families with 15,000 adult members, including a sizable number of foreigners.³ Others, using more restrictive criteria, would place the number at no more than 100 families.⁴

Bosch believes that the class structure is the most important factor in determining Dominican history. The rigid stratification began, he has written, with the creation of an artificial aristocracy in the colonial era; and the gap between the "have's" and the "have not's" continued to widen into the 20th century when the upper strata became increasingly wealthy.⁵ Bosch proposed to govern for the benefit of the masses, the first government to attempt to do so in the nation's history. The Dominican Republic had a government which aimed to rule without the aid of the "first families" and against what they considered their best interests.

³ Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), p. 62.

⁴ Marcio Antonio Mejía Ricart, Las Clases Sociales en Santo Domingo (Ciudad Trujillo: Librería Dominicana, 1953), pp. 23-24; and Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón, "Estructura de Nuestra Oligarquía," Listín Diario (December 12, 1964), p. 7.

⁵ Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo (Caracas: Grabados Nacionales, 1959), p. 21.

It is not surprising, then, that the business-professional-landholding elite led the opposition to the democratic and constitutional government. The PRD was the party of the worker, the farmer, the man in the street. The common people now had a say in their nation's affairs while the traditional upper class found itself out of power. Such a situation was intolerable to the elite; even more than the armed forces or the Church the Dominican oligarchy opposed the Bosch government from the start and worked almost incessantly for its overthrow. Because of the primary role played by the elite in the September 25, 1963, coup, this chapter concentrates primarily on the relations between it and Bosch.

The Elite and the Final Overthrow of the Trujillos

Through his monopolization of the national economy and through his control of their organizations, Trujillo had kept the elite elements atomized and hence largely powerless. Upon his death, then, these elements began to organize and take a more active part in politics.

The business community had been organized into the National Civic Union, a non-partisan, civic-patriotic association which led the fight against the Ramfis-Balaguer regime. But in addition to the UCN, the now-independent business and professional associations also joined the struggle against the continued Trujillo family dictatorship.

The businessmen were primarily concerned that the Organization of American States should lift the economic sanctions which hurt their profit-making.⁶ They made little mention of democracy, but they did call

⁶"El Problema de las Sanciones y sus Consecuencias," El 134 (November 4, 1961), p. 2; and Harry Kantor, "The Destruction of Trujillo's Empire" (Mimeographed copy of lecture delivered to Peace Corps contingent in training at Seattle, Washington, December, 1962), p. 6.

for respect for basic, universal human rights. Thus on August 28, 1961, in a paid advertisement in El Caribe, the Dominican Pharmaceutical Association joined the Lawyers' Association, the Medical Society, and the Dominican Society of Engineers and Architects in advocating that human rights be honored in the country. Their communiqué called for moderation and declared their "absolute repudiation of all acts of force or violence."⁷

A week later a similar communiqué from the Institute of Certified Public Accountants was published. It called for "moderation" but urged respect for basic human rights.⁸ Realizing that their professional and business positions might be jeopardized by an outright attack on the tyranny, all these associations, somewhat later, joined in calling for a civic action program of good faith and patriotism along the same lines that the moderate UCN was advocating.⁹

The organizational strength of the elite steadily increased during the last half of 1961. The UCN continued to lead the opposition to the dictatorship. It was influential in the final overthrow of the regime in November and soon emerged as the dominant political group in the country. The UCN led the general strike of December and persuaded Balaguer to share power with a Council of State. At this time the elite was the strongest and best organized of the newly emerging sectors of the population.

⁷The text is in El Caribe (August 28, 1961), p. 11.

⁸The text is in El Caribe (September 4, 1961), p. 3.

⁹The text is in Unión Cívica, I (September 20, 1961), 6.

The Elite and the Council of State

The seven-man Council of State which took power in mid-January, 1962, and ruled for the next fourteen months till Bosch's inauguration was made up almost entirely of professionals, businessmen, and representatives of the Dominican Republic's first families. It was a moderately conservative government which, while recognizing the need for change and reform, was not ready to carry out a full-scale political, social, and economic change. Its concern was primarily to establish stability and order in the chaotic Dominican political system and to create a climate in which private enterprise could flourish with a minimum of government regulation or planning.

Though the interim Council was made up of members of the elite, it represented the moderate element in this group. It thus came under attack from the extreme Rightists who wished absolutely no change at all--except perhaps retrogression. The Council was regarded as being "far too liberal," as one businessman grumbled. What these Rightists wanted to see was the return of a tough and tightly-knit government through which their personal fortunes could be advanced. They did not advocate a return of the Trujillos since the accumulation of wealth by this means would be again limited exclusively to the Trujillo family. Rather, they preferred that the government be in the hands of a strong military man whom they could manipulate for their own ends. For this reason the extreme Right, which was composed almost exclusively of those who had been among the favored few of the slain dictator and whose profit-hungry appetites were being starved, sought to provoke anomic movements--demonstrations and riots--in the hope that a Trujillista general would step in to prevent the chaos.¹⁰

¹⁰See James Buchanan, "Dominican '71 Caught in Crossfire," Miami Herald (May 12, 1962), p. 1.

Despite this prevailing sentiment on the part of the extreme Right, the period of the Council of State was remarkably free from political activity on the part of the Dominican business-professional-landholding community. The reason was simple: the same people who made up the Council and who received high government positions under it also were leaders of this community. Though the Council established an agrarian reform program, for example, it was limited and did not represent a threat to the landholders. The same was true of the Council's other reforms. A government composed of businessmen was simply not willing to make changes prejudicial to the business community. As one observer commented, "Too many people have too big a stake in things as they are to risk real innovations willingly."¹¹

The Elite and the Bosch Regime

As the 1962 election campaign progressed, the National Civic Union Party became even more closely identified with the business community. It had begun as a moderate, civic-patriotic organization dedicated to transforming the Dominican Republic into a stable and constitutional order. As such, it had attracted people from all social classes--both rich and poor. But it soon became more exclusive. Since several Councilmen were known to be UCN sympathizers, it was closely associated with the Council of State and was even accused of being the official party of the Council. It came to be considered a rich man's party and was the only party to occupy the Right on the Dominican political spectrum.¹² In a country where the poor

¹¹Quoted in Ibid.

¹²See Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 94-95.

outnumber the rich by an overwhelming majority, the Party of the business community and the elite stood little chance.

Bosch's landslide electoral victory over the UCN and its presidential candidate, a physician named Viriato Fiallo, brought class war to the Dominican Republic. His coalition, made up of peasants, slum dwellers, and some middle class elements, was the direct antithesis of the wealthy UCN supporters. The attempt of Bosch to instigate a genuine democratic and social revolution for the benefit of his followers was met by the concerted and unrelenting opposition of the Dominican establishment. The result of this conflict was the business community-inspired ouster of Bosch by the military and the reestablishment of a business-oriented government that was almost the exact replica of the one he had defeated by an overwhelming margin.¹³

At least at the beginning Bosch refused to deal harshly with the Right. Realizing that his administration needed the support of those who had staffed the government under Trujillo, the President refused to carry the de-Trujillo-ization campaign to completion. He is reported to have said that "to do so would mean arresting tens of thousands of people and deflect our energies from building our country."¹⁴

Bosch also attempted to create a climate propitious for business and investment. The Acting Commercial Secretary of Canada in Santo Domingo wrote that in the first three months of 1963 alone, more Canadian businessmen came to the Dominican Republic than in the whole previous year. He

¹³See Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a Coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," *The Nation*, CXCVIII (October 26, 1963), 255.

¹⁴Quoted in Sidney Lens, "Coup in the Caribbean," *Liberation*, VIII (October, 1963), 4.

reported that sales to the country were increasing and that under Bosch "prospects continue to be promising."¹⁵

Concern by the business community as to the course the new President would take was reportedly calmed by his early speeches and actions. The nervousness of the propertied interests over the presentation in January of a new draft constitution containing clauses tending to discourage merchants, industrialists, landowners, and potential investors was eased with its modifications by the Constituent Assembly. The fiscal policy of the Bosch administration also pleased the businessmen: the President promised that his government would never spend more than it received. To further stimulate development a draft law, which exempted new investments from duties for periods of up to eight years and from income taxes for up to three years, was prepared by the Industrial Development Commission and was being studied by the administration. Bosch, further, put great emphasis on restoring the country's credit abroad and clearing up the commercial arrears.¹⁶

With the speeches and tensions generated by the electoral campaign over, the economy began to show signs of renewed activity in all aspects of business. In part, the improving economic picture was due to the business community's renewed confidence in the government. Industrial development regained its relatively high level during the first quarter of 1963 and the number of construction permits showed a sharp increase in February. The construction materials industry continued the high volume of

¹⁵J. Clark Leith, "Making Sales in Santo Domingo," Foreign Trade (September 7, 1963), pp. 9-11.

¹⁶"Dominican Republic Strives for Industrial Growth," International Trade Review (May, 1963), pp. 95-96; and "New Bosch Regime Placates Dominican Businessmen's Fears," International Commerce, LXIX (June 10, 1963), 19-20.

production which had existed throughout 1962. As a reflection of the political uncertainty, the gross gold and foreign exchange holdings of the Central Bank declined from \$21.5 million on December 31, 1962 to \$17.3 million on February 28, 1963; but after Bosch took office they rose to \$22.2 million by March 29. Commercial banks expanded their loans from \$74.5 million at the end of 1962 to \$76.3 million on February 28, 1963. The principal increase was in commercial loans. On April 4 Bosch said that his administration had begun with a budgetary deficit of \$32 million for 1963 but that \$7.8 million in savings had already been made. Finally, in March, 1963, a \$22.75 million loan by the U.S. Agency for International Development was to be used to provide foreign exchange for imports from the U.S.¹⁷

Despite these early attempts on the part of the new government to create a healthy economic climate and thus gain the support of the business community, Bosch and the elite remained mutually antagonistic. The businessmen continued to fear the prospects presented by a revolutionary administration, while the President continued to exhibit a hostility to businessmen. Bosch's idea was to change the entire concept of business dealings in the Dominican Republic, to incorporate commerce into his revolutionary programs, and to infuse business with a broader social sense of national responsibility, not personal gain. These ideas were expressed in a speech he delivered to the annual convention of the Chamber of Commerce of the Americas meeting in Santo Domingo. The talk clearly defined his conception of the role of business and is worth quoting at some length. Bosch said:

¹⁷Michael Eric, "El Progreso Económico en la República Dominicana," La Prensa Gráfica [San Salvador] (July 11, 1963), p. 7; and "New Bosch Regime . . .," op. cit., pp. 95-96.

We hope . . . that Dominican business understands its social role and contributes to bettering the conditions of the Dominican people, not only through the taxes that it pays to the State and that the State returns in the form of works and services for the benefit of the great mass, but also through its own measures, that is, through business itself. Measures that favor the people at the same time favor the businessmen.

Bosch continued:

The businessman cannot live, as he has for a century or two, enclosed in his own world, turning his back on the changing reality. Even the businessman has to live in accord with this changing reality. He has to mould himself to the circumstances of the times; he has to adapt, in one form or another, so that the great revolution that is stirring the masses will be a just and democratic revolution and without violence. If he does not, the dikes of his resistance will one day be filled to the brim; that which the businessmen have constructed for their own profit will be torn down and destroyed.

The President concluded:

The times are revolutionary. It is not possible to stop the march of history . . . to detain a process that has been building up strength since the industrial revolution began in England in the 18th century. The times are revolutionary and the businessman must necessarily adapt himself to the revolutionary conception. This conception can be synthesized in a very few words: welfare for all.¹⁸

This revolutionary concept of commerce was wholly outside the realm of experience of the Dominican business community and it began to oppose the President. Leading the opposition was the Party which Bosch's PRD had defeated convincingly in the December, 1962, elections--the National Civic Union.

The UCN, the Party of the business-professional-landholding community, opposed the Bosch administration from the start. Though it was clear almost immediately that Bosch had won the elections, UCN candidate Fiallo bitterly

¹⁸The Bosch speech was reprinted under the title, "La Función de Comercio y Otras Cosas," PANORAMAS, Número 6 (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1963), pp. 145-152. See also B. Corcminas Pepén, "La Gran Responsabilidad de los Hombrés de Empresas," La Nación (February 16, 1963), p. 1; and Jaime A. Lockward, "La Prosperidad y su Función Social," La Nación (February 19, 1963), p. 5.

refused to concede for several days. The UCN high-handedly refused the President elect's offer to participate in the new government. Fiallo left the country two days before Bosch's inauguration in an obvious expression of contempt.

UCN attempts to topple the Bosch government began immediately after he took office. Anti-Bosch propaganda was concentrated on two seemingly contradictory themes: (1) that his government was being run by the U.S. "imperialists," and (2) that it was being infiltrated by communists. The target for the first theme was the intensely nationalistic Dominican people while the targets for the second were the Dominican military, the conservative U.S. press, and the UCN's own associates in the business community.¹⁹

The first charge--that his government was being run by the U.S.--provided the UCN with little advantage. It was well known that the U.S. had a huge stake in the Dominican Republic, but the charges that decisions were being made for Bosch in the U.S. Embassy fell flat. The President himself was an intense nationalist and often made it abundantly clear that he brooked no interference from the outside.

To the second charge--that the Bosch government was being infiltrated by the communists--the UCN received a better response. UCN propagandists were clever in their use of the techniques of modern political warfare. They handed out inflammatory information to syndicated "anti-communist" U.S. newspapermen, such as Hal Hendrix and Jules DuBois; and the fear that Bosch was another Castro ultimately reached the halls of the U.S. Congress. Women members of the UCN, posing as representatives of the Castro-oriented 14th of June Movement, telephoned armed forces officers

¹⁹New York Times (May 27, 1963), p. 10.

with threats of execution by firing squad once the Movement gained the upper hand in the revolutionary government.²⁰ To the officers, who were well aware of Fidel Castro's shooting of the former Batista military chieftains, these threats were real indeed.

Viriato Fiallo soon sent a letter to El Caribe in which he accused Bosch of "putting communists in key posts" in his government. He wrote that "The communist danger in our country is evident and increasing day by day." The letter further charged that Bosch was using the schools for communist indoctrination and of giving aid to the totalitarians of the extreme Left.²¹ Fiallo did not specify who were communists and what posts they occupied, but his charges had a considerable impact. Eventually the communists-in-government charge became the issue that united all the major opposition to the Bosch government.

The UCN had another issue on which it acted on behalf of the business community and against Bosch. This concerned the disposal of the vast Trujillo properties which the government had inherited upon the overthrow of the dictatorship. While the PRD administration proposed to hold on to these properties as a national patrimony for the benefit of all the Dominican people, the UCN wanted these holdings to be converted into share companies with private investors holding a majority of the stock. The profiteering element in the UCN wanted to lay their hands on this booty

²⁰Florangel Cárdenas, "Three Coups: One Successful, One Aborted, One Yet to Come," The San Juan Review, I (February, 1964), 4.

²¹The text is in El Caribe (May 17, 1963), p. 16. Based also on Viriato Fiallo, personal interview, Santo Domingo, December 30, 1964.

for its own advantage. Bosch was severely criticized for not going along with this proposal.²²

UCN opposition to the Bosch regime continued--vehemently and unceasingly. It was the UCN which organized the six-party coalition which formed to oppose everything which the PRD administration stood for. Speaking from exile in Puerto Rico, Bosch said he was deposed through a conspiracy headed by leaders of his political opposition, the UCN. He singled out Fiallo as the prime mover in the conspiracy. Bosch stated that though the UCN posed as the defender of democracy, it had actually killed democracy because it did not want or could not respect the overwhelming will of the people as expressed at the polls.²³

In addition to the business-oriented UCN political party, the business community began to express their opposition to Bosch through their business, professional, and social clubs and associations. Bosch's idea that commerce should assume a more social responsibility was not shared by the majority of the business community, and every attempt of the President or his majority party to pass social welfare measures met with the concerted hostility of the business associations.

The first instance of business opposition to the PRD program occurred even before Bosch was inaugurated. The issue involved was the proposed new constitution which attempted to incorporate social welfare concepts within

²²One observer maintains that the communist issue was only a smoke-screen to hide the desire to grab the Trujillo properties. See Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 35-38.

²³Report of a Bosch radio broadcast over station WIPR, the official radio of Puerto Rico, Miami Herald (October 8, 1963), p. 16-A.

the supreme law of the land. The business associations were the first groups to react in a significant way to these revolutionary proposals.

The Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry; the Association of Industries; and the Patronal Confederation claimed the proposed constitution ignored the rights of business and would lead to economic disaster for the country. While claiming to recognize the need for social justice in the Dominican Republic, the three business associations argued that a healthy climate for commerce was also essential. They singled out the articles in the new constitution which favored labor at the expense of the employers for special attack.²⁴ These articles gave organized labor the right to introduce legislation in the Congress and to share in profits.

The business leaders followed up their published communiqué by directing a harshly critical letter to Santo Domingo's leading newspaper where it received front page coverage. The letter stated that there existed a "justified fear" for the investment of new capital as a consequence of the projected constitution of the Bosch government. This missive, which was signed by the presidents of the three business associations mentioned above, argued that it was "absolutely impossible" for new capital to be invested in the development of industry when these could later be the object of expropriation and collectivization.²⁵

The PRD reacted to this criticism by offering to discuss these issues with the business community in the hope of adjusting their differences. But it was clear that the businessmen, who had long been afraid of what

²⁴The text is in El Caribe (January 31, 1963), p. 2.

²⁵The text is in El Caribe (February 5, 1963), p. 1. See also J.R. Hernández, "El Aporte de la Libre Empresa," El Caribe (January 31, 1963), p. 6.

the reform-minded Bosch might do and who now saw that their fears had been well grounded, were not prepared to compromise. Another blast from the business associations came less than a week later.

The Dominican Association of Landholders and Agriculturists this time joined the other business associations in opposing the new constitution. In a full, two-page advertisement, the businessmen pointed to the "gravity of the danger in adopting the proposed text." It stated that the acceptance of the new constitution would mean a considerable waste of national wealth, the impossibility of obtaining new foreign capital, the disappearance of many enterprises and the difficulty of obtaining new ones, and--this was their trump--the lowering of the standards of living not only of the capitalist class but of the workers as well. The paid advertisement concluded by appealing for a constitution that would bring harmony to all groups and classes.²⁶

The PRD-dominated assembly, which was drafting the new constitution, accepted some of these criticisms on the part of the business community and made some modifications in the most offensive articles. But even the modified version failed to satisfy the business leaders. The Association of Landowners and Agriculturists criticized the revision on the grounds that it would be fatal to the economic welfare of the country. They specifically objected to Article 16 which gave the Congress, in which the PRD held at least two to one majorities in both houses, virtual carte blanche power to oversee contracts or to regulate the economy in the national interest.²⁷

²⁶The text is in El Caribe (February 10, 1963), pp. 10-11.

²⁷The text is in El Caribe (April 13, 1963), p. 13. See also Partido

Business opposition to Bosch and his administration continued throughout his seven-month rule. Seemingly on every issue which the President or his Party proposed, the bitter and undivided hostility of the business community was aroused.

On April 4, 1963, for example, Bosch announced the need for increased taxes, stressing that the incidence was not to fall on the already-overburdened shoulders of the poor. By a very simple process of elimination, it became apparent on whose shoulders the incidence would fall. The reaction of the businessmen was immediate and vehement--they were against it.²⁸

Another of Bosch's tax proposals aroused the hostility of the business community. Reminiscent of Henry George's "single tax," he proposed a law providing that any increase in the value of a piece of property due to public improvement (for example, the extra value a new highway would give the adjoining land) should go to the government.²⁹ Though the law was not enacted, this proposal was sufficient to frighten the influential property-owners still more.

An attempt to reformulate the outmoded Labor Code also met with stiff business resistance. The Association of Landowners and Agriculturists claimed that the new Code was being written by PRD deputy, Miguel Soto, president of the Party's labor arm. Any measure in which Soto had a hand,

(Footnote 27 continued from preceding page)

Demócrata Cristiano, Un Informe: Seis Meses de Gobierno, 27 de Febrero-27 de Agosto, 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), p. 4.

²⁸See El Caribe (April 6, 1963), p. 11.

²⁹This type of tax is not particularly unusual in a democracy. Great Britain, for example, has enacted such a measure.

the Association argued, would be extremely prejudicial to the interests of the employers.³⁰ The National Council of Men of Enterprise also objected to the proposed reform of the Labor Code.³¹

In the exclusive Union Club of Santo Domingo an organization called Independent Dominican Action (ADI) was formed. Its initial communiqué said that it was to be a non-partisan political group dedicated to democratic principles, the defense of spiritual values and traditional sentiments, and the ending of class strife.³² In fact, Independent Dominican Action became a principal focus for the growing opposition to Bosch and was closely linked with the UCN. It severely denounced the President and his programs on several occasions and its extremely Right wing leaders were among the principal organizers of the reactionary Christian anti-communist crusades which swept the country during the late summer.

Whereas previously Bosch had been sporadically criticized by several of the business associations, he now received their concerted and united opposition. On May 14, 1963, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry was created and three days later the first general assembly was held. In his opening speech President Juan Gassó Pereyra said that the Federation was to be the rallying center for all business, industrial, and agricultural societies.³³ From this time until the end of his short tenure the business opposition to Bosch became even more unified and effective.

³⁰See El Caribe (June 29, 1963), p. 1.

³¹The text is in El Caribe (June 28, 1963), p. 18. See also the Boletín Industrial for this period.

³²The text is in El Caribe (March 17, 1963), p. 14.

³³For the organizational announcement see El Caribe (May 15, 1963), p. 1. An editorial is on p. 6. The speech is reported in El Caribe (May 18, 1963), p. 9.

Business resistance and hostility to the President thus continued to increase. If he or his Party didn't receive it from one side they received it from the other. The owners of La Romana, the only foreign-owned sugar complex in the Dominican Republic, were accused by Bosch of trying to disrupt and eventually overthrow his government because of his efforts to promulgate a law fixing top prices on the Dominican sugar exports.³⁴ Whether there was any truth to his charge that the La Romana organization would go so far as to advocate his overthrow cannot be ascertained, but it was well known that the U.S.-owned company was not particularly favorably disposed toward Bosch.

Centers of political power also exist in some of the nationalist social-business clubs of the capital city. In regard to the case of Bosch, the most important of these was the organization of the Spanish businessmen. These Spanish businessmen had long been among the President's most vituperative critics and he had responded with equally stinging and bitter attacks. The Spaniards were reportedly the instigators of the September merchants' strike which finally forced Bosch's overthrow.³⁵

The President's agrarian reform was another of the many programs that were frustrated by the elite. Bosch had planned to dole out the former Trujillo lands to the peasants; but the program was blocked when landowners, who claimed to have owned the properties prior to Trujillo, tried to regain their former properties through the courts. The resulting

³⁴See El Caribe (May 29, 1963), p. 1.

³⁵See Ronald Hilton, "Report on Santo Domingo: Latin America Specialist Outlines Events Leading to Coup," letter to New York Times (October 1, 1963), p. 38.

legal entanglements stalled the agrarian reform.³⁶ With the distribution of the land thus halted, thousands of campesinos began the invasion of what was considered by the landowners as their private domain. This revolutionary uprising of course provoked great fear and an uproar among the terratenientes.³⁷

On the last day of July, 1963, the Dominican Congress attempted to deal with some of these problems in the notorious "Law of Confiscations." Aimed at stopping the complicated litigation over the ownership of the former Trujillo properties and thus at giving new impetus to the stalled agrarian reform, the law provided that all properties which the state had in its possession could not be abrogated. More importantly, it stated that anyone who had obtained property "illicitly" under Trujillo or subsequent administrations could have it confiscated by the government.³⁸ This last section of the law was so vague that all private property was put in jeopardy. The vagueness led to the conviction that only the revolutionary Bosch or his even more revolutionary Party would have the authority to judge what "illicit" enrichment meant, a prospect which was not pleasing to the business-landowning community.

The Dominican Association of Lawyers sent a letter to Bosch and to the congressmen citing four areas in which the Law of Confiscations violated

³⁶See Hispanic American Report, XVI (September, 1963), 682. On the complex problem of determining the ownership of the former Trujillo properties see Edward DeGraaf, "The Strange Legacy of El Benefactor," The Reporter, XXV (July 6, 1961), 30-31.

³⁷Leoncio Ramos, "El Golpe de Estado del 25 de Septiembre," Ley y Justicia, I (October 25, 1963), 16-30.

³⁸The text is in El Caribe (July 31, 1963), p. 13.

the Constitution.³⁹ Acting in harmony the National Council of Men of Enterprise; the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry; the Association of Landowners and Agriculturists; the Association of Industries, and the Patronal Confederation purchased a full-page advertisement in El Caribe in which they repudiated the Law of Confiscations, appealed to the government to bring a necessary period of tranquility to the country, and called on all democratic elements in the nation to give all the help necessary to prevent the Dominican Republic from being converted into another Cuba. This last danger was inevitable, they said, unless the present government's policies were discontinued.⁴⁰

On the 31st of July El Caribe bannered a headline, "The Communist Danger" and an editorial on the front page. On this occasion the owner editor of the newspaper, Germán Ornes, was acting more as a frightened property owner who feared that his business might be confiscated by the government than as the free and crusading newspaperman that he usually was.⁴¹ The editorial listed the various forces that were opposed to "communist activity"--industrialists, newspapermen, the clergy, landowners, the "democratic" political parties, the armed forces, and agriculturists. With this lineup against him Bosch was already doomed by the end of July, though he remained in office for almost two more months.

³⁹The text is in El Caribe (July 29, 1963), p. 9.

⁴⁰The text is in El Caribe (July 30, 1963), p. 11. See also Partido Demócrata Cristiano, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴¹Ornes' fear was caused by a Bosch comment that perhaps the ownership of El Caribe was not quite so clear as it had seemed at the time the newspaper was turned over to Ornes. The paper had been restored to Ornes, the original owner, by President Balaguer in late December, 1961. At that time few questioned whether Ornes' claims to the paper were legitimate. See pp. 350-351.

The Law of Confiscation had one further effect--it prompted a new and stronger charge by the National Civic Union against Bosch. Two of the UCN senators had walked out of the chamber during the debate on the measure and it was clear that the business-oriented political party was violently against the Law. UCN leader Fiallo sent Bosch a letter accusing the President of concentrating all powers of the state in his hands and claiming that his regime was fast becoming a dictatorship. It was, further, according to Fiallo, a dictatorship in which the communists were gaining the upper hand.⁴²

The conflict between Bosch and the business community was headed for a climax. Both sides refused to compromise. The dispute had long before reached a point where neither side was willing to retreat, but on August 26, just one month before the government would be overthrown, an attempt at reconciliation was made. A group of directors of the National Council of Men of Enterprise--J.R. Hernández of the Patronal Confederation, Marino Auffan of the Chamber of Commerce, Juan Pablo Toral of the National Council of Men of Enterprise, Elizardo Dickson of the Association of Landowners and Agriculturists, and Tomás Pastoriza and Antonio Najri of the Association of Industries--met with Bosch for four hours. One of the directors was quoted as saying: "The President insists that the business community must be infused with a modern spirit as one of the requisites of his social program in the Dominican Republic. The President has very strong ideas. We also have very strong though opposing ideas. Nevertheless, it was an amicable meeting."⁴³

⁴²The text is in El Caribe (July 29, 1963), p. 9.

⁴³Listín Diario (August 27, 1963), p. 1.

The differences between Bosch and the business community thus seemed to be irreconcilable. When it was already too late the President attempted to assuage businessmen's fears. At the end of August, as a gesture of co-operation toward the business community, Julio A. Cuello, an independent, was named justice minister to replace Luis Lembergt Peguero, a member of the PRD. The President began to hold a series of luncheons with the businessmen in an attempt to reconcile their differences, but the basic antagonism between Bosch and business persisted.

The climax was reached shortly before the constitutional government was overthrown. On Friday, September 20, five days before the coup, a commercial strike closed the leading stores and businesses in Santo Domingo. It was estimated that the strike affected some 75 per cent of the commercial establishments in the capital and that the stoppage was partially extended to some of the other major cities. Although almost all of the large stores in Santo Domingo were closed, the smaller shops remained open, many under Police protection. The protection was required since some of the businesses had been threatened with damage by hired thugs and others were reportedly closed only with bribes of \$100.⁴⁴ The following day the shop-keepers' strike was broken when most shops in the capital, with the exception of the exclusive stores on the main street, reopened.

The strike had been organized by the business-oriented National Civic Union Party acting in collaboration with the National Front for the Fight

⁴⁴Julio D. Postigo's Librería Dominicana was one of the shops which remained open. Postigo, president of the middle class Rotary Club and a PRD sympathizer, gave a graphic account of the threats he received and also of the "communist" accusations hurled against him. Personal interview, Santo Domingo, November 27, 1964.

Against Communism and Independent Dominican Action. The Front and ADI, composed mostly of business and professional people, had sought to turn the commercial shutdown into a general strike which would force the overthrow of Bosch. Their plea was broadcast over three of Santo Domingo's leading radio stations on the morning the stoppage began. The country's workers' federations declined to join the strike, however, and issued a joint statement claiming that the action was a thinly-disguised plot to depose the government. The plan for a total paralysis through a general strike was thus frustrated, but the store-closing was eminently successful in its primary purpose. The UCN, the Front, and ADI sought to provoke anti-government sentiment. While the strike did not last as long as these organizations had hoped and was not 100 per cent effective, it was nevertheless a political success as it produced an atmosphere propitious for a coup.⁴⁵

The day before Bosch was overthrown the New York World Telegram bannered a front page headline which screamed "Dominican Regime Near Collapse." Pulitzer-Prize winning columnist Hal Hendrix pointed to the legislation proposed by the Dominican administration providing for stringent confiscation measures against those who might have benefitted in any way from the Trujillo rule. Those who had benefitted most from his rule, at least until the last two years of the dictatorship, were those business elements with which this chapter is concerned. "Should

⁴⁵The merchants' strike is reported in El Caribe (September 22, 1963), p. 1; New York Times (September 21, 1963), p. 2 and (September 23, 1963), p. 3; Miami Herald (September 21, 1963), p. 1; and Hispanic American Report, XVI (November, 1963), 871. See also Hilton, op. cit., p. 38; and David Blank, "Dominican Ultras Sabotage Latin Democratic Reforms," New Americas, III (October 21, 1963).

this legislation be pushed," wrote Hendrix, "it could trigger President Bosch's ouster overnight."⁴⁶ That very night, with the connivance and urging of the business community, the armed forces staged the coup.⁴⁷

The Elite and the Post-Bosch Government

The overthrow of Bosch resulted in a regime which was almost identical to that which governed as the Council of State and which Bosch had beaten soundly in the elections of December, 1962. The business orientation of the Triumvirate, to which the armed forces had immediately turned over the reins of government, became obvious at once. Those now chosen to govern the Dominican Republic, in addition, had all held important positions under the interim Council. The initial Triumvirate consisted of Emilio de los Santos, former chairman of the Junta Electoral under the Council; Manuel Tavárez Espaillat, a wealthy industrialist who had served as the secretary of the treasury during the Council government; and Ramón Tapia Espinal, a prominent lawyer who occupied the post of secretary of industry and commerce under the Council. In the course of the next year all these men resigned, but the nature of the replacements remained the same: Donald J. Reid Cabral, a prominent businessman and a former member of the Council; and Ramón Cáceres Troncoso, who represented one of the Dominican Republic's most prominent families and who had also worked under the Council of State.

⁴⁶Hal Hendrix, "Dominican Regime Near Collapse," New York World Telegram (September 24, 1963), p. 1. In less than twenty-four hours events caught up with the prediction. "How's This for Bulls-Eye Reporting?" the Telly asked the next day.

⁴⁷Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón, "El Golpe de Estado Militar de 1963," Listín Diario (September 25, 1964), p. 7.

Though composed almost exclusively of businessmen, the Triumvirate, like the Council before it, represented the moderate element in the business and professional community. It was conservative but it did not wish to return to a regime resembling that of Trujillo. The Triumvirate was moderate but not impervious to change. It recognized the need for reform, but it was not prepared to carry through a genuine social-political-economic revolution.

That it was moderate was evidenced by its rejection of demands by ultra-Rightists that it expel the three ranking officials of the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo. The influential Independent Dominican Action, a group of reactionary businessmen who were by now asserting that they had led the coup which had deposed Bosch a month previously, asserted that the U.S. diplomats were guilty of "intolerable intrusion" in the country's domestic affairs. ADI's call for the expulsion of charge d'affaires Spencer M. King, political officer Harry Shlaudeman, and cultural affairs officer Malcolm McLean was emphatically rejected by the Triumvirate.⁴⁸

For a short while the businessmen were able to keep political power completely in their own hands. But government-by-committee, as the triumvirate system meant, and the weak individuals who made up the Triumvirate could not provide strong, certain, and effective leadership. The result was that power began to drain off in several different directions, none of which was favorable to the business community.⁴⁹

⁴⁸New York Times (October 19, 1963), p. 8.

⁴⁹Much of this analysis of business conditions in the post-Bosch period is taken from Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 5-6.

For businesses to operate profitably a minimum of honesty and efficiency in government is required. Neither of these conditions existed in the Dominican Republic after Bosch fell. Graft and corruption were especially rampant in the public service. Bribes to administration officials to insure that one's papers remained on top of the pile began to occur on a scale almost matching that of the Trujillo era. The corruption had become so widespread that the U.S. went so far as to seriously consider the unprecedented step of cutting off economic aid. The situation became so hopeless that few capable people were any longer willing to participate in government and politics; many, in fact, became a-political. The lack of honesty and of efficiency in government were thus interrelated, and both deficiencies worked to the detriment of the businessmen.

Even more important was the competition offered the businessmen by the armed forces. Through their mushrooming canteens the military imported food, liquor, and all kinds of household goods duty-free and went into the wholesale business. U.S. cigarettes, for example, which sell for 80 cents per pack in the cities' stores were purchased by the armed forces at prices as low as 20 cents and resold to retailers at enormous profits. Military profiteering of this sort became so widespread that the businessmen, who had to pay the high tariffs from which the canteens were exempt, threatened to go on strike and close their stores in protest.

The military later made an even bolder move. It announced its intention to operate the canteens as a commercial company. The company, which had an operating capital of \$500,000, was even incorporated. The new super-canteen dealt in everything from perfume and jewelry to medicine. Sales were supposedly to be limited to armed forces personnel and their families,

but methods of avoiding such technicalities had long been in operation. The result was that an officership in the armed forces became one of the most profitable professions in the country.

The creation of the National Police Company, Incorporated, as the canteen operation was called, caused panic in the business community. An unidentified spokesman for the Chamber of Commerce stated that it would be "incompatible" for the chief of police, the powerful Belisario Peguero, to be at the same time president of a commercial company organized to make a profit. In a futile gesture, the head of the Lawyers' Association pointed to an 1869 law and pronounced the formation of the company "illegal."

Business pressure eventually forced Triumvirate head Donald Reid Cabral to cancel the company, but commercial activity through the canteens continued to cut into the profits of the store owners. The irony of these corrupt activities by the military and in the government administration was not lost on the businessmen. For it had been the business community which had incited the armed forces to oust the scrupulously honest President Juan Bosch. The businessmen were outmaneuvered by their former allies, and many shop-keepers and industrialists began wishing that Bosch were still in office.

Yet, the business community had never been unanimous in its opposition to Bosch in the first place. Though the distinctions are not absolute, there are differences in attitudes between the organizations which are made up predominantly of the elite and the organizations which are predominantly middle class. The elite organizations were considerably less favorably

disposed to the Bosch government than were the more middle class organizations (see Table 10).

Table 10

Business Reaction to Bosch
Government, by Organization

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Number Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused to Answer</u>
<u>Elite</u>	15	2	3	9	1
Chamber of Com. Ag., Ind.	5	1	1	3	0
Assn. of Ind.	3	0	1	2	0
Assn. of Hac. and Ag.	3	0	1	2	0
Assn. Patronal	4	1	0	2	1
<u>Middle Class</u>	20	10	2	6	2
Rotary	4	2	0	1	1
Assn. of Lawyers	7	4	1	2	0
Assn. of Doctors	5	2	1	2	0
Assn. of Engs. and Archs.	4	2	0	1	1
Totals	35	12	5	15	3

Many professionals and small shop-keepers had voted for Bosch in the 1962 elections. Such prominent businessmen and industrialists as Abraham Jaar and Diego Bordas served in his cabinet. Upon his overthrow several important business leaders, including representatives of some of the international banking houses and of the powerful Vicini sugar interests privately

condemned the coup. A group of lawyers, three of whom were members of the National Civic Union which had led the opposition to Bosch, formed the Independent Front for Constitutional Rehabilitation and demanded that the military-backed Triumvirate resign to permit the restoration of constitutional government.⁵⁰

On the other hand, some of the more progressive-minded business leaders, such as Tomás Pastoriza and his associates in the Asociación para el Desarrollo, Inc. of Santiago, men who were genuinely interested in change and reform and who were initially disposed to cooperate with the Bosch government, legitimately claim that the President made it increasingly impossible for them to work with him. The constant crises generated by the PRD regime ultimately produced an uncertain and hence unhealthy business climate. Bosch himself became progressively more intransigent.⁵¹

Despite some exceptions, however, the elite business community in the Dominican Republic, was long opposed to Bosch and supported--and even urged--the military takeover. Indeed the big businessmen, prominent professionals, large landowners, and big industrialists were the most unanimous and best organized of all the sectors of Dominican society which led the opposition to the PRD government. From the time of Trujillo, when

⁵⁰For the story of Bordas and his role see Cárdenas, *op. cit.*, p. 6. The condemnation of the coup by the bankers is reported in Donald A. Allen, "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase," *The Reporter*, XXIX (December 5, 1963), 29; while the opposition of the Vicini's was known from personal interviews with family members. On the lawyers who were in favor of constitutionality see the text of one of their statements in *Listín Diario* (August 12, 1963), p. 4; and *New York Times* (October 7, 1963), p. 14.

⁵¹Tomás Pastoriza, personal interview, Santiago, October 9, 1964.

all their associations, clubs, and societies were tightly controlled by the regime, this element had grown into the most unified and powerful force in politics. The several upper class business and professional associations could be expected to line up together on major issues that deeply concerned them. Where division and uncertainty sometimes characterized the activities of the other more conservative and more traditional groups in the society--the Church and the armed forces--the business elite almost always presented a united front.

The community of the elite businessmen, professionals, and landowners was not, however, a monolithic or militaristic organization. Their organizational lines are loosely drawn. Few businessmen attend organization meetings and many are not members of any of the associations. On most minor issues, only the presidents of the organizations speak out. But when a major issue like the Bosch government or the canteens comes along, they can usually be quickly mobilized. Petty differences are put aside and most of the community can be counted upon to act as one--unified, powerful, almost invincible.⁵² Because they are small face-to-face groups in which all know each other or are interrelated, there is often little need for a tightly-knit organization--the telephone may serve just as well.

The development of all these business, professional, landowning, and industrial associations was a forward step in the Dominican Republic's attempt to achieve a competitive pluralist democracy. During the Trujillo era, all these groups were either non-existent or closely watched by the regime and their members kept highly atomized. After he was overthrown, they had formed into powerful intermediate groups between the state and

⁵²Manuel José Cabral, personal interview, Santiago, October 8, 1964.

the individuals that make it up and helped to prevent arbitrary and absolute rule (the case of the Canteen Company of the Police.) The organizations of the elite, however, were more powerful than the other intermediate organizations with the result that the entire political system was thrown into imbalance.

The concerted power of this element in Dominican politics is enormous. Bosch received a little over 600,000 votes out of slightly more than one million cast in the 1962 elections. But this large popular mandate was almost meaningless once he took office. For between elections, only a few families rule in the country--those with money and upper class status--and Bosch became totally unacceptable to almost all of them. The former President himself recognized this point during an interview at his exile residence in Puerto Rico. "Democracy is possible in the Dominican Republic once every four years--on election day," he said, "but the rest of the time it is impossible." When asked whether he thought elections would take place in the country in 1965 as scheduled, he shrugged and stated that even if they did take place they would be meaningless. Bosch concluded, "The power of the oligarchy prevents any real democracy in the country."⁵³

If the oligarchy and the business community refuses to accept the need for peaceful and democratic change and reforms, such as Bosch and his PRD government were attempting to carry out, the only alternative, many Bosch sympathizers now argue, seems to be a Castro-like revolution. If the upper class refuses to give up any of its wealth and prerogatives in a slow and orderly fashion, it seems likely that they will be forced

⁵³Juan Bosch, personal interview, Aguas Buenas, Puerto Rico, February 23, 1964.

to give up everything through a violent upheaval. Once again, Bosch himself has articulately summarized the narrow range of choices left open to the old landowning, propertied, and moneyed elite in the present revolutionary epoch:

The peoples of Latin America find themselves on the brink of a revolution. It is a revolution that will once and for all do away with the power of the minority of large landowners, businessmen, and the upper middle class of our Hemisphere, and that will also dispose of the military cliques that serve them.

The revolution failed in Cuba because it was side-tracked to communism. The duty of democrats when a revolution takes place is to see that it does not depart from democratic principles. But I fear that it will be almost impossible to prevent the coming revolution in Latin America from being bloody, destructive, and prolonged.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Juan Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 4.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY

The traditional groups in Dominican politics--the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landholding elite--were also the strongest and most unified. These came in conflict with the more "modern" sectors then emerging in the society. In this scheme the bureaucracy occupied an intermediate and transitional position; it was partially traditional and partially modern, at a stage of conflict between the old and the new Dominican Republic.

The fall of the Trujillo dictatorship did not mean that the traditions and practices of thirty-one years of one-man, absolute rule ended immediately. Corruption, nepotism, loyalty checks, the sowing of distrust and suspicion, the shuffling of political officeholders, and wholesale dismissals for purely political reasons had become ingrained habits in the Dominican public service and did not cease overnight. Rather, these traits carried over into the years after 1961 when they helped retard the effort to bridge the transition to a stable and functioning democratic government. The old habits were then challenged by new forces--austerity programs, experimentation in local government, the emergence of a strong government employees' organization, the effort to enact a civil service law, the de-Trujillo-ization campaign, and large-scale government planning. The result of the clash between the traditional style of bureaucratic behavior and the new demands and forces contributed to the disruption, fluidity, and morbid politics of the post-Trujillo period.

In the Dominican Republic the government is the largest employer. Under Trujillo some 75 per cent of the gainfully employed population worked for the regime directly or indirectly--directly in one of his agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises and indirectly as members of the government. The percentage did not change greatly in the three years after the dictator's death. Since the government took over many of the Generalissimo's properties after he was slain, many of those who worked for Trujillo directly continued to work for the government. The regular government bureaucracy was increased. The overall result has been a huge proportion of the Dominican labor force employed by the government.

One recent survey placed the number of regular government employees at 50,000. This figure did not include those employed by the numerous autonomous agencies. Nor did it include, for example, the thousands of seasonal cane-cutters who worked for the government-owned sugar complexes. An exact breakdown of all those dependent on the government is impossible to obtain.¹


The Dominican governmental structure is constitutionally organized as follows: there are the three traditional branches of government--the executive, legislative, and judicial. Under the executive are thirteen ministries of state, which make up the cabinet. One novel feature is the Ministry of Public Properties which looks after the vast former Trujillo properties. Making up almost a fourth branch of the government are the

¹ See Herman Bernholz, "Survey of the Dominican Administration" (Unpublished study done by the Public Administration Advisor, A.I.D., 1963).

seventeen autonomous agencies which are entwined through all sorts of inter-connecting committees and informal arrangements with the executive and the various ministries. Chart 1 provides a graphic picture of the governmental structure.

The physical or surface aspects of the governmental apparatus are impressive. The Agrarian Institute, for example, is located in the huge mansion overlooking the Caribbean Sea which was once Trujillo's private residence while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in another former Trujillo mansion, somewhat older but with an even closer view of the Sea. Other government offices are housed in still more residences which previously belonged to Trujillo family members or close henchmen. The most impressive government buildings are those which were originally built for Trujillo's 1955 Peace Fair. The Fair was a total failure (no one came) but the complex of seventy-nine structures, which cost some \$50 million to put up, was converted into government offices. Located some five kilometers west of downtown Santo Domingo on the Caribbean coast, the Dominican government buildings appear to be model structures.

The model physical appearance of the buildings on the outside, however, is not matched on the inside. They were not designed for their present occupants and the result is an almost complete lack of organization. There seems to be no reason for one office or agency being here and another there. Things are stored or thrown most anywhere. Wires meander across the floor. Very little of the furniture or equipment that one normally associates with a functioning office is present. In a huge room there is liable to be a single desk. Most government employees begin work at 7:30 a.m. and quit at 1:30 p.m.--a six-hour day and a thirty-

Chart 2²Formal Structure of the Dominican Government

²Source: Eugenio Pérez Montás, Junta Nacional de Planificación, Organización y Administración de la Planificación (Santo Domingo: Official Publication, 1964), p. 125. See also Collet and Clapp, Inc., Organization and Administration of the Government of the Dominican Republic (Mimeographed report submitted to the Dominican Government and to A.I.D., 1963).

hour week. But even with the short working hours there is little for them to do. It would seem appropriate for government workers to at least shuffle papers, but there are few papers to shuffle. The entire picture is one of lethargy and inefficiency. Only in the tourist office are matters speedily and efficiently handled, and this is probably a legacy of the Trujillo era.

The Traditional Style of Bureaucratic Behavior

In the Dominican Republic, as in other developing countries, family interrelationships are liable to play a more important part in determining political action than competence or achievement. If, for example one has a relative in a high government position, he is much more likely to receive a job under that individual than one who is more able but a non-relative. A family is liable to have a near-monopoly on a government department or agency, and relatives are liable to receive preferential treatment over non-family members. The degree to which this kind of nepotism and family favoritism characterizes a bureaucratic structure is one criterion for determining how far a political system has moved from traditionalism to modernity.³

One's family connections are an essential determinant in Dominican politics. It matters little who the president might be; the same "first families" always have a near-monopoly on influential government positions and, more often than not, on the presidency as well. The names of Cabral, Cáceres, Mejía, Espailat, Ricart, Troncoso--to name only a few--are the

³Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962). The Latin American authority Frank Tannenbaum also sees the role of family and friends as a key to understanding bureaucratic behavior in Latin America. Personal interview, Gainesville, Florida, December 7, 1963.

names of the traditional ruling class in the country. The ruling diumvirate during much of 1964 was composed of Donald Reid Cabral and Ramón Cáceres Troncoso (who is thus a descendent of two of the country's first families). One Dominican from the upper class said that when a member of his family recently married into another first family, they could count no less than seven Dominican presidents in the two families' histories.⁴

A visit to the National Palace provides a glimpse of the family style of Dominican politics. Everyone appears to know everyone else and--especially under the post-Bosch government--all are interrelated. Waiters pass in and out of the inner sanctums with little cups of coffee (cafecitos) on silver trays, as if government were little more than a constant family reunion. The more elegant of those waiting outside the various offices are likely hoping to see an uncle or second cousin who will grant their request; while the less-favored and tie-less non-relatives are kept waiting endlessly and can only hope to pounce on an official as he passes through the halls. All this is part of the style of the Latin American public service, probably more pronounced in the Dominican Republic than elsewhere. Juan Bosch--writer, artist, theoretician, and not a member of the Dominican elite--could not and would not function in this atmosphere; and this probably contributed to his overthrow.

A good example of the family orientation of Dominican bureaucratic behavior was the Department of Education during the period of the interim Council of State. Manuel Joaquín Báez Bello was head of the Department. His wife Thelma Fedora de Báez worked in the school República Argentina.

⁴Federico C. Alvarez, "La Clase Que Gobierna," El Caribe (September 27, 1964), p. 10-A.

Daughter Thania María Báez was employed by the National Conservatory of Music, administered by the Department of Education. A son, José Ramón Báez, worked under his father at a salary higher than others doing the same work. Sister Altagracia Báez worked in the Escuela Colombia while brother José Manuel Báez, was in the sports section of the Department. Luis Báez, Jr., was a baseball instructor in this section, a job created by his father. Another brother, Luis Báez, worked in the Provisions, Equipment, and Transport section; while still another brother, Horacio Báez, was employed, significantly, in the Personnel Section. Pedro Julio Báez worked for the department and sister-in-law Celeste Caro de Báez in the Escuela Uruguay. A total of eleven members of the prominent Báez family worked in the Department of Education.⁵

Another traditional characteristic of the Dominican bureaucracy is widespread peculation. One of the unique features of the Trujillo era had been the spirit of fraud and corruption which pervaded all governmental business. The cruder forms of economic exploitation flourished. The government itself--i.e., Trujillo--became one of the most lucrative of entrepreneurs making highly profitable deals with contractors and businessmen and finding new occasions for enrichment whenever a highway or public building was constructed or whenever private business required a franchise or favor. Private capital was made of the public resources; there was no such thing as conflict of interest. Germán Ornes wrote:

What makes the Dominican situation particularly abhorrent is the sheer corruption and hypocrisy that pervades Trujillo and the small group of men who carry out his ill-fated policies. With "Operation Big Swindle" in full swing . . . government has been turned into a

⁵El 1J4, 1 (October 11, 1962), 2.

permanent exercise in thievery, embezzlement, bribery, blackmail, and all the unlawful devices evolved by contemporary lords of the underworld.⁶

Bribery was considered the "normal" way of doing business in the country. This practice came to light during a 1957 U.S. Senate Finance Committee investigation of tax evasion. The Committee learned that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, operating under pressure from the State Department, had allowed the Lock Joint Pipe Co., a New Jersey construction firm, to deduct as a legitimate business expense a \$1,800,000 bribe split between Trujillo and a go-between for a building contract in the Dominican Republic. Under questioning internal revenue commissioner Russell C. Harrington stated that such bribes were "an ordinary and legitimate business expense."⁷

These features of the Dominican government did not cease when the Trujillo era came to an end. Though the most blatant kinds of graft were eliminated, many of these traits had become the norm of governmental behavior. To talk of conflict-of-interest legislation to many bureaucrats was to speak of another world. Government remained a means of gaining personal advantage, usually economic, for oneself. If a member of the government failed to enrich himself through speculation, he was considered either stupid or a fool.

During the interim period of the Council of State, which was composed largely of the traditional Dominican ruling class, this style of speculation was particularly pronounced. It remained on a small scale, however, and

⁶Germán Ornes, Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean (New York: Thomas Y. Nelson, 1958), p. 252.

⁷Ibid., pp. 253-254.

should not be equated with the wholesale plundering of the previous thirty-two years. Rather, graft during the year of the Council's rule consisted of awarding government contracts to friends and relatives, of receiving favors or goods in return for some service, and of self-aggrandizement by virtue of one's inside knowledge of a pending government program.⁸ It must be emphasized that to most Dominicans this manner of gaining personal advantage through participation in the government is not considered corrupt; it is the norm of bureaucratic behavior. Juan Bosch himself has accurately written of this kind of accepted speculation:

. . . for these oligarchic groups even honest administration is an unforgivable sin, since they have always been accustomed to receiving illegal advantages through friends and relatives entrenched in government positions. Government for them is the vehicle through which privileges are distributed; but these privileges should be exclusively theirs.⁹

When the Bosch government came to power, much of this small-scale speculation was curtailed. The president himself was scrupulously honest and departed from Santo Domingo penniless, reportedly leaving \$101.04 in a bank account to pay his creditors. A furniture store reclaimed his household furniture. The only two cabinet members accused of corruption were summarily fired. One reason why Bosch became unpopular with the government employees is that now they had to get their little rake-off or work their shady deals not in the open, as was the accustomed norm, but when the President wasn't looking. Discovery meant dismissal, a new and short-lived method in the Dominican bureaucracy, and was probably another factor in his overthrow.

⁸For the type of graft during the rule of the Council of State see Fernando Ruiz Brache, "Moral Acomodaticia," Fenepia, I (Septiembre 19, 1962), 4.

⁹Juan Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 4.

There undoubtedly was corruption in the Bosch government, but it was of a totally different kind, both qualitatively and quantitatively, than that which came before or would come subsequently. No longer was a government position exclusively for personal gain. Graft under President Bosch most often took the form, not of individual speculation, but of transfer of funds to the Dominican Revolutionary Party or one of its subsidiary organizations. Quantitatively these transfers were nowhere equal to the conflict-of-interest corruption of the previous administration, and qualitatively, it might be argued that this graft was more justified since it was usually employed to assist the labor or campesino sectors of the party, not for personal gain.¹⁰

The overthrow of Bosch brought the traditional and family-style speculation back with a vengeance. As if trying to make up for the seven months lost during his administration, government servants engaged in a rash of corrupt practices that had not been employed since the Trujillo regime. Bribes to administration officials, for example, occurred on a scale almost matching that of the former era. Government offices became so overstaffed that many were receiving salaries without rendering any services. More importantly, the spirit of fraud which characterized every aspect of government under the slain Generalissimo again was rampant in the public service--the enrichment of favored individuals through the

¹⁰On the corruption in the Bosch government as compared with the traditional style of Dominican graft, see John P. Roche, "Return of the Syndicate," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 5-8. For evidence of this kind of "transfer of funds," see El Caribe (October 3, 1963), p. 1, and Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional de la República Dominicana: Estudios y pruebas documentales de las causas del Movimiento Reivindicador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964), pp. 350-355.

expenditure of funds for public projects, self-aggrandizement through one's knowledge of pending government programs, the receipt of goods, favors, or money through the performance of an official duty. In the words of John P. Roche, the ousting of Bosch meant the "return of the syndicate."¹¹

Closely interrelated with the traits of first family influence and widespread speculation in the Dominican public service is the habit of placing in public charges only those personally loyal to the national leadership. The feeling (with a good deal of justification) is that only those who have a strong personal tie to the government can be trusted to loyally carry out its programs. The emphasis, then, is on personal loyalty rather than administrative competence. One implication of this trait is that every government (there were eight in the first three years of the post-Trujillo period) feels obliged to dismiss many of those who had served in the previous administration and bring in a whole new slate of administrators. The result, of course, is a great deal of inefficiency.¹²

One of the principal methods by which Trujillo controlled the government machinery and kept it atomized was the constant shifting of personnel up and down the administrative ladder to insure that no one had an opportunity to build up a personal and loyal following to rival his own. Following his death, the removal and replacement of public employees continued as one of the most effective methods for politicians to make

¹¹For documentation of many of these abuses see J.A. Cross Beras, "Corrupción Administrativa," Listín Diario (June 28, 1964), p. 7.

¹²"Un Vislumbre de Servicio Civil," Listín Diario (December 12, 1964), p. 6.

political capital. Ramfis, for example, continuing in the tradition of his father, once replaced fifty-three government employees at a single time. Forty-two of the fifty-three shifts were in the customs office, the most lucrative source of graft in the public service.¹³ Seemingly the many transfers in this department provided an opportunity for as many as possible to get their share of the peculation and thus keep more people happy and loyal.

The final overthrow of the Trujillo dynasty occurred in November, 1961; and with them into exile went their most notorious henchmen and advisers. Trujillista personnel, who had represented a new governing elite fostered by the favoritism of the dictator, had thus been removed from the very top level, but from the intermediate level (agency and department heads) on down the entire apparatus remained intact. The management of the Dominican government was then left in the hands of the traditional ruling class on whom Trujillo had had to rely for the everyday management of the country's routine affairs.

When the Council of State began governing the country in January, 1962, rule by the traditional group was perpetuated and extended. The Council was largely made up of members of the Dominican elite families, and the result was that the entire governmental structure came under the control of this element. Despite a well-publicized de-Trujilloization campaign, there were actually very few removals from office and shuffling of personnel during the Council's fourteen-month tenure. When on occasion someone was replaced, it caused a huge stir, but these removals were infrequent and in no way comparable to the wholesale purges that would later occur.¹⁴

¹³El Caribe (November 5, 1961), p. 13.

¹⁴On this theme see Fenopia, I (October 9, 1962), 6.

The election of Juan Bosch represented a distinct threat to the traditional ruling class. In his campaign speeches and in several pronouncements just before his inauguration, Bosch had declared open war on the oligarchy. The elite felt that its very existence was threatened by his rule. The threat was so real that defeated candidate Viriato Fiallo of the elitist National Civic Union Party attempted to convince the oligarchic Council that before it turned over its mandate, it should pass a law to protect the approximately 30,000 UCN members of the public service from being dismissed by the incoming government.¹⁵

For his part, Bosch felt that the government oligarchy would sabotage his revolutionary programs. Upon taking power he dismissed many members of the old elite and replaced them by people personally loyal to him and to his programs. The government workers' organization called a special meeting of its representatives from all over the country to protest the "unjustifiable dismissals" and to insist that these practices stop immediately.¹⁶

Bosch continued to have trouble with the civil service throughout his seven months in office. There were not enough competent people in his own Party to adequately staff all the required posts, and reliance on the bureaucracy left over from the Council's days meant that his own programs were continually frustrated through such techniques as the bureaucratic "slow-down." During one four-day period 143 government employees were fired. The reaction on the part of the civil servants was still another strike which paralyzed the government. This was a recurring pattern

¹⁵Hispanic American Report, XVI (March, 1963), 41.

¹⁶El Laborista, I (April, 1963), 8.

which ran all through his short tenure: Bosch would have someone replaced and the government workers would go on strike; or, he would not fire the person and his projects were not carried out. The overall result was frustration for his reform measures and a period of continuous crisis politics.¹⁷

Finally tiring of the battle the President tardily attempted to co-operate with the existing civil service. In deference to its demands, he asked the government offices not to accept any more political recommendations, no matter from whom they came, and ordered that the replacement of government employees should cease.¹⁸ But, coming less than a month before his overthrow, this conciliatory move was too late; the bureaucracy was already alienated from its chief and many government workers openly co-operated with the growing anti-Bosch movement.

The ouster of the Bosch government again produced a massive turnover in the government service. The President and many of his close aides at the top level were forced into exile. The secretary of state for the presidency of the new government, speaking officially for the ruling Triumvirate, promised that there would be no dismissals of lesser public employees without "just cause." All those working for the government were confirmed in their posts.¹⁹ But in fact there were many dismissals; "just cause" was frequently found. In Santo Domingo's municipal government offices, for example, fifty were dismissed and in the National Housing Institute thirty-

¹⁷Leoncio Ramos, "Huelgas en los Servicios Públicos," Ley y Justicia, 1 (September 5, 1963), 18-24.

¹⁸Listín Diario (August 28, 1963), p. 1.

¹⁹The text is in El Caribe (October 3, 1963), p. 11.

five more were fired. The "first family" government which replaced Bosch found it was difficult to work with his people as he had with the elite.

The constant shuffling of political office-holders for purely political reasons is recognized as a grave problem in the Dominican Republic. The distribution of political offices is seen as one of the most effective ways for politicians to pay off political debts.²⁰ Then too, given the nature of family-style politics and the need for personnel personally loyal to the regime in power, there would seem to be few alternatives. The system involves enormous waste; with each change of government the accumulated experience of the past is lost and the state machinery suffers a partial paralysis.

Some new currents and forces emerged in the government service in the post-Trujillo years. Most of these, in one form or another, represented attempts to alleviate the Dominican Republic's traditional type of bureaucratic behavior. What was required, some writers felt, was a total reform and restructuration of the entire civil service.²¹

New Currents in the Bureaucracy

Staffing the government

Many of the Dominican Republic's governmental problems stem from the impossibility of recruiting sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel to fill the many posts. In a country where the government is by far the largest employer, this difficulty is apparent from minor

²⁰Pedro Alvaro Bobadilla, "Saquemos la Policía de Nuestras Instituciones Autónomas," El Caribe (November 6, 1963), p. 10.

²¹Marcio Mejía Ricart, "Reestructuración del Servicio Civil," La Nación (May 3, 1964), p. 4; and Juan José Ayuso, "La Reforma Administrativa," La Nación (May 28, 1963), p. 5.

municipal offices to the presidency; there simply are not enough people in the country with sufficient training or experience to staff the government.

This is a relatively new problem in Dominican affairs. Prior to 1930 the government was small and performed few services. During the Trujillo era no large public service was needed because all governmental decisions were made by the dictator or one of his few trusted advisers.

With the attempt to establish a democratic government after his overthrow, however, the need for a larger government and for more qualified personnel greatly increased. The state had taken over the old Trujillo enterprises and someone had to be found to manage these concerns. In addition, the establishment of government programs and agencies in public health, education, land reform, economic development, and social welfare beginning in 1962 during the rule of the Council and the expansion of these activities and services during the Bosch administration meant that the government required an even greater quantity of competent managers.²² Many of the inefficiencies and failures which impeded the transition from near-totalitarian dictatorship to democracy may be attributed to the lack of enough able personnel to man the state apparatus.²³

The want of adequate quantities of people to carry out the numerous government programs was a legacy of the Trujillo regime. The fall of the dictatorship left the country with insufficient human resources to discharge the large number of new responsibilities that the government was now called

²²See Joseph La Palombara (ed), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 4.

²³For a detailed documentation of this lack see Collett and Clapp, Inc., op. cit., the entire volume.

upon to perform. The dictator's system of constantly shuffling personnel, of planting distrust and suspicion, of purges and investigations, and of reserving all major decisions for himself left a critical shortage of trained technicians and administrators. It became necessary, for example, to bring in German technicians to run the country's only paper mill. There were only three Dominicans with bachelor degrees in business administration. There were no economists and no planners to direct the change toward (1) an orderly, democratic, political system, and (2) all the sorely needed economic and social reforms which the country urgently required.²⁴

Various attempts were made in the interim period to begin to solve the problem of the lack of trained administrators. The Council of State initially created a planning board to map government action for restoring economic stability. The board was headed by Dr. Nicolás Pichardo, one of the members of the Council, while its six other positions were filled by cabinet members. Pichardo said that the board's first tasks would be to compile accurate information on all government departments and to try to bring some order out of the chaotic situation caused by overthrow of the thirty-one-year Trujillo regime. Foreign and local experts were to be called in to help, said Pichardo, "we intend to take full advantage of the technical assistance offered by the Organization of American States and the United States."²⁵

The O.A.S. and the U.S. quickly responded and technical assistants began to pour into the country. In addition to the large regular U.S. Embassy staff, the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.)

²⁴Tad Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum," New York Times Magazine (September 2, 1962), p. 40.

²⁵New York Times (January 28, 1962), p. 34.

team eventually came to number forty people. Puerto Rico and Venezuela sent a large number of technicians. All kinds of official, semi-official, and private organizations began to participate in the campaign to help the Dominican Republic get back on its feet. Under the auspices of the Business Council for World Understanding, with its headquarters in Washington, many officials from private U.S. companies analyzed many of the problems of operating the government-controlled, former Trujillo properties. The Council and the business managers it sent made recommendations for improvements and developed long range plans for the ex-Trujillo concerns.²⁶

Despite this large-scale technical assistance campaign, only a small step had been taken toward resolving the enormous problem. Such was the lack of administrative experience in the Dominican government that the Council of State members were forced to spend precious hours on simple matters like the authorization of licenses for carrying weapons or the addition of a few employees to the Santo Domingo Sanitation Department--all matters that should have been handled at a much lower level.²⁷ The problem carried over into the succeeding administration.

Of the two major parties competing in the 1962 elections, the Dominican Revolutionary Party was least qualified, in terms of personnel, to run the government. The PRD was essentially a workers' and peasants' Party, and the small town shopkeepers and few professionals also included in its ranks were not a large enough element to staff the growing bureaucracy. The lack was so great that during the election campaign the Party had a

²⁶"Report on the Dominican Republic," Latin American Report, V (September, 1963), 16.

²⁷Szulc, op. cit., p. 40.

difficult time finding sufficiently qualified candidates to run for all the congressional and municipal posts at stake.²⁸ It would presumably have an even greater problem in securing competent people to staff the technical and administrative parts of the government. When asked about this prior to the election, Bosch said that should he and his Party win, there would be many officials in the government who were then National Civic Union members only because the ruling Council was UCN-dominated and who would afterwards rally to the PRD cause and help it run the government.²⁹ This transfer of allegiances never took place and helps account for Bosch's difficulties with the public service.

Bosch was never able to gain the support of the country's small but powerful elite, whose skills and managerial experience were essential to a smooth running of the governmental machinery. His open warfare on the oligarchy had permanently alienated this vital sector. Tad Szulc cites two examples. A prominent Dominican builder moved his business to Puerto Rico. He admitted that he should be helping out at home but, as he said, "the situation in the Dominican Republic is so uncertain, and you know how it is . . .". A leading businessman who played a major role in making possible the country's first free elections in thirty-eight years refused a post in the Bosch cabinet because he distrusted him "on principle" and turned instead to conspiring against him.³⁰

²⁸See Robert J. Alexander, "Democratic Victory in Dominican Republic," New Americas, III (January 15, 1963), 8.

²⁹Juan Bosch, personal interview, Santo Domingo, September 1, 1962.

³⁰Tad Szulc, "After Trujillo, A Reformer With a Mission," New York Times Magazine (September 8, 1963), p. 63.

During Bosch's term the technical assistance begun under the Council continued and, in some areas, increased. Many out-of-office experts with a like-minded democratic orientation came to the Dominican Republic from all over Latin America to help. These included such men as the Costa Rican agricultural specialist Carlos Campos and the Argentine writer and politician Dardo Cúneo. PRD President Angel Miolán made a trip around Latin America enlisting additional support. U.S. and O.A.S. technicians came in a steady stream for stays of a few days, a few weeks, or a few months. Under United Nations' auspices an attempt was made to develop courses of study in economic planning and development.

The President himself recognized the great need of his country for assistance in the administrative and management field. In an interview with the editors of the Latin American Report, the following answers were given:

- Q. Under the former dictatorship, a vacuum was created in many technical fields--including government administration. In what way do you feel the United States can be of assistance?
- A. Our need for technical assistance is great. Yet, we do not have enough funds, especially not enough dollars, to send students to the United States. So what we are doing is to take advantage of all the various scholarships which are offered to us in the United States and other countries through international organizations. Meanwhile, we are taking advantage of the presence of foreign technicians in our country who can train our young people.
- Q. Do you regard the assistance of foreign capital and foreign technicians as a temporary "stop-gap" program?
- A. Assistance, both in the form of capital and technicians, cannot be considered as any short term program. Our needs are very great.³¹

³¹"Report . . . ," op. cit., p. 23.

The great inflow of technical help during the Bosch administration was, nevertheless, not sufficient to fill the need. As a result the Bosch government was forced to depend largely on a conglomeration of well-meaning but totally inexperienced young people, political hacks from the PRD, and a catch-all of provincial lawyers, rural shop-keepers, and school teachers. These often-uneducated men, whose political experience had been conditioned either by the thorough corruption of the Trujillo regime or the perpetual jealousy and bickering of splintered exile groups, were not able to meet the demands of a functioning administration.³²

The President himself attempted to make up for this deficiency single-handedly. He arrived at his office at 5:00 in the morning and often worked at the problem of administering the Dominican Republic sixteen hours per day. Bosch tried to be a one-man government. He had to arbitrate routine questions and spurious political squabbles with the result that the reforms he had promised never got off the ground. When it was suggested that some of the responsibilities of his office might be delegated to the executive apparatus, Bosch could only smile. Where could these trusted and trained people be found? The problems facing the country were serious in themselves, but the shortage of men to grapple with them was still more serious.³³

Part of the blame for the maladministration of the government, however, must be shared by President Bosch. He is an artist and writer, not

³²On the personnel of the Bosch government see Szulc, "After Trujillo . . .," op. cit., p. 63; and Norman Gall, "Ferment in the Caribbean," The New Leader, XLVI (June 10, 1963), 9.

³³Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a Coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, CXC VII (October 26, 1963), 254.

an administrator. Indeed, his only administrative experience had come as a cultural affairs adviser and speech-writer in the regime of Carlos Prío Socarrás in Cuba. Cultural affairs advising did not involve him in the hurly-burly, the give-and-take, the bargaining, that is effective politics. He had the poet's suspicion of red tape and bureaucracy and of those who seemed to him more concerned with shuffling papers than with great issues like the soul and destiny of the nation.³⁴

The day before Bosch was overthrown, it was reported that the Dominican public service was infused with "apparently unmanageable incompetence" at every level from the National Police to the provincial districts and municipalities.³⁵ Part of this was no one's fault, part of it Trujillo's, another part Bosch's. But the greatest difficulty was that the public administration the President inherited was incapable of handling the new demands placed upon it. What few capable administrators there were had not received their appointment for what they had known but whom they had known. They were selected not for their talents or abilities but for their connections. Bosch tried to change all this, but the concept did not die easily. Some of his difficulties are summed up in a story related by Sidney Lens. He writes that a PRD district leader was turned down when he asked that Party member be given a job in the tourist bureau. The district leaders readily admitted that the Party member knew nothing of tourism or the workings of an office but argued that the prospective appointee had campaigned hard for the Party. Although Bosch had publicly

³⁴"Otro Golpe," Política, III (October, 1963), 116-117.

³⁵Hal Hendrix, "Dominican Regime Near Collapse," New York World-Telegram (September 24, 1963), p. 1.

spoken against favoritism, the district leader could not imagine why his request had been refused. Favoritism had been the traditional style and the only one he had known during his life-time.³⁶

De-Trujilloization

While on the one hand the Dominican government was attempting to find trained and experienced personnel to staff the public service, it was on the other hand trying to de-Trujilloize it. The campaign to rid the government of Trujillistas, reminiscent of Germany's de-Nazification following World War II, frequently worked at cross purposes with the effort to staff it.

The National Committee of de-Trujilloization of the Public Service was created by the Council of State on the last day of June, 1962. Councilman José A. Fernández Caminero, who had proposed the idea, was appointed chairman. Its purpose, as the name suggests, was to preside over the purging of Trujillo collaborators from all branches of the government. These Trujillistas were considered "flagrant obstacles to the development of democracy in the Dominican Republic." The Committee was only to be an investigating team, however, and all final decisions were to be left to the Council.³⁷

On July 17 the Committee issued a communiqué saying that it had not yet made any recommendations for the removal of any members of the government service. The mere creation of the Committee had already frightened the

³⁶Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 35.

³⁷See El Caribe (July 1, 1962), p. 1 for the Committee's announcement of organization.

public employees, and it was forced to deny that it was seeking to foster "inquietude" or that it intended to remove minor officials who had been forced to work for the regime. Though the Committee had not yet recommended the firing of anyone, it did say that there had been some resignations in the public service.³⁸

A week later Chairman Fernández Caminero asked the several political parties to submit names of suspected Trujillistas to the Committee for investigation. He pointed out that rumors of whom was being investigated had seriously hampered government operations and stated that the Committee reserved the right to decide whether the names of those being investigated should be made public.³⁹

In early August, however, the Committee presented the Council with a virtual ultimatum, insisting that fifteen government employees be dismissed within twenty-four hours. These employees were accused of "close ties with the Trujillo tyranny." The Council refused the demands of the Committee on the grounds that it could not bow to an ultimatum.⁴⁰

The vice president of the Committee, Bienvenido Mejía y Mejía, a Dominican Revolutionary Party supporter, later stated that it had not been able to proceed with cleaning the public service of Trujillistas because of the "indifference of the governmental community." Mejía y Mejía blamed reactionary professional organizations and political parties for sabotaging the de-Trujilloization campaign.⁴¹

³⁸The text is in El Caribe (July 18, 1962), p. 9.

³⁹El Caribe (July 24, 1962), p. 1.

⁴⁰El Caribe (August 10, 1962), p. 1. See also Manuel Baquero Ricart, "Trujillismo y Destrujillización," El Caribe (August 21, 1962), p. 6.

⁴¹El Caribe (September 16, 1962), p. 9.

The government workers had long kept silent about the threatened purge but their official organization eventually came out in favor of cooperation with the Committee. It recognized the grave danger of continued Trujillista influences and promised to "find and denounce all those persons who for well-grounded reasons and motives ought to be eradicated from the public administration." The government workers' union threw a new and potentially explosive ingredient into the already simmering pot by arguing that de-Trujilloization should not be confined to the public service but should be extended to include the armed forces as well.⁴²

A month and a half later the government workers' organization, perhaps now certain that no action would be taken, issued another call for a Trujillista purge. It said that, notwithstanding the efforts of the de-Trujilloization Committee, no one had as yet been dismissed. The criteria for determining who was a Trujillista had always been vague, but now the public servants themselves listed those elements who should be removed: criminals, members of the Military Intelligence Service, obvious collaborators, those who had enriched themselves during the Trujillo period at the country's expense, relatives and others linked to the former regime, those who had held "more or less permanent" positions under his government, professionals and writers who had sold their services to the regime, those who had contributed to the failure of the various attempts to overthrow Trujillo, those who had supported the Balaguer-Ramfis government, and those who had supported the Rodríguez Echavarría coup.⁴³

⁴²El Caribe (August 21, 1962), p. 5.

⁴³The text is in El Caribe (October 5, 1962), p. 5.

The government workers, though probably realizing that nothing would come of the proposed purge, were following an essentially contradictory course. When they took the lead in advocating the "total de-Trujilloization" of the public service, they were at the same time leading the campaign for the enactment of a civil service law to protect their members from arbitrary dismissals. The two policies were incompatible.

The entire drive to purge Trujillistas from the government was soon ended, though the theme continued as a favorite political slogan. No one was dismissed as a result of the de-Trujilloization Committee's investigations and recommendations. While the worst offenders of the Trujillo era had either left the country or already been jailed, it became apparent to almost all that the government could not operate without the men who had been associated one way or another with his regime. The nature of Trujillo's near-totalitarian system meant that no one could be aloof; everyone had been forced to be, in some degree, a collaborator. A thorough de-Trujilloization would have resulted in the dismissal of most of those who were so badly needed to man the growing government. The criteria formulated by the government workers' organization, for example, to determine who was a Trujillista would have meant the replacement of almost the entire public service.

Former President Joaquín Balaguer in an article entitled "La Destrujillización" wrote that since the Council of State had created the De-Trujilloization Committee, it should begin the investigations with itself. It was well known that only two of the seven Council members were completely free of any past association with the regime. President Rafael Bonnelly had himself once been a Trujillo cabinet member and ambassador. Balaguer's

article, in conclusion, cited the example of one of the Dominican Republic's most popular composers who was censured for writing merengues in honor of Trujillo. In his defense the composer had admitted writing the merengues but pointed out that everyone else was equally guilty for having danced to them.⁴⁴

The result was that de-Trujilloization was redefined. It should not, some wrote, mean simply the replacement of one corrupt official by another. De-Trujilloization, rather, should consist in the elimination of the immoral practices and methods of the Trujillo era, of the abuses and despotism of the dictatorship--the doing away with graft, nepotism, libel, bureaucratic favoritism, revenge, and coercion and the restoration of public honesty, tolerance, the rights of individual liberty, and the reign of morality and human dignity. It was, in short, a change in attitudes, not of employees.⁴⁵ With this redefinition of de-Trujilloization, the campaign to rid the public service of Trujillista collaborators ended.

The organization of the government workers

The principal method by which Trujillo had controlled the Dominican Republic was to ensure that each individual remained atomized, that no one belonged to an organized group which might ultimately challenge his own power. Atomization was especially maintained in the public service where no independent association was allowed to form. When the Trujillos were driven out, the government workers were among the first to organize.

⁴⁴Joaquín Balaguer, "La Destrujillización," Renovación, XXVI (October 2-8, 1963), 3. See also Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy . . .," op. cit., p. 40.

⁴⁵Balaguer, op. cit., p. 3; and Mario Bobea Billini, "Otra Vez el Tema de la Destrujillización," El Caribe (February 3, 1963), p. 7.

The National Association of Public Employees (ANEP) came into existence in November, 1961. Its initial communiqué put forth six principles for which it would struggle: the advancement of "real democracy," especially in the public administration; the civic education and social and economic dignity of its members; the recognition of the institution of the administrative career; aloofness from partisan politics; the raising of each member's work capacity; economic security and the opportunity for its members to develop to their full capabilities. While claiming to be a-political, ANEP's statement concluded that the organization could not remain apart from the civic-patriotic movement then taking place in the country.⁴⁶

After the government had taken over many of the former Trujillo properties and set them up as autonomous state agencies, the Association was reorganized into the National Federation of Public Employees and of Autonomous Institutions (FENEPIA). By May, 1962, the Federation contained thirty-two affiliated organizations, ranging from the National Lottery to the Department of Justice. At the height of its strength FENEPIA claimed 200 affiliated unions with a total of 20,000 members in about every government department, ministry and agency and in all parts of the country.⁴⁷ It was headed by Rafael Danilo Noboa.

One of FENEPIA's first principles was its defense of the public servants' right to continue in his job irrespective of his party affiliation. The organization pointed to the "politicalization" of the bureaucracy during

⁴⁶The text is in El Caribe (November 25, 1961), p. 11.

⁴⁷FENEPIA's growth figures, somewhat exaggerated, may be found in its official publication, Fenepia, throughout this period.

the era of the dictatorship and stated that this could not be permitted to happen again. It came to the defense of a woman in the Sanitation Department, for example, who was a member of the Castro-oriented 14th of June Movement and who was about to be fired by her conservative National Civic Union superior.⁴⁸ For the first time in the nation's history the civil servants had an effective organization which could serve as a counterweight to the politicians who had always been able to dismiss government employees at will.

The power of the government workers' organization increased so greatly, however, that eventually the pendulum swung only in one direction. It became next to impossible to dismiss civil servants, no matter how incompetent or dishonest. When Bosch tried to clear the bureaucracy of some of its dead wood and to replace others with more effective and able personnel, he was stymied in his efforts. At the height of the May, 1963, crisis with Haiti, for example, FENEPIA called a strike and demanded that the government cease what the labor Federation considered the "unjustified dismissals" of its members.⁴⁹

FENEPIA was later totally destroyed by Bosch. The government workers' organization had long been closely associated with pro-communist causes and its leadership was affiliated with the pro-Castro political parties. Acting in alliance with the 14th of June Movement, it had sought to cause enough disruption to force cancellation of the 1962 elections. Its tendency to cause disruption carried over into the Bosch administration. In the face

⁴⁸See "Apartidismo," Fenepia, 1 (October 9, 1962), 3.

⁴⁹Antonio Martínez R. "Nuestra Constitución y la Huelga en los Servicios Públicos," El Caribe (May 9, 1963), p. 8; and Julio C. Bodden, "FENEPIA Dispone Paro General," El Caribe (May 5, 1963), p. 1.

of constant harassment from the public employees, the President acted. In one two-day period he dismissed 143 civil servants, a move which was fiercely opposed by FENEPIA. The result was a total victory for Bosch and the destruction of the government workers' Federation.⁵⁰

Though some of its leaders attempted to keep it alive, FENEPIA all but disappeared. Its offices in the Edificio Palacio in downtown Santo Domingo were closed and no one there knew where they had moved. It is probable that no offices were reopened. After a total silence of over a year, FENEPIA on December 1, 1964, issued a call for solidarity with the striking sugar workers. Four of its old directors denied having any part in the call, however, and the government workers did not walk off their jobs. The public service remained without an effective organization.⁵¹

Though in terms of the central thesis of this study, the absence of an intermediate organization for the government workers to counterbalance the power of the politicians is to be lamented, the overall view is that FENEPIA probably played more of a destructive than constructive role in the first years of its existence. Its strikes or threats of strikes frequently disrupted the entire governmental machinery. In a country where the government is overwhelmingly the largest employer and entrepreneur, a strike by the government workers is disastrous. It is true that while FENEPIA was not yet strong enough to force a general strike which would entirely paralyze the country, its partial strikes were effective

⁵⁰Antonio J. Tatem Mejía, "El Fracasado de FENEPIA," La Nación (May 9, 1963), p. 5.

⁵¹The text of FENEPIA's call is in El Caribe (December 1, 1964), p. 10. The negative results are in Listín Diario (December 2, 1964).

and contributed to the chaotic and morbid politics of the period.⁵² A happy balance between partisanship and non-partisanship in the public service has not yet been worked out.

The struggle for a civil service law

One of FENEPIA's major projects was its advocacy of a new civil service law. Trujillo had had such a law enacted in 1946 but it had never been actually operative. Hence, the government employees' organization took the lead in pushing the project and actually drew one up in late 1962. The proposal was presented to Councilman Nicolás Pichardo who promised to study it and submit it to the consideration of the whole Council. FENEPIA stated that the only reason it had submitted the measure was that it wished the duties and rights of the government employees to be decided by regular and legal means.⁵³ Coming only a month before the elections, the proposed law was obviously intended to protect the government workers from dismissal by any in-coming government. The Council of State failed to act on the proposal and left the matter to the new administration.

FENEPIA then began its campaign for a civil service law by appealing to the PRD-dominated Congress for the inclusion of the measure in the proposed new constitution. The government workers this time added an ultimatum to their request: if action were not taken by February 22, there would be a

⁵²On the political nature of FENEPIA see Mario Bobea Billini "Lec-ciones de una Huelga," El Caribe (August 30, 1962), p. 9; and Rafael Andrés Ortega, "La Huelga Funesta de FENEPIA," El Caribe (August 2, 1962), p. 7. For the FENEPIA view see Tomás C. Abreu Cruz, "Vayamos a la Uni-dad," Fenepia, I (September 19, 1962), 7.

⁵³El Caribe (November 14, 1962), p. 11.

general strike.⁵⁴ The government did not enact the civil service law, however, and there was no general strike. But FENEPIA continued to press for the enactment of the bill. In May, accusing the government of being "cold and indifferent" to the plight of its employees, President Noboa of FENEPIA again called for a strike in favor of the law. Though some of its affiliated organizations went along, the strike had little effect on the majority of the ministries and departments; and no civil service law was enacted.⁵⁵

The post-Bosch government of the Triumvirate at one time announced that it was about to promulgate a civil service law. But by the end of 1964 the law had not yet been enacted. After the first three years of the post-Trujillo period, the government workers thus had neither an effective organization nor a working civil service law. They remained in much the same atomized condition as they had under the dictatorship.

Experiments in local government

One of the assumptions of democratic theory is that experience with democracy and democratic methods at the local level contributes to democracy at the national level. It is assumed that the practice of democracy, locally instills democratic habits, that people become used to operating within a democratic framework, and that these habits eventually help strengthen democracy nationally.

⁵⁴The text is in El Caribe (February 11, 1963), p. 4.

⁵⁵On the entire struggle for a civil service law see Leoncio Ramos, "Urge que se Dicte una Ley de Servicio Civil," Ley y Justicia, I (October 25, 1963), 9-12; and Pedro Alvaro Bobadilla, "Sobre la Ley del Servicio Civil," El Caribe (August 7, 1964), p. 9.

Under Trujillo the Dominican Republic received no training in democracy at the local level. The municipalities were not autonomous; all decisions, including minor administrative matters, were decided at the top by Trujillo or one of his henchmen. The official Dominican Party maintained officers throughout the countryside and all political matters were channelled through this apparatus. The PD's candidates for local office, like those for other positions, all received 100 per cent of the vote unless the dictator wished otherwise. In the 1949 election in the municipality of Pepillo Salcedo, for example, the three candidates of the Dominican Party for the three positions of regidor (assemblyman), their three suplentes (alternates), and the three candidates for the three positions as síndicos (prefect) each received all the 2,149 votes cast.⁵⁶ Local elections during the Trujillo era almost always followed this pattern.

A municipal association was set up by the Trujillo government to help maintain its control over local affairs. All cities were required to join. The association functioned as part of the Ministry of the Interior (Police). Though the association performed certain beneficial services for the provincial towns and cities, its chief purpose was to centralize decision-making. It provided administrative, engineering, and legal services for municipalities; loaned money; distributed national subsidies; and bought, sold, or loaned equipment, such as road machinery. The association served as an intermediary between the local and national governments and thus served to strengthen the regime's control over the outlying areas.⁵⁷

⁵⁶El Caribe (November 6, 1949), p. 5.

⁵⁷John B. Blandford, Public Administration in Latin America (Washington: Pan American Union, 1955), pp. 34-35.

Following the overthrow of the Trujillo regime, an attempt was made to establish more democratic practices at the local level. While international attention was focused on the presidential race during the 1962 election campaign, much of the actual politicking and wooing of votes took place in the municipalities. All of the major and minor parties established branch offices in towns and cities throughout the country, and the campaigns for local offices, as well as national offices, were launched in earnest.

Most commentators on the 1962 Dominican elections have stressed the nearly two to one victory which Juan Bosch achieved in the contest for the presidency, and some have pointed to the comparable majorities which his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) piled up in the Congress. What is forgotten by these analysts is that the PRD swept an even larger percentage of municipal offices. The PRD elected more than twice as many regidores and nearly six times as many síndicos as the second place party, the National Civic Union (UCN). See Table 11.

Table 11

Number of Síndicos and Regidores Elected by Each Party
in the December, 1962, Election

<u>Party</u>	<u>Síndicos</u>	<u>Regidores</u>
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)	62	266
National Civic Union (UCN)	11	119
Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC)	0	10
Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party (PNRD)	4	19
Others	0	3
Totals	77	417

Source: Gaceta Oficial (March 31, 1963). The PRSC was listed third because its total popular vote was greater than that of the PNRD. The PNRD, despite a smaller total vote, won more offices because of its overwhelming strength in one area of the country. See pp. 240-241 and 257-258.

With Bosch in the presidency and his PRD controlling most of the municipal governments, a concerted effort was made to reform the structure and practices of local government. Under U.S. Information Service auspices, for example, a large group of mayors was sent on a tour to observe the functioning of U.S. municipal governments. Local leaders, especially youths, were brought into the capital where they received short courses in democratic community development. A Municipal League had been established as one of the seventeen autonomous agencies of the state, and this was now given added responsibilities. The League had an office and a full-time staff and began to carry out many of the programs that had existed only on paper during the Trujillo era. It provided technical assistance, served as a clearing house through which the municipalities could share experiences, and became a joint agent of national and local government.⁵⁸

The overthrow of Bosch halted the attempt to establish a more democratic structure at the local level. The program of training democratically oriented community developers was stopped entirely as many of the PRD-dominated municipal governments were forced from office. The activities of the Municipal League were curtailed and, because of the central government's wholesale intervention in local politics, the much-prized autonomy of the municipalities was threatened.⁵⁹

The experience of the Dominican Republic with democratic government at the local level has thus been very limited. A few months was not enough time for democracy to become deeply ingrained as a habit. The municipalities

⁵⁸See Blandford, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

⁵⁹Guarionex Aquino Morales, "La Autonomía Municipal," Listín Diario (November 15, 1964), p. 7.

have not yet had a chance to test the thesis of theorists of democracy that local government may serve as a training ground for democratic government at the national level.

The question of the former
Trujillo properties

It will be recalled that Trujillo had personally owned vast amounts of lands, a share in most businesses, and all the important industries in the Dominican Republic and ran the country as his personal fief. Upon the overthrow of the regime these properties passed into the hands of the state. President Joaquín Balaguer, behaving like a generous politician seeking to extend his term, gave away millions of dollars worth of the former Trujillo land, livestock, and taxicabs. In other cases where Trujillo had obviously swindled the property, it was returned to the former owners. The controlling shares in five other Trujillo holdings were given the companies' employees. Nevertheless, the great majority of the former Trujillo properties were kept in the hands of the government. Some forty-nine companies, plus hundreds of thousands of acres of the country's best farming and grazing lands, were inherited by the government and remained under its control.⁶⁰

The question of the disposal of these properties involved some complex and difficult issues. Here was a tempting opportunity for a politician to stage a gigantic give-away and reap political gains for himself. Such a

⁶⁰See Edward DeGraaf, "The Strange Legacy of El Benefactor," The Reporter, XXV (July 6, 1961), 30-31; Thomas P. Whitney, "In the Wake of Trujillo," The New Republic, CXLV (December 11, 1961), 6-8; and "The U.S. and the Dominicans: What Will be Done with the Trujillo Properties?" The New Republic, CXLVI (February 12, 1962), 13-14. The list of the confiscated properties is in *El Caribe* (December 5, 1961) p. 1 and (December 8, 1961), p. 1.

move, many felt, would deprive the Dominican people of a share in the national patrimony and the nation of a chance for a healthy economic future. Despite the difficulties and temptations, the Dominican Republic was perhaps fortunate in receiving this windfall. Alone among the Latin American countries, it was in a position most easily and painlessly to establish a viable mixed economy--part free enterprise and part socialist, with the two competing with and complementing each other. The Dominican Republic would not have to stage a revolution against vested interests; its nationalization program had already been accomplished by the simple step of inheritance. All that now remained was the efficient administration of these properties.

In mid-May, 1962, the Council of State moved to resolve the administrative problem. Thirty of the former Trujillo enterprises were given their autonomy. The Council reserved the power to have its auditors check the companies' books on occasion, but this was the only control which the government intended to exercise. These businesses were to manage their own affairs, were to be self-supporting, and were to be free from political pressures. Though independent, they were known as state autonomous industries.⁶¹

On the same day it had established the autonomy of these enterprises, the Council also voted approval of an Industrial Development Corporation, itself an autonomous agency. The Corporation's purpose, as its name implied, was to increase the development of all Dominican industries. (Sugar and cattle-raising were excepted. These two industries each came to have an autonomous agency of its own. The National Livestock Institute

⁶¹El Caribe (May 18, 1962), p. 1.

was set up a week after the Industrial Development Corporation was established. The Dominican Sugar Corporation was created in December, 1963.) The top-level junta of directors of the Development Corporation was made up of the president of the Corporation, the secretary general of the Planning Board, the secretary of state of finances, the secretary of state of industry and commerce, the governor of the Central Bank, and two members chosen from private industry. The profits from these operations, which accounted for some 43 per cent of Dominican industry, were to be plowed back into the economy in the form of loans for the development of new industries.⁶²

The Council then moved to insure the continuation of the system. As a safety measure it passed a law prohibiting the return of the confiscated Trujillo properties to their former owners. The claimants might be compensated in some other form, but their properties could not be returned. It was hoped that the system of autonomous state industries would thus become a permanent feature.

Recognizing the need for central planning and management, however, newly elected President Bosch announced that he planned to cut down the autonomy of the government's autonomous operations. The result was a large-scale conflict between Bosch and the outgoing administration even before he took office.⁶³ On April 16, nevertheless, the first step toward centralization was taken; a law was passed giving the President power

⁶²See Víctor Pizano, "El Estado, Las Empresas y la CFI," Listín Diario (July 2, 1964), p. 6.

⁶³See the exchange of statements between Bosch and Bonnelly in El Caribe (February 20 and 21, 1963).

to reduce the autonomy of the state agencies by decree. The centralization process had decidedly mixed results.

The agrarian reform technician Gifford Rogers provided a critical account of the politics involved in the centralization in one of the autonomous state agencies, the Agrarian Institute. Bosch first appointed his own personal representative to oversee the Institute's program and then created a central committee to coordinate all the activities of all the government agencies dealing with agrarian reform. Both these moves cut down the autonomy of the Institute, but they also contributed to the frustration of the President's program. His personal representative undercut the authority of the director-general and the regular staff, which led to jealousy, ill will, and friction; while the coordinating committee was never able to agree on plans and projects, which led to indirection and inaction. Rogers concluded that Bosch's centralization measures were much more harmful than beneficial and stated that it is surprising that he accomplished anything at all in the area of agrarian reform.⁶⁴

The Agrarian Institute was only one of many autonomous agencies over which the PRD government attempted to centralize control. In all of them the results were the same: disruption, chaos, and inefficiency.⁶⁵

Though favoring centralization, Bosch was nevertheless committed to the autonomous agency concept. On September 9, only two weeks before he was overthrown, the President signed a bill authorizing the National

⁶⁴Gifford Rogers, Agrarian Reform--Defined and Analyzed. With Emphasis on the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo: International Development Services, 1964), p. 151. Bosch's attempts to administer the agrarian reform are dealt with in more detail in Chapter X, pp. 320-321.

⁶⁵Antonio Rosario, "Consideraciones sobre la Supresión de la Autonomía del Banco Agrícola," El Caribe (June 9, 1963), p. 7.

Housing Bank. The Bank, which was set up as another autonomous state agency, was to coordinate national activity in the realm of financing, building, and improving rural and urban housing. It was thus both autonomous and centralized.⁶⁶

One of the most fascinating semi-autonomous agencies set up during the period was the Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES). CIDES was a quasi-public quasi-private organization which performed many formal and informal coordinating roles in the Bosch government. It was ostensibly a non-governmental "center for social-economic training" established by Norman Thomas' Institute of International Labor Research Inc. of New York; and, ostensibly, its funds came from the Institute and the Kaplan and Parvin Foundations. CIDES also received support from the Ford Foundation, which channeled grants through Brandeis and Harvard Universities, and from the U.S. government (though this latter was not broadcast) through the AID program and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁶⁷

The organizer and coordinator of CIDES was Sacha Volman, a Rumanian born, U.S.-naturalized citizen who had been active in liberal and socialist movements in many countries. Volman remains the great mystery man of Dominican politics; his role and purposes to Dominicans are far from clear. He is seen as the furtive international carpetbagger type who lurks in the shadows and exercises a secretive and powerful influence over Dominican politics. Indeed, one of the most often heard criticisms

⁶⁶El Caribe (September 10, 1963), p. 22.

⁶⁷For the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency, see the very amusing story in New York Times (September 1, 1964), p. 1.

of Volman and his operations was that they were always shadowy and secretive even in open and above-water projects. He was, further, Bosch's closest personal advisor and confidant.

The purposes of CIDES were many and varied. Economically, it aimed at bringing to the Dominican Republic many technicians and advisors to assist the Bosch government in its programs. Because these advisors would operate outside the regular government apparatus, they would be free to work without red tape and bureaucratic restrictions. Their purpose was to make studies and train Dominicans to operate a program of economic development and planning. Among those brought to the country were the Costa Rican agrarian reform specialist Carlos Campos, the Cuban economist Alberto Arredondo, and the Argentine político and journalist Dardo Cúneo

Despite the existence within the regular Dominican government of a National Planning Board, CIDES and its experts also took over some of the major responsibilities which would otherwise have gone to the Board or another agency. It prepared the budget; drafted legislation on customs, insurance, housing; compiled statistics on national income, employment, living costs; and conducted surveys on population and manpower.

The use of CIDES as a technical apparatus to assist in economic development, however, formed only part of its operations. Perhaps of more importance were its political doings. The organization was aimed at intensive mass education of key sectors of the Dominican population-- notably labor and peasants--in the ways of democratic government. Given Volman's close association with Bosch, this meant that labor and the campesinos were to be organized into strong supporters of the PRD.⁶⁸

⁶⁸A more detailed treatment of CIDES' efforts to organize the peasantry is in Chapter X, pp. 319-321.

CIDES had one further function which is seldom mentioned. It provided the channel through which U.S. influence could flow. With the advent of Bosch and a legitimate government, U.S. aid and advice was forced to become less overt; CIDES provided the means. U.S. money helped support the organization and many U.S. advisors came to the Dominican Republic under its auspices. It served as the means by which the U.S. could maintain its heavy stake in Dominican politics without it being labeled outright intervention.

CIDES and its operations ended with the overthrow of Bosch. Volman himself went into hiding immediately following the coup, provoking more widespread speculation about the whereabouts and doings of the "mystery man," and a week later slipped out of the country. While most Dominicans were happy to see him go, many were sorry that CIDES itself had folded. Despite its penchant for working secretly and behind-the-scenes, which Dominicans resented, the value of its contributions was soon recognized. Nothing comparable to this brain trust, kitchen cabinet, educational center, administrative clearing house, planning board, and bill-drafting center was organized to replace it.⁶⁹

⁶⁹Accurate information on CIDES is difficult to obtain. This analysis draws heavily on Sacha Volman, "La educación para el cambio social," PANORAMAS, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1965), 5-88; Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 160-169; and Abraham Lowenthal, "U.S. Aid to the Dominican Republic: The Politics of Foreign Aid" (Unpublished manuscript: Harvard University, 1964). Background information came from interviews with Sacha Volman, Santo Domingo, August 28, 1962; Alberto Arredondo, Santo Domingo, August 29, 1962; and Dardo Cúneo, Santo Domingo, August 28, 1962. See also the official magazine of the organization, CIDES.

The attempt at austerity

One other new trend of the Bosch period must be discussed: the attempt to impose an austerity program on the country to bring it out of the economic doldrums. In the first interview granted to newsmen after his inauguration, the President said that he had spent his first working days consulting his economic advisers on how to cut back the public payroll and trim the budget. "A country our size, confronting immense problems, has no right," Bosch is reported to have said, "to indulge in the luxurious salaries I found on the public payroll."⁷⁰

Bosch took the lead in this effort. One of his first acts was to cut his own salary from 5,000 to 1,500 pesos (the peso is officially at par with the dollar) per month. He then took the unprecedented step of announcing that he and his family would live on his salary alone without perquisites. He at first insisted on living in his own modest home rather than the National Palace in an attempt to save still more.

As long as Bosch confined the austerity drive to himself, it was widely hailed. When he proceeded to slash the salaries of ministers and undersecretaries from \$2,200 to \$1,200 and from \$800 to \$600 per month, respectively, he provoked bickering among his closest advisers.

The austerity program was nevertheless widened. Bosch slashed the Dominican foreign service, removing eighteen from the Washington post alone. At the Housing Bank the traditional five-hour work day was replaced by the U.S.-model eight-hour-day with only a short lunch break instead of the accustomed two hour siestas that usually stretched into three by the

⁷⁰United Press International story datelined Santo Domingo (March 3, 1963).

time the work began again. When he proposed to further reduce the public service, the austerity drive came to an abrupt halt.

Then-President Carlos T. Roa of the government workers' organization, FENEPIA, met with Bosch to "denounce the state of uncertainty and insecurity in which the public servants were carrying out their work." He called for a "regularization" of bureaucratic procedures and issued again the bugaboo that if the public service was to be reduced, so should the armed forces.⁷¹

The attempt at austerity ended in failure as quickly as it had begun. Opposition to the drive was found at every level and could not have been successfully carried out without alienating all those on whom Bosch had to depend for the everyday workings of the government. This abrupt upsetting of the norms of Dominican bureaucratic behavior created more difficulties than forcing the issue through would have solved.

The post-Bosch government also attempted an austerity program. In the face of pressing economic difficulties, it enacted various measures in an effort to gain a favorable balance of payments and restore economic solvency. Absorbing a lesson from the previous austerity attempt, the Triumvirate proceeded as slowly as possible but the program was nevertheless widely resented.⁷²

The role of the bureaucracy in the post-Trujillo years was fluid, conflicting, rapidly-changing. The traditional style of Dominican bureaucratic behavior--nepotism, peculation, the lack of professionalism

⁷¹See El Caribe (March 4, 1963), p. 11; (March 11, 1963), p. 14; and (April 7, 1963), p. 4. On the entire issue see Mario Bobea Billini, "La 'Aplanadora' y el Papel de FENEPIA Pro Servicio Civil," El Caribe (March 29, 1963), p. 7.

⁷²See El Caribe (October 16, 1964), p. 11.

in the public service, politically determined removals and appointments, overwhelming family influence--came in conflict with the new forces acting in the bureaucracy--big government and the need for large numbers of technical personnel, the de-Trujilloization campaign, the emergence of a government workers' organization for the first time and its struggle for an effective civil service law, an experiment with democracy at the local level, the windfall of the Trujillo properties which made the government the country's largest entrepreneur and which brought forth a whole flock of problem-creating autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies and corporations, the attempt at austerity. The result was a period of disruption, of constant strikes or threats of strike, of turmoil, of challenge to vested and revolutionary interests, and of constant change. Essentially, in Gabriel Almond's terms and more specifically in terms of Fred W. Riggs' conceptualizations in the field of developing bureaucracies, this was the struggle of a society going through the transition from traditionalism to modernism.⁷³

The Dominican public service remained highly atomized. No strong government workers' organization had emerged to replace FENEPIA and no effective civil service had been promulgated. Much of the same bureaucratic behavior which characterized the Trujillo era continued in the post-Trujillo years. For these reasons, the bureaucracy remained among the weakest of the Dominican political sectors. It had not yet reached the stage, necessary in a functioning pluralist democracy, where it could compete on even terms.

⁷³See the introduction by Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in W.J. Siffin (ed), Toward a Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1957), pp. 23-116.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

One of the most important developments in the post-Trujillo years was the emergence of a strong but sometimes immature, programmatic but also personalistic, fluid but nevertheless lasting political party system for the first time in the nation's history.

Political parties are conceded to be essential to a modern, democratic political system. They serve as the principal channel of communication between the ruled and the ruler. During the Trujillo era the parties did not serve this intermediary function; they were strictly under the control of the regime and used by it as an apparatus of control. In the period after the overthrow of the dictatorship the parties began to serve as intermediate organizations between individuals, interest groups, and the state and as channels by which interests were articulated and communicated by these individuals and groups to the government. In exercising these functions, however, they were often weak and ineffective.

The weakness and ineffectiveness of the parties is best demonstrated by the fact that the Church, the armed forces, the labor organizations, the peasants, and the business community often channeled their interests directly into the political system without using the parties as intermediaries. In comparison with some of these other sectors the political parties were still in an infant stage; they could not, for example, compete with the more-often-unified voice of the armed forces, the Church, or the business-professional-landowning elite. The parties, nevertheless, have begun

to play an important role in the developing Dominican political system--and their importance is increasing.

The Birth of the Political Parties

The present political party structure in the Dominican Republic began to be formed even while Trujillo was still in power. Some of the many exiles from the dictatorship banded together in Caracas, Havana, San Juan, San José, Mexico City, and New York to form opposition groups which, in turn, became the nuclei of the parties which came into existence after the Generalissimo was assassinated. Other opposition groups were organized clandestinely within the country during the last two years of the dictator's rule; and, upon his overthrow, these too were converted into political parties.

Foremost among the exile element was the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). The PRD was founded by Juan Bosch, a writer and intellectual who went into exile a few years after Trujillo came to power and founded the Party in 1939. Its program called for the creation of a democratic order--politically, socially, economically, and morally--in the Dominican Republic. The PRD was closely associated with the popular or Aprista-like parties in Latin America, such as Democratic Action in Venezuela, National Liberation in Costa Rica, Popular Democratic in Puerto Rico, and Authentic in Cuba. Indeed Bosch's closest friends, socially as well as politically, were the leaders of these parties--Rómulo Betancourt, José Figueres, Luis Muñoz Marín, and Carlos Prío Socarrás. Bosch, further, liked to say that his Party was "spiritually attuned" to the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and to the New Frontier of John F. Kennedy.¹

¹ See Stefan Baciú, Juan Bosch: Del exilio a la presidencia (Santo

For more than twenty years the PRD constituted the major opposition to the Trujillo regime. From its branch offices in Caracas, Mexico City, San Juan, and New York a continuous flow of propaganda was directed against the dictatorship. The Party put out pamphlets, newspapers, and press releases exposing the terror and corruption existing in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo and was recognized by the dictator himself as his most effective opponent. Indeed, Trujillo helped build up the PRD within the country by his frequent references to it. Bosch, who wielded a vitriolic pen, and Nicolás Silfa, head of the New York section, became the pet hatreds of El Benefactor.²

On July 5, 1961, after Trujillo had been assassinated and after his successors had guaranteed that a political opposition would be allowed, a committee of three PRD officials--Angel Miolán, Ramón Castillo, and Silfa--returned to the country from their long exile and announced that their purpose was to "contribute to the birth and consolidation of democracy in the Dominican Republic." An office was opened and two days later a political rally was held. The crowd, inflamed by the fiery speeches, staged a march on the National Palace and later burned the government-owned radio station. This was the first such popular uprising in the post-Trujillo period; and the Police eventually opened fire on the rampaging mob, wounding six and jailing twenty more.³ On October 20 the President of the

(Footnote 1 continued from preceding page)

Domingo: Librería Dominicana, 1963); and Gastón Baquero, "Semblanza de Juan Bosch," Mundo Hispánico (February, 1963), pp. 63-68.

²Jesús de Galíndez, La era de Trujillo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacífico, 1956), p. 441.

³El Caribe (July 8, 1961), p. 1.

Party, Juan Bosch, returned to the country and launched the campaign that exactly fourteen months later would carry him to the presidency of the Republic.⁴

Other of the exile organizations were smaller, less well organized, and not so active. These included the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard under Horacio Ornes, the Dominican Populist Party under Francisco Javier Guillani, the Dominican Liberation Movement under Tulio Arvelo, the Nationalist Party under Virgilio Vilomar, the Dominican Patriotic Union under Juan Díaz, the Dominican United Front under Tobías Cabral, the 27th of February Revolutionary movement, the Dominican Popular Movement under Máximo López Molina, and the Popular Socialist Party.⁵

Some Dominican exiles were more important for their individual opposition to the regime than for their activities as members of political groups. These included the poet Pedro Mir, General Miguel Angel Ramírez Alcántara, the writer and intellectual Juan Isidro Jiménez-Gullón, the journalist Germán Ornes, Juan Rodríguez García, Angel Morales, Horacio Vicioso, Guaros Velázquez, and others.⁶ Many of these exile groups or

⁴Bosch had presented his view of the route the Dominican Republic should follow in a statement written twenty-four hours after the assassination of Trujillo. See Juan Bosch, "Un Camino para el Pueblo Dominicano" (Mimeographed: San José, Costa Rica, June 1, 1961).

⁵Information on some of these minor exile movements may be found in Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 439-441; Germán Ornes, Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1958), pp. 307-308; New York Times (August 16, 1959), p. 2 and (August 30, 1959), p. 21; and La República [Puerto Rico] (August 16, 1960), p. 39.

⁶Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 441-443; and Ornes, op. cit., p. 308. See also J.A. Osorio Lizaraza, Germen y Proceso del Antitruillismo en América (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta "Colombia," 1956).

individuals also formed minor political parties when they returned to their country after the death of Trujillo.

Another organization which would later emerge as a major political party was formed within the Dominican Republic during the last two years of the Trujillo era. On June 14, 1959, an invasion of the country was launched by a group of exiles based in Cuba. The invaders failed in their attempt to rally popular support to their cause of overthrowing the dictatorship and were wiped out by the ruthless and efficient Trujillo armed forces. The example of these martyrs was inspiring, however, and a clandestine 14th of June Movement was begun, the only organization to oppose Trujillo within the country. Secret cells were formed and the rudiments of a political party organization took shape.

Following the assassination of the Generalissimo, the 14th of June Movement formed into a civic-patriotic organization to oppose the continuation of the Trujillo family dictatorship. As such, it attracted some of the Dominican Republic's most prominent citizens and representatives of its first families--such as Ramón Cáceres Troncoso, Nicolás Pichardo, Gustavo Adolfo Mejía Ricart, and José Antonio Fernández Caminero. On July 8, 1961, the Movement was reorganized as a political party under the leadership of Fernández Caminero. Its communiqué called it an "open door organization" and urged all who believed in liberty and justice to join its program of "civic action." It expressed a desire to work with other groups opposing the continued tyranny and pledged itself to work for the establishment of a democracy in the Dominican Republic.⁷

⁷The text is in El Caribe (July 9, 1961), p. 1. See also Rafael César Hoepelmán, "Se Reorganiza en el País el Movimiento 14 de Junio," La Nación (July 8, 1961), p. 3.

On July 15, 1961, the formation of a third major opposition group was announced. The group, which had begun holding meetings even before Trujillo was killed, was called the National Civic Union (UCN). Its initial communiqué was signed by 114 Dominicans, mostly business and professional men. The new organization was not to be a political party but, like the 14th of June Movement, a civic action association dedicated to opposing the continuance of the Trujillo regime. Indeed, many of its leaders, such as Fernández Caminero, were also members of the 14th of June Movement. The UCN chose as its president Dr. Viriato Fiallo, a country physician.⁸

These three major groups--the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the 14th of June Movement, and the National Civic Union, along with a whole host of smaller organizations--carried the fight against the continued Trujillo family dictatorship under Ramfis. The obstacles to their activities were enormous. The press and the radio remained under the control of the regime so that the new opposition was frequently prohibited from communicating its views. The Trujillos had the Police raid the opposition headquarters and at one time over 200 were arrested, including UCN leader Fiallo. Opposition members were dismissed from their government jobs, rallies were broken up by the Police, and several oppositionists were killed.

Despite these obstacles, the opposition continued to flourish. Robert J. Alexander feels that the primary reason for their successes was that the people of the Dominican Republic had lost their fear of the regime. For the first time in several decades, Alexander writes, they were willing to

⁸Viriato Fiallo, personal interview, Santo Domingo, December 30, 1964. See also New York Times (July 16, 1961), p. 3. For a biography of Fiallo see New York Times (December 15, 1961), p. 19.

run the risk of joining the opposition.⁹ Rallies, meetings, and demonstrations continued to be held throughout the country and the crowds became steadily larger. Local units were established in most of the major cities and the membership ranks of the opposition groups swelled.

The opposition grew primarily at the expense of the official parties which Trujillo had established to help secure his control over the political affairs of the country. Foremost among the official parties was the Dominican Party (PD), founded by Trujillo during his first term in office, but there were two others. The Dominican Labor Party (PLD) and the Nationalist Party (PN) had both been organized on December 15, 1960, when Trujillo sought to "democratize" his regime in the hope that the O.A.S. sanctions would be lifted; and both were permitted to win some "elections" throughout the country. Though all three official parties continuously denied in the official press that they were losing membership, it was clear that the emerging opposition was gaining at their expense.

The PLD and the PN were the first to be sacrificed. On August 7 the PLD was dissolved and the PN disintegrated the following day. The statements of the parties announcing their dissolution urged that their members all "revert to the ranks of the party of their origin, the Dominican Party." In fact, most members of the two parties joined the opposition.¹⁰

The Dominican Party thus remained as the single official party. It continued to claim that its strength was undiminished, but it too was

⁹Robert J. Alexander, "The Dominican Left Wins First Victory," New America, 1 (December 8, 1961), 6.

¹⁰The texts of the dissolution statements are in La Nación (August 7, 1961), p. 1 and (August 8, 1961), p. 24. See also New York Times (August 10, 1961), p. 6.

losing ground to the opposition.¹¹ The government press every day published lists of PD adherents, but these lists were largely manufactured. At one time a picture of a PD rally published in the press was exposed by the opposition as the same picture which had been published years previously. The PD continued to carry some weight as the official voice for the regime; but when the last of the Trujillos left the country in November, the fate of the Party was sealed. On December 28, 1961, the Dominican Party was officially dissolved. The finality of the move was made evident by the fact that all the furniture in the Party offices, like the other former Trujillo properties, reverted to the state.¹²

The Emergence of a Political Party Spectrum

Major changes soon began to take place within two of the dominant political organizations which had led the struggle against the Trujillos. Prior to the overthrow of the regime, the National Civic Union and the 14th of June Movement, both civic action associations, had worked closely together in opposition to the continued Trujillo family dictatorship. Both contained many of the most prominent people in the Dominican Republic and, as has been mentioned, many of these belonged to both groups. Now, however, with their common cause--the overthrow of the Trujillos--accomplished, a serious and ever-widening split developed between them. The 14th of June Movement went steadily toward the Left, while the UCN went steadily toward the Right.

¹¹"La Desintegración del Partido Dominicano," El Radical, 1 (September 13, 1961), 3.

¹²The text of the PD's letter to President Balaguer announcing the dissolution is in El Caribe (December 29, 1961), p. 1.

The first indication of a split occurred in late November, 1961, after the Trujillos had been driven from the country, when UCN leader Fiallo and 14th of June Movement leader Manuel Tavárez Justo returned triumphantly from Washington where they had gone for consultation. The two refused to ride in the same car during the tumultuous parade from the airport into the city. Other differences between them soon emerged. The UCN was prepared to deal with Balaguer to bring about the gradual establishment of a democratic state, while the 14th of June Movement's position was that Balaguer could not be trusted and had to be replaced immediately. The 14th of June Movement also insisted that the U.S. immediately withdraw the naval task force which had been stationed just outside Dominican territorial waters during the period when the Trujillos were ousted and which had been cruising in the vicinity since that time. The UCN acclaimed the presence of the U.S. ships, saying that they had thwarted the attempt of the Trujillos to reestablish a dictatorship.¹³

The two reunited in opposition to the Rodríguez Echavarría coup in mid-January, but after this forty-eight-hour period of harmony they grew even further apart. The UCN supported the setting up of the Council of State while the 14th of June Movement began to raise the charge of oligarchic rule. The Catorces (as members of the 14th of June Movement were called) accused the UCN of treason when it officially converted itself into a political party on February 8, 1962, of harboring Trujillistas, of being the official Party of the Council, and of being reactionary. The 14th of June Movement's antipathy to all U.S. activities

¹³New York Times (November 23, 1961), p. 34.

in the Dominican Republic increased until it became violent and almost paranoid, seeing "yankee imperialist" plots behind every innocent move. The call for a revolution patterned after that of Fidel Castro became more insistent.¹⁴

Realizing that the Party was becoming more and more under the control of Castro-oriented elements, many of the 14th of June Movement's most prominent leaders and members began to resign. With these more conservative elements out, the Movement became even more decidedly the Fidelista group in the country. The resignations continued as a steady stream until the organization was reduced to the status of being a minor party.¹⁵

While the 14th of June Movement was going increasingly to the Left, the National Civic Union was going further to the Right. It had begun as a moderate organization composed mainly of business and professional people dedicated to transforming the Dominican Republic into a stable and constitutional order. Though the UCN occupied a Center position on the political spectrum, it was forced toward the Right. With the overthrow of the Trujillos, the Right was completely discredited and a vacuum resulted at that end of the spectrum. Almost all the parties claimed to be Leftist, with the result that the Center Party was given the damning label "The Party of the Rich."¹⁶

¹⁴These developments may be traced in the newspaper of the 14th of June Movement, El 14, during late 1961 and early 1962.

¹⁵See Mario Bobea Billini, "Opinan Hay Dos Tendencias Dentro del 14 de Junio," El Caribe (February 20, 1962), p. 4.

¹⁶This point is stressed by Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 94-95.

The emergence of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party as a strong force between the other two major parties on the Dominican political spectrum made even more difficult the predicament of the UCN. The PRD was a member of the "Democratic Left" group of political parties in Latin America; it favored widespread political, economic, and social reforms (in contrast to the less revolutionary UCN) and planned to carry out these reforms within a democratic framework (in contrast to the 14th of June Movement which increasingly saw the more totalitarian methods of Fidel Castro as the only hope for the Dominican Republic). The PRD quickly became known as the "Party of the Poor"; and in a country where the poor outnumber the rich by an overwhelming majority, the victory of the PRD over the UCN in the elections was already assured.

The National Civic Union, 14th of June Movement, and Dominican Revolutionary Party thus emerged as the major political parties in the country, presenting a fairly clear and wide range of programs and orientations. Other minor parties and a large number of infinitesimally small parties also emerged during this time, adding further diversity to the electoral panorama.

The most important of the minor parties was the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC). The PRSC was formed by a nucleus of three returning exiles--Alfonso Moreno Martínez, Guido d'Alessandro, and Mario Read Vittini--and was based on a doctrine of revolutionary Christian socialism. The Party's platform called for free elections, the separation of Church and State, a change in the social-economic structure, agrarian reform, the liquidation of feudalism, economic development, the ending of the country's traditions of misery and ignorance, respect for private

property, solidarity with all free nations, and a just redistribution of the wealth.¹⁷

The PRSC purports to offer a middle way and claims to be a third force. One of its favorite slogans is "Neither Yankees nor Russians, Neither Capitalism nor Communism!" The Party attracted many of the newer generation of Dominican political leaders and was especially strong among the University students. It maintained close ties with Christian-socialist movements throughout the world, particularly with the COPEI of Venezuela and the Christian Democrats of Chile. Its presidential candidate, Moreno Martínez, placed third in the 1962 elections.¹⁸

The Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party (PNRD) is the personal machine of General Miguel Angel Ramírez Alcántara. It is oriented along the lines of the "friends and neighbors" concept. The Party's offices are located in the home of General Ramírez Alcántara's sister in Santo Domingo, but its main strength is in the city of San Juan de la Maguana. There the Ramírez family reigns supreme and the General is the local caudillo. The PNRD's national slate finished fourth in the 1962 presidential elections; but in terms of the number of senators, deputies, mayors, and aldermen elected, the Party placed third on the strength of its overwhelming vote in the San Juan area. It has little strength in the rest of the country.¹⁹

¹⁷Luis O. Matos y Sánchez, "El Social Cristiano y su Doctrine," El Caribe (November 7, 1962), p. 8. See also the official newspaper of the PRSC, Pueblo.

¹⁸Based on personal interviews with Alfonso Moreno Martínez, Santo Domingo, September 15 and 16, 1964; Antonio Rosario, Santo Domingo, November 11, 1964; and Javier Caonabo Castillo, Santo Domingo, November 11, 1964. See also Robert J. Alexander, "The Rise of Latin American Christian Democracy," New Politics, III (Fall, 1964), 82.

¹⁹General Miguel Angel Ramírez Alcántara, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 4, 1964. Based also on interviews in San Juan de la Maguana.

General Ramírez (he is called "General" because he fought in the 1948 Costa Rican civil war and was one of the leaders of the 1949 invasion attempt against the Dominican Republic, and he enjoys very much telling of his experiences in these encounters) regards himself as the patron of San Juan and the benevolent father of his followers. This is illustrated by a story Ramírez tells on himself. It seems the General and a friend were having a cafecito in San Juan when an urchin in shorts walked by. "By God, he has Ramírez legs," roared the caudillo as he motioned the boy over. "What's your name?" he asked the boy. "Jorge González." "Hmmm," said the general, "and you mother's name?" "Rosa González." "And your father?" The boy straightened, stood up tall, and said, "Sir, my father is General Miguel Angel Ramírez Alcántara."

The Social Democratic Alliance (ASD) was formed by Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón, a writer, philosopher, intellectual, and most articulate critic of all recent Dominican governments. While in exile, Jiménez-Grullón was a member of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, though he later broke with Bosch. Upon his return to the Dominican Republic following the death of Trujillo, he joined the National Civic Union and was considered the probable vice presidential candidate on a ticket with UCN President Fiallo until he abruptly quit that Party.²⁰

Claiming that the UCN was becoming the official Party of the Council of State, Jiménez-Grullón and a small group of sympathizers formed the ASD. Its program called for the maintenance of private property and free enterprise adjusted to the social interest and the public welfare, economic and human rights for all citizens, eradication of the vestiges of the Trujillo

²⁰Hispanic American Report, XV (June, 1962), 322; and Eduardo Clemente Cortilla, secretary of organization of ASD, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 8, 1964.

dictatorship, a system of representative democracy with the end of developing a positive political, economic, and social democracy, harmony between the individual and the group, education, the development of a more nationalistic sense, and close relations with the nations of the Americas.²¹ The Party did not develop a strong organization or a large popular following; its strength was based largely on the personal appeal of Jiménez-Grullón, who finished fifth in the 1962 presidential elections.

The Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard (VRD) was organized in exile in 1956 by Horacio Ornes, leader of the 1949 Luperón invasion attempt against the Trujillo regime and brother of the influential owner-editor of Santo Domingo's leading newspaper, El Caribe. The VRD began as a splinter group from the Dominican Revolutionary Party and many of its programs remained close to those of the parent organization. Upon his arrival in the country after the assassination of the dictator, Ornes promised to fight for a "democratic, representative regime based on social justice" and called for a genuine social revolution "to destroy arbitrary power forever." He declared that the VRD hoped to install a "democratic-socialist government" in the Dominican Republic and that the country should remain a part of the Western bloc.²² Only a couple days before the December 20 elections, Ornes pulled the VRD out of the running and threw his support to Bosch. This support was not a decisive factor in Bosch's landslide victory, but the VRD does have some strength and should be considered a minor party.

²¹The text is in El Caribe (April 25, 1962), p. 11.

²²See El Caribe (November 27, 1961), p. 12 and (June 24, 1962), p. 9; and Declaración de Principios, Programa y Estatutos Generales de Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1962). Based also on interviews with Horacio Ornes, Santo Domingo, August 27, 1962, and November 11, 1964.

As a group, the several communist and pro-Castro parties in the country may also be considered a minor party. The official communist party is the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), but the Party had little strength and its activities were limited to the occasional nighttime scrawling of a slogan on some wall or building. The Popular Dominican Movement (MPD) headed by Máximo López Molina proclaimed itself a socialist party and was bitterly anti-U.S. and Fidelista-oriented. More important were the intensely nationalistic, anti-U.S. and pro-Castro 14th of June Movement and the Revolutionary Nationalist Party (PNR), though the latter never gained much strength. The 14th of June Movement, though beginning as a major party, steadily declined in strength until it refused to participate in the elections for fear that its weakness would then become public knowledge. When acting in concert, these other extreme Left parties are capable of making their voices heard.

In addition to the major and minor parties, a large number of very small parties emerged for the 1962 campaign. At one time at the height of the election struggle some twenty-nine parties could be counted. Brief mention might be made of some of them: The Authentic Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRDA) was formed by Nicolás Silfa, one of the leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party who was expelled for accepting the post of Minister of Labor under the Council without consulting the Party. The Progressive Christian Democratic Party (PPDC) was organized by another dissident PRD leader, Ramón Castillo. The National Party (PN) of Virgilio Vilomar descended from the Horacista Party of pre-Trujillo days. The Democratic Christian Party (PDC) headed by Mario Read Vittini split off from the Revolutionary Social Christian Party. Other small parties included the

Democratic Workers and Peasants Party, the National Revolutionary Front, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Dominican Democratic Union, the 27th of February Revolutionary Movement, the 20th of October Patriotic Front, the Fifth Republic Party, the National Vanguard Front, and others.²³

Most of these small parties were little more than one-man operations, existing one day and merging, dividing, or disappearing the next. They were based largely on family ties; in one of them the father was president of the party, his wife secretary general, and his two daughters typists. Usually some friends or relatives would consent to have their names included in the party's membership rolls, but few others.

An amusing story was told concerning one of these parties which illustrates this point. On the night of the election a presidential candidate and his wife were at home analyzing the returns, "José," the wife suddenly exclaimed in anger, "you must have a mistress." "Why?" questioned the husband, somewhat taken aback. "Well," she replied, "We know that I voted for you and that you voted for yourself. You received three votes. Who else would vote for you?"

The Election Campaign

This wide variety of political parties presented a confusing array to Dominicans, untrained in the practices of a political party system, especially in the early months of the campaign. Splits and mergers were frequent, though the splits took place much more often than the mergers. Most were personalistic parties with allegiance going to the person of the

²³See Guillermo Martínez Márquez, "29 Partidos en Busca de Una Solución," El Caribe (November 4, 1962), p. 7; and "República Dominicana: Multiplicación de Partidos," Hispanoamericano, XLII (December 24, 1962), 40.

leader rather than to what he stood for. The ranks of total membership for all the parties far exceeded the number of eligible voters since many joined several. The parties handed out campaign buttons; and the wearing of buttons from more than one party was considered both more decorative and more democratic. The number of adhesiones (affiliates) was not an accurate index to actual party strength.

Not only were political parties new to Dominicans, but the entire idea of free and open elections in which one had a choice between more than one slate of candidates was also a revolutionary concept. The problems in setting up the machinery for the elections were enormous. At the invitation of the Dominican government, an O.A.S. mission was sent to the country to assist in reformulating election procedures. The mission consisted of three men: former Panamanian supreme court justice Víctor F. Goytia; University of Pennsylvania political scientist Henry Wells, a specialist in Caribbean politics; and Juan P. Zaballos, a member of the Uruguayan electoral tribunal. Their report advised the government on such seemingly simple and uncontroversial topics as ballots, voting locations, eligibility for voting, representation, etc.²⁴ Each of these topics, however, were new to the Dominican Republic and they all raised controversial disputes among the political parties.

The difficulties of arranging elections in a country with little or no experience in such matters were so great that the elections almost did not take place. Not only were there threats from the Right (in this case, the armed forces) and the Left (the pro-Castro elements), which raised the

²⁴Henry Wells, "The O.A.S. and the Dominican Elections," Orbis, VII (Spring, 1963), 150-163.

possibility that the entire effort might be sabotaged, but electoral procedures themselves almost forced a cancellation. Thus the election for the constituent assembly, scheduled for August, had to be cancelled because of the lack of the necessary 4,000 polling booths and 25,000 election supervisors.²⁵

Another crisis involved the ballots. Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party and five other parties demanded that each party have a different color ballot and that there be two ballots for each party, one for the presidential candidates and one for all the other posts. Bosch felt that the National Civic Union, which had a more literate following, would receive the advantage if the ballots were all the same color. The PRD threatened to withdraw from the elections if its demands were not met, but the electoral board eventually worked out a compromise. The parties received different colored ballots--blue for the UCN, white for the PRD, green for the PRSC, etc.--and the ballots were perforated across the middle with the presidential candidates on top and all other candidates on the bottom. Ticket-splitting was thus made easy.²⁶

The election campaign had begun hesitantly. None of the parties was absolutely convinced that the elections would indeed take place and few of them were willing to commit themselves to any definite programs or candidates until they saw which way the wind was blowing. Several of the larger parties had begun to publish newspapers and make radio broadcasts but these usually contained only mild utterances. An effort was made to establish

²⁵Hispanic American Report, XV (October, 1962), 713.

²⁶Rowland Evans, Jr., "First Steps in Dominican Democracy," The Reporter, XXVIII (January 3, 1963), 22; and Miguel A. Peguero, Jr., "La Doble Boleta y el Voto Blanco," El Caribe (November 23, 1962), p. 9.

party branches and recruit new members throughout the country but, for the most part, this was also half-hearted.²⁷

The campaign soon began to warm up. One spark was provided by the announcement that former President Joaquín Balaguer intended to return from exile to participate in the elections. Balaguer had been nominated for the presidency by Nicolás Silfa's Authentic Dominican Revolutionary Party, but this slate was not allowed. Under a law prohibiting Trujillista activity, Silfa and his wife, who was secretary general of the PRDA, were imprisoned and fined \$300 each. The electoral board rejected the PRDA candidates on a technicality, airlines serving the Dominican Republic were instructed not to sell Balaguer a ticket, and armed forces units were alerted to watch all airports in the country in case he tried to slip in. Balaguer did not make the attempt, but the issue served to heat up the campaign.²⁸

In August and September another controversial candidate, Julio Peynado, was put forward. Peynado, whose father had served two years as a puppet president of Trujillo, was sponsored by the Democratic Front, composed of the National Party of Virgilio Vilomar and the Progressive Christian Democratic Party of Ramón Castillo. For a short period Peynado's candidacy was boomed out by a sound truck touring the streets of Santo Domingo and impressively long lists of his adherents were published daily in the newspapers. On September 19 he officially announced that he was

²⁷New York Times (June 10, 1962), p. 30; and Hispanic American Report, XV (August, 1962), 514.

²⁸Nicolás Silfa, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 25, 1962.

a candidate, but only ten days later accusations that Peynado was implicated in the atrocities of the Trujillo regime forced his withdrawal.²⁹

In the jockeying for electoral advantage, the Left made two major attempts to unify the diverse parties. Early in the campaign the 14th of June Movement, the Revolutionary Nationalist Party, and the National Revolutionary Front formed the Revolutionary Bloc of National Unity (BRUN).³⁰ Later in the year, after the first attempt had failed, Leftist leaders again tried to meld the several pro-Castro and revolutionary parties into a popular front. The front would have included the independent Marxist Social Democratic Alliance (ASD) of Jiménez-Grullón as well as the 14th of June Movement, the Popular Socialist Party, and the Dominican Popular Movement; but this effort also failed.³¹

None of the minor parties succeeded in their attempts to find an imaginative issue or a charismatic leader that might catapult them to the level of the major parties. The Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party (PNRD) of General Ramírez Alcántara continued strong only in the caudillo's home area of San Juan, while the ASD remained as the apparatus through which Jiménez-Grullón could express his views. Nor did the two remaining minor parties which had the greatest chance of increasing in strength--the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard of Horacio Ornes and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party--achieve much success. The Democratic-

²⁹Virgilio Vilomar and Ramón Castillo, personal interviews, Santo Domingo, September 2, 1962. See also Hispanic American Report, XV (November, 1962), 809.

³⁰See Mario Bobea Billini, "Green el BRUN Expuesto a Infiltración Extremista," El Caribe (February 14, 1962), p. 4.

³¹Hispanic American Report, XV (December, 1962), 918.

Left orientation of the VRD was attractive to many Dominicans, but the Party was hurt by its close collaboration with the conservative Council, by its refusal to take a clear and consistent stand, and by the overall image of Ornes as an opportunist. The PRSC was rent by internal dissension and split when one of its founders and the vice president of the Party, Mario Read Vittini, was expelled and then formed his own party.

One of the three major parties had long before begun to decline. The 14th of June Movement had a strength equal to that of the National Civic Union and the Dominican Revolutionary Party in the months following the death of Trujillo. At that time its membership and directory were made up of diverse elements. Beginning with the final ouster of the Trujillos in November, 1961, however, the Party began to move increasingly toward Fidelismo with the result that it lost much of its former following.³²

The 14th of June Movement was never organized throughout the country like the other two major parties and confined its activities almost exclusively to the making of propaganda in the capital city. As the executive committee fell more and more into the hands of its extreme Leftist leaders and as the Party became nearly synonymous with Castroism in the Dominican Republic, considerably more defections from its ranks occurred until its strength was confined almost exclusively to some high school and University students and some of the unemployed in Santo Domingo. The Catorces were weakened still more by a serious split in the movement which came into the open only two months before the elections.³³

³²Robert J. Alexander, "Democratic Victory in the Dominican Republic," New Americas, III (January 15, 1963), 3.

³³Frances Grant, "Dominicans Face Elections," Hemisphérica, XI (December, 1962), 2; and Florangel Cárdenas, "Three Coups: One Successful, One Aborted, One Yet to Come," The San Juan Review, I (February, 1964), 6.

The Party had lost so much of its initial strength that it decided not to participate in the elections. The official reason for withdrawal was that it was being discriminated against and that the election was fixed so that the U.S.-favored UCN would win.³⁴ Its rallying cry became "Elections No, National Unity Government Sí!" But it was generally conceded that this was only an alibi, that the real reason the Party refused to take part in the elections was that the returns would provide an accurate gauge of its weak popular support, and that the 14th of June Movement preferred not to have this weakness become common knowledge.³⁵

The decline of the 14th of June Movement left only the UCN and the PRD as major parties. The National Civic Union had at one time been the dominant political organization in the country. It had led the fight against the continued Trujillo family dictatorship and pressured Balaguer into sharing power with the Council of State. As a patriotic, non-partisan, civic-action association it achieved enormous initial success; but when it was converted into a political party on February 8, 1962, it began its decline.³⁶

UCN President Viriato Fiallo stated that the conversion of the organization into a party would not mean the abandonment of its patriotic objectives but that they would rather be increased. Fiallo said the reason for the change was that none of the other parties represented the true

³⁴Antonio Duvergé, Executive Committee of the 14th of June Movement, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 28, 1962.

³⁵Alexander, "Democratic Victory . . . ," op. cit., p. 3.

³⁶See Julio Mendoza Alcántara, "UCN Partido Político," Unión Cívica, I (March 2, 1962), 3; and José A. Penzo F. "La Conversión de UCN en Partido Político," El Caribe (February 16, 1962), p. 5.

interests of the Dominican people.³⁷ In keeping with these sentiments the Party published a revolutionary "Declaration of Principles." The Declaration called for the establishment of human rights, the rule of law, and a representative and democratic government. It pledged the defense of labor and the campesinos and the "total subordination" of the armed forces to the civilian authority. It recognized the social nature of private property and urged large-scale economic planning and state action to guarantee the satisfaction of social needs for the masses. In foreign affairs the Party called for amiable relations with all nations but asserted that it would naturally be associated with the democratic bloc.³⁸

Despite the revolutionary pronouncements, the UCN became identified with the oligarchy and with reaction. The majority of the members of the governing Council of State were either members or sympathizers of the Party, and the close association of the UCN with the unpopular Council in the public mind became an albatross around its neck. The Party continued to appeal almost exclusively to the business-professional-landowning community which made up a very small proportion of the voters. Bosch used the word "tutempotes" ("big shots") with devastating effect to characterize his principal opponent.

There were other reasons for the UCN's failure to maintain the advantage it had once enjoyed. Its conversion from an a-political civic-action group into just another political party cost it the support of many

³⁷El Caribe (February 9, 1962), p. 1.

³⁸The text is in El Caribe (February 27, 1962), p. 9. See also Mario Bobea Billini, "Dicen es muy Revolucionaria Declaración Principios UCN," El Caribe (February 28, 1962), p. 4.

patriotic and non-partisan early supporters. The Party was late in beginning its campaign outside the capital city, and it never succeeded in matching the organizational base which the PRD had built up. Presidential candidate Fiallo was a benevolent fatherly type without charismatic appeal who could not generate fanatical devotion among his followers. He always wore sunglasses--even inside--which made him look like one of Trujillo's henchmen. Finally, the UCN ran an inept campaign which, especially in the last two months before the elections, alienated many of its followers.³⁹

These other reasons were important, but the class issue was decisive. The UCN could never shake its label as "The Party of the Rich." It incessantly tried to overcome its identification with the oligarchy by directing its propaganda efforts at the lower class urban workers and rural campesinos. It promised jobs and increased wages to labor and agrarian reform to peasants. An office of social assistance was established to help the poor and needy--and all the activities of the office were well publicized.⁴⁰ But despite all these efforts, the UCN could not attract the vote of the masses.

The principal reason for the Party's failure to attract the lower classes was, unsurprisingly, that it was an upper class party. It enjoyed the backing of the richer and more aristocratic elements and its leadership continued to be drawn exclusively from these ranks. It was

³⁹See the series of articles by Mario Bobea Billini in El Caribe exploring some of the reasons for the UCN's loss: "Causas del Revés de UCN se Remontan a Origen Partido" (January 4, 1963), p. 6; "Enfoque de la Campana de Proselitismo de UCN y PRD" (January 5, 1963), p. 6; and "Factor del Voto Negativo Contra UCN Fué Decisivo" (January 7, 1963), p. 6.

⁴⁰For example of the UCN's attempt to appeal to the lower classes see Luis Langa Mota, "Que el Rico Sea Menos Rico y Que el Pobre Sea Menos Pobre," Unión Cívica, II (August 25, 1962), 3; and Carlos Esteban Deive, "Sentido de Nuestra Revolución," Unión Cívica, II (August 25, 1962), 5.

difficult for a laboring man to see how he could benefit from a party led by the same elements who had traditionally kept him subjugated. It was likewise difficult for a campesino to comprehend how he would gain from an agrarian reform when some UCN leaders urged that the government-owned lands earmarked for the agrarian reform be returned to private ownership.⁴¹

Not only did the UCN's identification as a rich man's party prevent it from making new converts, but it also caused the resignation of members already on its rolls. In mid-September, for example, eighteen Party officials resigned their positions and invited all "honest" members to make the same decision. Many took the advice. The published communiqué of the officials stated that "the majority of its [the UCN's] directors belonged to the high bourgeoisie with which the Dominican people have had a sad experience." The dissident group accused the UCN of being the official Party of the Council of State and, finally, of "continuing to serve the interests of the oligarchy."⁴² The issue of class, in a country where class lines and social distinctions are sharply drawn, proved to be the determining factor in the election campaign.

The UCN's weaknesses were the Dominican Revolutionary Party's strengths. In the first place, the PRD, under the professional direction of Angel Miolán, was well organized. While the other parties were disputing among themselves, the PRD opened branch offices in the most remote areas of the country. Bosch was apparently the only political leader who realized that the campesino vote would be decisive and acted on that knowledge.

⁴¹Alexander, "Democratic Victory . . .," op. cit., p. 3.

⁴²The text is in El Caribe (September 18, 1962), p. 11.

Early in 1962 the Party already had a greater membership than the other parties. By March it had some 300,000 registered members and became the first political organization to meet the requirements for registration as a party.⁴³

In the second place, the PRD ran a smart and professional campaign. Its programs remained clear and simple, unmarred by the ambiguities and contradictions that characterized the UCN programs. Though it too suffered the loss of some of its principal leaders--most notably, Nicolás Silfa and Ramón Castillo--it was not hit by wholesale defections from its ranks as was the case with the UCN. The Party consistently came out on the side of democracy and the people and emerged triumphant and unscarred from all disputes. The prime example of this was the "communist" issue raised by the Church in the last flagging days of the campaign; but there were many other such cases. Finally, the PRD timed its campaign perfectly, hitting its peak immediately prior to the election, in contrast to the UCN which had peaked a full year earlier.

Bosch also succeeded in appealing to the same peasant and labor elements that the UCN had failed to attract. He talked in terms the campesinos understood and liked, as illustrated in this campaign announcement:

No country can exist without a government, but neither can it exist without farmers. Hence a farmer is as important as the president. The president governs but the farmer plants yucca and beans and just as we could not live without a government, neither could we live without yucca and beans. Therefore for us the poorest farmer is as

⁴³The PRD's early rise has been traced by Mario Bobea Billini in a series of articles in El Caribe: "Dicen que Mientras Otros Disputan, el PRD Crece" (January 24, 1962), p. 7; "Mientras Otros Pelean, Bosch Sigue Ganando en Zona Rural" (February 21, 1962), p. 4; and "Opinan el PRD es Partido de Mayor Militancia Actualmente" (April 11, 1962), p. 6. See also Sacha Volman, "La educación para el cambio social," PANORAMAS, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1965), 31.

important as the president, and so we cannot understand why the president here is conceded more importance than the farmer.

This type of appeal gained Bosch the support of the peasantry who make up 70 per cent of the country's three million inhabitants. To them and to the urban lower classes of the capital, the PRD candidate was a crusader charged with a mission to change the old order while his principal opponent was considered the representative of the wealthy. When asked why she favored Bosch, one peasant woman answered, "Because he is working for me." Bosch constantly hammered at the class issue and it became speedily known that his PRD was the "Party of the Poor."⁴⁴

Bosch and his Party were the prime movers in bringing the Dominican campesinos into politics for the first time. The PRD distributed cheap transistor radios throughout the countryside, and it was not unusual for crowds of 40-50 to gather together to listen to a Bosch broadcast. He himself visited virtually every isolated settlement, touring in work pants and an open shirt and filling his fifteen-minute rallies with promises of agrarian reform, cooperatives, and social justice. Bosch talked the language the peasants could understand--such as the regional dialect of Cibaeña--because he had been born and raised in this environment. PRD lieutenants fanned out into all areas of the country gathering information on the local needs of each community. This information was relayed to party headquarters, sorted, and given to Bosch who would then make reference

⁴⁴Howard J. Wiarda, "Juan Bosch: Portrait of a President," New Orange Peel, I (Spring, 1963), 18ff. This article was based on interviews with PRD leaders Juan Bosch, September 1, 1962; Angel Miolán, August 8, 1962; Thelma Frías, August 8, 1962; Juan Casanovas Garrido, August 8, 1962; and Bueneventura Sánchez, August 8, 1962, in Santo Domingo. See also Bonafede, op. cit., p. 28.

to the specific needs of the specific community during his daily radio program.⁴⁵

The PRD cemented its control over the peasant and worker sectors during August and September when it succeeded in formally organizing a large mass movement. The campesinos were organized into the National Federation of Peasant Brotherhoods (FENHERCA) which came to number some 150,000 members. The Party also promoted a merger between the FOUPSA and CESITRADO labor federations and maintained very close relations with FOUPSA Libre (later CONATRAL), the other major labor federation.⁴⁶

The Elections

In the December 20 elections there were six presidential candidates, but it was clear that only Juan Bosch of the Dominican Revolutionary Party and Viriato Fiallo of the National Civic Union had a chance to win.⁴⁷ Bosch received the last-minute (December 18) support of one of the minor parties, Horacio Ornes' Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard, but this support was not a vital factor in his election. The candidate of the PRD received a majority with 619,491 (58.7 per cent) of the total 1,054,944 votes cast while his UCN opponent received 317,327 votes (30.1 per cent). The combined vote for the presidential candidates of the other parties was 118,126 (11.2 per cent). See Table 12.

⁴⁵Norman Gall, "Ferment in the Caribbean," The New Leader, XLVI (June 10, 1963), 8; and Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 80-89.

⁴⁶Volman, op. cit., pp. 38-48; and Alexander, "Democratic Victory . . .," op. cit., p. 3.

⁴⁷See Bernardo Viera Trejo, "Siete Dominicanos en Busca de una Silla," Bohemia Libre Puertoriquena, II (December 23, 1962), 62-66.

The vote for Bosch was in a majority in twenty-one of the Dominican Republic's twenty-six provinces and in the National District. His greatest margins came in the populous National District (which includes the country's largest city of Santo Domingo) where he swept the vote of the urban poor and outpolled Fiallo by more than a four to one majority and in the province of San Cristobal, the birthplace of Trujillo, where he piled up a twelve to one margin over his nearest competitor. Fiallo took four provinces--three of them in the traditional and conservative Cibao and one on the neighboring north coast.⁴⁸ General Ramírez Alcántara's PNRD swept the caudillo's home area of San Juan.⁴⁹

Bosch's presidential landslide was repeated in his Party's sweep of the Dominican National Congress. Bosch ran slightly ahead (2.3 per cent) of his Party. Though his name at the top of the ballot was undoubtedly helpful to the PRD, the election returns point to the fact that it was almost as much a Party victory as a personal victory for Bosch. The PRD won majorities in both houses with forty-nine of seventy-four seats in the Chamber of Deputies and twenty-two of twenty-seven in the Senate. Fiallo was not much of a help to his Party's slate; the percentage of votes cast for the presidential candidates and the congressional candidates was identical. The UCN picked up twenty deputies and four senators with the majority of them coming from the Cibao. The PRSC won a Chamber seat in the strongly Catholic province of La Vega. (It may be significant that

⁴⁸The class nature of the election returns is stressed by Luis Alberto Monge, "Elecciones en la República Dominicana," El Mundo en Español, No. 254, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹See the election returns study compiled by Howard J. Wiarda, Dominican Republic: Election Factbook, forthcoming.

La Vega was also a center of the Church's attacks on Bosch in the last week of the campaign when a Catholic radio station broadcasting from the Santo Cerro called him a "Marxist-Leninist.") The PNRD picked up all three deputies and the one senator from the province of San Juan and another deputy in the neighboring province of Elías Pina. See Table 12.

Table 12

Election Returns, December 20, 1962

<u>Party</u>	<u>Presidency</u>			<u>Congress</u>			
	<u>Pres. Candidate</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Deputies</u>	<u>Senators</u>
PRD	Juan Bosch	619,491	58.7	591,088	56.4	49	22
UCN	Viriato Fiallo	317,327	30.1	315,371	30.1	20	4
PRSC	Alfonso Moreno Martínez	54,638	5.2	56,794	5.4	1	0
PNRD	Virgilio Mainardi Reyna	35,764	3.4	36,972	3.5	4	1
Others		<u>27,724</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>47,779</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	Totals	1,054,944	100.0	1,048,004	100.0	74	27

Source: Gaceta Oficial (March 31, 1963).

There was no doubt that the election was scrupulously fair. U.S. and Latin American scholars, government officials, journalists, and writers were invited to the Dominican Republic to participate in a forum on democracy in the days prior to the election. The forum culminated on election day when the participants were stationed at polling places around the country. No fraud or corruption was observed, and the balloting took place without incidents.

Political Parties and the Bosch Government

Even before the election, El Caribe, Santo Domingo's leading newspaper, had published an editorial entitled "The Important Role of Those that Lose," in which it urged the parties that lost to refrain from sabotaging the new government and to make their criticisms constructive.⁵⁰ The role of the opposition was regarded as so crucial that at the time of the election U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was reported to have exclaimed that "What this country needs more than a good winner is good losers."⁵¹

Most of the twenty-nine parties which at one time existed during the campaign disappeared as soon as the election took place. Those that remained were not "good losers"; the concept of a "loyal opposition" was unknown in Dominican politics. Political defeat was taken as a personal insult which could only be revenged by destroying the victor. Among the losers there was no thought of cooperation with the government or of engaging in partisan but constructive criticism until the next elections could be held. All this meant for the opposition that the Bosch regime had to be annihilated immediately. It was almost the classic Latin American struggle between the Reds and the Blues, between the "in's" and the "out's."

In the days prior to his inauguration Bosch invited the five major opposition parties to cooperate with his government in a national unity front. Cabinet posts and other important government positions were offered as inducements. But his overtures to the several parties were rejected. The idea of the losers cooperating with the winners to establish a functioning political system was unheard of.

⁵⁰El Caribe (December 13, 1962), p. 10.

⁵¹Quoted in Bonafede, op. cit., p. 29.

The Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard, which had supported Bosch in the election, was among the first to reject the invitation. While agreeing with the "pacific and democratic principles" of the PRD, the VRD sought to retain liberty of action to work for its own pet projects and reserved the right to criticize. The Vanguard's communiqué stated that with Bosch's electoral triumph over the oligarchy, there was no more need for such close harmony between the parties. The VRD saw its role as one of "vigilance."⁵²

The National Civic Union also declined to join the united front. Its statement said that it wanted to give the PRD a chance to attempt to develop by itself the program for which the people had voted. It forbade its members from accepting any government position that involved political matters. The UCN also expressed a desire to remain free to criticize.⁵³

Both the Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party (PNRD) and the Social Democratic Alliance (ASD) vowed to maintain a position of "independence" with regard to the new regime. PNRD President Ramírez Alcántara argued that such independent vigilance was necessary for the "authentic functioning of representative democracy."⁵⁴ The PNRD and the ASD, along with Read Vittini's Christian Democratic Party, joined together a short while later in a Revolutionary Front for Democratic Oppositionists' Action (FRADO). The autonomy of the parties was to be maintained, but they vowed to work together "to defend a revolutionary democratic system in accord with liberty, justice, and the spiritual and material elevation of the people."⁵⁵

⁵²The text is in El Caribe (February 23, 1963), p. 22.

⁵³The text is in El Caribe (February 26, 1963), p. 2.

⁵⁴La Nación (February 9, 1963), p. 1.

⁵⁵El Caribe (March 14, 1963), p. 1.

The Revolutionary Social Christian Party also decided to remain outside the proposed coalition. Secretary General Guido D'Alessandro said that it would support the democratic and revolutionary measures which the government enacted and would attack any steps taken in the opposite direction. In his statement D'Alessandro said that the PRSC must remember that it was not just a political party but an ideological movement committed to the political, social, and economic transformation of the country in accord with social-Christian principles.⁵⁶

But the PRSC refused to join the organized opposition FRADO parties. Nineteen hundred and sixty two presidential candidate Moreno Martínez stressed the Revolutionary philosophy of the Party and pointed out how close it was to that of the PRD. The PRSC remained an independent opposition; and when Bosch was overthrown, it was the only opposition Party to condemn the coup.⁵⁷

The stance assumed by the communist and pro-Castro parties was ambiguous. The more-extremist Popular Socialist Party and the Popular Dominican Movement rejected what they called the "electoral farse" as a contest between reactionaries, while the more moderate 14th of June Movement and the Revolutionary Nationalist Party accepted the election of Bosch as a genuine expression of popular sentiment.⁵⁸ Fourteenth of June Movement President Tavárez Justo later stated that his organization would oppose the

⁵⁶La Nación (January 8, 1963), p. 1.

⁵⁷Alfonso Moreno Martínez, "Oposición Socialcristiana," El Caribe (March 17, 1963), p. 6.

⁵⁸Mario Bobea Billini, "Hay disparidad de criterio en las fuerzas de Izquierda?" El Caribe (January 30, 1963), p. 6; and L. Kamynin, "Election Farce," International Affairs [Moscow] (February, 1963), pp. 89-90.

Bosch regime, but that this would be "constructive criticism."⁵⁹ When Bosch came in conflict with the more conservative elements in Dominican society, however, it was the 14th of June Movement which was among his staunchest defenders.

Bosch did receive support from some elements in the opposition, but this was almost negligible. The one-man National Party of Virgilio Vilomar offered its help.⁶⁰ Several members of the VRD rejected their Party's independent stand and pledged their support to the regime.⁶¹ Claiming that "ultra conservatives" were attempting to destroy the progressive forces in the Party and take over control of the executive committee by "undemocratic means," a group of UCN directors resigned in a body and vowed allegiance to Bosch.⁶² The support of the insignificant PN and of a few dissident elements from some of the other parties was little help to Bosch in the face of the concerted campaign which the opposition launched.

Leading the opposition was the National Civic Union, the Party of the business-professional-landowning community. The UCN had been the PRD's bitterest foe in the election campaign, and its bitterness was carried over after Bosch was inaugurated. The attempts of the UCN to sabotage the government have been more extensively treated previously,⁶³ but they should be briefly summarized in this context.

⁵⁹El Caribe (February 2, 1963), p. 1.

⁶⁰El Caribe (February 27, 1963), p. 12.

⁶¹El Caribe (March 7, 1963), p. 9.

⁶²The text is in El Caribe (April 3, 1963), p. 3.

⁶³Supra, pp. 161-164.

The UCN first tried to convince the Dominican people that Bosch was a puppet of the U.S. Embassy. When this failed,⁶⁴ UCN propagandists tried a new and seemingly contradictory tack. They persuaded important Dominican armed forces, Church, and business elements, along with influential U.S. newspapermen and congressmen, that Bosch was another Castro. This theme was enthusiastically received by those who were looking for a rationalization for their opposition to the PRD government, and the UCN thus continued to broadcast the 'communist infiltration' message throughout Bosch's short administration.⁶⁵

The Party of the business-professional-landholding elite vigorously opposed--and often effectively frustrated--the PRD's reform measures. The UCN pulled five of the opposition parties--the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard, the Progressive Christian Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party, and the Christian Democratic Party--into a coalition which continuously harrassed the Bosch government. It was the UCN, acting in collaboration with Independent Dominican Action and the National Front for the Fight Against Communism, which organized the store-owners strike that occurred only a few days before the constitutional government was overthrown and that was probably the final straw prompting the armed forces to intervene.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Though most Dominicans are intensely nationalistic, the overwhelming majority, at the same time, favors increased U.S. influence in their country. For Dominicans this is not necessarily a contradiction. See Caribbean Research Limited Preliminary Tables: Public Attitude Study, Dominican Republic (Unpublished study prepared for the U.S. Embassy, December 10, 1962), p. 11.

⁶⁵Cárdenas, op. cit., p. 4; and New York Times (May 27, 1963), p. 10.

⁶⁶See El Caribe (May 17, 1963), p. 16; Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 35-38; and Ronald Hilton, "Report on Santo Domingo: Latin American Specialist

The President had made one last attempt to gain the support of the opposition. When he proposed a reorganization of his cabinet to include representatives of some of the other parties, his own PRD turned on him. The executive committee of the Party called an urgent meeting to discuss the relations between it and Bosch. Though the PRD officially reaffirmed its support to the Party leader,⁶⁷ a serious split developed which later led to an open break between Bosch and several of his chief lieutenants.⁶⁸

The Ouster of Bosch and the Disruption of the Party System

The ouster of Bosch severely disrupted the emerging political party system. His Dominican Revolutionary Party headquarters were padlocked, the President and other PRD leaders forced into exile, and the offices of the peasant FENHERCA and labor FOUPSA-CESITRADO arms of the Party raided and broken up by the Police. The PRD had shown signs of internal dissension before his overthrow on September 25, 1963, but now the cleavages came into the open and a series of public controversies resulted.

With Bosch and the other PRD leaders--such as Angel Miolán and Juan Casanovas Garrido--in exile, the Party was reorganized under the leadership of Virgilio Mainardi Reyna, José Francisco Peña Gómez, Máximo Ares García, and José Rafael Molina Urena. The central headquarters were reopened and the strong organization which had helped carry the Party to victory in

(Footnote 66 continued from preceding page)

Outlines Events Leading to Coup," letter to New York Times (October 1, 1963), p. 38. Bosch's own statement of the role of the UCN in his overthrow is in Miami Herald (October 8, 1963), p. 16-A.

⁶⁷The text is in El Caribe (August 31, 1963), p. 3.

⁶⁸See Alvaro Montalvo, "Crisis en el PRD," Ahora, II (2da. quincena de Septiembre, 1963), 3-4.

1962 was resurrected. Bosch, who remained the most popular leader in the Dominican Republic even after his overthrow, was prohibited from entering the country to participate in the proposed 1965 elections; and the PRD's strength without him remained unknown.⁶⁹

All the communist or pro-Castro parties were made illegal after Bosch's ouster. These included the PSP, MPD, PNR, and the 14th of June Movement. The most important of these, the 14th of June Movement, began guerrilla activities in the hills in favor of a return to the constitutional order; but most of them, including Catorce leader Tavárez Justo, were massacred by military counter-insurgency forces. The Party retained its strength among the students and a few labor elements, but was kept out of politics by pinning the all-encompassing and too simple "communist" label on it.⁷⁰

The conservative and business-oriented UCN had long been Bosch's bitterest opponent; and, immediately after his overthrow, the government became a virtual monopoly of that Party. The three men who comprised the civilian junta to which the armed forces had turned over political power were all UCN-oriented and the administration consisted chiefly of Party members. The UCN was not able to control the widespread administrative and military graft and could not effectively hold the country together. The Party was weakened by several splits and lost much of its support in the business community.⁷¹

⁶⁹Pedro Alvaro Bobadilla, "La Reestructuración del PRD," El Caribe (December 9, 1963), p. 7. The list of those prohibited from entering the country for the 1965 elections was published in El Caribe (October 3, 1964), p. 8. Based also on personal interviews with Peña, Mainardi, and Ares, Santo Domingo, November 27, 1964.

⁷⁰Norman Gall, "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again," The Nation, CXCVIII (February 17, 1964), 159-160.

⁷¹Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 6; and Abel Fernández Simó, executive committee, UCN, personal interview, Santo Domingo, July 9, 1964.

With the promise of future elections, two new parties were formed. The first of these was the Reformist Party (PR) of former President Joaquín Balaguer. Balaguer was tainted with the Trujillista stigma but remained popular with some because he doled out much of the Trujillo properties after the family was forced from the country. Balaguer himself was later exiled and, like Bosch and some of the other PRD leaders, was prohibited from returning to the country for the elections.⁷²

The Liberal Evolutionist Party (PLE) was the second of the new parties preparing for the proposed 1965 elections. The PLE was headed by Luis Amiana Tio, one of the two survivors of the group who were killed for their part in the assassination of Trujillo. Amiana Tio was a mayor of Santo Domingo under the dictator, a member of the interim Council of State, and later a brigadier general. He resigned his generalship to head the new party, but he makes no secret of the authoritarian rule which he favors. "Authority is indispensable," he was reported to have said. "I need authority to run my family, my house, my cattle. I would need it to run my country." Though the PLE was particularly effective in organizing support, especially among old Trujillista and disenchanted UCN leaders, it has been helped also by the support of powerful armed forces king-makers.⁷³

The overthrow of Bosch thus produced chaos in the political party realm. While the UCN was originally the most important party in the post-Bosch government, it later alienated much of its support. The Party was

⁷²Raúl G. González, Secretary General of the Reformist Party, personal interview, Santo Domingo, November 10, 1964; and P. Francisco Garrido, executive committee of the Reformist Party, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 10, 1964.

⁷³Gall, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161. Based also on personal interviews with Luis Amiana Tio, Santo Domingo, January 3, 1965; and Antonio Chaljub Urena, executive committee of the PLE, Santo Domingo, October 20, 1964.

soon divided and weakened. The PRD which had won 60 per cent of the vote in the 1962 elections, was excluded from any participation in the government. The 14th of June Movement was all but annihilated, while the Reformist Party's only influential leader was prohibited from entering the country. Some of the largest political groupings in the country were thus completely outside the decision-making process and were virtually excluded from national affairs.⁷⁴

The Dominican Republic had begun to emerge from what Maurice Duvergé in his classic book Political Parties called "polypartism," or the "pre-historical era of parties." He wrote:

Multi-partism is often confused with the absence of parties. A country in which opinion is divided amongst several groups which are unstable, fluid, and short-lived does not provide an example of multi-partism in the proper sense of the term; it is still in the pre-historical era of parties; it is to be situated in that phase of general development at which the distinction between bipartism and multipartism is not yet applicable because there are as yet no true parties.⁷⁵

Duvergé's statement was especially applicable to the political party situation early in the campaign of 1962, when some twenty-nine parties had emerged. Splits and divisions in the parties were frequent, and most of these were the result of picayune personal animosities.⁷⁶ These were largely personalistic, one-man parties based on personal allegiance to the leader or caudillo, with little in the way of programs and no organization. An "old" adage of the time best summarized the situation: "When

⁷⁴See Howard J. Wiarda, "Here We Go Again: Round Two in the Dominican Republic," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, I (July, 1964), 3-4.

⁷⁵Maurice Duvergé, Political Parties (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 228.

⁷⁶See Domingo Beryes Bordas, "La Pluralidad de Partidos Revela Inmadurez Política," Listín Diario (August 6, 1963), p. 6.

two or three are gathered together in Santo Domingo, there is a political party; when they part, there are at least two more."

Out of this "pre-historical era of political parties" emerged several pragmatically oriented and organizationally strong parties which presented a fairly clear and wide-ranging political spectrum. Chief among these were the PRD and the UCN, but the 14th of June Movement, PRSC, VRD, PNRD, and ASD were also developing in this direction. It is of course true that Bosch, Fiallo, and the other party leaders were also personalistic caudillo leaders, but it must be stressed that their personal leadership was not the only reason for their parties' success. Their ideological positions and their organizations were equally important, best illustrated by the fact that the PRD remained strong even though its caudillo leaders were outside the country.⁷⁷

A regime without parties or with only a single official party, as in the Trujillo era, insures the permanence of the dominant elite in the country. Only "downward communication"--the use of propaganda to organize and direct all public opinion--is allowed to take place. The presence of a multiplicity of well-organized political parties means that communications can go upward as well as downward; previously isolated groups in the society can make their presence heard. It is for this reason that political parties are so essential to the functioning of a pluralistic and democratic government.⁷⁸

⁷⁷See William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 315-320. Pierson and Gil's theoretical structure is adapted to Dominican reality in Maximo Lovaton Pittaluga, "Calificaciones Impropias," Listín Diario (December 9, 1964), p. 6.

⁷⁸See Duvergé, op. cit., p. 425.

In the Dominican Republic the political parties were especially effective in enabling sectors of the population which had never before had a say in national affairs to make their voices heard. For the first time peasants and workers, who make up the overwhelming majority of the citizenry, had a chance to express their views. In a population of just over 3 million, more than a million (estimated at 70 per cent of those eligible) voted.⁷⁹ The political parties, because of their organizing and wooing of these votes, were the primary agents, the most important "intermediate organizations," through which the population acted.

The overthrow of Bosch resulted in the disruption of the political party system. The post-Bosch party situation offered little cause for early optimism for the emergence of a functioning and stable multi-party system. Nevertheless, the mere presence of these several parties mitigated against the government returning to a form of totalitarianism. In three years the parties had emerged as strong and vital factors in the Dominican political process; they were strong enough to force the government to adopt certain measures and refrain from adopting others. This, in itself, was a considerable step from the one-party controlled state of Trujillo--so large a step, in fact, that it was doubtful if a return to something resembling the Trujillo regime could now be possible.

⁷⁹See Nathan A. Haverstock, "Return to Democracy," Américas, XV (March, 1963), 15.

CHAPTER IX

THE ROLE OF LABOR

The development of a labor movement was one of the key aspects in the attempt of the Dominican Republic to build a democratic society in the wake of the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Organized labor is comparable in importance to political parties as a means by which a large sector of the population, which had never before played an integral role in politics, may make its voice heard in national decision-making. It is an essential ingredient in a modern, functioning, pluralist democracy. Under Trujillo, labor had been a diffused, illiterate, unskilled, unorganized, and inarticulate mass, tightly controlled by the dictatorship. In the period after he was slain, labor began to develop into fairly cohesive, centralized, articulate, and organized units. This chapter traces this development.

The emergence of new labor organizations did not occur as a chain of steady successes. The movement was frequently characterized by divisionism, so that labor nearly as often fought with itself as with its natural opponents. Like most of the societal sectors in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo, it was often fluid and amorphous. Unions frequently transferred their affiliations from one labor federation to another, and the workers themselves often switched membership in the unions. The labor movement which developed was still weak and in its infancy, but its importance should not thereby be underestimated.

The Birth of the Labor Movement

Even while Trujillo was still in power, some labor organizations had been formed among the exile groups. Angel Miolán, for example, occupied the post of labor secretary in the long-exiled Dominican Revolutionary Party. The PRD organization in New York, under the direction of Nicolás Silfa, had started the Dominican Democratic Workers Committee in Exile. In Caracas a group called the Dominican Revolutionary Workers Front was organized. Also in the U.S., Fernando Muñiz, a prominent Dominican labor leader, headed the Free Union of Dominican Workers in Exile. The activities of these groups were confined to picketing, lobbying, and making propaganda against the Trujillo dictatorship. They were important, however, in that several of these exile organizations and individuals formed the nuclei of the labor movements that would soon emerge in the Dominican Republic.¹

Another organization active in Dominican labor affairs prior to Trujillo's death was the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), the Latin American branch of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Like the exile organizations, ORIT's activities were largely confined to propaganda blasts at Trujillo and publication of damaging exposés of labor conditions under his dictatorship.²

After Trujillo was killed, the activities of these organizations increased. Many of the exile groups, most importantly the PRD, began returning

¹For the activities of these exile groups see Ultimas Horas [Caracas] (April 28, 1960), p. 9; "Dominican exile workers ask inclusion of Trujillo's merchant marine in world wide boycott planned by American maritime unions" (New York: PRD news release, November 11, 1958); and Comité Obrero Democrático Dominicano del Exilio, Mensaje (New York: PRD, May 1, 1961).

²See, for example, Inter-American Labor Bulletin, IX (May, 1958), 1.

to the Dominican Republic where they campaigned effectively against the continued dictatorship of Balaguer and Ramfis. The AFL-CIO, affiliated with ORIT, sent a representative to the country to survey the possibilities of developing a labor movement. ORIT itself began the training of exiled labor leaders at the Labor Relations Institute of the University of Puerto Rico. These leaders were to return to the Dominican Republic as soon as the Dominican government guaranteed that the creation and functioning of a free, independent, and a-political trade union movement would be permitted.³

The product of all these activities was the creation of a new and independent labor organization, the Frente Obrero Unidos Pro-Sindicatos Autónomos (FOUPSA) on September 17, 1961. All of FOUPSA's founders claimed to be from labor ranks; all were members of the three dominant opposition groups, the PRD, the 14th of June Movement, and the National Civic Union; and all claimed to be anti-communist and favorable to the U.S. A manifesto was distributed by the organization throughout the country claiming its adherence to the principles of a free, democratic trade union movement.⁴ One of FOUPSA's first acts was to cable ORIT for recognition and for educational materials dealing with labor.

The new labor federation received a warm reception from the workers and encouragement from public servants and those employed in the Trujillo family enterprises, even though such affiliation and sympathy meant the loss of their jobs. By October FOUPSA had organized in seventeen of the

³See Hispanic American Report, XV (September, 1961), 610; and Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XI (August, 1961), 17.

⁴The text of the organizational communiqué is in El Caribe (September 21, 1961), p. 17. See also the manifest by FOUPSA, Nuestro Lema: Libertad, Salud, y Bienestar (Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Stella, 1961).

Dominican Republic's twenty six provinces and had more than 10,000 members. Its stronghold was in the city of La Romana at the country's largest non-Trujillo-owned sugar mill.⁵

Chart 3

Labor Organization Active in the
Dominican Republic,
in Order of Appearance

Name	Short Form
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	ICFTU
Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores	ORIT
Frente Obrero Pro-Sindicatos Autónomos	FOUPSA
Confederación Dominicana de Trabajadores	CDT
Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos	CESITRADO
Frente Obrero Pro-Sindicatos Autónomos Libre	FOUPSA Libre
Frente Obrero Pro-Sindicatos Autónomos Nacionalista.	FOUPSA Nacionalista
Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos	CASC
La Unión Dominicana de Trabajadores Sindicalizados	La Unión
Federación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y de Institutos Autónomos	FENEPIA
Federación Nacional de Maestros	FENEMA
Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres	CONATRAL

⁵Hispanic American Report, XV (January, 1962), 994.

FOUPSA's major problem was that the old government-controlled Dominican Confederation of Workers (CDT) still controlled some 70 per cent of the wage earners. The CDT was administered by the official government Party, the Partido Dominicano (PD), and all workers had to be members of the PD to hold their jobs. Government opposition to FOUPSA thus continued. Its activities were not reported in the newspapers, nor was it allowed to begin a radio program. On October 5 one of the official newspapers of the regime issued a plea for FOUPSA to join with the CDT in a single labor federation and thus achieve a united labor front.⁶ The plan would have meant continued government control of the entire labor movement, but the newly emerging labor organization did not act on the proposal and the regime did not force its acceptance.

The government nevertheless continued in its attempts to halt the growth of FOUPSA. The Balaguer-Ramfis regime gave orders to the air lines serving the Dominican Republic not to transport the labor leaders ORIT had trained in Puerto Rico to the country. The CDT and the secretary of labor frequently used the official press to denounce FOUPSA and its leaders. On another occasion ORIT cabled the government asking permission to send an ORIT-ICFTU mission to the country to assist the infant labor movement; but the government replied that ORIT would have to work through the CDT, and ORIT rejected the proposal.⁷ All these attempts to frustrate the growing labor opposition proved to be only temporary setbacks.

Despite the official position, then, FOUPSA thrived. Within three months it had achieved a majority position among trade union organizations.

⁶El Caribe (October 5, 1961), p. 4.

⁷Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XI (September, 1961), 4.

The major reason for its overwhelming success was the collapse of its rival, the CDT. After the final disintegration of the Trujillo dictatorship in November, everything associated with the former regime was discredited or destroyed. The Trujillo-controlled CDT, unable to compete without official backing, was dissolved.⁸ By early December FOUPSA was the dominant organization in the country with approximately 60,000 members.⁹

Politics and Divisionism in the Labor Movement

Labor organizations in developing countries, such as the Dominican Republic, are highly political. Political action is usually a more fruitful method for labor in these areas to fulfill the wants and needs of their members than the more "modern" means of collective bargaining. The labor movements in developing countries are thus intrinsically bound to political movements out of necessity. They are ideological in character and are most likely to be closely associated with political parties, often acting as branches of the parties.¹⁰ The trade unions and labor federations which developed after the ouster of the Trujillos are prime examples.

⁸"El Fracaso de la CDT," Unión Cívica, I (November 23, 1961), 6.

⁹Noticiero Obrero Interamericano, Num. 79 (December 15-31, 1961), p. 3.

¹⁰The studies of the political nature of labor organizations in developing areas have become numerous. See Raymond J. Barret, "The Role of Trade Unions in Underdeveloped Countries," Labor Law Journal, XIII (December, 1962) 1047-1059; George C. Lodge, Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); and Sidney C. Sufrin, Unions in Emerging Societies: Frustration and Politics (Syracuse University Press, 1964). Other scholars, recognizing the political role of labor in all developing countries, have stressed that in Latin America politics and labor are especially intertwined. See Robert J. Alexander, "Unions in the Latin America and Caribbean Area," in Jack Schuyler (ed), International Labor Directory (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 32-47; and Charles A. Page, "Labor's Political Role in Latin America," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVII (Autumn,

From the time it began, FOUPSA was intimately involved in politics. Its leadership was made up of members or sympathizers of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the National Civic Union, and the 14th of June Movement. All these political organizations vied for control of the labor movement. What kept labor together, however, was that all these groups were united by a single cause--opposition to the continued Trujillo family dictatorship. As long as this single cause remained, FOUPSA remained a unified organization.

With the removal of the Trujillos from the country, unity among the opposition groups also disappeared. They represented an increasingly wide range of irreconcilable views. This diversity of ideological positions and orientations on the political spectrum was immediately reflected in the labor movement.

In the face of these diverging ideologies, FOUPSA President Augusto A. Rodríguez G. tried to keep the labor movement together by rejecting all political intervention. He argued that labor had been politically oriented during the preceding tyranny with dire consequences and that it now should be a-political. FOUPSA would not become associated with any political party, Rodríguez said; labor would reject political means and concentrate on collective bargaining to achieve its ends.¹¹

This attempt to maintain unity in the labor movement by proclaiming it a-political failed almost immediately. Only ten days after Rodríguez

(Footnote 10 continued from preceding page)

1952), 481-494. Dominican commentators have also recognized the political role of labor in their country. See, for example, Mario Bobea Billini, "Las Huelgas Políticas," El Caribe (December 1, 1964), p. 7.

¹¹ La Nación (December 11, 1961), p. 2.

issued his statement, FOUPSA began to disintegrate. It was widely alleged that FOUPSA Secretary General Mario Sánchez, Assistant Secretary General Wenceslao Ricardo, and Secretary of Organization Fernando Muñoz maintained close ties with the increasingly Fidelista leaning 14th of June Movement. But before these and others could be removed, President Rodríguez was himself ousted in a dramatic secret meeting. Rodríguez claimed he had been the victim of a "planned campaign" led by "left wing extremists."¹²

The ouster of Rodríguez was the first split in the post-Trujillo labor movement. The ex-President of FOUPSA received the backing of the powerful, 5,000 member chauffeurs' union led by Robinson Ruiz López and gained the support of a few other minor unions. With these sympathizers he organized a new labor federation, the Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos (CESITRADO). Initially the U.S. labor movement supplied some funds to the Rodríguez faction to help him meet his payroll.¹³

Other unions and labor leaders soon began to leave the FOUPSA organization. When Benito de la Cruz, a FOUPSA official, accused the federation of being anti-U.S., he was drummed out of his office and later beaten.¹⁴ The Textile Workers' Union attacked the "undemocratic practices" employed by FOUPSA and left the federation.¹⁵ After Manuel Tuma, president of the

¹²El Caribe (December 21, 1961), p. 16. See also, La Nación (December 25, 1961), p. 6 for an interview with Rodríguez and an elaboration of his charges of "communist infiltration." The question as to whether FOUPSA was at that time actually communist-dominated is treated more extensively in Chapter XII.

¹³Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (March, 1962), 5.

¹⁴El Caribe (January 26, 1962), p. 9 and (February 25, 1962), p. 3; and La Nación (January 31, 1962), p. 3 and (February 20, 1962), p. 3.

¹⁵The text is in La Nación (February 21, 1962), p. 3.

strong La Romana provincial committee of FOUPSA, had accused the leadership of a "close relationship and frequent reunions with the leaders of the 14th of June Movement," he was fired.¹⁶ One of FOUPSA's founders, Ramón Batista, also resigned at this time after accusing its president, Sánchez, of becoming a dictator.¹⁷ All these losses of key unions and personnel severely hurt the once-dominant labor federation.

On February 11, 1962, many of the dissident elements from the FOUPSA organization--and also from the CESITRADO organization--banded together to form a third federation, FOUPSA Libre (Free FOUPSA). The most important union in the new federation was again the chauffeurs' under Ruiz López, who had now deserted CESITRADO. Ruiz López was made secretary general of FOUPSA Libre; and this labor federation ultimately grew into the strongest organization in the country, largely at the expense of FOUPSA.

The original FOUPSA thus continued to decline in strength. In early May, Secretary General Sánchez, who only a few months previously had been accused of being a Castro sympathizer, himself labeled FOUPSA an "extremist organization," resigned, and took many members with him.¹⁸ Less than a week later Vice President Agustín Estévez also resigned after stating that its leadership was not interested in the workers.¹⁹ Fernando Muñoz, another prominent FOUPSA leader, was expelled in July and formed still another federation, FOUPSA Nacionalista.²⁰ The divisions in FOUPSA's leadership

¹⁶El Caribe (February 4, 1962), p. 11 and (February 7, 1962), p. 7.

¹⁷La Nación (February 5, 1962), p. 2.

¹⁸El Caribe (May 10, 1962), p. 9; and La Nación (May 9, 1962), p. 7.

¹⁹La Nación (May 12, 1962), p. 7.

²⁰Fernando Muñoz, "A los obreros dominicanos," La Nación (September

had by this time produced so many splits that it was reduced to a secondary position in the Dominican labor movement.

Other new labor federations, also competing for the allegiance of the workers, emerged during the first half of 1962. The most important of these was the Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos (CASC) founded on February 5 in Santiago. The CASC was based on social-Christian principles and maintained close ties with the international Roman Catholic labor organization. It was linked ideologically with the Revolutionary Social Christian Party and proclaimed itself revolutionary, anti-imperialist, non-sectarian, and non-partisan. By the end of April, the CASC claimed to have twenty-five labor unions with a total of 14,000 workers affiliated with it. Though it continued to grow, CASC remained the weakest of the major labor federations thus far considered.²¹

Another of the new labor federations emerging during this period was the Dominica Union of Syndicated Workers, "La Unión." La Unión's major goal, as the name implied, was to unify all the diverse labor organizations into a single movement. Headed by President Marcos de Vargas and Secretary General Héctor A. Romero, the labor organization tended to lean toward

(Footnote 20 continued from preceding page)

10, 1962), p. 4. See also, "La Aristocracia Obrera," El 104, 11 (October 18, 1962), 3, in which Muñiz and Ruiz López are branded as traitors to the working class.

²¹See L. Henry Molina, "Nacimiento del Sindicalismo," Pueblo, 1 (March 24, 1962), 9; José Gómez Cerda, "Sindicalismo Cristiano en la República Dominicana," Amigo del Hogar (June, 1963), pp. 13-16; and Manuel Rosendo López, "Sindicalismo Cristiano," Revolución Obrera, 1 (April 16, 1963), 2. Much of these and later comments on CASC is based on personal interviews with executive committee members Gómez Cerda, Rosendo López, and Jesús Caminero Morcello, Santo Domingo, August 10, 1964.

Castroism. While it was not a communist organization, it was Fidelista-oriented and violently anti U.S. La Unión's original communiqué was signed by representatives of thirteen labor unions; and the organization, though continuing to put out propaganda, never gained much larger a following.²²

In addition to the major, all-encompassing federations, some minor and restrictive labor federations also developed. The most important of these were the Federación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y de Institutos Autónomos (FENEPIA), the government workers' organization, and the Federación Nacional de Maestros (FENEMA), the teachers' organization. At the height of its strength FENEPIA could call on some 20,000 members while FENEMA, though much smaller, was important because of the people it encompassed. Both federations were dominated by Castro-oriented elements and frequently disrupted Dominican politics at crucial moments by going out on strike.

Though most individual unions joined one of the federations, there were several, further, especially those in the large industrial plants, which remained independent. The most important of the independents were the cement workers, the electrical workers, the brewery workers, the rum (Bermúdez) workers, the telephone workers, the tobacco workers, and the sugar (Rio Haina) workers.

In early 1962, then, five major trade union federations--FOUPSA, CESITRADO, FOUPSA Libre, CASC, and La Unión--in addition to two specialized federations--FENEPIA and FENEMA--plus several strong industrial independents

²²The text of the organizational communiqué is in El Caribe (May 30, 1962), p. 15. See also, "La Unión: Auténtica Sindical," Claridad, I (July 7, 1962), 13 for its ideological position.

were competing for the allegiance of the Dominican workers.²³ Despite the bitter hostilities generated by the struggles within the labor movement, most neutral observers welcomed the competition which had developed for the first time in the nation's history and considered it a healthy sign for Dominican democracy.²⁴ Out of the competition, FOUPSA Libre emerged as the dominant federation.

The Struggle for the Labor Movement:
The Development of FOUPSA Libre--CONATRAL

The breakup of the FOUPSA organization and the formation of new labor federations early in 1962 resulted in a fierce struggle for control of the trade union movement. Between January and March much of the battle took place in the streets of Santo Domingo. The major antagonists were the members and sympathizers of FOUPSA, now increasingly following the pro-Castro line of the 14th of June Movement, and the more democratically oriented elements who had split off from the parent organization. FOUPSA members, in alliance with Fidelista-leaning students wielding bicycle chains, assembled during the mid-day closing of stores and business places and threatened to smash the windows of any one that opened. Initially these elements gained control of the capital's central area and life in the normally bustling city came to a near stand-still.²⁵

²³The best analysis of the emergence of the major federations is Virgilio Alcántara, "Evolución del Movimiento Sindical en la República," El Caribe (March 3, 1962), p. 18. Another valuable account is Américo Jiménez S., "Vibraciones Obreras," Revolución Política (April 21, 1962), p. 2.

²⁴See Vicente Estrella Pimental, "Movimiento Laboral Necesita Más Acción y Menos Papeleo," La Nación (April 10, 1962), p. 6.

²⁵Jeanne Bellamy, "First Year Rough for Dominican Labor," Miami Herald (November 19, 1962), p. 7-A. This lengthy and analytical article was based on the experiences of AFL-CIO representative Andrew McLellan in the Dominican labor movement.

AFL-CIO representative Andrew McLellan and U.S. Labor Attaché Fred Anthony Somerford had been most active in early 1962 in leading the opposition to what they called the "left wing extremism" of FOUPSA. It was well known that the U.S. had provided funds to the Rodríguez faction when it split with FOUPSA. On February 6 the two daily newspapers in Santo Domingo carried stories based on a FOUPSA pamphlet distributed in the city charging the two with fomenting divisionism in the Dominican labor movement and of intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The pamphlet urged that the two be expelled from the country. A week later some 500 demonstrators, mostly students, burned a U.S. flag, chased and stoned a U.S. newsman, and staged a parade carrying coffins marked "McLellan" and "Somerford" through the streets to the U.S. Embassy. On the following day Rodríguez and several of his followers were set upon and beaten, McLellan was labeled a "capitalist lackey" and burned in effigy, and Somerford's expulsion from the country was demanded in an editorial in El Caribe.²⁶

Those who had left FOUPSA were not wholly passive in their resistance to these assaults. The battle was carried in the streets by the chauffeurs, port workers, and less extreme students. The port workers carried their grappling hooks which had a powerful psychological effect on the chain-wielding members of FOUPSA and the Federation of Dominican Students. By March the struggle for control of the streets had been largely won by the anti-FOUPSA forces.²⁷

²⁶See El Caribe (February 17, 1962), p. 29. The point of view of the university students may be found in Fracua (February 22, 1962), pp. 1-2.

²⁷Bellamy, op. cit., p. 7-A.

At the height of this violent period the more democratically oriented labor elements were reorganized into the new federation, FOUPSA Libre. FOUPSA Libre held its first meeting on February 11, 1962, at which time charges against the parent organization were drawn up and a statement of adherence to democratic principles was adopted. It claimed to be only in favor of the workers, anti-communist, anti-demagogic, and anti-"sensationalism and opportunism." It appealed to the "more serious and responsible" elements in labor and opened its arms to all who wished to affiliate.²⁸

FOUPSA Libre made rapid gains, both by recruiting new affiliates and by taking members away from FOUPSA. Public opinion began to turn away from the parent labor organization. The violence instigated by FOUPSA and the firing of sugar cane fields by Castro-oriented elements produced much disenchantment. The UCN accused the federation of mis-representing the role of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic, of employing terroristic methods to divert attention from its unwillingness to hold democratic elections to choose its leaders, and of concealing its radical political ties.²⁹ On February 15 a FOUPSA Libre advertisement in El Caribe accused FOUPSA of being ignorant of the true needs of the workers, and cited the necessity of establishing a free trade union movement. The communiqué concluded by arguing persuasively that if democracy could not be established in the trade union movement, it had little chance of succeeding in the country as a whole. AFL-CIO representative McLellan later claimed that

²⁸"Bloque FOUPSA Libre Define su Posición." Noticiario Obrero Dominicano, Num. 4 (September 20, 1962), p. 1.

²⁹The text is in El Caribe (February 16, 1962), p. 2.

this manifesto was the turning point in the struggle.³⁰ Whatever the validity of this claim, FOUPSA Libre began to prosper.

Several reasons may be suggested to help account for FOUPSA Libre's growth. Its clear statement of adherence to democratic principles and a parallel rejection of the disruptive practices of FOUPSA undoubtedly persuaded many to join the new federation. At the same time it cut deeply into the affiliation rolls of CESITRADO by undermining that federation's position as the rallying organization of the democratic Left.

Most important was the U.S.-provided money, men, and materials which were channeled into FOUPSA Libre. The AFL-CIO and the ORIT began to pour technicians, organizers, recruiters, and teachers into the Dominican labor movement. McLellan and Somerford had of course been active in the fight for several months, and the new program remained under their direction. The campaign was anticipated in a telegram sent to FOUPSA Libre Secretary General Ruiz López by ORIT Secretary General Arturo Jaúregui: "ORIT, representing twenty-six million workers, promises help and solidarity to your forces to reestablish a vigorous and honest Dominican trade movement."³¹

ORIT launched its program with the establishment of a permanent institute of labor education under the direction of Humberto Hernández of the Colombian Confederation of Workers. Three Dominicans trained at the Labor Institute in Puerto Rico assisted Hernández in setting up regional institutes. Saby Nahama of the AFL-CIO was sent to take charge of the recruiting end. Manuel Varela of the International Federation of Petroleum Workers; Adrian Flores of the International Food, Drink, and Tobacco Workers; José Ramón Morales

³⁰Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (March, 1962), 2.

³¹The text is in El Caribe (February 21, 1962), p. 9.

of the Public Services International; Orve Schaeffer of the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International; and many others came to work in the country. These labor leaders could muster more know-how, experience, and financing than the other federations; and their help to FOUPSA Libre was invaluable.³²

By April McLellan was able to announce that FOUPSA Libre was winning a "clear victory." He pointed to the disintegration of the original FOUPSA and cited the example of thirteen unions in San Francisco de Macorís which voted to leave the parent federation and join FOUPSA Libre as symptomatic. Other trade unions which had remained unaffiliated while they waited to see which of the federations would emerge from the early chaos dominant now flocked to join FOUPSA Libre.³³ Its membership had by this time increased to some 70,000 workers and, according to McLellan, was the "dominant labor center in the country."³⁴

The FOUPSA Libre-staged May Day parade, the first such event in thirty-two years, illustrated the strength of the organization and the corresponding weakness of FOUPSA. The parade took three hours to pass by and was estimated at being four miles long. It was an impressive display of labor, especially FOUPSA Libre, power. Following the parade, however, Fidelista-leaning students and workers staged a surprise attack on the federation's headquarters. Some windows were broken, but the Police broke up the demonstration before

³² Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (April, 1962), 1.

³³ Examples of labor unions leaving FOUPSA and joining FOUPSA Libre may be found in La Nación (March 6, 1962), p. 5 and (April 19, 1962), p. 7. See also Saby Nahama, "Communist Anti-U.S. Campaign Found Losing Ground in Dominican Republic," Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (May, 1962), 2.

³⁴ Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (April, 1962), 1; and Hispanic American Report, XV (June, 1962), 323.

the offices had been extensively damaged.³⁵ The incident was not significant in terms of damage, but it did illustrate the change of tactics which had been forced on the extreme Leftist elements in the labor movement. Unable any longer to compete for the allegiance of the workers, they attempted to disrupt the society to a degree that would lead to a military takeover and conditions under which they could pose as the only defenders of the workers.

While FOUPSA Libre had by this time achieved a position of predominance in the labor movement, this position was still precarious. It should not be assumed that FOUPSA Libre's new dominant status was as yet secure or permanent. While this period of late spring and summer, 1962, was peaceful compared to the chaos of earlier months, there were still powerful disruptive and disintegrative forces at work. Several examples illustrate the difficulties involved. On the one hand, some employers remained manifestly opposed to the unions. They offered their workers wage increases for rejecting the unions and even showed favor to spurious communist unions in an effort to confuse and divide their employees. Some union leaders were dismissed from their jobs for their organizing activities.³⁶ Fidelista charges of "Yankee intervention" continued to have an appeal.³⁷ In April CESITRADO denounced the government for offering economic assistance to FOUPSA while ignoring the other federations, a charge which the Council of State was forced to

³⁵See La Nación (May 3, 1962), p. 7 and (May 4, 1962), p. 15.

³⁶Robinson Ruiz López, "Dificultad de Asociación en el Campo Laboral Dominicano: Cómo Resolverlo?" La Nación (June 13, 1962), p. 4.

³⁷See the Fidelista newspaper Fogonazos (April 21, 1962), p. 2.

admit.³⁸ The head of the sugar mill in San Pedro de Macorís had the Police throw Rolando Leonard, another ORIT representative, in jail and the government refused to guarantee against further such occurrences.³⁹ Labor Attaché Somerford said that success in the labor movement had not been achieved until after the riotous demonstrations of mid-June had been weathered.⁴⁰ But even after this date, the paralyzing twenty-six-day strike at the huge La Romana sugar complex during August and September demonstrated that communist elements could still easily exploit discontent and a strike situation in an industrial plant which had been assumed to be safely under FOUPSA Libre control.⁴¹

Despite these disruptions, FOUPSA Libre continued to grow and become more powerful. Regional organizations were founded in Barahona, La Romana, Santiago, Puerto Plata, and San Pedro de Macorís to strengthen the national structure and to make the educational program more effective. The major area of recruitment was in the Haina sugar complex where some 25,000 workers were organized. Other strong centers were established in the mining centers, cotton plantations, and the salt industry. ORIT Secretary General Jaúregui announced that the movement was "maturing democratically."⁴² By August

³⁸El Caribe (April 28, 1962), p. 9.

³⁹El Caribe (June 30, 1962), p. 7.

⁴⁰Fred Anthony Somerford, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 27, 1962.

⁴¹Jorge Muniz Marte, "La Huelga de los Azucareros," El Caribe (August 27, 1962), p. 7; and Julio C. Estrella, "Los Problemas Laborales en la Industria Azucarera," El Caribe (September 12, 1962), p. 9.

⁴²La Nación (September 16, 1962), p. 6.

FOUPSA Libre had some 150 trade unions affiliated with the federation and had considerably outdistanced the opposition.⁴³

The highlight of the year for FOUPSA Libre was its First National Congress held in Santo Domingo, November 23-25. The Congress was a gala event. Dominican President Rafael Bonnelly addressed the inaugural session in the Ambassador's Lounge of the National Palace, and the ceremony was carried over national television. Bonnelly stressed the theme of this study when he hailed the development of the labor organization as a "great step in the process of perfecting the democratic structure of groups which contribute to the strengthening of the productive activities of the Republic."⁴⁴ The seventy-four-piece National Symphony played for the delegates. Those present included Bonnelly's cabinet; diplomatic personnel; twenty-four international labor representatives including McLellan of the AFL-CIO, Manuel Pavón of the Mexican Confederation of Labor, Jaúregui of ORIT, Augusto Malavé Villalba of the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor, Arturo Sabroso of the Peruvian Confederation of Labor; and 465 delegates and official observers. The Congress received unusually wide play in the Dominican press.

The festivities should not blind one to the real significance of the Congress. It was indeed a "First" in that the convention was the first of its kind in the 470 year history of the Dominican Republic. Never before had the delegates of a democratically organized trade union federation assembled in the country. The Congress brought home the ascendancy which FOUPSA Libre had achieved since its organization on February 11, only ten

⁴³ Noticiero Obrero Interamericano, Num. 90 (November 30, 1962), p. 6; and Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (September-October, 1962), 3.

⁴⁴ The text is in El Caribe (November 24, 1962), p. 2.

months before. There were now 209 labor unions affiliated with the organization with a total membership estimated at close to 100,000.⁴⁵ FOUPSA Libre was still growing rapidly, often at the expense of its competitors but also in new and untapped labor areas, and had reached a position of overwhelming predominance. To symbolize this new ascendancy the federation changed its name from FOUPSA Libre, which made it appear as a mere branch of the old FOUPSA, to the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (CONATRAL).

Politics and the Frustration of the Labor Movement

Labor in developing countries, studies have shown, is intimately involved in politics and frequently the labor federations serve as appendages of the political parties. The Dominican Republic is a case par excellence of a highly politicized labor movement. With elections scheduled for December 20, 1962, the four major parties attempted to corral the labor vote by capturing the trade union federations.

The most obvious alliance of this sort was between the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) and the Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos (CASC). The two were aligned ideologically through their common belief in revolutionary Christian socialism. Though the CASC was an autonomous organization and though the labor federation accepted membership from men

⁴⁵See Bellamy, op. cit., p. 7-A.

of all parties, its executive committee was composed entirely of PRSC members. Close harmony was maintained between the Party and the Confederation and the two reacted similarly on almost all issues.⁴⁶

The extreme Left political parties, most notably the 14th of June Movement, had initially gained a toe-hold in the labor movement by infiltrating the parent FOUPSA organization. When their efforts were frustrated in that federation, the extreme Leftists formed a new labor organization, La Unión. Both La Unión and the 14th of June Movement were intensely nationalistic, pro-Castro, and bitterly anti-U.S.; and they worked closely together. Neither the Party nor the trade union federation prospered, however; the 14th of June Movement chose not to participate in the elections and La Unión remained insignificant with only eighteen affiliated unions.⁴⁷

The National Civic Union had long tried to lure the labor vote by taking over one of the labor federations. Paradoxical as it may seem, the organization over which this conservative Party attempted to achieve hegemony was the same FOUPSA that was accused of being communist dominated. When still a patriotic, civic-action movement in 1961, the UCN had provided funds to the fledgling FOUPSA; and in the December general strike after the overthrow of the Trujillos, the two had worked in close harmony. In the early part of 1962 the AFL-CIO had accused FOUPSA of being "permanently leagued to the UCN."⁴⁸ The UCN-dominated Council of State government had

⁴⁶Based on personal interviews with PRSC presidential candidate Alfonso Moreno Martínez, Santo Domingo, September 15 and 16, 1964; and CASC executive committee members Jesús Caminero Morcelo, Manuel Rosendo López, and José Gómez Cerda, Santo Domingo, August 10, 1964.

⁴⁷"Hacia Dónde Va el Movimiento Obrero?" El 14, 11 (September 6, 1962), 3; and "Como está el Movimiento Obrero en la República Dominicana?" Claridad, 1 (June 6, 1962), 7.

⁴⁸El Caribe (March 1, 1962), p. 1.

once admitted supplying funds to the labor federation; and as late as August, FOUPSA President Miguel Soto said that the UCN was trying to influence and control his organization.⁴⁹ The UCN's efforts were largely unsuccessful, however; the Party of the business-professional-landowning community had little chance of luring the labor sector of the population.

The attempts of the Dominican Revolutionary Party to gain a labor arm were somewhat more complicated. The PRD was a peasants and workers party and its political campaign was primarily directed toward these elements. Presidential candidate Juan Bosch was committed to a reform program of social, economic, and political justice aimed at raising the standard of living of the lower classes and of integrating these elements into the society.

Bosch and his Party initially maintained close, if informal, ties with FOUPSA Libre. Both organizations were democratically oriented and shared many of the same ideas about how the Dominican Republic should be reformed. In addition, Bosch was a close personal friend of ORIT Secretary General Jauregui, ORIT inter-American affairs representative Serafino Romualdi, and many other ORIT and AFL-CIO trade union leaders. These ties were all so intimate that at one time FOUPSA said that FOUPSA Libre might more accurately be named the "Somerford-ORIT-FOUPSA Libre-PRD."⁵⁰

The PRD attempted to establish a near-monopoly in the trade union movement. Not only did the Party seek to maintain close contact with FOUPSA Libre, but it also brought two of the smaller labor federations, FOUPSA and CESITRADO, under its control. In early September the PRD promoted a merger

⁴⁹El Caribe (August 26, 1962), p. 16. For an example of the UCN's plea to labor see Marino A. Hernández, "Fuentes de Trabajo," Unión Cívica, 11 (August 25, 1962), 8.

⁵⁰El Caribe (March 2, 1962), p. 11.

between the two into the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Dominicanos FOUPSA-CESITRADO. Though both numbers were undoubtedly gross exaggerations, it was reported that CESITRADO contributed 102 affiliated unions to the merger while FOUPSA brought in eighty-seven.⁵¹ Even if these figures were valid, the total number of 189 unions in the new confederation was still considerably less than that of FOUPSA Libre at the time. Miguel Soto, one of the original founders of FOUPSA, was named president. Soto was later elected a deputy in the Dominican Congress running on the PRD ticket.

When Bosch and the PRD won the elections in December, 1962, he and his Party's major source of votes came from the rural campesinos and the urban workers. Given the close harmony between Bosch and FOUPSA Libre and between the PRD and FOUPSA-CESITRADO, the emergence of a strong, unified, and democratically-oriented labor movement in the Dominican Republic seemed assured.

Bosch and the PRD attempted to weld their electoral support among the workers and their close ties with the several labor federations into a unified labor movement. Even before the elections FOUPSA-CESITRADO President and PRD candidate Soto had called for a single, all-encompassing labor federation. The campaign began in earnest, however, after Bosch was elected.⁵²

Leading the campaign was PRD President Angel Miolán who had formerly worked for Vicente Lombardo Toledano's Confederación de Trabajadores de

⁵¹El Caribe (September 7, 1962), p. 24; and Hispanic American Report, XV (February, 1963), 1114-1115.

⁵²The text of Soto's statement is in El Caribe (December 11, 1962), p. 13. See also Mauro Barrenechea, "Fresh Start in Santo Domingo," Américas, CVIII (March 16, 1963), 366-367.

América Latina (CTAL) and who had been in charge of labor affairs for the exiled Party during the Trujillo years. FOUPSA-CESITRASO had already been secured as the labor appendage of the Party and the election of its President, Soto, as a PRD deputy in the Congress made the alliance even more firm. The small Leftist labor federation, La Unión, which had long been an advocate of unity in the trade union movement, was also brought in. Miolán next attempted to enlist FOUPSA Libre (now renamed CONATRAL), the dominant labor federation, into the PRD's attempt to achieve a unified labor front.⁵³

The issue provoked a great deal of discussion in the Dominican press, and the overall consensus was that a unified labor movement would be beneficial to the workers. It was argued that in the U.S., Venezuela, and other democratic countries, only one major trade union federation existed. The workers all had common interests, several commentators said, and they should therefore have a common labor organization. The struggling Dominican democracy could not afford to have labor fight among itself instead of struggling only for the benefit of the workers. The factionalism and divisionism which had characterized the labor movement up to that point, it was felt, had severely weakened labor's bargaining position vis-a-vis their natural opponents--the industrialists and the patrons.⁵⁴ Not

⁵³The social-Christian CASC labor federation was also invited to join the movement for labor unity. CASC's reply was that though it favored unity in the interests of the workers, its ideology prevented it from joining a formal confederation. CASC, nevertheless, generally worked closely with and supported Bosch and the PRD. See Fernando García, "Central Unica," Revolución Obrera, I (May 8, 1963), 8.

⁵⁴See Mario Bobea Billini, "Unidad Sindical o Pluralidad de Centrales de Trabajadores," El Caribe (January 17, 1963), p. 8; and M.A. Velázquez-Mainardi, "La Dirigencia y la Unidad Obrera," La Nación (January 15, 1963), p. 5.

mentioned in these persuasive arguments was the PRD idea that a single, democratically oriented labor federation would serve Bosch and the Party as a strong counter-balance to possible armed forces intervention.

Despite the overwhelming opinion in favor of a central labor federation, CONATRAL refused to go along. Influenced by ORIT and Somarford, it attempted to make the impossible argument that labor in the Dominican Republic should be a-political, that it should completely divorce itself from political issues and concentrate solely on achieving economic gains through collective bargaining. Not only is the possibility of an a-political labor movement in a highly politicized country like the Dominican Republic highly unlikely; but, if the end in view is democratic political development, it is also undesirable. The political development specialist Sacha Volman argues that a labor movement which exists in a political vacuum is prey on the one hand to subversion by the communists and on the other to seduction by totalitarians of the Right.⁵⁵

Somewhat more plausibly, CONATRAL said that it had taken the U.S. forty years of intense effort to achieve a unified labor movement and that the Dominican Republic was not yet prepared for such unity. But it failed to mention Venezuela and other developing countries where a single dominant trade union federation has served as a prime support for new democracies and as a force to unify divisive political societies. Finally, the CONATRAL statement argued that it feared a single labor organization would be used for purposes similar those of Russia, Castro's Cuba, and

⁵⁵Sacha Volman, "La educación para el cambio social," PANORAMAS, XIII (enero-febrero, 1965), 27.

Trujillo's Dominican Republic--as if the Bosch government were similar to these three.⁵⁶

CONATRAL's arguments were not convincing, and another reason might be suggested for its bitter rejection of the PRD proposal for a unified labor movement. FOUPSA Libre--CONATRAL had in a sense been the creation of the U.S. labor attaché and U.S. money, men, and materials had been largely responsible for its growth. It was obvious also that the hand that wrote the CONATRAL communiqué arguing against that federation's participation in a unified labor movement had been guided by the strong right arm of the U.S. embassy. Further, the U.S. labor attaché, whose thinking was everywhere evident in the communiqué, was known to feel that Bosch and Miolán were "thieves and gangsters" and that their Party was "probably communistic."⁵⁷

Here, then, was a case in which a labor-oriented government was frustrated in its efforts to aid labor by the intransigence of a single U.S. official. At a time when the whole U.S. effort was directed toward helping the Bosch government and the cause of democracy, one essential sector remained completely outside and opposed to the aim of the entire aim of the entire aid program. The Latin American parent organization of CONATRAL--ORIT--did not manifest this anti-PRD sentiment. Bosch, Miolán, and Soto were all close personal friends of ORIT Secretary general Jaúregui and many other labor officials affiliated with it and the worldwide parent

⁵⁶The text is in La Nación (January 22, 1963), and Emilio Antonio Checho E., secretary general of CONATRAL, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 7, 1964.

⁵⁷Fred Anthony Somerford, personal interview, Santo Domingo, February 17, 1964.

ICFTU. Only the labor attaché maintained his bitter antipathy toward the entire Bosch government. The resentment to Somerford was so great that even a year after Bosch was overthrown, Soto turned livid with rage at the mere mention of his name. "We want democracy in our own way," he said, "not according to the dictates of the U.S. labor attaché."⁵⁸

Soto was not alone in his condemnation. Though the most pro-Bosch sentiment was found in the FOUPSA-CESITRADO and CASC federations, a majority of CONATRAL supporters were also sympathetic to his government. Table 13 renders the Attaché's position even more difficult to justify.

Table 13

Labor Reaction to Bosch Government

<u>Federation</u>	<u>Number Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused to Answer</u>
FOUPSA- CESITRADO	16	13	2	1	0
CASC	11	8	1	2	0
CONATRAL	<u>27</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>
Totals	54	36	4	9	5

The result of the Somerford position was a bitter division in the labor movement throughout the seven-month Bosch government. CONATRAL continued to follow the simplistic collective bargaining, anti-communist policy of George Meany and Jay Lovestone of the AFL-CIO. It dogmatically kept aloof from the great political questions that were dividing Dominican society. CONATRAL's only political pronouncements were bitter diatribes

⁵⁸Miguel Soto, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 7, 1964.

against the alleged "communism" which it saw infiltrating the Bosch regime. It accepted its "proper role" by concentrating almost exclusively on securing modest wage and hour gains for the workers and by failing to take a stand on the supremely important issue of whether the Dominican Republic would achieve a successful transition to democracy or return to a tyranny resembling that which had existed under Trujillo.⁵⁹

Bosch, for his part, continued to attempt to lure or legislate all the Dominican workers to his cause. Immediately after he took office, when labor began a series of strikes which came close to paralyzing the economic life of the nation, the President went on national radio and television and stated that "labor has a friend in the Palace."⁶⁰ On May Day Bosch visited the headquarters of both FOUPSA-CESITRADO and CONATRAL. When these conciliatory measures failed, the PRD proposed a bill in the Congress providing that whenever two or more labor organizations existed in a single place of work, only the majority union would be legally recognized. The proposal brought a predictable criticism from CONATRAL.⁶¹

The campaign against Bosch continued. As early as mid-July, it was clear to many observers that the days of constitutional government were numbered. Recognizing the danger, FOUPSA-CESITRADO issued still another call to unite the workers in support of the regime. It published a communiqué in the government newspaper pointing to the possibility of an armed forces coup and the dire consequences this would entail for the

⁵⁹Sidney Lens, "Tinderbox in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 37; and David Blank, "Dominicans Moving Left, U.S. Standing Pat," New Americas, III (January 15, 1963), 3, 8.

⁶⁰The text is in El Caribe (March 19, 1963), p. 16.

⁶¹See Juan Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 4.

Dominican labor movement and the workers. The statement urged all workers to rally their support behind democracy, the fatherland, and the constitutional authority.⁶²

While FOUPSA-CESITRADO attempted to unify labor behind Bosch, CONATRAL did almost everything but urge his overthrow. It criticized the President openly for not suppressing the communists and at one time placed an advertisement in the newspapers urging the people to put their faith in the armed forces to defend the country against what it thought was a growing communist menace. Robinson Ruiz López, former secretary general of CONATRAL, came right out and publicly asked the military to oust the President.⁶³

FOUPSA-CESITRADO and CONATRAL were thus nearly diametrically opposed in their positions regarding the Bosch regime. When the constitutional authority was indeed ousted on September 25, 1963, the two labor federations again reacted in predictable fashion. CONATRAL praised the "patriotic gesture" of the armed forces in overthrowing Bosch, warmly saluted the new civilian junta, and applauded the "exemplary conduct" of the workers in not rising up in defense of the PRD government. The statement said that the new government would be more amenable to the interests of the workers than Bosch had been. After making these pronouncements, CONATRAL reiterated its "a-political" nature.⁶⁴

⁶²The text is in La Nación (July 17, 1963), p. 9.

⁶³See Sidney Lens, "Coup in the Caribbean," Liberation, VIII (October, 1963), 4; La Nación (July 15, 1963), p. 1; and Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), p. 211.

⁶⁴El Caribe (September 27, 1963), p. 11. See also Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase," The Reporter, XXIX (December 5, 1963), 29; and Movimiento Popular Dominicano, Obreros: Unidad Frente a los Imperialistas (Mimeographed paper, 1963).

Though CONATRAL was obviously happy with the coup, its parent organization, ORIT, energetically condemned the military takeover. ORIT issued a statement saying that it "deeply regrets" the overthrow of the Bosch government and that it was gravely concerned for the future of free labor in the Dominican Republic.⁶⁵

Joining with ORIT in a vigorous condemnation of the coup were both FOUPSA-CESITRADO and CASC. They called the takeover the work of a small minority and a disgrace to the nation. Both urged an immediate return to constitutionality and promised to fight against any violation of labor freedom on the part of the de facto government.⁶⁶

These violations, however, were not long in coming; and it is interesting that the lineup was again precisely the same as it had been on previous occasions. The Police raided the headquarters of both the FOUPSA-CESITRADO and CASC organizations--breaking up equipment, confiscating materials, and jailing labor leaders. On the other hand, the post-Bosch government did not at all interfere with CONATRAL. These conditions--frequent government intervention in and persecution of CASC and FOUPSA-CESITRADO and complete freedom for the activities of CONATRAL--prevailed throughout 1964 and early 1965.

The Dominican labor movement, despite numerous problems, had come a long way in the short time after the Trujillos were overthrown. An informal survey of workers carried out in mid-November, 1961, at the time

⁶⁵Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIV (September, 1963), 1.

⁶⁶El Caribe (September 27, 1963), p. 1; and Porfirio L. Barácer, "La Política Dentro de las Confederaciones de Trabajadores," El Laborista, I (November, 1963), 6.

the last of the Trujillos fled the country, revealed that an overwhelming majority of the workers had no conception of the ends, means, or nature of labor unions. Indifference to or ignorance of their existence was the most common response of those interviewed. Some 90 per cent had no idea of what a trade union was. Most respondents considered it something "official" or like a social club.⁶⁷

The basic education of the workers in the fundamentals of trade unionism was thus one of the first tasks for the labor federations to undertake. All the organizations--FOUPSA, CESITRADO, CASC, FOUPSA Libre, La Unión, FOUPSA-CESITRADO, and CONATRAL--conceived of their roles as educators as well as organizers. With the enormous resources of the AFL-CIO, ORIT, ICFTU, and the U.S. government behind it, CONATRAL was the most effective of the labor federations in this area.⁶⁸ Short courses were offered to both labor leaders and the rank-and-file. The programs of the several federations in the area of labor education was an astounding success: of seventy-four workers interviewed during the last half of 1964--three years after the first survey--fully fifty-five, or 75 per cent, could provide a satisfactory answer as to what a trade union was.

In terms of organization, significant gains have also been made. At the time Bosch was overthrown there were three major trade union federations functioning in the country. CONATRAL claimed to have close to 300 affiliated labor unions with over 100,000 members and was by far the largest. CASC claimed to have ninety-six unions with approximately 25,000 members.

⁶⁷"Sobre el Sindicato," Unión Cívica, I (November 15, 1961), 3.

⁶⁸See Mario Bobea Billini, "Mientras Otros Politiquean," El Caribe (August 9, 1964), p. 7.

FOUPSA-CESITRADO's strength was sharply reduced following the coup; and by 1964 it only claimed to have seventy-four affiliated trade unions with about 20,000 members. In addition to the major federations there were many unions that had remained independent. Over 500 trade unions with a total membership of 195,473 have been organized. This is a far cry from the situation which existed during the Trujillo era when with no effective organization to represent them, the workers were almost slaves.⁶⁹

The new labor organizations have been effective in bargaining in favor of the workers. Many of the wage increases have been in excess of 100 per cent. Sugar cane cutters, for example, who earned less than a dollar per day during the Trujillo years were making \$2.50-\$3.00 per day in 1964. A worker who made \$1.50 per day in the mills in the previous era now received \$3.20.⁷⁰ The gains which the unions have achieved for the workers was illustrated even in such insignificant areas as the price of a shoe-shine. In 1962 it was still possible to have one's shoes shined for five cents. In 1964 a sign on a huge tree in the Parque Colón read. "Attention: The Union of Bootblacks Advises the Public: From February 1 the Prices Will be the Following: Black and Brown Shoes 15 cents, Whites 40 cents, and Two-tones 50 cents."

⁶⁹Official figures from the Ministry of Labor, Listín Diario (December 4, 1964), p. 7. See also United States Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Directory of Labor Organizations, Western Hemisphere (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 2. These figures may be contrasted with those, however overinflated, from the Trujillo era. See Lázaro Euclídes Pimental Castro, Evolución de los Sindicatos en la República (Unpublished doctoral dissertation; University of Santo Domingo, 1961), p. 22.

⁷⁰E. García Godoy, Director of Labor Relations, South Puerto Rico Sugar Co., personal interview, La Romana, October 21, 1964. See also Lens "Tinder Box . . . ," op. cit., pp. 36-37.

At the same time that much has been accomplished, many problems remain. One of these is the lack of literacy in the unskilled. Another is the lack of trained and experienced union leaders. The poverty of the country provides a third problem area. The workers are still so poor that they cannot pay the dues necessary so that their unions can carry on their normal functions. There is still a hostility to the unions on the part of the employers and a suspicion of them on the part of the employees. The employers continue to concoct all sorts of schemes to frustrate the unions; while the government frequently sees "communist infiltration" in labor organizations where there are no communists.

The major problem in terms of the overall thesis of this study, is the weak and fluid organization of the entire labor sectors of the population. First of all, the individual unions are loosely organized. Then, the labor federations are often con-federations in which the individual unions frequently shift affiliations. Finally, the several federations do not provide a united voice for all labor. This problem is well illustrated in the giant La Romana sugar complex. There are thirty-one unions present: six are affiliated with CONATRAL, seven with FOUPSA-CESITRADO, and eighteen are independent. Frequently the individual unions and the federations work at cross purposes, both with management and among themselves. Labor in the Dominican Republic has emerged as a strong intermediate force in the period after Trujillo, but compared with the other organized sectors of the population, it remains weak.

It is for these reasons that the overthrow of Bosch severely disrupted the emerging labor movement. The President's television comment that labor had a friend in the National Palace was not mere rhetoric. He and his Party were

genuinely dedicated to the workers and aimed at bringing harmony to the labor movement. His successors returned to the traditional pattern of branding all labor's demands as "too much" and all its strikes as "illegal." The PRD-associated FOUPSA-CESITRADO offices were frequently raided and the Federation's President, Soto, jailed as a "preventive measure" whenever the threat of a work stoppage was imminent. The social-Christian CASC headquarters were also raided at intervals by the Police. On one occasion such "communist propaganda" as the latest papal bulls were confiscated. The entire labor movement was disrupted and practically halted. Labor no longer had its allies in the Palace. The struggle of the workers to achieve parity with the other sectors of the population will, as a result, likely be prolonged and perhaps violent.

CHAPTER X

THE ROLE OF THE PEASANTRY

Even weaker and more fluid than the "modernizing" political parties and labor organizations was another newly emergent and newly expectant sector, the rural peasantry.

The campesino (rural peasant) has traditionally been the forgotten man of Dominican politics. He has remained almost completely outside national decision-making. The Dominican Republic is primarily an agricultural country; some 70 per cent of the population is rural and 65 per cent are dependent solely on their agricultural labors. Of this 65 per cent only about 20 per cent are seasonally employed by the large plantations while the remaining 80 per cent live by subsistence farming. Largely illiterate (in the countryside the illiteracy rate may run as high as 80-90 per cent) these peasants have never played a significant role in the national existence. They produced little, consumed little, bought little, and continued to live in the manner to which they had always been accustomed.¹

Only after the Trujillo regime was overthrown did the Dominican campesino begin to have significance. One implication of the attempt to establish democracy in the country during this period was a free and open election, the first of its kind in the nation's history. The peasant was enfranchised and, realizing that his vote counted as much as that of the traditional

¹Gifford E. Rogers, Human Resources of the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo: International Development Services, Inc., 1962); and Informe sobre la República Dominicana (Anonymous: typed carbon copy, University of Puerto Rico, 1959), p. 11.

ruling elite, the political parties began to woo him. Other efforts were being made to integrate the campesinos into the national existence--peasant leagues, cooperatives, credit unions, agrarian reform programs.

All these attempts to bring the rural masses into the economy, politics, and the society represented something new in the country; they were all being tried for the first time. A beginning was made in this integration process, but three years was too short a period in which to change traditions and customs which had existed for centuries and the campesinos remained the least important of the sectors which this study is considering. His organizations were still in their infancy; they were weak and fluid and had only a small impact. It is important, nevertheless, to consider the birth of this movement.

Life in the Countryside

The Dominican Republic does not have the "Indian problem" that some of the other countries of Latin America have. Unlike Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru--in which the great pre-Colombian Indian civilizations were located--there are few Indians in the country. The original inhabitants, it will be recalled, were all but wiped out by the diseases which the Spanish conquistadores brought with them. The Dominican Republic, in comparison to some of these others, is a relatively homogeneous and integrated country. Spanish is the language even of the countryside with the result that there is no communications barrier. Only as one approaches the Haitian border is another language heard--the creole-patois of the former French colony--but even here Spanish is understood and spoken. This is in marked contrast to Guatemala, for example, where some 50 per cent of the population does not speak the national language. Further, the Dominican

campesino is not completely outside modern civilization, as is the case in the Indian countries. He does not, for instance, gape in awe as such a modern contraption as a bus goes by. Though an obviously foreign-looking person is sometimes the subject of scrutiny in the Dominican countryside, at least the foreigner has been seen before. The Dominican campesino is not living in a state of cultural shock as is the case in most of the Indian regions of Central and South America; he is aware a 20th century civilization does exist. For no matter where one is in the Dominican Republic, he is never more than six hours (by car) from the capital city. This proximity to modern life rubs off and it is rare to find a peasant who has not been in Santo Domingo several times. He is aware that he is a Dominican, furthermore, and shares a sense of nationalism and pride in his country. Much the same mores and customs prevail in all parts of the country so that there is no cultural dichotomy as there is elsewhere in the Americas. For all these reasons, then--common language, sense of common nationality, common customs, lack of an isolated indigenous population, proximity to modern life--the Dominican campesino, in comparison to his counterpart in certain other Latin American countries, is relatively integrated into the country's national life.

But "integration" takes several different forms and is a matter of degree. For despite the fact that the Dominican Republic is a comparatively homogeneous country, it should not be thought that, because of this, the Dominican campesino is also wealthy in relation to peasants in the Indian countries. He is not. In both the U.S. and the countries of the Caribbean there has long been a widespread illusion, fostered largely by Trujillo propaganda, that Dominicans are well off. Nothing could be farther from the truth in almost every part of the country. Many of its people live

little or no better than the next-door Haitians, who are proverbially cited as the poorest of the hemisphere. Those dependent on subsistence farming are the worst off, but even the rural employed work for a pittance. In the area around Cotui cane-cutters were earning 55 cents per ton in 1962 with an entire family, including the women, able to cut around two tons per day. These wages occur in a country where prices, including those for such basics as rice and beans, were higher by far than in the U.S.²

The conditions of the Dominican campesino are miserable throughout the nation, but in some areas they are more wretched than in others. In the fertile East the Vicini family, which has large holdings devoted to sugar and cattle raising, and the U.S.-owned South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. have built low cost houses for the workers who cut the cane. Though without water or light, these shacks are still better than what the campesinos had ever had before. Throughout the central part of the country--especially the Vega Real--and the North--especially the Cibao Valley--the lands are wealthy and the comparative richness is reflected in the more prosperous conditions of the peasants. Most of the campesinos in these areas wear Western clothes (however raggy) and shoes (however full of holes). Their houses are made out of wood, and may even have a floor. They may own a chicken or two and have a small plot of land on which they can grow a few beans and some yucca for home consumption.

It is in the vast Southwest, however, that one finds people living under extremely primitive conditions. Most have inadequate clothes,

²See Thomas P. Whitney, "The U.S. and the Dominicans: What Will be Done with the Trujillo Properties?" The New Republic, CXLVI (February 12, 1962), 13-14.

food,³ or housing, no readily available water, and no electricity. Their shanties are patched together with leaves and mud and their clothes with hardly more substantial materials. Little mal-formed children run naked wallowing in the same grime and filth as the pigs until they are eleven or twelve when they start producing more children of their own. Many have bloated bellies due to malnutrition, while scars and marks frequently cover their bodies as a result of the bites and diseases which they accumulate. There are very few doctors or medical facilities.

What water there is usually comes from a common stream, polluted by the animals which roam free. Few bother with civil or religious marriage and most of the men have two or three or more families in different locations. The moral problem involved seems unimportant compared to the practical--no provision is made by the man for the care of his several families and the woman is forced to grub for food and clothing for herself and her many children. Even the professional people--dentists, lawyers, and teachers--in the towns that dot the area live in houses that some Mississippi share-croppers could match.

Cristoba, a community of 2,000 located on the road between Cabral and Duverg , is typical of the region. Here the people live without the most elemental subsistence. To speak of water and light here is only a luxurious dream. Sometimes a few of the men may find employment at the Barahona sugar mill thirty miles away. There is no medical dispensary and no hygiene. Bathing must be done in an old canal which is several miles away and where the danger of disease or an epidemic is grave. Water must be carried in

³The national per capita caloric intake is 1,950 per day, better only than Bolivia, Haiti, and Ecuador in the Americas. See Statistical Abstract of Latin America (University of California at Los Angeles: Center of Latin American Studies, 1963), p. 29.

cans on one's head from the source four miles away to the houses. One resident was quoted to have said, "We don't have anything here--not even women, because they are too busy working." Cristobal, though on a major road, remains completely ignored--its people claimed that no government official had passed through the town in more than a year.⁴

Though Cristobal and its surrounding area is the most depressive and poverty-stricken region of the country, it is by no means an exception. Even in the comparatively rich areas of the East, the Center, and the North, the conditions are nearly as bad. The "model" communities put up by some of the large companies in these areas are confined to the main roads for show purposes, but off the major highways the grinding poverty sets in again.

Trujillo had forced many of the campesino squatters off the good lands and taken them over for himself. He became the largest landowner, cattle raiser, and food grower and his vast holdings came to include the best farming and grazing areas in the country. As a sop to the dispossessed peasants, he instituted a much-publicized agrarian reform program which meant that they were resettled in the less fertile hillsides.⁵ Deforestation and the subsequent erosion made these lands almost worthless with the result that the subsistence existence of the campesinos declined still further throughout the 1950's. By 1963, with some 70,000 of these nomadic families in the mountains, there was a strong possibility that the Dominican Republic would be eroded like Haiti--its top-soil completely washed away.⁶

⁴See Radhamés Gómez P., "Zona del País Vive Gran Miseria," El Caribe (August 4, 1962), p. 1 and (August 5, 1962), p. 1.

⁵On the Trujillo agrarian reform see Fabio A. Mota, Un estadista de América, obra socio-política de Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1945), pp. 217-227.

⁶Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a Coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, CXCIII (October 26, 1963), 255.

Many of these impressionistic descriptions of the miserable conditions in the countryside are backed up by empirical data. In a survey conducted by Carlos M. Campos and Alberto Arredondo of a representative group from all the rural areas of the country, the following information was collected: 90 per cent said their habitual meal was rice and beans; 26 per cent came from homes made out of wood, blocks, or cement while the remaining 74 per cent lived in shacks built of leaves, mud, and sticks. Only 18 per cent of these homes had electricity; 73 per cent had no floors in their houses; 33 per cent got their water from the river while 48 per cent had wells and 19 per cent relied on a public fountain. Only 27 per cent had sanitary facilities within their houses. Fifty-nine per cent came from families in which neither the father nor mother could read or write. None had a television set, 2 per cent had a phonograph, and 12 per cent a radio. Only 4 per cent had a full-scale bath--most bathed in the river or from a pail. Fifty-one per cent said that they could obtain credit only at rates of 20 per cent per month while the rest reported almost equally usurious rates. Most said that the nearest school was many kilometers away. The wage scales of those interviewed were fantastically low--35 per cent received 20 cents daily and another 25 per cent 30 cents daily. Only 8 per cent said they received \$1.50 or more per day. These wages were paid only for the days that they worked--there was no guarantee when and for how long they would obtain employment. The prices the campesinos had to pay for basic items in comparison with city-dwellers was also high. Where beans sold for 16 cents per pound in the city, they ran up to 28 cents in the countryside; while rice was 13 cents per pound in the city, it was 16 in the campo. Manufactured goods for personal use--such as shoes, shirts, and pants--

cost about 50 per cent more in the rural areas than in the capital. When polled as to what they needed most, 79 per cent of those interviewed listed land and employment as number one. Campos and Arredondo concluded from their studies that the diet of the Dominican campesino is inadequate, that they live in inhospitable shacks with no facilities, and that there was little hope for them to raise their standard of living.⁷

Not only is the Dominican countryside fantastically poor, it is also inefficient. Work efficiency calculations prepared for the Dominican Agrarian Institute indicated that each worker employed in agriculture produces only enough food for five other persons. The lowness of this ratio is emphasized when it is compared with that of the U.S. In the U.S. the average agricultural worker produces enough to feed twenty-seven people.⁸

Because the situation in the countryside was so hopeless, many campesinos began to migrate to the capital city in the hope of finding permanent employment and a higher standard of living. But jobs in Santo Domingo, where the population had doubled between 1950 and 1960, were now impossible to obtain and the displaced peasants joined the ranks of the unemployed. Unemployment mushroomed until it approached 40 per cent, a figure which makes the worrisome 6-7 per cent of the U.S. look tiny by comparison. Occasionally they found work as stevedores, peddlers, bottle collectors, prostitutes, or housemaids. These urban peasants set up shacks much like they had lived in the country in the city's teeming slums, especially along

⁷Carlos M. Campos and Alberto Arredondo, "Las Condiciones de Vida del Campesino Dominicano," PANORAMAS, Num. 4 (Julio-Agosto, 1963), pp. 81-110.

⁸M. Jay Wiltbanks Jr., Considerations for an Agricultural Supervised Credit Institute of the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo: International Development Services, Inc., 1964), p. 1.

the Ozama River. Crowded, filthy, without water, electricity, or sanitation, filled with naked, diseased, starving children, with rats and pigs competing for the meager food, these shanty towns, made of strips of bark and old packing cases, presented a sorry spectacle. They disrupted all efforts of the government to relieve the housing lack and to begin a social welfare program. Crime and violence became so common that the Police would only enter these areas in daylight and then only in groups. And with nothing to do and little hope left, the unemployed urban campesino was ripe for all sorts of demagogic appeals. He proved to be an extremely disruptive force in the effort to bridge the transition from dictatorship to democracy.⁹

For all these reasons, then, an effort was made to "do something" about the "campesino problem." The result was that for the first time in Dominican history, the needs and wants of the rural peasants were considered. The first to pay attention to the campesino on a major scale were the political parties who sought his vote, but soon many attempts were being made to organize the countryside. An agrarian reform program sought to improve his conditions, revitalize the land, and motivate him to stay on the farm. An upheaval in the campo was begun; an attempt was started to fully integrate the traditionally isolated and atomized campesinos into the national, political, and social life.

The Attempt to Organize the Peasantry

After the assassination of Trujillo an attempt to mobilize and organize the peasantry was begun. Power had passed to Ramfis and he

⁹Miguel Angel Presto, "El Exodo Campesino: Sus Causas y Consecuencias," Ahora, III (September 12, 1964), 5-7; El Caribe (October 29, 1964), p. 8; and Gall, op. cit., p. 255.

had promised free and honest elections. When it became apparent that the official Dominican Party might have to compete in an open campaign battle for the first time in its thirty-year existence, a national congress of campesinos was called to drum up support for the Party in the rural areas. This was the first such national peasant convention ever held in the Dominican Republic, and it was reported in the official press that thousands attended from every part of the country. But the congress remained completely under the control of the official Party. President Antonio Chaljub Urena and Secretary General Virgilio Hoepelman followed the established line by sending a cable to the O.A.S. asking that the sanctions imposed against the Trujillo regime be lifted. The primary purpose of the convention, however, was to swear allegiance to the memory of the slain dictator and to rubber-stamp the program of the nation's puppet President, Joaquín Balaguer.¹⁰

This initial attempt to organize the campesinos, however farcical it might have been, disintegrated when Ramfis and later Balaguer were forced from the country and the Dominican Party, which had organized this peasant branch, collapsed. The subsequent coming to power of the Council of State and the definite prospect that there would be an honest election in which diverse groups would be allowed to compete revived interest in the campesino. The several political parties then emerging for the campaign sought to woo the rural votes and enlist the peasants in their organizational ranks. The efforts of the parties to mobilize campesino support represented the first genuine attempt to organize this sector in Dominican history.¹¹

¹⁰See El Caribe (September 29, 1961), p. 1 and (November 1, 1961), p. 1.

¹¹The efforts of the parties to mobilize peasant support is treated

The Dominican Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch was the first to realize the importance of the peasant vote. While the other parties engaged only in verbal squirmishes among themselves, the PRD concentrated on organizing the campesinos. One of the principal planks in the Party program, designed to appeal to the peasants, was the insistence on the immediate redistribution of the former Trujillo properties to 70,000 rural families and the establishment of rural industries. Already by January, 1962, after only six months of operations in the Dominican Republic, the PRD had 250,000 affiliates; and by March, nine months before the election, the number had increased to over 300,000.¹²

Realizing that the PRD was sweeping the countryside, another of the major parties, the National Civic Union, launched its campaign in the rural areas. UCN leaders got out of the capital city for the first time and, following the example of the PRD, held public meetings, made speeches, and passed out Party propaganda.¹³ The UCN, however, soon became identified with the rich and the upper class patrons and it lost much of the rural support which it had initially had.

It was not long before the other parties followed the examples of the PRD and the UCN and initiated their campaigns in the countryside. All the parties--from the conservative UCN to the Fidelista-nationalist 14th of June

(Footnote 11 continued from preceding page)

in Chapter VIII, pp. 252-256, but the most salient features of these efforts should also be considered here.

¹²See Mario Bobea Billini, "Dicen que Mientras Otros Disputan, el PRD Crece," El Caribe (January 24, 1962), p. 7; and "Mientras Otros Pelean, Bosch Sigue Ganando en Zona Rural," El Caribe (February 21, 1962), p. 4.

¹³Mario Bobea Billini, "Dicen UCN Ha Iniciado su Campana en la Zona Rural," El Caribe (February 24, 1962), p. 4.

Movement and the communist Popular Socialist Party--called for the raising of living standards for the campesinos and for agrarian reform. Indeed, agrarian reform soon became one of the major campaign issues. All of the major and minor parties chose one of the party chieftains at the executive committee level to serve as a secretary of campesino affairs. The major and minor parties and even some of the small one-man parties established offices throughout the countryside until at one point at the height of the campaign in August, 1962, every city, town, and village contained several party offices.

The result of the realization of the importance of the campesino vote was a mad scramble to enlist as many peasants as possible in the parties' membership rolls. The scramble proved somewhat confusing to the campesinos who had never been wooed with so much ardor before, and it was not unusual for the rural peasants to join two or more parties.

Despite this confusion, it became clear that PRD had by far the best organization and the largest following among the campesinos. Whereas the UCN established branch offices in the Dominican Republic's secondary towns--Baní, Azua, Barahona, San Juan de la Maguana, La Romana, San Pedro de Macorís, Higüey, La Vega, Moca, Montecristi, Puerto Plata, San Francisco de Macorís, as well as in the two major cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago--the PRD had representatives and a functioning office at almost every widening of the road where half a dozen shacks were gathered together.

The presidential candidate of the PRD, Bosch, was, furthermore, an effective campaigner in the countryside; and it was he who most effectively brought the Dominican peasant into politics. Bosch visited almost every

settlement and his daily radio broadcasts, heard on transistor radios distributed by the Party, were aimed especially at rural communities.¹⁴

The PRD message, in addition, was clear and simple and consistently on the side of the rural poor. In his campaign speeches Bosch promised that he would continue to work until each Dominican could go to sleep at night with a full stomach. "The price of one's work ought to be equal to that which is necessary to maintain his family," he argued.¹⁵ His talks were full of promises of food, water, housing, electricity, clothing, health facilities, cooperatives, agrarian reform, and improved education. In this new paradise there were to be government stores where the peasants could buy beans, rice, and plantains without being robbed by usurious merchants. Bosch's electoral promises of social and economic advances in the countryside had an appeal, however demagogic. "Sure Bosch promises big things," one campesino is reported to have said. "He may not keep his promises but at least he makes them. Nobody else does that."¹⁶ This kind of message evoked a strong empathetic response among the peasants, and most of them became enthusiastic supporters of the PRD.

Many of these supporters were later formally organized into the National Federation of Campesino Brotherhoods (FENHERCA), which served as the peasant arm of the PRD. FENHERCA always claimed to be non-partisan; its goal, the organization said, was to help the peasants and to stay aloof from the election campaign. On August 16, 1962, FENHERCA held a meeting in

¹⁴See Norman Gall, "Ferment in the Caribbean," The New Leader, XLVI (June 10, 1963), 8.

¹⁵The text is in El Caribe (August 2, 1962), p. 9.

¹⁶Quoted in Gall, "Ferment . . . ," op. cit., p. 8.

San Cristobal at which time it reiterated these themes. Its principal reason for existence, according to its official statement, was to promote an "effective and dynamic agrarian reform"; and Gustavo Jiménez Cohen, executive secretary of the meeting, said that it was "oblivious to the party struggle."¹⁷ In fact, however, FENHERCA was not non-partisan and its affiliation with the PRD was never doubted. All the leaders of the campesino Federation were also PRD leaders and its membership was composed almost exclusively of PRD members.

In September FENHERCA held its first national convention in Santo Domingo. At that time the organization claimed to have some 3,000 affiliated Brotherhoods with 150,000 members in all of the nation's twenty-six provinces. President of the organizing committee was José Rafael Molina Ureña of the PRD, but Party chieftains Juan Bosch and Angel Miolán also helped preside over the meeting. Molina Ureña stated the purpose of the campesino Brotherhoods: the inauguration of a "true agrarian reform, not violent but peaceful." Juan Bosch said that FENHERCA "will be the greatest force to maintain social justice and democratic liberties in the Dominican Republic." Posters read "Campesinos, FENHERCA is your salvation" and "Down with the exploitation of the peasants."¹⁸

A Declaration of Principles was also adopted at the convention. The document began by citing the major problems of the rural areas: the miserable life of the campesinos, the twin evils of latifundia and minifundia existing side by side, the debt peonage by which the peasants were

¹⁷El Caribe (August 17, 1962), p. 13.

¹⁸El Caribe (September 23, 1962), p. 9.

kept under the thumb of the landlord, the poor use of the land, the population explosion in the countryside, and the campesino as the forgotten man. FENHERCA then stated its own ideals: the unification and organization of the peasants under one banner, the betterment of the campesinos' living conditions, a new and effective agrarian reform law. It promised to "fight without rest" for the campo so that each family could have its own lands, to defend the peasants against a government prejudicial to their interests, and to use the Brotherhoods as the "great instruments for the liberation of the Dominican campesinos."¹⁹

FENHERCA emerged as the organized vanguard of the PRD in the countryside. This, coupled with the Party's strong regular organization in rural areas and the charismatic appeal which presidential candidate Bosch himself had among the peasants, enabled the PRD and Bosch to sweep to a two to one victory over the nearest competition in the elections. The greater part of Bosch's 619,491 votes came from the rural population.

After the elections, however, the FENHERCA organization all but ground to a halt. Only after Bosch had been in office for several months did the government's leaders begin to realize the potential which this rusting and idle grass roots organization provided. A belated attempt was then made at revival.

FENHERCA President Cesar Roque, who was elected a PRD congressman, said that at the height of its strength during the last month of the Bosch administration it had 166,000 campesinos listed on its membership rolls. The organization worked closely with the President's agrarian reform programs. It

¹⁹The text is in El Caribe (September 24, 1962), pp. 10-11.

helped organize cooperatives and credit unions, conducted surveys on economic affairs, and inaugurated a literacy campaign in the countryside. Some sixty young teachers working out of the cities of Santiago, San Francisco de Macorís, Azua, San Pedro de Macorís, and the capital put on a strenuous drive to teach the campesinos to read and write. Books, pamphlets, and manuals of civic and political education, prepared and published in Mexico under the direction of Víctor Alba, served a double purpose: they were used as part of the literacy drive and they were also employed to indoctrinate the campesinos in the democratic-Left ideology of the PRD. An attempt was thus made to mobilize the peasantry behind the Bosch government.

As the peasant arm of the Bosch administration, FENHERCA also received the help of the U.S. government. Washington was pouring immense amounts of money and assistance into the Dominican Republic, and the PRD's campesino organization was the recipient of some of this aid. It received money and technical assistance from the Institute for International Labor Research, headed by Norman Thomas, and also from the Farmers' Union, the U.S. farmers' organization which had long been closely associated with the Democratic Party.²⁰

Other organizations working in collaboration with Bosch and the PRD had also sprung up to assist in the effort to mobilize and organize the peasantry. The most important of these was run by Sacha Volman, Bosch's closest personal adviser. In 1962 Volman became the organizer and coordinator

²⁰ Much of this information on FENHERCA is based on interviews with its president César Roque, Santo Domingo, September 17, 1964; and PRD secretary of campesino affairs Mariano Pena, Santo Domingo, December 21, 1964. See also Víctor Alba, "Historia de una iniquidad: Los generales y los personajillos contra el pueblo dominicano," Suplemento al Num. 6 de PANORAMAS (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1963), pp. 12-14.

of the Interamerican Center of Political Training (CIDAP). CIDAP was a school for campesino youths which aimed at teaching them how to organize such things as peasant leagues, cooperatives, and credit unions. The school was located just west of Santo Domingo. Classes were held in an old house on the property while the students lived in a massive tent. In August, 1962, CIDAP had thirty-four students and its faculty included Bosch and Miolán of the PRD, the Cuban Alberto Arredondo, and the Argentine Dardo Cúneo. The students trained by CIDAP provided the nucleus for the original mobilization of the peasantry by the PRD and its campesino arm FENHERCA.²¹

CIDAP was later reorganized into the Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES), again under the direction of Volman. With Bosch in the presidency and Volman as his closest adviser, CIDES began to play a much more important role than the old CIDAP organization had ever done. It drafted legislation dealing with campesino affairs, conducted surveys on land tenancy, and wrote an agrarian reform program. Though CIDES, like FENHERCA, professed to be non-partisan, it actually promoted and reinforced the programs of Bosch and the PRD. These efforts were concentrated on at least three levels. A Center for Social Education and Documentation published low-cost brochures, manuals of political education, and magazines aimed at the lower class, barely literate reader. A training school was set up to instruct youthful peasant leaders in the techniques of running cooperatives, but also to provide a corps of democratically oriented rural political leaders which could be useful to the PRD. The first group consisted of ninety-six trainees. Volman and his collaborators also aimed at mass

²¹ Sacha Volman, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 28, 1962;

education which, at the same time, would be used to indoctrinate the campesinos in the PRD ideology. CIDES was receiving financial help from the U.S. and, with this, was extending aid and credit to rural cooperatives. All these efforts represented a large-scale attempt to change the way of life of the campesinos by raising his standard of living and by giving him an organization through which his voice could be heard.²²

FENHERCA and CIDES were the principal organizations used by the PRD and Bosch to enlist the campesinos into the political life of the nation, but there were others. The PRD, after all, was a peasant-oriented Party, similar to APRA in Peru, and dedication to the needs of the peasants was among the major items in its program. The result was that the Bosch administration attempted to involve the entire state apparatus in the movement. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and most other ministries and agencies joined in the effort to raise living standards in the countryside.

On one occasion the Agrarian Institute, the Agricultural Bank, the Institute of Credit and Cooperative Development, and other agencies were coordinated in a concerted attempt to establish a chain of credit unions throughout the campo. The primary purpose of the credit unions was to make loans to small farmers to enable them to break the vicious circle of poverty and poor crops in which they were caught. Credit unions were also an integral part of the agrarian reform program, then being begun. It was felt that cooperatives were essential to organizing the campesinos and that

(Footnote 21 continued from preceding page)

and Volman, "La educación para el cambio social," PANORAMAS, XIII (Enero-Febrero, 1965), 38-48.

²²Supra, pp. 223-225.

credit unions were often essential to a successful cooperative. Some of these organizations were even established as credit cooperatives, thus combining the two concepts.²³

One of the most interesting experiments was the attempt to educate the rural masses in the ways of organizing a cooperative through the public school system. The Ministry of Education was told to see that such instruction was given in the rural schools. The hope was that these youths would carry the methods back to their home communities and that more cooperatives would thus be begun. But like many of the government's projects to organize the campesinos, this one was only beginning when the Bosch administration was ousted.²⁴

Another project along these lines was the use of foreign technicians to train Dominican leaders in the administration of cooperatives and also to offer an orientation to the campesinos who would form the organization. It was thought that if both leaders and followers could receive some training, the chances for the success of the cooperative would be greater. These technicians, members of International Development Services Inc., were hired by the Dominican government with U.S. A.I.D. money for help primarily in the agrarian reform operation; but the administration felt that an even better use of their skills would be in the preparation of a training program for cooperatives. Bosch was overthrown before the project got much past the planning stage, however.²⁵

²³George Lockward, "Las Cooperativas de Crédito en la República Dominicana," La Nación (June 20, 1963), p. 5.

²⁴Octavio Ramírez Duval, "El Nuevo Plan Educativo en Apoyo de la Reforma Agraria," La Nación (July 5, 1963), p. 5.

²⁵Gifford E. Rogers, Progreso de la Reforma Agraria en la República

This analysis has concentrated primarily on the efforts of the PRD and the subsequent Bosch administration to organize the peasantry because they were the most important, but there were other organizations working for the same general goals. A fuller treatment has been offered in Chapter IX on "The Role of Labor," but brief mention should here be made of the organization of rural labor, particularly the sugar workers. During the Trujillo era only the government controlled labor federation had been allowed to function, and this organization did not work for the benefit of the workers but only for the regime. In the few years after Trujillo's assassination, however, independent labor organizations developed at a rapid pace until they came to include in their ranks a sizable percentage of the employed rural proletariat.

The Roman Catholic Church was also beginning to work in this direction. Bishop Hugo Polanco of Santiago, for example, criticized the system of large landholdings in his own diocese, the Cibao Valley, and called on the government to distribute the land to peasants and to assist them in forming cooperatives.²⁶ Bishop Juan F. Pepén used the churches in the Higüey area not just for religious services but as educational and social centers as well. Many priests, such as Padre René Tousigninet of Barahona, were active in the cooperative movement.

The social-Christian labor federation, CASC, also initiated a drive to organize the campesinos. One of the seven branches of the CASC is the Dominican Federation of Christian Agrarian Leagues (FEDELAC). FEDELAC claimed

(Footnote 25 continued from preceding page)

Dominicana (Santo Domingo: International Development Services, Inc., 1963), pp. 6-7.

²⁶The text is in El LJ4, 1 (January, 1962), 1.

to have thirty-eight affiliated Agrarian Leagues with a total membership of 20,000 (this figure did not include those peasants who were actually part of the rural industrial force--such as cane cutters--who had their own, separate CASC organization). Though organized in all parts of the country, its stronghold was in the Cibao. The CASC further claimed that it was the only labor federation which had attempted to organize the rural subsistence campesinos. As part of its activities FEDELAC administers various social centers and conducts educational institutes for its members. The first of several planned "Casas Campesinas," which was to serve as a combined social, cultural, and political center for the peasants, was established in La Vega. The federation has made only a minor dent in a major problem, however, and even its stated membership figures are probably exaggerated.²⁷

One of the most important and least publicized efforts in this area is the work of the Peace Corps. The first group of twenty-one Peace Corps volunteers arrived in the Dominican Republic on July 11, 1962, and began to work in the rich agricultural area of the Cibao Valley. The chief task of this initial group was to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in organizing a rural development service. Since that time the total Peace Corps contingent has swelled to approximately 150 volunteers and its activities have become more diversified. Those sent to the rural areas have usually been trained in what the Peace Corps calls "community development," the program designed to help rural settlements to help themselves. Many Peace Corps volunteers have been engaged in such ambitious projects as a cooperative

²⁷ José Gómez Cerda, secretary of campesino affairs, CASC, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 10, 1964. See also the FEDELAC communiqué, Listín Diario (September 17, 1964), p. 9.

of one sort or another, while others have organized such seemingly insignificant activities as 4-H clubs and baseball teams. But even these latter organizations are important in areas in which nothing like them had existed before.

The overthrow of Juan Bosch was a severe setback to the movement to organize the countryside. His Dominican Revolutionary Party offices were padlocked for a time and all the Party's activities came to a standstill. The Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES) collapsed and its leaders left the country. The Instituto de Desarrollo y Crédito Cooperativo found it impossible to secure funds from the post-Bosch government. Perhaps most important, the National Federation of Campesino Brotherhoods (FENHERCA) virtually ceased to exist. The Police raided the headquarters of the organization in an effort to stop the spread of "communism" in the country and much equipment and materials were broken up and confiscated. Its radio program was also prohibited. The coup against Bosch meant, further, that FENHERCA no longer received U.S. aid and the economic pinch has particularly hurt. The organization no longer had the funds to buy books and hire teachers. César Roque, president of FENHERCA, said that his organization was willing to work with the government of the Triumvirate but that his help had not been sought. Roque stated that there was no future for his organization under the post-Bosch government and that it was impossible to even talk to this regime. "The movement to organize the campesinos is no longer permitted," he concluded.²⁸

²⁸César Roque, personal interview, Santo Domingo, September 17, 1964.

Though the ouster of Bosch was indeed a setback, not all efforts to organize the countryside ceased altogether. The Peace Corps, the Church, and FEDELAC continued with their work. These were, nevertheless, insignificant efforts in comparison with the mass mobilization that had been attempted before.

The Politics of Agrarian Reform

Of fundamental importance for the emergence of a modern and diversified economy, of a more mobile society, and of a more democratic political system in the Dominican Republic was an agrarian reform. Only a very few have traditionally owned the major portion of the arable land in the country and they have used their economic power to dominate the workers and tenants on their estates. Trujillo was the largest landowner for many years, but the system of large landholdings had long prevailed. Dominican agriculture suffered not only from the high degree of concentration of land ownership but also from the existence of a huge proportion of plots which were too small to be economically viable--thus the twin problems of minifundia and latifundia.

A recent survey by an agrarian reform technician estimated that 86 per cent of all the 460,335 farms in the country were less than 80 tareas (6.4 tareas equals one acre) but that the combined land area of all these holdings amounts to only 19 per cent of all the land being cultivated (approximately 30,000 square kilometers). Only 1 per cent of all the fincas, on the other hand, are larger than 800 tareas, but this 1 per cent includes 54 per cent of the total cultivated land.²⁹ These figures did not include the

²⁹Gifford E. Rogers, Tenencia de la Tierra en la República Dominicana (Santo Domingo: International Development Services, Inc., 1963), pp. 45-47.

six million tareas owned by the government, the inclusion of which would have made the concentration of land ownership even more pronounced.

Several reasons may be advanced to suggest why an agrarian reform program was considered essential. In the first place, the wave of democratic sentiment which swept the country after the overthrow of Trujillo led to a general feeling, among both the masses and the enlightened oligarchy, that it was no longer appropriate for a few large landowners to completely control the political and economic destinies of so many. Under the prevailing latifundia system, much land was wasted, technical advances were slow in coming, and the market for the goods of a society wishing to industrialize remained small. The migration of landless peasants to the city not only created pressing social problems there but also undermined agricultural production. It was felt that a program had to be developed to make the rural areas attractive enough so that the campesinos could be induced to remain on the soil. Landownership, it was thought, would be a powerful incentive. Finally, an agrarian reform gives a stronger political voice to the campesinos; and, especially after the Bosch government took power, agrarian reform served as a way of mobilizing and organizing the peasantry.³⁰

Agrarian reform is thus both a technical operation and a political football. The key aspect of any program is the redistribution of the land, but it also involves education, the establishment of cooperatives, technical assistance, and credit. All these items may be fairly simply administered by non-political technicians. But the program has so many potentially attractive features as to prove irresistible to politicians. While the

³⁰See Rafael Martínez González, "La Reforma Agraria en la República Dominicana," El Caribe (January 19, 1936), p. 7 and (January 20, 1963), p. 7.

technician is concerned with such items as efficient land use, the politician is concerned with obtaining support and dispensing "pork." At least in the Dominican case, the technicians and the politicians often came in conflict and the result was a contradictory, aborted, and on-the-whole unsuccessful agrarian reform.

Agrarian reform in the Dominican Republic had received its initial distorted impetus during the Trujillo era. While the Generalissimo confiscated the best lands in the country for his personal use, the dispossessed peasants had been forced to move to the hilly and less fertile areas. This process was called an "agrarian reform" by the dictator and the program was well publicized by the regime.³¹

Following Trujillo's assassination the puppet President Balaguer began another aborted agrarian reform program. He announced that 350,000 tareas would be distributed to needy peasants and a commission was appointed to study the problem. But this program was merely another publicity gimmick. At the time the government was attempting to "liberalize" its image in the hope that the O.A.S. would lift the economic sanctions still in effect, and agrarian reform was part of this attempt. The commission held meetings and exchanged ideas, all of which received front page coverage in the government-controlled press, but very few lands were ever distributed.³²

When this gesture failed to convince the O.A.S. to lift the sanctions, the government tried another tact. The son and heir Ramfis began to give

³¹Manuel Valldeperes, Acción y Pensamiento de Trujillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1955), p. 160.

³²El Caribe (July 20, 1961), p. 1 and (August 1, 1961), p. 1.

away portions of the huge family empire. The largest of these giveaways was the Rio Haina sugar complex, valued at \$100 million. The message that accompanied the gift said that the sugar mill was to be administered for the sole benefit of those who labored in it. The Trujillo propaganda machine called this "an act of generosity without precedent."³³ In fact, however, this move was little more than another attempt to improve the tarnished Trujillo image; and, indeed, none of the gestures made during the Trujillo era could reasonably be called an agrarian reform in any accepted use of the term.

With the last of the Trujillos driven from the country. Balaguer, who continued in the presidency for a short time afterwards, attempted to establish his own independent power base among the campesinos. Using the former Trujillo properties, he gave away plots of 40-50 tareas to hundreds of landless peasants. He also proposed to give the cane cutters a share of the former Trujillo mills.³⁴

Before Balaguer could give away the entire Trujillo properties, however, he himself was ousted. He was replaced by the caretaker seven-man Council of State and the lands belonging to the Trujillos were kept in the hands of the government. The Dominican Republic thus had a golden opportunity to launch a successful agrarian reform--vast landholdings were already under the ownership of the state. The Dominican government did not have to engage in expropriations of private lands and thus raise the antagonisms of foreign investors or Dominican hacendados. All it had to do

³³The text of Ramfis' statement is in El Caribe (October 26, 1961), p. 1 and an editorial is on p. 5.

³⁴Moisés Contreras C., "Repartición de Tierras por el Estado," El Caribe (December 24, 1961), p. 5.

was divide the land which it already had in its possession. It was estimated that there were enough state-owned lands to carry out an effective agrarian reform for at least four years. Only later would the thought of troublesome confiscations of private lands have to come up.³⁵ The prospect seemed simple and certain.

The idea of an agrarian reform was laid to rest for a while after Balaguer was forced out and until the succeeding Council was well established and had consolidated its support. Then, on April 27, 1962, the Council established the Agrarian Institute. The Institute was to be an autonomous state agency with authority to contract its own financial obligations. It was governed by a board of directors composed of seven members: the Secretary of State for Agriculture (chairman), the Secretary of State of Labor, the general manager of the Agrarian Bank, and four members to be appointed by the Council. The Institute was charged with the responsibility for carrying out the agrarian reform program throughout the entire territory of the Republic. It was not until May 24, however, that the Institute actually began to function. On that date the agronomist Manuel de Jesús Vinas Cáceres was named Director General, and he began to organize the program.³⁶

In the meantime the Council of State had already begun the resettlement of campesinos. Earlier in May some fifty families were given lands of 50 tareas each in the municipio of Bonao. These lands had formerly been the property of Trujillo's brother, Arismendi. Though the Generalissimo

³⁵Rogers, Tenencia . . ., op. cit., p. 48.

³⁶Rogers, Progreso . . ., op. cit., pp. 1-2.

and later Balaguer had employed the phrase, this represented the first genuine step to the direction of agrarian reform in the history of the country.³⁷

On July 23 the Agrarian Institute signed a contract with International Development Services Inc. to provide technical assistance for the program. The IDS technicians prepared a series of studies on the various facets of agrarian reform and assisted and advised in program planning, project execution, and review. In addition the Council received technical assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, which helped in the formation and execution of an agricultural credit program; from the Levantino Foreign Fruit Co., which furnished a fruit and vegetable specialist; from the governments of West Germany and Israel; and from the O.A.S. and CEPAL.³⁸

Along with the technical assistance, the administrative machinery for an effective agrarian reform was put into operation, oiled, and the roles of the various agencies involved defined. In addition to the Agrarian Institute and the Agricultural Bank, the Council also created a National Housing Institute and a National Planning Board. The Agrarian Institute would supervise the distribution of lands and work for more efficient land use. The Agricultural Bank would provide long term credit. The National Housing Institute would supervise low-cost home construction, while the National Planning Board would oversee the entire operation.³⁹

³⁷El Caribe (May 5, 1962), p. 1. For a report on the success of this initial effort a year later see R. Hart Phillips, "La Reforma Agraria en la República Dominicana," El Caribe (August 29, 1962), p. 6.

³⁸Gifford E. Rogers, Agrarian Reform Defined and Analyzed, With Emphasis on the Dominican Republic (Santo Doming: International Development Services, Inc., 1964), pp. 148-150.

³⁹Julio C. Estrella, "La Reforma Agraria en Marcha," El Caribe (August 9, 1962), p. 7.

With the machinery, the men, and the plans ready, the Council began a more extensive effort. In August 400 families were settled on lands formerly belonging to the Trujillos. The lands were in the southern provinces of Azua and Peravia and comprised the vast estate, Hacienda Fundación. Along with the distribution of the land the government set up a cooperative to assist the campesinos in the sale of their products. Government agronomy experts were provided to assist in finding newer and better uses for the land. Housing construction was begun, and the peasant families could pay back the loans with long term payments of \$2-\$3 per month.⁴⁰

Projects were also under way for the development of two of the country's major rivers, the Rio Yaque del Norte and the Rio Yaque del Sur. The projected plans included power and irrigation. At the time it was thought that development of the Yaque del Norte would be best since the progressive city of Santiago would provide the personnel and the "push" to make it a successful project. The development of the Yaque del Norte became a political issue, however; politicians in the South opposed a plan that excluded their home area.⁴¹ The project was stalled, and the campesinos failed to receive any of the intended benefits.

After the ambitious start in August, the agrarian reform thus began to slow down. The Agrarian Institute had been under a great public pressure to immediately initiate an agrarian reform throughout the nation, and the result of the "crash" program was some unsound practices.⁴² The Institute

⁴⁰El Caribe (August 1, 1962), p. 1.

⁴¹Julio C. Estrella, "La Corporación del Valle Yaque del Norte," El Caribe (August 12, 1962), p. 7; (August 13, 1962), p. 7; and (August 14, 1962), p. 5.

⁴²Rogers, Agrarian Reform . . ., op. cit., pp. 150-151.

and the governing Council thereafter proceeded with less haste. In addition, as the December 20 elections approached, the Council found itself increasingly concerned with complex electoral issues and had little time to indulge in the luxuries of agrarian reform. Finally, the Council felt that such a major item as agrarian reform should best be put off until a constitutional and legitimate government could take office. It thereafter deferred the matter to the incoming government. And in the interim period between the elections and the inauguration of Bosch on February 27, 1963, nothing in the way of agrarian reform was accomplished.⁴³

Though the Council's plans had called for the resettlement of no less than 2,500 campesino families on new lands before its mandate expired, the government came nowhere near this goal. By the end of its term, eight projects had been initiated, the preliminary work on eight others had been completed and a total of only 822 new landowners had been settled.⁴⁴

In addition to falling far short of its stated goals concerning the number of families it hoped to settle, the Council's agrarian reform, though a positive program for the most part, failed to evoke much response. None of the excitement and fervor that one would have expected to accompany the first steps toward such a dynamic social revolution as agrarian reform was felt either by the government officials who administered the program or by the peasants who received the land.⁴⁵ Perhaps the reason was that the business-oriented Council of State had little genuine interest in

⁴³Ibid., p. 139.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 151.

⁴⁵Tad Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum," New York Times Magazine (September 12, 1962), p. 40.

giving more than a token assistance to the peasants. Whether this reasoning is correct or not, it was clear that agrarian reform under the Council was not a vital plank in its program and that its distribution of land was not nearly so extensive as the vast majority of campesinos had hoped.

The incoming Bosch administration attempted to change all this. His Dominican Revolutionary Party was a peasant-oriented Party that had been carried to power largely on the basis of its campesino support, and Bosch himself was dedicated to raising the standard of living of the rural masses. The new President announced that agrarian reform was to be the major undertaking of the government, the cornerstone on which his administration would rise or fall.

Only a week after taking office, Bosch appointed Gustavo Machado Báez as the new head of the Agrarian Institute, replacing Vinas Cáceres. Machado Báez first proceeded to completely reorganize the structure of the Institute, which caused a good deal of disruption in its regular procedures. Then Bosch appointed Carlos M. Campos, a Costa Rican agricultural authority, as his personal representative in the Institute and granted him even more authority than the Director General. One result of Bosch's move was that the Director General had his prestige and power undermined. Another result was a division of authority within the Institute and the creation of two competing bureaucracies within a single agency. These factors contributed to the confusion and lack of progress that characterized the agrarian reform under Bosch.⁴⁶

Another of the organizational changes instituted by Bosch was the creation of a Presidential Coordinating Committee to oversee all the agrarian

⁴⁶Rogers, Agrarian Reform . . ., op. cit., p. 140.

reform programs. The purpose of the Committee was laudable--the coordination of the many diverse government ministries and agencies who had a finger in the agrarian reform pie--but the result was disastrous. The responsibility for planning and carrying out the agrarian reform was taken from the Agrarian Institute and placed in the hands of the fifteen-member Committee. Each Committee member had a different idea on how the agrarian reform should operate and the Committee more often worked at cross purposes than as a team. The system was unwieldy and inaction-by-committee was the result.⁴⁷

Another disruptive force in the agrarian reform was the attempt of the National Federation of Campesino Brotherhoods (FENHERCA) to gain control of the program. FENHERCA was the peasant arm of Bosch's PRD and concerned more with securing political gain than with the technical aspects of agrarian reform. Its plan was to gain campesino support for the Party by the immediate redistribution of all the lands under the control of the government. Such a program of indiscriminate land sub-division would, according to two agrarian reform technicians, undoubtedly have degenerated into chaos in the countryside.⁴⁸

There were other administrative problems which tended to contribute to the failure of the Bosch agrarian reform program. The chief of these was the web of overlapping and conflicting authorities working in this area--the Agrarian Institute, the President, the President's personal adviser in the Institute, FENHERCA, the PRD, and the Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES). As head of CIDES and as Bosch's confidant,

⁴⁷ibid., p. 144.

⁴⁸M. Jay Wiltbanks, Jr. and Gifford E. Rogers, personal interviews, Santo Domingo, September 21, 1964.

Sacha Volman, exercised great influence in the agrarian reform program. Carlos M. Campos, the President's personal representative in the Institute, also worked for CIDES. Angel Miolán, President of the PRD, felt that he should have a say in the affairs of the campesinos he had initially helped organize. FENHERCA also received help from CIDES. Bosch attempted to juggle all these competing individuals and organizations but failed in the attempt. The overall result was chaotic.

Bosch's initial plans for an extensive agrarian reform had been received with great gusto. Whether out of a sense of noblesse oblige or for fear that they might otherwise be confiscated, several of the major landholding companies in the country donated extensive tracts to the agrarian reform program. The Curaçao Trading Co. gave 7,000 tareas; 8,000 came from José Armentós and Co.; and a whopping 53,000 tareas were received from the U.S.-owned South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Not to be outdone by its counterpart the U.S.-owned Grenada Co. later chipped in with 54,000 more tareas.⁴⁹

On April 25 the President announced that he was making agrarian reform the central program of his administration. His idea was to make the Dominican campesino free from the possibility of any form of economic, political, moral, or intellectual exploitation. All the appropriate ministries and agencies and all their personnel would be mobilized for the vast undertaking. "Agrarian reform is the Dominican Revolution," he said.⁵⁰ But the crisis with Haiti occurred at this time and the needs of a possible war effort took precedence over agrarian reform. The program was therefore laid aside for a time.

⁴⁹El Caribe (March 27, 1963), p. 1 and (May 23, 1963), p. 7.

⁵⁰El Caribe (April 26, 1963), p. 1. See also Juan Onofre Holguín G., "En Torno a la Reforma Agraria," La Nación (April 26, 1963), p. 4.

The initial attempt at agrarian reform in the Bosch administration came in mid-May. The organizational and formal administrative set up of the program was impressive: the National Housing Institute would supervise the building of low-cost homes; the Ministry of Agriculture would build irrigation canals, the Ministry of Public Works would build farm-to-market roads; the Ministry of Education would provide for adult education; the Agricultural Bank would make credit available; the Agrarian Extension Service would give technical agricultural advice and instruction in establishing coops; the Planning Commission would supervise the construction of aqueducts, the Office of Natural Resources would attempt reforestation; and the Peace Corps would be utilized in many ways. Despite the impressive structure, only forty families were settled.⁵¹

By July nothing more had been done. The government had resettled just these few campesino families, but one critic said that his was not a genuine agrarian reform. Agrarian reform, he argued, implied much more than merely dividing up and distributing the land and Bosch had failed to carry out these further measures. No cooperatives had been established and no irrigation projects had been undertaken, for example. Bosch was more interested in industrialization than in agrarian reform, he said, but to ignore the one for the other would result in what Marx called the "anarchy of production."⁵²

From the time Bosch was inaugurated until August, a period of six months, only those forty families in the initial Matanzas project had been

⁵¹ Mario Bobea Billini, "El Presidente Inicia su Plan de Reforma Agraria," El Caribe (May 17, 1963), p. 6.

⁵² José Gell S., "Vamos a la Reforma Agraria?" El Caribe (July 10, 1963), p. 7.

settled. The Agrarian Institute had not distributed any land or settled a single campesino. The Institute had been put to work gathering social and economic data on applicant families, running orientation sessions for its employees, and disseminating publicity and propaganda at the farm level. Reorganizational efforts had also taken up much of the Institute's time. But it must again be emphasized that to the land-hungry peasants there was no agrarian reform. By failing to move quickly and dramatically in this field, Bosch had alienated much of his initial campesino support.⁵³

Though the major cause of the frustration of the agrarian reform was the administrative ineptitude of the Bosch government, there were other factors. The President's \$150 million program had called for the settlement of 5,500 families on 90,000 acres of former Trujillo land by the end of 1963; of 25,000 on 1 million acres by 1967; and of 70,000 families on the total 2 million acres by 1970. But the plan was stalled when many landowners, who had been dispossessed by Trujillo, flocked to the courts seeking title to their former land. The Dominican judicial process is notoriously slow and much time was lost in the complicated litigation.⁵⁴

The frustration of the campesinos, who had been promised so much and who had thus far received so little, was immense. Taking the agrarian reform law into their own hands--and reportedly acting with the approval of the PRD's peasant apparatus, FENHERCA--thousands of campesinos moved

⁵³Rogers, Agrarian Reform . . ., op. cit., p. 151; Gall, "Anatomy . . .", op. cit., p. 254; and "El Gobierno Promete Pero no Cumple," and "Obras, Obras, No Palabras," El LJ4, 11 (May 10, 1963), 3.

⁵⁴Hispanic American Report, XVI (September, 1963), 682. On the difficult legal snarls which these claims raised see Edward DeGraaf, "The Strange Legacy of El Benefactor," The Reporter, XXV (July 6, 1961), 30-31.

onto private lands in the northwest Cibao. They claimed that these lands rightfully belonged to the government, that they were meant for the peasants, and that they therefore had a legitimate right to them. The movement provoked an uproar from the landowners and only increased their opposition to the agrarian reform.⁵⁵

During the months of August and September, only a short time before Bosch's overthrow, a concerted agrarian reform program finally got under way. In these two months 1,400 families were given the right to settle on state-owned lands. The figure is not so impressive as it at first seems. Eight hundred of these families had squatted on former Trujillo land in the Nagua area soon after the dictatorship was overthrown and placed it under cultivation. Since the land was already producing crops and since the units were approximately the size used by the Agrarian Institute in its settlement projects, the government decided to allow these peasants to stay where they had squatted. Other benefits of the government's program were given to them and they were included within the overall agrarian reform structure.⁵⁶ But it would not be accurate to include these squatters in the figures for total numbers of families resettled by the government.

Subtraction of the 800 squatters from the 1,400 total leaves only 600 families actually settled by the Bosch government before it was overthrown on September 25, 1963. The figure of 600 falls extremely short on the 5,500 which the administration had promised to settle by the end of 1963. Even more impressive is the fact that the Bosch program had resulted

⁵⁵ Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional de la República Dominicana: Estudios y Pruebas Documentales del Movimiento Reivindicador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), pp. 298-299.

⁵⁶ Rogers, Progreso . . ., op. cit., pp. 12-13.

in the settlement of 25 per cent less families than had the agraria reform of the Council of State; 800 campesino families were resettled on state-owned lands by the Council while only 600 were resettled by the Bosch government.⁵⁷ At least in the number of peasants involved, a business-oriented government had carried out a far more successful agrarian reform than a peasant-oriented government.

After Bosch was overthrown another period of reorganization and re-appraisal began. The Agrarian Institute's chief technical adviser, Rogers, feels that perhaps the overthrow was a blessing for Dominican agrarian reform. He has criticized the policies of the Bosch government on the grounds that (1) it had initiated projects before the Institute had clear title to the land involved and that hence no settled family could be certain of not being evicted at some future date, and (2) it had initiated projects indiscriminantly and erratically without first establishing the feasibility of the project, a practice which was causing a loss of money, time, and prestige for the agrarian reform program. Rogers claimed that the new government realized in a way that the Bosch administration did not that agrarian reform could only be conducted on a sound and well-planned basis, with well-defined objectives, and in an integral manner.⁵⁸

The Dominican agrarian reform was reorganized for the third time. Vinas Cáceres was again appointed as Director General early in October, 1963; and he proceeded to revamp the entire structure. Especially interesting was the attempt to incorporate other government agencies into the agrarian

⁵⁷ Rogers, Agrarian Reform . . ., op. cit., pp. 151-152.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 152.

reform program in a manner that would avoid the overlapping and competing jurisdictions of the previous administration. These other agencies and ministries were to serve only in an advisory capacity when called upon by the Planning Committee and to execute their respective portions of any project under a master plan which was to be the direct responsibility of the Agrarian Institute.⁵⁹

Immediately following Bosch's ouster the agrarian reform ground to a halt. The civilian Triumvirate to which the military had turned over political power required some time to consolidate its position. By the end of 1963, only 200 more families had been settled on the government's land.⁶⁰ When Donald J. Reid Cabral took over leadership of the Triumvirate, there was some pickup in the agrarian reform; but the post-Bosch government of the "first families" was not primarily interested in a program that would strengthen the campesino sector.

The agrarian reform program in the Dominican Republic had only begun to scratch the surface of a vast, underlying problem. It has been estimated that the former Trujillo properties inherited by the government could adequately accommodate between 45,000 and 50,000 campesino families.⁶¹ As of the end of 1963, however, only 1,700 families had been resettled on these lands.

Even the few projects that have been initiated have not been an overwhelming success. Several reasons may be suggested to account for the

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 146.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁶¹ Rogers, *Tenencia . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

extremely limited accomplishments in the Dominican agrarian reform program:

- (1) During the short time that a genuine agrarian reform program has been in operation (since mid-1962), it was under the direction of three different Dominican governments. Each of these governments had its own idea as to what constituted an effective agrarian reform with the result that each change in government brought a complete change in organization and orientation. The political instability meant that much time and effort was lost during the transitions from one government to another and cut down the amount of time the Agrarian Institute could devote to the most pressing problems. After twenty months of existence, it was estimated that only twelve of these were useful for actual agrarian reform work.
- (2) Agrarian reform was often used as a political football, and the political considerations frequently took precedence over the technical aspects. While it is probably impossible to completely eliminate politics, a happier balance between the political and technical aspects might have been achieved.
- (3) The various agencies, ministries, organizations, and individuals involved in the agrarian reform frequently worked at cross purposes. The lack of coordination among all those involved contributed to needlessly conflicting jurisdictions and wasteful competition.
- (4) Many of the agrarian reform projects were ill-planned and their objectives vaguely defined. Failure to obtain clear titles to

the lands involved was one of the government's primary mistakes. The Agrarian Institute wasted much time and money on preliminary studies, land surveys, and land preparation on projects which had to be postponed or abandoned because a hastily-conceived plan had not bothered to clarify the land titles.⁶²

Gifford Rogers has concluded his study of the Dominican agrarian reform on an optimistic note. He writes that the groundwork has been laid, the lessons of past mistakes absorbed, and the future policies clearly defined and established. Barring unforeseen political upheavals, he says finally, there is no reason why the agrarian reform program in the Dominican Republic could not become the showcase for all of Latin America.⁶³

Former President Juan Bosch is not so optimistic. Speaking of the entire attempt to mobilize and organize the campesinos, Bosch related the following story. Forty days before Bosch was ousted by the military, U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin had told him, "Mr. President, your popularity is intact." Martin's remarks came while the two were traveling to dedicate an agricultural school. They were prompted by the obvious warmth with which Bosch was greeted by the campesinos who lined their route.

As the former President tells it, he explained to Ambassador Martin that although he was conscious of the fact that his popularity remained high, especially among the rural peasantry, he was also conscious that this did not mean that his government was not in danger of being overthrown at any moment. He said to the Ambassador:

⁶²See Rogers, Agrarian Reform . . ., op. cit., pp. 153-154.

⁶³Ibid., p. 154.

These peasants who have greeted me with so much sympathy represent votes at election time. But in Latin America, the will of the majority does not represent true political support because the majority is really powerless. Power is concentrated in the hands of minorities who possess arms, money, and the means of communication, and those minorities do not respect the will of the majority. True, the majority has influence and power every four years. But in the intervals between elections--even in those Latin American countries which hold regular elections--political power is held by oligarchic groups and the military forces which they manipulate to protect their own special interests.⁶⁴

Bosch's story is essentially accurate, but the situation was gradually and tentatively changing. The Dominican campesino in 1963 was not the same forgotten man of politics that he had traditionally been through 1961. Since the overthrow of the Trujillo regime, the beginnings of a veritable revolution had taken place in the countryside. The campesinos had been wooed, organized, and given an agrarian reform. It is of course true, as this chapter has stressed, that only a beginning had been made toward organizing the peasantry and that the agrarian reform had been extremely limited. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an organizational structure had emerged and the beginnings of an agrarian reform had been made. While most peasants were still not members of any organization--indeed, many had not heard of any of them--a survey of sixty-eight campesinos from all areas of the country revealed that a sizable percentage had been mobilized (see Table 14).

⁶⁴ Juan Bosch, "Why I Was Overthrown," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 3.

Table 14

Organization of the Countryside

<u>Program of Organization</u>	<u>Members or Participants</u>	<u>Knowledge of Program or Organization</u>	<u>No Knowledge of Program or Organization</u>
Political parties	31	21	10
FENHERCA	12	8	42
CASC	6	6	50
Agrarian reform	12	32	18
Cooperative	4	9	49

While his voice was thus still weak, as Bosch says, the Dominican campesino was gaining in importance. The country could not go back to the old system under which the peasantry had been easily ignored. Too much revolutionary upheaval had occurred in the campo in the three years following the Trujillo's ouster for a simple return to the traditional ways to be possible. When Bosch was ousted, there was little protest from the campesinos. One reason for their apathy was the disappointment they felt for his failure to fulfill his many campaign promises. Another and more important reason was the weakness of the peasant organizations and their low percentage of members, which left the campesinos without a means to make their voices heard. The peasantry, nevertheless, remained sympathetic to the Bosch government (see Table 15).

Table 15

Peasant Reaction to the Bosch Government

<u>Number Interviewed</u>	<u>Favorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Indifferent</u>	<u>Unfavorable to Bosch</u>	<u>Refused to Answer</u>
68	31	25	12	6

The overthrow of Bosch was, despite his deficiencies as an administrator of an effective agrarian reform, a setback to the effort to integrate the campesinos into the political society. Most of the peasant organizations linked to the PRD disintegrated when the government fell. The agrarian reform program was returned to the non-political technicians. There was little prospect that the campesino would soon emerge with a powerful enough organization to compete on an even basis with the other groups in the society. As with the case of labor, the peasantry no longer had a friend in the National Palace.

CHAPTER XI

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Another of the principal pillars upon which Trujillo's control of the Dominican Republic had rested was his near-monopoly of the country's communications system. The two principal newspapers in the capital city, El Caribe and La Nación, and the nation's third daily in Santiago, La Información, were completely subservient to the regime. The radio and television stations were also either owned or controlled by the Trujillos.

In the post-Trujillo years the Dominican Republic made a concerted effort to overcome this legacy. For the first time in a generation freedom of speech and press existed. Newspaper circulation increased rapidly and the content was improved. The number of radio stations and receiving sets mushroomed. All these accomplishments in the communications field were not achieved without considerable struggle, and it is these struggles with which this chapter is concerned.

Communications is seen as an essential ingredient in the process of political modernization. The development of mass media is one of the principal means by which consensus is achieved in a developing society.¹ Trujillo's rule had been characterized by the atomization of all groups and individuals. In the period after his assassination an attempt was made to bring these atomized groups and individuals together and to give them a new unifying principle. In this effort communications played a primary role.

¹Lucian W. Pye (ed), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). See especially the introduction by Pye.

The Press

It required some time following the assassination of Trujillo for the Dominican press to achieve even the semblance of freedom. While the government remained in the hands of Balaguer and Ramfis, much of the communications system continued under the ownership of the Trujillo family. The media that were not owned directly by the family remained subservient to the regime.

Immediate following Trujillo's death the newspapers were filled with homage and praise of the dictator. Both major papers devoted their entire editions to the "glories of his rule." Praise soon became adulation. "Trujillo Has Not Died" screamed a headline in El Caribe, while La Nación carried a long article entitled "From Death to Immortality." The subservient Dominican Press Society condemned the "tragedy" and pledged its vigorous support to Ramfis. Other articles attempted to "correct" the derogatory comments made about Trujillo by foreign correspondents. The famed "Foro Público" column continued in El Caribe, and La Nación began a column of the immortal "Thoughts of Trujillo."²

Some relaxation of the controls was eventually permitted. Ramfis had agreed to "democratize" his regime and an opposition was permitted to organize. Some of these opposition organizations began to publish small newspapers of their own. The National Civic Union put out Unión Cívica, the 14th of June Movement issued El 14, and the Dominican Revolutionary Party El Democrático. Other opposition sheets--El Rápido, Aula, and Libertad

²The continued subservience of the press may be seen in any issue of El Caribe or La Nación during this period.

in Santo Domingo and La Verdad and El Radical in Santiago--were launched. These periodicals were often severely critical of the government.

Opposition comments remained under severe restraint, however. The major newspapers, El Caribe and La Nación, refused to accept paid advertisements from the opposition groups and did not report their activities. They instead devoted all their attention to the official Dominican Party. At times local officials prohibited the opposition papers from circulating in their areas. When they contained articles in any way critical of the regime, the newspapers El Mundo of Puerto Rico and Diario de las Américas and El Mundo Dominicano, both printed in the U.S., along with such magazines as Visión, Time, Life en Español, and Bohemia Libre were not allowed to enter the country.

President Ricardo Castro Beeche of the Inter-American Press Association accurately described the conditions of the press in the Dominican Republic in his report to the general assembly of the Association in mid-October, 1961. Castro Beeche said that the press was "still under pro-government control and pro-government elements exercise economic control over all means of communication." But there was more freedom of expression than formerly, he reported, and semi-weekly publications had been issued recently by the political opposition to the government.³

These conditions prevailed throughout the period that the Trujillo family dictatorship continued. There was a gradual easing of the restrictions. Eventually the official press began to cover some of the activities of the opposition groups. But such coverage remained limited and the Dominican Party continued to receive most of the headlines. The press remained largely

³New York Times (October 17, 1961), p. 5. See also Alberto Malagón, "Hacia una Libertad de Prensa," Unión Cívica, I (October 14, 1961), 7.

under official control until the Trujillos were ousted in November and the dictatorship came to an end.⁴ At that time the flowering of the Dominican press began.

The case of El Caribe

El Caribe, the principal newspaper of Santo Domingo, was founded in 1948 to serve as the official spokesman for the Trujillo government. In 1954 it was bought by Germán E. Ornes Coiscou who served as owner-editor for little more than a year. In 1955, while on a tour of the U.S., Ornes wrote a letter to Trujillo stating that he did not intend to return to the Dominican Republic and offering to sell the newspaper. Instead of buying it, however, Trujillo had the finance company foreclose on the mortgage and the paper was confiscated by the government without compensation. Ornes remained in exile during the rest of the Trujillo years, during which time he wrote a critical study of the regime entitled Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean.⁵ El Caribe continued to be the official voice of the dictatorship.

Following Trujillo's death Ornes returned to the Dominican Republic. Successive decisions of the Inter-American Press Association had long recognized his claim to ownership of the newspaper as legitimate; and on November 25, after the last of the Trujillos had left the country, he walked into the offices of El Caribe and claimed it as his private property. The director at the time, Jaime Lockward, refused to surrender the paper.

⁴"La Prensa Oficialista," El LJ4, 1 (November 11, 1961), 10.

⁵Germán Ornes, Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1958). See pp. 196-200 for the story of the Trujillo takeover.

A dispute took place and the Police intervened. The Police advised the disputants to settle the matter in court. Instead, Ornes solicited a meeting with President Balaguer who appointed a special commission to study the case. While it was being studied, a group of El Caribe employees signed a petition asking that it be returned to Ornes, the "legitimate proprietor."⁶

Balaguer awarded the newspaper to Ornes on December 30, only two days before the President began sharing power with a Council of State and two weeks before he was ousted. The announcement from the National Palace that accompanied the return said that this would be the "first time in many decades that there would be a newspaper independent of official ties and of partisanship."⁷ The only dissenting voice at the time was that of the Leftist intellectual Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón who argued that the case had not been sufficiently studied and that the decision should be reconsidered.⁸

Upon receipt of the paper, Ornes stated that the Dominican press could now begin a total reorientation on the basis of "absolute liberty, objectivity, and impartiality." The new owner-editor added that El Caribe would take the lead in putting out information and news of a national nature and that he would not have any ties with political or official organizations.⁹ For the most part, the editor and the newspaper maintained this position.

⁶The text of the employees' petition is in El Caribe (November 26, 1961), p. 9. See also Julián Díaz Valdeperes, "La Cuestión de 'El Caribe,'" El Caribe (December 29, 1961), p. 5.

⁷The text is in El Caribe (December 31, 1961), p. 1.

⁸The text is in El Caribe (January 15, 1962), p. 7.

⁹See El Caribe (December 31, 1961), p. 1.

During all of 1962 El Caribe was in the forefront in urging that elections take place and that the country return to a democratic and constitutional government. Primarily because of its stand in criticizing Church attacks on Juan Bosch, it was widely accused of being partial to the PRD's presidential candidate. In fact, however, it maintained a strict neutrality during the campaign and was non-partisan in both its support and its criticism. One writer credited Ornes and his newspaper with being among the principal reasons why the transition from the Council of State to an elected government had gone so smoothly.¹⁰

Ornes saw his and the paper's role as being much broader than the straight reporting of news. He felt that after thirty-one years of the Trujillo dictatorship, during which time an entire generation had grown up knowing almost nothing about the outside world, his duty was to educate as well as to inform. He thus used the paper as an instrument of general education, devoting one or two pages in every issue to articles on literature, health, economics, and politics.¹¹

The evolution of El Caribe as a free and independent newspaper was not always smooth. During the Rodríguez Echavarría coup of mid-January, 1962, the newspaper was placed under censorship and on January 18 it appeared with large blank spaces in many of its leading articles; but this only lasted for a single issue. From October 8 till November 2, 1962, it was hit with a crippling strike; but after twenty-six days the fledgling

¹⁰W. K. Mayo, "Juicio Sobre El Caribe," El Caribe (January 2, 1963), p. 1.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1; and Mario Bobea Billini, "Preponderan Obra de Prensa por Crear una Conciencia Popular," El Caribe (June 3, 1962), p. 4 and "Periodismo Independiente y Reeducción Cívica," El Caribe (January 13, 1963), p. 7. Based also on Germán Ornes, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 13, 1962.

newspaper reappeared without having suffered greatly. For the rest of the time, El Caribe was free to publish what it wished and its issues appeared every day.

Only on one major issue did Ornes and his newspaper depart from their usually responsible stand. President Bosch, at one time piqued by an El Caribe editorial criticizing his government, offhandedly mentioned that perhaps the newspaper had been too hastily awarded to Ornes and that perhaps the case should be reopened. Ornes, fearing that his paper might again be confiscated as it had been under Trujillo, reacted by joining the growing chorus of those who charged that communism was infiltrating the Bosch government. He enlisted the support of the Inter-American Press Association (which Ornes had carefully cultivated for just such an occurrence), and Bosch was forced to categorically deny that he was contemplating confiscation of the newspaper.

The ill will between the two men continued however. At one time a crowd, inflamed by a Bosch speech, gathered in front of the National Palace and shouted "Abajo El Caribe" ("Down with El Caribe"). The President then called Ornes personally to assure him again that he would not interfere in the newspaper's affairs; but the owner-editor was not convinced and reiterated the infiltration charge with a front page editorial under the banner headline, "The Communist Danger." El Caribe continued to bitterly attack Bosch during the last two months of his administration and made it clear that it would not disapprove if his government were overthrown. For what they considered unfair practices and irresponsible journalism on the part of Ornes, many of El Caribe's best reporters quit their jobs after Bosch was ousted.¹²

¹²See Horacio Ornes, "Sobre la Propiedad de El Caribe," El 134, 11

Once this personal pique had been settled by the coup against Bosch, Ornes and El Caribe returned to being the crusading, educating, criticizing, and responsible editor and newspaper they had traditionally been. The criticisms were now a bit more guarded, as though Ornes were attempting to insure that the confiscation talk not be raised again, but they were often pointed and caustic nevertheless.

During all this period the newspaper continued to grow--both in terms of coverage and of circulation. Its information services came to include the Association Press, United Press International, Editors Press Services, King Features Syndicate, Newspapers Enterprise Association, Foreign News Service, American Literary Agency, Agencia Periodística Latinoamericana, and the New York Times News Service. More and better reporters were hired to cover the expanding news fronts. From an average December, 1961, circulation of 35,000 copies per day, it expanded to an average circulation of 47,000 per day by September, 1963. It had topped 50,000 only twice during 1962--53,500 on January 19 when the news of Rodríguez Echavarría's overthrow was published and 70,283 on December 21, when the election returns began to show Bosch the winner. By September, 1963, however, it had begun selling 50,000 papers fairly regularly and without the need for a major news story the previous day to push it over that mark. No other newspaper in Dominican history had ever sold 50,000 issues in a single day.¹³

(Footnote 12 continued from preceding page)

(April 26, 1963), 5; El Caribe (July 27, 1963), p. 1 and (July 31, 1963), p. 1; and Hispanic American Report, XVI (June, 1963), 358. Based also on a personal interview with El Caribe's chief editor, Radhamés V. Gómez P., Santo Domingo, December 8, 1964.

¹³El Caribe (September 10, 1963), p. 1.

The case of La Nación

La Nación was founded by Trujillo in 1939 to serve as a mouthpiece for the government. It was later sold to Mario Fermín Cabral and ultimately became the property of the official Dominican Party. Regardless of who owned it, the newspaper always was recognized as the voice of the Palace.¹⁴

Following the November ousting of the Trujillos, the destiny of La Nación remained obscure. There was no one who had an obvious claim to ownership, as was true in the case of El Caribe. The newspaper hence floundered for several weeks while it was run as a cooperative by the employees, though it continued to publish regularly.

On January 2, 1962, Julio César Martínez, a veteran Dominican newspaperman who had been closely associated with the democratic Left PRD while in exile during the Trujillo years, assumed the editorship of La Nación. Martínez claimed to have bought the paper from the legitimate heirs of Mario Fermín Cabral. His ownership claims were obscure, however, since it was never clear whether the newspaper was the property of the Fermín Cabral heirs to sell;¹⁵ and the paper continued as a trust of the state until the dispute could be settled.

The issue was not fully resolved for well over a month. When they learned who had bought it, La Nación's employees refused to turn possession over to Martínez. They claimed that he was a relative of General Rodríguez Echavarría, and that he had voiced support for the armed forces Secretary's

¹⁴ Jesús de Galíndez, La era de Trujillo (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacífico, 1956), pp. 317-318.

¹⁵ Martínez's claims may be found in Julio César Martínez and Rafael Ruiz Mejía, El Caso de "La Nación" Ante la Opinión Pública (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1962).

coup of mid-January. For his part, Martínez continued to assert that the newspaper was his private property and accused the employees of staging a "communist coup." He cited President Balaguer's dictum of January 4 that properties formerly owned by the Trujillos should be returned to their "legitimate owners" and claimed that he was the legitimate owner of La Nación. Martínez also enlisted the support of the Inter-American Press Association which asked the Dominican government to guarantee the would-be owner's property rights.¹⁶

The controversy was settled when the Dominican government, which held the paper as a trust while the question was pending, assumed outright ownership. This takeover was justified on the grounds that all properties held by the Trujillos had, upon their overthrow, been inherited by the state. La Nación, the government felt, was part of this inheritance. Martínez strongly objected to what he considered the confiscation of his private property, but the decision was final. The governing Council of State named Rafael Bonilla Aybar as the new director.¹⁷

Despite its continued control of La Nación, the Council denied that it interfered with the Council denied that it interfered with the newspaper's editorial policy. The denial was prompted by a charge of presidential candidate Juan Bosch that the paper was not free to follow an independent line.¹⁸

¹⁶Leoncio Pieter, "El Caso de La Nación Pone a Prueba Nuestra Libertad de Prensa," El Caribe (March 4, 1962), p. 4.

¹⁷El Caribe (February 27, 1962), p. 18.

¹⁸El Caribe (August 2, 1962), p. 16.

Though the Council of State's denial of interference in La Nación's editorial line was essentially correct at the time, the newspaper was never the dynamic force that El Caribe was during the transition period prior to the December 20 election. By its own editorial admission, it didn't attack anyone, didn't intrigue against anyone, and didn't respond to the attacks of its enemies.¹⁹ Like El Caribe, La Nación attempted to educate as well as inform its inexperienced readers; but its educational articles were neither quantitatively nor qualitatively near the level of the other major newspaper. Its coverage of straight news was also not equal to that of El Caribe.

The Bosch charge of Council interference in La Nación's editorial policy ultimately began to carry more truth. The Council was primarily made up of National Civic Union sympathizers and, as it became clear that the UCN was losing ground, the newspaper began more and more to side with that Party. It never gave its outright support to UCN candidate Viriato Fiallo, but it did side with the UCN on a wide range of electoral questions as the campaign drew to a close.

La Nación continued to be plagued by disputes involving its directorship. The reactionary Bonilla Aybar was removed as director for malversion. Martínez continued to press his case for ownership. In January, 1963, editor Luis Caminero was dismissed following publication of an open letter to president-elect Bosch which was held to violate the government's new libel law. Three different people held the post of director in a period of little more than a month. Finally, on February 12, two weeks before Bosch was scheduled to take office, the government announced that it had

¹⁹La Nación (January 23, 1963), p. 4.

"intervened" and that La Nación would henceforth be directed and managed by the General Press Office of the National Palace.²⁰

The newspaper continued to struggle along under the control of the government for several months. On July 27, 1963, La Nación was closed by order of the Ministry of the Presidency. The move came as a surprise to the current director Pedro Alvaro Bobadilla; and no reason for the closing was given in the official statement announcing the cessation of publication.²¹ President Bosch later said that the government could no longer afford to absorb the losses which continued publication would entail, though other political reasons for its closing have been suggested.²²

La Nación had not had a long and glorious history as an independent newspaper. It did make a contribution to the development of communications in the post-Trujillo period, but the contribution was small and the paper was not sorely missed. Only El Caribe lamented the loss of its evening sister, calling it an "unfortunate newspaper."²³

²⁰The text of the government's intervention message is in La Nación (February 12, 1963), p. 7. See also Juan José Ayuso "Crisis de un Diario: La Nación," La Nación (January 15, 1963), p. 5.

²¹The text is in El Caribe (July 28, 1963), p. 9.

²²One story is that La Nación was closed because it published the advertisement of a communist organization against the government's wishes. Another story is that a foreign embassy was attempting to use the paper to tell the Dominican Police what to do. Bosch's explanation, however, seems the most plausible and was echoed by La Nación's former chief editor, Virgilio Alcántara, personal interview, Santo Domingo, October 15, 1964.

²³El Caribe (July 29, 1963), p. 6.

The case of Listín Diario

Only four days following the closing of La Nación, the Santo Domingo daily Listín Diario resumed publication after a silence of twenty-one years. The paper had been founded in 1889 by Arturo J. Pellerano Alfau who served as director for thirty-two years. In 1921 it was taken over by his son, Arturo J. Pellerano Sarda, who ran the paper until 1942 when it was forced to close because Trujillo had diverted all advertising to his official organ, La Nación.

When Listín Diario reappeared on August 1, 1963, it was still a Pellerano family enterprise. Its president was Carlos Alberto Ricart, who had married a daughter of the family. Its vice president was Eduardo Pellerano, treasurer was Rogelio Arturo Pellerano, chief of production Moisés A. Pellerano, and chief of publicity Carlos V. Pellerano.

The directorship of the paper was given to the articulate and distinguished Rafael Herrera. Under Herrera's direction, Listín Diario flourished. The major reason for its initial success was its vigorous editorial policy in favor of constitutional government and democracy. Unlike its morning counterpart, El Caribe, Listín Diario came out strongly in favor of Bosch and against the coup. Its editorials, written by Herrera, were terse, clear, and explosive.²⁴

Listín Diario was widely credited with saving whatever was left of Dominican democracy after Bosch was overthrown. It maintained a steady editorial attack on the abuse, corruption, arbitrariness, and brutality

²⁴"Periódico Dominicano: La Pugna de Listín Diario," Visión [New York] (July 24, 1964) and reprinted in Listín Diario (August 5, 1964). Based also on personal interviews with President Carlos Albert Ricart, Santo Domingo, January 3, 1965; and Rafael Herrera, Santo Domingo, December 1, 1964.

in the armed forces and sought to create a climate of public opinion opposed to the reestablishment of a dictatorship. Its criticisms forced one triumvirate to exclaim, "This newspaper makes me sweat." Herrera himself expressed the newspaper's philosophy:

This newspaper is truly a bulwark of freedom. We do not submit to the interests of anyone. We only think of the national interests; we have no fear of demonstrating that popular opinion is mistaken even though this may make up unpopular.²⁵

For its criticism of the post-Bosch government Listín Diario suffered economically. The Dominican government is the largest purchaser of newspaper advertising space, and it boycotted Listín Diario from the first. Government advertisements went mostly to El Caribe which had been more amenable to the coup and more favorable to the ruling Riumvirate.²⁶

Even without government advertising, the newspaper grew. Initially it had printed only 10,000 copies, but its circulation almost immediately increased to approximately 35,000. At one time Listín Diario was in such demand that it was being sold in the streets for 25 cents when the actual price was only five cents. It attracted some of the best reporters from the defunct La Nación and the discredited El Caribe. Its financial problems were ameliorated when it eventually began to receive its share of the government's advertising. Because of its responsible stand against the coup, many hailed it as the country's best newspaper.²⁷

Listín Diario, in terms of coverage of the news, however, was not the country's best paper. Its information services--United Press Inter-

²⁵Quoted in "Periódico . . . ," op. cit., p. 1.

²⁶The government denied that it was boycotting Listín Diario. See El Caribe (October 19, 1963).

²⁷"Periódico . . . ," op. cit., p. 1.

national, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, Editors Press Service, and King Features Syndicate--did not provide it with the international coverage nor the feature articles that El Caribe's did. Its editorial pages, aside from the continued high-level editorials of Herrera, were weak and frequently devoted exclusively to the uninformative polemics of Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón and Laútico García.

The case of La Información

La Información, founded in 1915 by Luis A. Franco, is published in the Dominican Republic's second largest city, Santiago de los Caballeros, and claims to be the voice of the entire northern Cibao region. La Información was the only Dominican daily to publish continuously throughout the entire Trujillo period. It was never taken over by the regime and remained under private ownership, but it generally followed the official line or, on a few issues, stayed non-political.²⁸

La Información was the first Dominican newspaper to carry the fight against the continued Trujillo family dictatorship after the Generalissimo was slain. It was able to do this primarily because it was the only daily paper in the country not directly controlled by the government. Though guarded, its editorials frequently came out in support of the emerging opposition.

Though La Información's circulation increased from 1,500 daily during the Trujillo era to 10,000 three years afterwards, the newspaper demonstrated little desire to expand or to help usher in the new Dominican democracy, as both El Caribe and Listín Diario had done. It remained

²⁸Galíndez, op. cit., pp. 317-318.

a Franco family operation and continued to be run in a personalistic fashion. The paper had long been sold only by subscription, though an effort was being made to sell some copies on the streets. Occasionally the owner-editor, L. Enrique Franco, wrote a stirring editorial which received the attention of the capital city's newspapers, but this was an infrequent occurrence. Though Santiago was becoming increasingly known as a progressive city in which much news was being made, these stories were often unreported. La Información refused to hire more and better reporters to cover the expanding newsfronts; and, though it claimed to be the voice of the entire North, it did not report the news or sell papers in the several secondary cities of that area. Its information services--United Press International, King Features Syndicate, United Press Service (Nea Budget), and Servicio Latino de Prensa--did not give it much international coverage or many educational features. It sometimes carried an informative educational article, but it had not seen its role as an educator in the same light that El Caribe had. Most of its editorial comments took the form of paragraph-long notes which were often closer to the gossip level. Though there was probably not enough room in the area of Santiago for two daily newspapers, there was room for considerably more than what La Información provided.²⁹

The case of Prensa Libre

Prensa Libre was founded on June 12, 1963, to serve as the personal voice of Rafael Bonilla Aybar. Bonilla Aybar, who for a time had been director of La Nación during the period of the Council of State, felt that it was his duty to save the Dominican Republic from what he thought was

²⁹L. Enrique Franco, personal interview, Santiago, October 8, 1964.

the communist menace represented by the Bosch government; and his newspaper was devoted almost exclusively to that cause.

Prensa Libre met with a large initial welcome. Its simple anti-communist message received the wholehearted support of the conservative National Civic Union Party, and Bonilla became the principal spokesman for the increasing number of groups who were becoming concerned over the alleged communist infiltration of the Bosch regime. He was a leader and chief speaker at the series of Christian reaffirmation anti-communist rallies which swept the country during the last two months of Bosch's short tenure. Bonilla made fiery--and clearly libelous--speeches on radio and television urging the overthrow of the constitutional authority. For his anti-government pronouncements he was at one time arrested (the government said he had been arrested on charges of embezzling funds from La Nación, though it was clear that the regime wished to silence him) but the arrest only turned him into a martyr for the anti-communist cause. His thirteen days in jail did not soften Bonilla's criticisms; upon his release his first statement was that the Bosch government could rely on the full support of international communism.³⁰

There can be little doubt that Bonilla and Prensa Libre were most influential in the movement which ultimately culminated in the overthrow of Bosch. After La Nación was closed, his was the only evening daily being published in the capital; and it was avidly read by those same business elements with whose views the paper coincided. Bonilla himself, in addition to his newspaper, was most active personally in the anti-Bosch movement.³¹

³⁰ Hispanic American Report, XVI (June, 1963), 358 and (July, 1963), 463.

³¹ See Jottin Cury, "El Caso de Bonilla Aybar," El Caribe (April 9, 1962), p. 6.

With its cause célèbre--the ouster of the Bosch government--accomplished, Prensa Libre lost its raison d'être. It continued to pound its anti-communist theme; but with all Leftist organizations closed down and illegalized by the government, this was no longer a live issue. Prensa Libre received the United Press International wire service but it provided little other coverage and hence lost many of the readers who had previously not missed an issue. Bonilla claims that the paper continued to show a profit, but it had only a small circulation. It was eventually admitted to the Inter-American Press Association but only over the strong objections of the other Dominican periodicals which accused it of irresponsibility."³²

In addition to these daily newspapers, there were many other periodicals which appeared, sometimes only for a short period, and which added diversity and information in the developing Dominican communications network. Mention had already been made of Unión Cívica of the National Civic Union Party, El 14 of the 14th of June Movement, and El Democrático of the Dominican Revolutionary Party. But there were others which appeared during the 1962 election campaign. These included Pueblo of the Revolutionary Social Christian Party, Vocero Nacional of the National Party, Libertad of the Dominican Popular Movement, and PNR of the Revolutionary Nationalist Party. These were all 2-8 page papers which usually appeared weekly. Most of them disappeared once the elections had taken place, but a few continued to publish.

In the Dominican Republic's second cities--Baní, Azua, Barahona, San Juan de la Maguana, San Francisco de Macorís, Moca, La Romana, Puerto Plata, Montecristi, San Pedro de Macorís, Higüey, La Vega--weekly newspapers

³²El Caribe (October 20, 1964), p. 1.

frequently appeared and disappeared. These were almost exclusively devoted to local news and provided little national or international coverage.

Other periodicals--both national and foreign--provided a diversity of opinion and information which had never existed under Trujillo. The most important Dominican weekly newsmagazine was Ahora, first issued on January 15, 1962, and headed by the experienced journalist Rafael Molina Morillo. Ahora carried well-written, concise, and informative articles on national issues. For a time Julio César Martínez, claimant to the defunct La Nación, published the weekly twelve-page newspaper Renovación. La Tarde, printed on the old La Nación press, appeared for a short while and then closed because of economic difficulties. Other magazines--such as Vanidades, Bohemia Libre, Readers Digest, Selecciones, and Life en Espanol--were among the country's best selling periodicals and circulated freely.

There were a good many other newsheets, magazines, and newspapers which appeared in the post-Trujillo years which presented the views of certain interest groups, organizations, and government agencies. These included Avance of the National Police, Alas of the armed forces, Acción Católica and El Amigo del Hogar of the Church, the Boletín Industrial of the Association of Industries, FENEPIA of the national government workers' federation, Noticiero Obrero Dominicano of the CONATRAL labor federation, El Termómetro of the Radical Revolutionary University Front, El Rápido of the National Revolutionary Front, Ataque of the Democratic Revolutionary University Front, The Dominican Tribune of the English-speaking business community, CIDES of the Interamerican Center of Social Studies, Fraque of the Castro-oriented student federation, Ley y Justicia of the lawyer Leoncio

Ramos, and Idecoop of the Institute of Development and Cooperativism. It must be emphasized that this list is not complete. It is representative, however, and provides some idea of the wide diversity of viewpoints which were presented to Dominicans after the stifling single point of view presented during the Trujillo era.

A diverse and independent press was one of the major developments in the field of journalism in the years after Trujillo was killed, but there were other legacies of the dictatorship in this area that had to be overcome. One of the major problems was the lack of experience and training of Dominican reporters in communicating a straight news story. Under the dictatorship most of the news had come directly from the National Palace in the form of press releases, and no one had had any doubts how the stories should be covered. They were always according to the official line. This legacy carried over into the era after the Trujillos. Reporters did not know how to find a story, how to cover it once it was found, and how to write it up. The result was that many stories went unreported, that straight news was frequently jumbled together with polemic, and lively stories were made uninteresting. Several attempts were made to help overcome these difficulties.

The formation of the Dominican Journalists Association was among the most important of these efforts. Previously the reporters had been organized in an association that was completely under the thumb of the government, but now their organization was free and independent. Among the new Association's functions was the education in journalistic practices and techniques of its own members.³³

³³The text of the Association's principles is in El LJ4, I (October 7, 1961), 15.

The Bosch government was especially active in this field. An information service was created to assist reporters in covering all the stories that were breaking around the National Palace. The creation of this service was criticized by anti-government figures on the grounds that it would lead to a situation similar to that of the Trujillo era when only the official line was reported, but these fears were not realized and the service proved to be a success.³⁴

The holding of press conferences, an unprecedented event in Dominican history, was another of the attempts to assist reporters in communicating items of national significance. The Council of State's accomplishments had often fallen flat because they did not receive enough publicity in the press to make people aware of them. The press conference was an attempt to overcome this difficulty. Bosch frequently held conferences with newspapermen and tried to enlist them in his crusade. Those reporters who were especially critical of the government were sent special invitations to the Palace where an attempt was made to woo them to the cause.³⁵ Recognizing the importance of communicating its position to the populace, the post-Bosch government of Donald J. Reid Cabral scheduled a press conference every afternoon at 5:00.

The need for competent reporters remained critical. In the entire country the number of trained, experienced, and skilled journalists could be counted on one's fingers. In recognition of this crucial need, a journalism school, the Escuela de Ciencias de la Información Pública, was organized in the National University. But like many of the other

³⁴The text of the organizing communiqué is in El Caribe (July 10, 1963), p. 9.

³⁵See El Caribe (May 17, 1963), p. 9.

shortages which the thirty-one-year Trujillo dictatorship bequeathed, the lack of good reporters will require years to overcome.

In terms of press freedom there were also some remarkable developments in the post-Trujillo years.

During the fourteen months of government by the Council of State the press enjoyed a freedom which it had never had before. This fact was recognized by the Commission of Freedom of the Press of the Inter-American Press Association. The Commission pointed to El Caribe as the leading independent newspaper of the country and mentioned favorably La Información. It stated that La Nación, though under government control, at times criticized the government and allowed the opposition parties to publish their pronouncements. Finally, the IAPA Commission cited the freedom allowed communist and pro-Castro publications.³⁶

Freedom of the press to express its views was also a characteristic of the Bosch administration. The President himself was committed to the free play of conflicting ideas and at one point urged the press to carefully scrutinize all the government's activities. The new Constitution, written under PRD leadership, guaranteed "freedom of the written word" and stated that "the press cannot be submitted to any kind of coercion or censure." Even El Caribe, which would later turn against Bosch, commented editorially that "With such guarantees the functioning of a free press has been assured."³⁷

³⁶The text is in El Caribe (November 3, 1962), p. 2.

³⁷See El Caribe (February 14, 1963), p. 8.

Bosch was committed to the principles set forth in the Constitution-- indeed, it may be argued that his over-commitment was one of the causes of his undoing. For when his advisers urged him to clamp down on the open activities of Fidelista-communist publications, whose pronouncements were turning the armed forces, the Church, and the business community against him, Bosch steadfastly refused.³⁸

Only a few minor instances of government interference in the freedom of the press occurred. The most prominent of these was the case of La Nación in which the Council intervened and put under government control and which Bosch eventually closed. In two other cases the government only intervened when the newspapers in question favored the overthrow of the government. The first of these was the closing by the Council of State in November, 1962, of much of the pro-Castro press, which was urging that revolution and not the scheduled elections was the only hope for the Dominican Republic. The second case involved Bosch's threat to take action against El Caribe and the jailing of Prensa Libre editor Rafael Bonilla Aybar who was openly advocating the ouster of the President. In neither of these latter two episodes, however, was the newspaper in question closed or its freedom of expression curtailed.³⁹

After Bosch was overthrown the press continued to speak with a free voice. In a speech before the Inter-American Press Association El Caribe editor Germán Ornes said that all national and foreign periodicals were allowed to circulate freely and that at no time had the newspapers been

³⁸The text is in El Caribe (July 17, 1963), p. 10.

³⁹See Hispanic American Report, XV (January, 1963), and XVI (July, 1963), 463.

subject to censorship. Ornes reported that the three principal daily papers in the country--El Caribe, Listín Diario, and La Información--had formed a pact that an attack on one of them by the government was to be considered an attack on all, but that the pact had not as yet been invoked. He concluded: "There is freedom of the press in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican press is alert and disposed to defend its liberty and independence even at the risk of its own existence."⁴⁰

The unstable political situation prevailing in the country after the ouster of the constitutional government on September 25, 1963, did not adversely affect the press. Though the government was at times oppressive, arbitrary, and dictatorial, it did not interfere with the freedom of the press to criticize these same characteristics. The press had emerged as a strong enough intermediate organization in the period following the overthrow of the dictatorship that the government was unwilling to interfere with it. A year later Ornes could again report to the IAPA that freedom of the press had been maintained.⁴¹

The Dominican press had thus expanded greatly in the period after Trujillo. In terms of more and better newspapers, improved coverage of the news, and the freedom to express its views, the press was probably the area in which the biggest steps were taken to erase the legacy of the dictatorship. At the most prosperous times of the Trujillo era, the three major dailies--El Caribe, La Nación, and La Información--had a combined circulation of only 45,000. At the end of 1962 these three news-

⁴⁰The text is in El Caribe (November 18, 1963), p. 2.

⁴¹The text is in El Caribe (October 17, 1964), p. 1.

papers were selling approximately 70,000 copies dailies. A year later--with Listín Diario replacing La Nación as Santo Domingo's second newspaper--the combined circulation was nearly 95,000--one for every thirty-five people. These figures compared favorably with the per capita figures for other Latin American countries. Especially when one considers the many other diverse periodicals which have at one time or another published their views during this period and which vied for the readers' attention, the more than 100 per cent increase in so short a time is truly phenomenal.

Radio and Television

The story of the development of radio and television in the Dominican Republic was, in many respects, similar to the story of the development of the press. During the Trujillo era the radio and television facilities were either owned by or subservient to the Trujillos, and the propaganda broadcast by these media was similar to that of the newspapers--seldom deviating from the official line.

Following the assassination of the Generalissimo, radio and television remained under Trujillo family control. But under the Ramfis "liberalization" program, opposition groups were sometimes allowed to broadcast their views. The dictatorship had at first been afraid to take this step but, after a crowd inflamed by the initial meeting of the Dominican Revolutionary Party marched on the government-owned Radio Caribe and broke up some of its equipment, the Trujillos relented and invited the opposition to voice their opinions over the air. The PRD then began a program "Tribuna Democrática" over Radio Caribe and the National Civic Union initiated its "Baluarte

Cívica" program over La Voz del Trópico.⁴² Both programs were severely handicapped. La Voz del Trópico limited its transmission range especially for the UCN broadcast and Radio Caribe presented a "counterprogram" to refute the "lies" of the PRD.⁴³

Immediately after the final ouster of the Trujillos from the country, confusion reigned in the broadcasting media. As with the press, some of the primary questions involved the ownership, direction, and orientation of the formerly Trujillo-owned or directed radio and television stations. Once under the control of José Arismendi Trujillo, La Voz Dominicana, for example, was at first placed under the control of the armed forces. La Voz del Trópico was shut down for a period. Radio Caribe was run by the government and, like La Nación, its director was frequently replaced. Radio Rahintel was forced to close because it was not receiving any business from the country's biggest advertiser, the government. Some degree of order and stability was brought out of this initial chaos by the Council of State government.

During the period of the Council the contents of the programs began to improve as well. Previously a typical day's programming included music, movies, soap operas, etc. The only news consisted of handouts from the National Palace. Now, however, an attempt was made to devote more time to educational and public affairs programs.⁴⁴

⁴²La Nación (July 8, 1961), p. 9.

⁴³See Unión Cívica, I (October 21, 1961), 7 for the report of these restrictions by the newly formed Dominican Association of Writers and Journalists to the IAPA.

⁴⁴Carlos Holguín-Veras, "Algo de Nuestra Farándula," El Caribe (October 30, 1964), p. 12; and Pedro B. Vázquez, Assistant Director General and Supervisor of the Department of Press, Radio Santo Domingo Television, personal interview, Santo Domingo, October 10, 1964.

Helping to provide the new public affairs programs to both radio and television stations was the U.S. Information Service. With offices in the capital city under the direction of Malcolm McLean and in Santiago under the direction of Robert Sandin, the U.S.I.S. began a program to supply a wide variety of tapes and films on educational and public affairs subjects to the stations. Most Dominicans had never before been exposed to these materials.⁴⁵

Another step in this direction was the creation of press and publicity agencies to provide newsworthy items to the radio and television stations. Most of the news broadcast over Dominican stations during the course of the day was simply read from the morning newspapers (Radio Mil, which had its own reporters, was one of the few exceptions). The press agencies were an attempt to overcome this limitation. The Agency of Press and Publicity under the direction of Rafael Rivas Jérez was the first such organization in the country. Rivas conceived of the role of his agency as educational, and he provided information to five radio stations.⁴⁶

The political parties began to make increasing use of the radio as the election campaign progressed. The National Civic Union, the 14th of June Movement, and the Dominican Revolutionary Party all had programs which were broadcast six days per week. As was mentioned previously, the PRD had a particularly effective technique whereby Party representatives visited every settlement in the country where they met with local officials

⁴⁵Based on personal interviews with Malcolm McLean, Santo Domingo, August 20, 1962; and Robert Sandin, Santiago, October 7, 1964.

⁴⁶Rafael Rivas Jérez, personal interview, Santiago, October 8, 1964.

and inquired about local needs. These needs were then relayed to the Party headquarters and presidential candidate Juan Bosch would make reference to the specific needs of each settlement and promise to do something about them.

What made Bosch's campaign effective was the mushrooming number of radio sets in the country. Most of these were cheap, Japanese transistor models which sold so rapidly they didn't have to be advertised. As late as 1958 there had been only 50,000 radios in the country but by the end of the election campaign the number had increased to an estimated 200,000, a 400 per cent increase.⁴⁷ Those who could not afford to buy a radio of their own listened avidly to the sets of others, and it was not unusual at the height of the campaign to see forty people gathered around a single radio to listen to a political broadcast.

As the elections approached, the most widely viewed television program came to be "Ante la Prensa" (Before the Press) presented over Radio Santo Domingo every Sunday night. Only the most prominent politicians were invited to face a battery of 6-9 reporters. Presidential candidates Juan Bosch, Viriato Fiallo, Alfonso Moreno Martínez, and many other influential political figures appeared on the program.

Another important political program was "Actualidades" (Actualities) founded on November 19, only a month before the elections, and presented over Radio Santo Domingo television. It was on this program on the night of December 17 that the famous debate between Juan Bosch and Laútico García, the Spanish Jesuit who had accused the PRD presidential candidate of being

⁴⁷The figures may be found in Selden Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 137; and "Report on the Dominican Republic," Latin American Report, V (September, 1963), 9. See also United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1960 Table 146.

Marxist-Leninist took place. The debate gained the rapt attention of the entire nation, and Bosch's dramatic victory on television presaged his victory in the elections three days later. One writer said that the debate was comparable in importance to the Kennedy-Nixon debates in deciding the 1960 campaign, and it was generally conceded that his television appearance won many votes for Bosch.⁴⁸

Television had now come to the fore as a means of communications for politicians. On the eve of the December 20 elections Bosch; presidential candidate Juan Isidro Jiménez-Grullón of the Social Democratic Alliance; presidential candidate Alfonso Moreno Martínez of the Revolutionary Social Christian Party; Lupo Hernández Rueda, William Read, and Marcio Veloz Maggiolo of the National Civic Union; and Horacio Ornes of the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard all spoke before the television cameras of Radio Santo Domingo.⁴⁹

Radio and television played an increasingly important role in politics. During the Bosch administration the President made frequent use of these media to communicate directly with the people. A television address was most often employed when the government confronted a crisis. As the opposition to Bosch grew, the crises became more frequent; and he appeared on television an increasing number of times. These talks were effective. They were advertised with front page headlines in the country's newspapers on the days they were to occur, thus preparing people for

⁴⁸ See Dom Bonafede, "Freedom After Trujillo: The Dominican Elections," The Nation, CXCVI (January 12, 1963), 28-30; Víctor Alba, "La República Dominicana a la escuela de la libertad," Cuadernos, LXX (March, 1963), 74; and Bernardo Pichardo, Resumen de la Historia Patria, 4th ed. (Santo Domingo: Librería Dominicana, 1964), p. 384.

⁴⁹ El Caribe (December 19, 1962), p. 1.

what was to come, and they were always discussed and debated the following day. Bosch himself, possessing the poet's facility with the Spanish language, was so effective in his presentation that he frequently brought the people out into the streets to demonstrate on his behalf.⁵⁰

Realizing the new-found importance of radio and television, the post-Bosch government also made extensive use of these media. A "people-to-people" program was inaugurated in an attempt to communicate the government's policies to the populace. Donald Reid often went on television to explain a new government program and made an effort to utilize the radio in a manner like that of Roosevelt's "fireside chats." Reid, however, was not as effective on the air as Bosch had been.

Radio and television came in for considerably more government intervention than did the more free and independent press. Most often this intervention was limited to the banning of certain political party programs from the air, but it occasionally involved the closing of a station.

The most frequent type of censorship under the Council of State was the suspension of communist and pro-Castro radio programs. The Council had passed a resolution authorizing it to cancel all broadcasts which it considered subversive. Under this measure the Council at one time suspended the regular radio program of the 14th of June Movement. This was an isolated case, however, and in general radio and television remained free and open during the Council's rule.⁵¹

⁵⁰Oswaldo Cepeda y Cepeda, Special Consultant to the President on Radio-Television, personal interview, Santo Domingo, September 19, 1964.

⁵¹See El Caribe (July 26, 1962), p. 7.

During the Bosch government there were several cases of government intervention in radio and television. The vitriolic Bonilla Aybar was arrested at gunpoint in April, 1963, for broadcasting his subversive, slanderous, and libellous anti-government comments over Rahintel television. El Caribe objected to this limitation of freedom of expression, the opposition parties made it a cause célèbre, and the O.A.S. Commission on Human Rights was called in to investigate. Bosch denied that he was trying to limit free speech, Bonilla was released, and the O.A.S. saw no need for action.⁵²

Bonilla continued his defamatory attack on Bosch. Though the President had legal justification for shutting him up, he refused to do so. Bonilla was even permitted to air his views over the government-owned television station, Radio Santo Domingo; and when a crowd of hundreds began to mill around the station threatening to attack the reactionary commentator, the Police were called in to protect him.⁵³

Bosch was ultimately forced to crack down on the subversive radio and television attacks against him. Several of the stations had begun to openly call for his ouster and for the armed forces to take over. The campaign reached its height during the shopkeepers' strike only a few days before the constitutional government was indeed overthrown. In the name of the National Front for the Fight against Communism, commentators from Radio HIN, Radio Pueblo, Radio Universal, and La Voz del Trópico,

⁵²See J.R. Hernández, "Atropello a la Libertad de Prensa," El Caribe (April 7, 1963), p. 7; and Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Un Informe: Seis Meses de Gobierno, 27 de Febrero-27 de Agosto, 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), pp. 16-20.

⁵³El Caribe (August 1, 1963), p. 24.

as well as from the television station Rahintel, supported the strike and attacked Bosch. The four radio stations and the television station were shut down by the Police and their employees detained. They were released almost immediately, however; but the Police continued to occupy the stations.⁵⁴

Following the coup government intervention in radio and television continued. PRD members and "Leftist" sympathizers employed in the state-run communications media were removed from their posts. Three radio stations, sympathetic to the constitutional government and against the coup were shut down for a long period but later permitted to reopen. The programs of some of the political parties were banned from the air.⁵⁵

Dominican radio and television, like the press, came a long way in the period after Trujillo. From 1958 to 1963 the number of radios had increased from 50,000 to 200,000--one for every sixteen people. During the same period the number of television sets had increased from 2,000 to 19,000--one for every 160 people. During the nine-month period from January to September, 1963, roughly the period that Bosch was in office, more radios (67,181) and more televisions (4,690) were imported than in the entire thirty-one-year Trujillo period. The number of radio stations had increased from thirty-one in 1958 to fifty-five in 1963--twenty-two in Santo Domingo, twelve in Santiago, and twenty-one scattered elsewhere

⁵⁴Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase," The Reporter, XXIX (December 5, 1963), 29. See also the text of the report by Germán Ornes before the Inter-American Press Association, El Caribe (November 18, 1963), p. 2.

⁵⁵Ibid.

around the country.⁵⁶ These figures were all among the highest per capita in Latin America.

Not only had these media increased in quantity, but they had also improved in quality. More attention was devoted to education, news, and public affairs. To be sure problems remained--the tendency to read news broadcasts from the morning newspapers, the lack of trained reporters and competent commentators, the tendency to equate liberty of expression with license to slander and libel, and government intervention or interference. It will likely require considerable time before these problems will be solved, but large and important steps were taken in that direction.

Despite these difficulties, the developments in the press and in radio and television after the Trujillo regime had been overthrown were enormous. Communications was probably the area in which the Dominican Republic had most completely erased the legacy it inherited from the dictatorship. For the most part the press, radio, and television played a responsible role; they educated as well as informed a public having little previous contact with the conflicting currents of the outside world. The public information media in the country enjoyed a freedom which they had never had before in the nation's history, and certainly not in the thirty-one years of the Trujillo dictatorship. Occasionally the new-

⁵⁶These statistics were taken from Rodman, op. cit., p. 137; "Report . . .," op. cit., p. 9; United States Information Service, Lista de Estaciones Radiodifusoras y de Televisión de la República Dominicana, por Localidad (Mimeographed, March, 1963); El Caribe (June 6, 1964), p. 20 and (July 30, 1964), p. 9; and República Dominicana en Cifras (Santo Domingo: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Sección de publicaciones, 1964), Cuadro 1.

found freedom was turned into a disservice--as in the case of Bonilla Aybar who, by abusing freedom of expression, contributed to the breakdown of consensus and the overthrow of Bosch.

On the whole, however, the developments in the mass media contributed to the process of political modernization and the building of consensus in this developing political society. The press, radio, and television helped unify the diverse and atomized individuals and groups in Dominican politics. Modern means of communications have expanded the expression of and the opportunities for the education of public opinion. Under Trujillo the propagation of opinion was monopolized and exploited by the regime so that opinion groups lacked the avenues for articulating their interests. Now, however, with the communications system free, open, and expanding, this legacy of the dictatorship had largely been eliminated.

CHAPTER XII

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The armed forces, the Church, the business-professional-landholding elite, the bureaucracy, the political parties, labor, the peasantry, and communications were the major internal forces operating in Dominican politics in the post-Trujillo years. Comparable in importance to these internal sectors were two major external forces, the United States and the communists.

The developing countries cannot any more be treated as closed or autonomous political systems. That is, no longer is it possible to consider the politics of one country as completely isolated from its world environment. Present-day political systems must be treated as parts of a larger network. The major cause for this broader view, in addition to modern communications and transportation which have made all nations interdependent, is the Cold War. The East-West struggle has involved almost all countries.¹ This is particularly true in the case of the Dominican Republic, which has become still another of the many pawns in the clash between the super powers. U.S. involvement has become so enormous as to raise the question whether the Dominican Republic is actually a sovereign state.

Ever since the U.S. military strategist, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, felicitously called the Caribbean Sea an "American Mediterranean" in 1888, U.S. military defenders have heeded his teaching. Through the years,

¹On this point see Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics," World Politics, XVI (October, 1963), 147-171.

especially following the Spanish-American War, the U.S. has maintained a long chain of military, naval, and air bases throughout the Antillean chain. The countries in and around the Caribbean are mostly small nations overshadowed by "The Colossus of the North." This area lies within what the U.S. considers its sphere of influence. Not all of Latin America is thus of the same strategic importance. Mexico and the area bordering the Caribbean are more vital than the South Atlantic countries because of their geographical proximity to the U.S. and to the Panama Canal. The domestic and international politics of the region are determined in large measure by the nature of their relations with the U.S.²

In the eyes of the U.S. military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department, the Panama Canal is the most important factor in the area; and the countries that border the Canal or its approaches are carefully scrutinized from the point of view of U.S. security. Sumner Welles, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and author of a classic history of the Dominican Republic, has written:

It may be confidently asserted that since the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone by the United States every American Secretary of State has regarded the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the orderly procedures of Government in the region of the Caribbean as a matter of deep concern to the United States. The outbreak of hostilities and the persistence of revolutionary conditions in that neighborhood have been motives for well-founded alarm.³

Another and more recent problem in the area, in the Pentagon's, CIA's, and State Department's view, is the threat of communist subversion from Cuba. In both these problems the Dominican Republic figures prominently. The

²See Daniel James, "Castro, Trujillo, and Turmoil," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIX (January 16, 1960), 26ff.

³Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (New York: Payson and Clarke Ltd., 1928), p. 925.

country is situated at the middle of the chain of islands, directly on the sea route between the U.S. east coast and Panama and between Europe and the Canal. It is also separated from Cuba by only a narrow stretch of water. For both these reasons the U.S. has come to maintain a vital strategic interest in internal Dominican affairs.

In the past three years the U.S. has manifested an even greater involvement in the Dominican Republic. Since the late 1950's when President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon were booed and spat upon on their Latin American tours and when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, the U.S. began to realize that Latin America could no longer be ignored, as it had been since the days of Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" in the 1930's, and that it could no longer be counted upon to automatically line up on the side of the U.S. on all questions. The response to this new realization on the part of the U.S. was the "Alliance for Progress."

The Dominican Republic was to be the "Showcase for the Alliance" and the "Alternative to Castroism in the Caribbean." As such it became the recipient of an enormous and all-encompassing U.S. aid program. U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic became so great that it was often impossible to tell who was governing--U.S. or Dominican personnel.⁴ The story of the U.S. as a major force, or pressure group, in internal Dominican politics forms the subject matter of this chapter.

Early Stirrings of a Policy

This study has already mentioned the role of the U.S. in contributing to the downfall of Trujillo through the imposition of economic and diplomatic

⁴See Caribbean Research Limited, 'Preliminary Tables: Public Attitude Study, Dominican Republic' (Unpublished Manuscript, December 10, 1962), p. 11.

sanctions and its role in the Generalissimo's assassination. Following his death a new and more complex policy began to take shape.

The primary aim of U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic during this period was the prevention of another Fidelista-like takeover. After the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco of April, 1961, the U.S. had apparently decided not to yield another country to Castro-communism at all costs. Regardless of the official pronouncements which piously called for the creation of democracy, U.S. thinking was first of all motivated by the negative and simple policy of anti-communism. Washington feared that without the elder Trujillo, the Dominican Republic might degenerate into chaos and that the communists would step into the vacuum. The goal of the U.S. was to prevent a revolutionary situation from developing in the country that could lead to the assumption of power by extreme Leftist elements.⁵

To secure this end the U.S. began to apply persuasion and pressure to the Dominican government to modify the excesses of the Trujillo era. Cautiously the U.S. nudged Balaguer and Ramfis into instigating limited reforms for the clamoring citizens hoping to prevent the breakdown of all authority. The policy had the following aims: (1) to help as much as possible a peaceful transition from dictatorship to a stable democracy, (2) to permit the reincorporation of the Republic into the inter-American system, and (3) to promote steps which would enable its people to achieve their aspirations for a better life without resorting to another dictatorship, either of the Right, or of the Left, but especially one of the Left.⁶

⁵Personal interview with a State Department official who worked on the Dominican desk during this period. He maintained that the prevention of another Castro-communist government in the Dominican Republic was the cornerstone of U.S. policy.

⁶See John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the

As much as they would have liked to see the Dominican Republic's post-Trujillo government make way for a stable and democratic regime, U.S. policy-makers feared an abrupt change. They were unwilling to go along with the anti-Trujillo opposition's demands that the dictator's heirs give up completely their control of the government. A plan was finally worked out whereby the U.S. hoped the Dominicans could have the Trujillos and democracy as well. On the Dominican side of the bargain an opposition would be allowed to function, several of the most hated Trujillo family members would go into exile, Police brutality would be curbed, some of the Trujillo family's commercial-agricultural-industrial empire would be turned over to the nation, and elections would be called. In return, the U.S. promised to use its influence to see that the damaging economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States on the Trujillo dictatorship would be lifted and also agreed to give the Dominican Republic a greater share of her all-important sugar quota.⁷

The arrangement worked tolerably well for a short while--an opposition was allowed to function, Police brutality was curbed, Ramfis gave away part

(Footnote 6 continued from preceding page)

Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 100; and Rayford Logan, "Dominican Republic: Struggle for Tomorrow," The Nation, CXCI (December 16, 1961), 488-490. Especially revealing is the article described as the "official leak," William Ryan, New York Herald Tribune (January 18, 1962), p. 1.

⁷Thomas P. Whitney, "In the Wake of Trujillo," The New Republic, CXLIII (December 11, 1961), 6-8; and Hispanic American Report, XIV (December, 1961), 895. For criticisms of the U.S. policy of working with and supporting the continued Trujillo family dictatorship see Carleton Beals, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis," National Guardian, XIV (December 11, 1961), 1ff.; and Yuri Bochkaryov, "The Dominican Crisis--Highlights and Sidelights," New Times [Moscow], No. 2 (January 10, 1962), p. 11-13.

of the family estate, elections were promised, and two of the former dictator's brothers were prodded into exile. The U.S. also carried out its end of the bargain. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Robert Woodward appeared before a special committee for the O.A.S. to list the reforms being made by the Balaguer-Ramfis government. The U.S. therefore recommended, Woodward said, "as a gesture of encouragement to further progress by the government of the Dominican Republic" that the economic sanctions prohibiting the export of petroleum products and trucks to the country be lifted. Diplomatic sanctions and the remaining economic sanctions would stay in effect pending further developments toward democracy.⁸

Ramfis, however, had expected the U.S. to recommend that all the O.A.S. sanctions against the Dominican Republic be lifted and counted particularly on the lifting of U.S. restrictions against Dominican sugar, by far the country's largest export product and the base of the Trujillo family fortune. Ramfis believed that he had fulfilled his obligations but that the U.S. had failed to live up to its end of the agreement. Even angrier at what they considered a U.S. doublecross were the two Trujillo brothers, and they hurried back from their exile in nearby Bermuda.⁹

The return of Héctor and Arismendi Trujillo signalled an attempt to reestablish the near-total dictatorship of the former era, which had been somewhat relaxed after the Generalissimo's death. Consul General John Calvin Hill tried to see Ramfis but the former dictator's son had panicked

⁸"United States Seeks Withdrawal of O.A.S. Sanctions," Department of State Bulletin, XLV (December 4, 1961), 929-932.

⁹See Hispanic American Report, XIV (January, 1962), 995; and New York Times (November 18, 1961), p. 21.

and left the country. His absence left a power vacuum which the two brothers sought to fill. Since the U.S. had long been involved in the fate of the Dominican Republic, the question was not whether the U.S. would now act but how. The U.S., it was felt, could not stand by while another oppressive dictatorship was imposed on the country, nor could it afford the political consequences of a Fidelista-communist government in another island so close to home. The U.S. could not be hamstrung by memories of the Cuban fiasco, but neither could it afford to make a blundering intervention.

The Trujillo brothers' return forced Woodward to make an embarrassing return to the O.A.S. to ask that action on his request for a partial lifting of economic sanctions be delayed "indefinitely." Secretary of State Dean Rusk also issued a statement. He warned that the U.S. could not stand idly aside and watch members of the Trujillo family "reassert dictatorial control." Rusk's strongly worded statement said that the U.S. was considering "further measures" to prevent the development of a "dangerous situation."¹⁰ Presumably the dangerous situation meant the chaos that might lead to a Castro-like takeover and the further measures included military action.

When the two brothers made their supreme bid to restore the Trujillo dictatorship, the U.S. decided to make a display of its might by sending a portion of the Caribbean Fleet. Rusk reached President Kennedy, who was in Texas attending the funeral of Sam Rayburn, and the approval was given. The next morning three ships from the Fleet appeared off the capital city and by the end of the day they had been joined by eleven more. Jet fighter

¹⁰New York Times (November 18, 1961), p. 24 and (November 19, 1961), p. 3. The text of Rusk's statement is in Department of State Bulletin, XLV (December 4, 1961), 931.

planes took off from the deck of the carrier Valley Forge on reconnaissance outside Dominican territorial waters but plainly visible from shore. Spanish language broadcasts programmed by the U.S. informed Dominicans that amphibious landing craft were also nearby and that the 1,800 Marines on the Navy units were prepared to come ashore.¹¹

The threat posed by the U.S. Fleet lying offshore was probably decisive in preventing the restoration of the Trujillo family dictatorship or the chaos which could easily have paved the way for a Castro-like regime. The presence of these naval units and the flight of U.S. jets emphasized to the Dominicans the possibility of armed intervention to preserve order and to prevent the return to an oppressive dictatorship. These moves apparently convinced the bulk of the Dominican military that they had best give their support to Balaguer. Administration officials were reported to have believed that the move to ease sanctions and the later switch to a show of force had demonstrated to the Dominicans the earnestness of U.S. interests in preserving a smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy in the Republic and preventing Castroism from spreading.¹²

The U.S. policy had also won the understanding and support of most Dominicans. Crowds lined the shore to cheer the U.S. Fleet, and it was

¹¹ Accurate accounts of these events may be found in New York Times (November 19-26, 1961); The Economist, CCII (January 27, 1962), 330ff.; and Hispanic American Report, XIV (January, 1962), 955. Extensive articles, more colorful but less accurate, also appeared in Time, LXVII (November 24, 1961), 28 and (December 1, 1961), 36-37; Newsweek, LVIII (December 4, 1961), 49-50; Life, LI (December 1, 1961), 98; and U.S. News and World Report, LI (December 4, 1961), 32-33.

¹² "Dominica's Slow Awakening," The Economist, CCII (January 27, 1962), 333; and New York Times (November 20, 1961), p. 1.

noted that for the first time the shouts were not anti-U.S. and anti-government. They shouted "Viva los imperialistas," an ironic shout to be sure, but one that seemed to reflect their genuine joy that the warships of their powerful neighbor had been committed to the preservation of their post-Trujillo freedom.¹³ A Dominican diplomat, in reply to Cuban charges of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, echoed the feelings of most of his people when he told the United Nations, "Blessed be the moment the United States Fleet came to Dominican waters."¹⁴

The U.S. intervention had been a risky undertaking, considering that it might have produced a civil war or, worse, a military occupation; but it was done with speed and good intentions and was, from a short-range perspective, highly successful. In the two weeks of chaos and looting which followed the ouster of the Trujillos, the U.S. Fleet continued to circle the island. Fearing that the anarchy might still lead to a Castro-like takeover, the U.S. exhorted the contending forces within the Dominican Republic to "exercise statesmanship and moderation to reach a prompt solution."¹⁵

U.S. policy next became identified with the movement to maintain Balaguer in office. It was thought that he was the most likely candidate to preside over a successful transition. For its support of Balaguer who, in the public mind, was considered a Trujillista, the U.S. lost much of the popular approval which had greeted its opposition to the Trujillos.

¹³See the picture and stories in the two newspapers of the capital city, La Nación and El Caribe, for this period.

¹⁴Quoted in New York Times (November 25, 1961), p. 1.

¹⁵"U.S. Expresses Concern over Events in the Dominican Republic," Department of State Bulletin, XLV (December 18, 1961), 1003.

A mob stormed the offices of the U.S. Consulate, then in downtown Santo Domingo, on the pretext that the U.S. was harboring the assassins of the Trujillo era. When these efforts were frustrated, the mob turned on the consular staff and stoned their cars.¹⁶

Caught in the dilemma of either opposing Balaguer and thus possibly producing the chaos which it had attempted to avoid or favoring Balaguer and thus losing widespread popular support, the U.S. sought to work out another compromise. It persuaded Balaguer to share power with a Council of State. This accomplishment was heralded by President Kennedy in a statement of December 20, 1961. Kennedy's announcement is worth quoting in full because it illustrated the priority of the Dominican Republic in U.S. thinking and augured the massive U.S. aid which would soon be sent to the country.

I want to make special note of the most encouraging developments in the Dominican Republic. The solution to the political difficulties in that country, the principal feature of which is the immediate creation of a Council of State, was announced by President Balaguer on December 17 and has now been accepted by the principal elements of the democratic opposition. It represents, in my judgment, an impressive demonstration of statesmanship and responsibility by all concerned. This accomplishment by the democratic opposition and the Dominican government is all the more remarkable when it is recalled that only recently the Dominican Republic emerged from three decades of a harshly repressive regime which dedicated itself to stifling every democratic Dominican voice. This victory of the Dominican people and its leaders is a striking demonstration of the fact that dictatorship can suppress but cannot destroy the aspirations of a people to live in freedom, dignity, and peace.

The Dominican people still face long and difficult efforts to transform their aspirations into an effective, soundly based democratic system. In this struggle they have the assurance of our sympathetic and tangible support. I understand that the O.A.S. is now considering the lifting of the sanctions imposed upon the Dominican Republic by collective action in August, 1960, and January, 1961. If the Council of the

¹⁶Hispanic American Report, XIV (February, 1962), 1097.

O.A.S. takes such action--and our representatives are supporting that step--we will resume diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic promptly. When this takes place, the Department of Agriculture will authorize the purchase under the Dominican allocation of non-quota sugar for the first six months of 1962.

In addition I propose to send upon the installation of the new Council of State, a U.S. assistance mission, headed by Ambassador Moscoso of AID and including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Milton Barall to visit the Dominican Republic. Its purpose will be to explore emergency requirements and the possibilities for longer-range cooperative programs under the Alliance for Progress, which can be of direct benefit to the Dominican people. I expect that this mission will arrive in the Dominican Republic late this month or very early in January.

I understand that Mr. Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, will head a high-level mission to the Dominican Republic in the near future to begin discussion and inquiries into economic and social development projects.

These actions are intended to assist the new Dominican government and people in developing a sound economic and social structure, which is indispensable to an enduring democratic political system.

The Dominican people and their leaders confront a great and seldom-given opportunity: the construction of a democratic society on the ruins of tyranny. It is a noble task but it is not an easy one. We wish them well, and we assure them of our desire to assist them in their efforts.¹⁷

Kennedy continued to display a personal concern for the success of the Dominican attempt to bridge the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

On the first of January, 1962, the Council of State government took office. The U.S. had argued in favor of the measure and on January 4 the O.A.S. economic sanctions were lifted by a 20-0 vote. On January 7 the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations with the country and on January 11 agreement was reached to include the Dominican Republic in the Alliance for Progress. As promised by Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso, head of the inter-American division of the Agency for International Development (AID), flew to the Dominican Republic on a fact-finding mission.¹⁸

¹⁷The text is in New York Times (December 21, 1961), p. 16.

¹⁸See the New York Times for this period.

U.S. hopes and plans for the Dominican Republic were temporarily halted in mid-January when Brigadier General Rodríguez Echavarría, head of the armed forces, staged his short-lived coup d'état. When news of the coup reached Washington, Secretary of State Rusk expressed strong concern and disappointment. More importantly, the U.S. cut off the aid that they had promised to pour into the empty Dominican coffers and made it clear that the Dominican sugar quota would not be restored until the country had taken more positive steps in the direction of democracy.¹⁹

The combination of U.S. pressure and the Dominican military was sufficient and Rodríguez Echavarría's abortive revolution was reversed within forty-eight hours by another golpe. The Council of State, this time without Balaguer, was restored to power. It was during the fourteen-month tenure of this second Council that the mammoth and all-encompassing U.S. effort in the Dominican Republic really began.

The Showcase for the Alliance

The overthrow of the Rodríguez Echavarría junta had been welcomed by the Kennedy administration with the dispatch of a \$25 million loan. But U.S. activities in the Dominican Republic during the Council of State period were not limited to the usual diplomatic activities and foreign aid. It was at this time that the "Showcase for the Alliance" theme began to be heard most often. U.S. influence thus started to reach into most every aspect of Dominican society. It would be impossible to chronicle all the organizations which became involved in the Dominican effort, since there were so many. Some of them must be briefly considered, however, to demonstrate the vast extent of the U.S. activities in the country.

¹⁹"Dominica's . . . ," op. cit., p. 333.

The most important aspect of the program was the overwhelming moral, political, and economic support which the U.S. gave the Council of State government itself. The U.S. had been instrumental in setting up the Council and it continued to back it against all attacks, both from the Right and from the Left. The Council was seen as the responsible agency which could preside over the interim period until elections could be held and a democratic and constitutional government installed in office. As such, the Council was subject to a constant crossfire from some who thought it was proceeding too fast and others who thought it was going too slowly. The U.S. consistently used its great influence to come to the defense of the Council.

An essential part of this support was, of course, economic aid. On February 24 the U.S. released the first installment of \$11.5 million of the promised \$25 million. A short while later another \$22 million credit was extended. Eventually the Dominican Republic came to receive more aid per capita than any other Alliance for Progress country.²⁰ All these promises of financial assistance were accompanied by a great deal of fanfare and publicity.

Despite the ballyhoo, however, the Alliance never caught on as a popular and inspiring slogan. Very few Dominicans--even those benefiting directly from its projects--had any idea of the program's existence or purposes. Even in the election campaign, when nearly every politician was talking about a democratic social revolution--which was exactly what the

²⁰Abraham Lowenthal, "U.S. Aid to the Dominican Republic: The Politics of Foreign Aid" (Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 1964), xiii.

program was designed to help carry out--no one mentioned the Alliance.²¹ And Dominicans frequently regarded the promises as empty gestures since the aid frequently arrived too late to solve the emergency needs.²²

Sugar was another important ingredient of the aid program. The original \$25 million credit had been accompanied by a hint that the U.S. might purchase more Dominican sugar than its assigned quota. It was later announced that the U.S. was willing to pay a premium three cents more per pound above the world market price for Dominican sugar. The country's all-important sugar industry would thus provide 50 per cent of all the income from exports scheduled to go to the U.S. for the first half of 1962.²³

These promises of an increased sugar windfall were also accompanied by much U.S. publicity, but Dominicans were more concerned with the reality. This was illustrated by the attention the pending 1962 sugar bill received in the Dominican press. While U.S. promises of aid were shunted to other pages, the consideration of the U.S. Congress in debating the bill received front page headlines for over two months. For instead of increasing the Dominican sugar quota, this bill threatened to cut it. A cut in the amount of sugar which the U.S. would buy was recognized in the Dominican Republic for what it was: economic and political disaster.²⁴

²¹Tad Szulc, "Santo Domingo: No Alliance," The New Leader, XLVI (January 7, 1963), 4-5.

²²Francisco Alvarez Castellanos, "Que Pasa con los 22 Millones?" Ahora, I (2da. quincena de Octubre, 1962), 53-54.

²³Hispanic American Report, XV (April, 1962), 135; and New York Times (January 23, 1962), p. 1.

²⁴The story of the pending legislation may be followed in El Caribe

The Dominican Republic did receive special considerations in the assignment of the sugar quota, but the legislative process had been so drawn out and the decision so close that most of the good will which the U.S. had built up in the country was lost. One analysis further pointed out that even with the favorable legislation, the Dominican Republic would receive \$18 million less than it had under the old sugar law.²⁵ This was a large amount for the country to lose, especially when one considers that the total Dominican budget for that year was only \$160 million. The dependency of the Dominican Republic on this market led one Dominican Sugar Corporation official to say that his country was "a victim of the sugar politics of the U.S."²⁶

The U.S. also met with mixed results in its efforts to reform the Dominican armed forces. At the invitation of the Dominican government, Brigadier General William A. Enemark and a team of assistants went to the country to survey with Dominican authorities the possibilities for a "program of military assistance and cooperation within the framework of the democratic and constitutional government being achieved in the Dominican Republic."²⁷ U.S. efforts to retrain the Dominican military

(Footnote 24 continued from preceding page)

and La Nación during May, June, and July, 1962. See especially Francisco Pérez Leyba, "Implicaciones de la Legislación Azucarera de EEUU," El Caribe (May 25, 1962), p. 4; and J.R. Hernández, "Alianza para el Azúcar: Rumbo al Caos," El Caribe (May 26, 1962), p. 4.

²⁵Julio C. Estrella, "La Ayuda Norteamericana y el Problema Azucarero," El Caribe (July 31, 1962), p. 5.

²⁶Listín Diario (September 27, 1964), p. 1. See also Douglas Cater and Walter Pincus, "Our Sugar Diplomacy," The Reporter, XXIV (April 13, 1961), 24-28.

²⁷"U.S. Military Assistance Team Visits Dominican Republic," Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (February 12, 1962), 258-259.

have been dealt with at more length in Chapter IV, but some of the programs and their results may be briefly mentioned. The National Police was increased from 3,000 to 10,000 members--and they turned into the most oppressive and corrupt of the armed forces. U.S. Special Forces officers taught anti-guerrilla tactics--and these were later used in the needless slaughter of a small group of 14th of June Movement members. In August, 1962, one U.S. Embassy official confidently asserted that the U.S. had every aspect of the Dominican scene, including the armed forces, completely under control. That this confident statement was a bit premature seems, from a later perspective, all too obvious. For on September 25, 1963, U.S. training and U.S. equipment was employed in the military overthrow of the first constitutional government in the Dominican Republic in thirty-three years. This is not to say that the U.S. was responsible for all these activities and atrocities on the part of the armed forces. But in the eyes of many Dominicans, the U.S. military mission was to blame.

Some of the U.S. efforts in the military field, it must be admitted, served a positive purpose. The strengthening of the Police, for example, enabled the civil authority to regain control of the streets in early 1962. It was hoped, further, that the sending of many Dominican officers to U.S. military schools in Washington and the Panama Canal Zone might produce a more responsible and professional officer corps. On the whole, however, the U.S. efforts to create a technically proficient, a-political military, reminiscent of the "a-political" Constabulary created during the 1916-1924 Marine occupation by which Trujillo rose to power, were unsuccessful; and the Dominican armed forces, despite the massive U.S. aid--and partially

because of it--returned to much the same oppression which had characterized the Trujillo era.²⁸

In the area of organized labor the U.S. also played a major role. This subject too has been dealt with at greater length elsewhere but it should be summarized here. Men, money, and materials poured in from the U.S., all of which assured that the Dominican labor movement developed in the way the U.S. labor attaché thought was best. In collaboration with the government's efforts, the AFL-CIO and many individual unions sent aid and technical assistance. The U.S.-dominated trade union federation ultimately emerged as the dominant labor organization in the country.²⁹

U.S. activities in the trade union field were not handled with much subtlety and produced a resentment among many of those Dominicans who would ordinarily be predisposed in favor of the U.S. At the convention of the U.S.-favored labor federation, U.S. money and influence was everywhere in evidence and it was obvious to all who was sponsoring the proceedings. A plush hall was rented. Alliance for Progress posters covered all available wall space. USIS people were on stage to handle the microphone set up. The audience was full of Embassy personnel. It was strikingly significant that a year previously, when U.S. money was temporarily halted, there had been no convention. This outright intervention in Dominican labor affairs was bitterly resented not only by the competing labor organizations but also by a sizable percentage within the U.S.-favored federation.

²⁸See Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 5-6.

²⁹The AFL-CIO efforts and the growth of the U.S.-dominated labor federation may be traced in the Inter-American Labor Bulletin and the Noticiero Obrero Interamericano.

Despite some of the notable contributions which U.S. intervention in the Dominican labor movement produced, the results were not wholly beneficial. On at least two occasions the labor attaché had been responsible for the division of the labor movement. For his efforts, a casket bearing his name had been carried through the streets of Santo Domingo and the country's leading newspaper had demanded his recall.³⁰ When the entire U.S. effort was aimed at the support of the Bosch government, the attaché felt Bosch and his principal lieutenant were "crooks and gangsters" and refused to go along with the primary aim of U.S. policy. As a result of what many considered the misdirected efforts of the U.S., the Dominican labor movement is much weaker than it might have been.³¹

In the intellectual, cultural, and communications sphere the U.S. was again most active. The primary organization in this area is the U.S. Information Service in Santo Domingo. Through films, broadcasts, and publications the USIS sought to improve the image of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic and to assist in improving the communications and educational standards and facilities of the country. A program whereby Dominicans could get an impression of the U.S. was initiated; and groups of mayors, students, or journalists toured the U.S. Under the direction of Malcolm McLean, the USIS operations were among the more successful of the U.S. efforts in the country.

³⁰See Fraqua (February 22, 1962), p. 1; and El Caribe (February 17, 1962), p. 29.

³¹See Sidney Lens, "Coups in the Caribbean," Liberation, VIII (October, 1963), 4.

The U.S. also contributed to a revitalization of the Dominican Republic's business and commerce. In a unique business-to-business technical aid venture, eleven large U.S. concerns sent sales, management, and production specialists to assist the Dominican government in running some eighty-eight businesses formerly owned by the Trujillo family. The technical advice was sponsored by the Business Council for World Understanding, a non-profit organization interested in developing Western Hemisphere trade. The Council felt that the Dominican Republic lacked the personnel to administer these enterprises and offered to help for a year or two until capable native administrators could be trained or given experience. The companies involved were the Koppers Co. Inc., Glidden International, General Foods Corps., General Mills Inc., W. R. Grace and Co., Permanent Cement Co., the Pepsi Cola Co., and the Plymouth Cordage Co.³²

A good example of the diversity of the U.S. organizations active in the Dominican Republic was "The Friends of the United States in Latin America." The "Friends," a group of businessmen acting in close harmony with the Department of Commerce Committee for the Alliance for Progress, set up the Alliance Housing Corporation. The Corporation was formed by U.S. and Dominican investors to help speed up the low-cost housing program with private capital. Their initial project called for the building of 100 prefabricated concrete homes to be offered at no-money-down and \$10.00 per month, with \$650 being the total purchase price.³³

³²New York Times (August 9, 1962), p. 11; and El Caribe (August 9, 1962), p. 1.

³³Friends of the United States in Latin America, "Private Enterprise Corporation Formed to Speed Alliance for Progress Housing" (Mimeographed copy of press release, June 4, 1962), pp. 1-3.

Not all of the U.S. businessmen involved in Dominican affairs during this period had such lofty goals. These included the legion of international carpetbaggers who descended on the country in the hopes of gypping the government out of its windfall of the Trujillo properties. One story has been related of a U.S. businessman who intended to sell the Council of State a bunch of second-hand voting machines from upstate New York. "These folks are going to have elections," he reportedly said, "so we can make money at the same time."³⁴

The Peace Corps contingent of approximately 150 volunteers is one of the largest, for a country of the Dominican Republic's size, in Latin America. These were not beatnik types with visionary plans to change the Dominican Republic overnight. Rather, they were practical and hard-working, educated and skilled. A study of one group of forty-two being trained to go to the Dominican Republic revealed that all forty-two had had some college training and that thirty of the forty-two had worked in such fields as forestry, veterinary medicine, fisheries, geology, dairying, livestock-raising, and other aspects of agriculture--all skills for which there was crying need in the Dominican Republic.³⁵

The contributions of the Peace Corps have been many and varied. Some have organized cooperatives; others have built schools. Many have been assigned to the countryside where they have assisted Dominicans in improving their subsistence and commercial crops, while others assigned to the city work in the teeming slums, the pitifully inadequate mental

³⁴Tad Szulc, "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum," New York Times Magazine (September 2, 1962), p. 41.

³⁵Howard J. Wiarda, "Education and Experience: The New Peace Corps Contingent for the Dominican Republic," POLYMACMA, I (August 15, 1964), 1-3.

institution, or the understaffed hospitals. Still others are, of course, more limited in their projects. Despite an occasional failure, the Peace Corpsmen have been among the most successful and certainly the most welcome of the many U.S. personnel working in the country. Several have become legendary. At least one was approached by a group of citizens who wished him to run for mayor of their city. At a meeting in the town hall of San Juan de la Maguana a Dominican pleaded that if the U.S. had to send economic help to the Dominican Republic, it should all be channeled through the Peace Corps. These sentiments were typical of the high regard in which the Volunteers are held.³⁶

U.S. help was not limited to the usual foreign aid channels. On July 6, 1962, President Kennedy announced a program of three years duration to assist the country to diversify and improve its agriculture. The President informed the Dominican ambassador in Washington that the U.S. was about to establish a special fund to help the Dominican Republic readjust its economy which had been misdirected through thirty-two years of the Trujillo tyranny.³⁷ Under the program the Dominican Agrarian Institute and the Agricultural Bank were established and the long-awaited agrarian reform was begun. Technical experts from International Development Services Inc. and from U.S. agricultural colleges were brought in to advise.

Politically, the U.S. was committed to the support of the governing Council of State; but an equally important part of its policy was devoted

³⁶Personal interviews with Peace Corps directors Andy Hernández, Santo Domingo, August 20, 1962; and L. Robert Sattin, Santo Domingo, June 27, 1964. See also Santiago Estrella Veloz, "Los Hombres Sobre el Terreno," Listín Diario (June 22, 1964), p. 14.

³⁷El Caribe (July 7, 1962), p. 1.

to making certain that the elections of December 20 took place as scheduled. To this end the U.S. provided funds to the emerging political parties to enable them to carry on an effective campaign. A U.S. political scientist almost single-handedly wrote the complex electoral law by which the entire process would be regulated.³⁸

The U.S. Embassy and diplomatic personnel tried to be scrupulously fair during the election campaign, but it was no secret that the U.S. would not be displeased if the candidate of the more conservative National Civic Union, Viriato Fiallo, won. This support for Fiallo on the part of most U.S. personnel was not overt but it became an open secret; and he was stamped with the lethal "Candidate of the Imperialists" label. The other front-runner, Juan Bosch was reported to have said, "I have no evidence to suggest that the U.S. has not been impartial, but several months ago some officials of the U.S. Embassy were very close to Fiallo."³⁹ Despite this favoritism on the part of the U.S. for Fiallo--and partially because of it--Bosch won the elections. The major concern of the U.S. had been that the elections take place, and it was prepared to give even more massive support to the winner, whoever he was, than it had to the Council. The elections of Bosch, then, signalled the end of one phase of U.S. aid to the Dominican Republic and the beginning of another.

The Council of State had not been merely a U.S. puppet but it had not been an independent and sovereign government either. The deep involvement

³⁸See Henry Wells, "The O.A.S. and the Dominican Elections," Orbis, VII (Spring, 1963), 150-163; and Dom Bonafede, "Dominican Vote is Private, but U.S. Plays a Big Role," Miami Herald (December 20, 1962), p. 7-A.

³⁹Quoted in Rowland Evans Jr., "First Steps in Dominican Democracy," The Reporter, XXVIII (January 3, 1963), 21.

of the U.S.--financially, militarily, commercially, agriculturally, politically, and in several other ways⁴⁰--meant that it owed its existence largely to U.S. efforts. The U.S. had created the Council and sustained it in power. With its authority resting largely on U.S. support, it could not easily resist U.S. pressures. The U.S. therefore carried out its programs without an effective Dominican government to challenge or disagree with them.

The election of Bosch meant that the Dominican Republic had a legitimate government with a power base independent of the U.S. Bosch himself was by temperament opposed to his country's total dependence on the U.S. and he began to reassert the nation's sovereignty. He criticized the Alliance for Progress as being too slow and bureaucratized to solve immediate and pressing problems,⁴¹ and in his inaugural address he angered U.S. officials by failing to mention the Alliance. His trip to Europe just before taking office was aimed at securing aid other than that of the U.S. and, upon assuming the presidency, he attacked a contract which the Council had signed with Standard Oil. In all these moves Bosch was attempting to reduce the Dominican Republic's subservience to the U.S. The result was that the U.S. aid program had to be modified.⁴²

⁴⁰ Good summaries of all the U.S. efforts may be found in Michael Eric, "La República Dominicana Será un Modelo de Progreso," El Caribe (February 19, 1963), p. 7; and Frank Peynado, "Estudio Político del Consejo de Estado," El Caribe (October 4, 1962), p. 9. See also Evans, op. cit., pp. 21-23.

⁴¹ Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: B. Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 140-159.

⁴² The different orientation of U.S. aid under the Council as compared to that under Bosch is stressed by Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 61-63.

The U.S. attempted to convince Bosch that his country should be made into the Latin American laboratory for the Alliance for Progress. Upon his election Bosch went to Washington for a series of high-level talks with U.S. officials. Secretary Rusk and Alliance coordinator Moscoso hoped to convert the Dominican President-elect into accepting U.S. aid on the same or a greater level than had occurred under the Council. Bosch was reluctant. He indicated that he hoped to have cordial relations with the U.S. but that he intended to remain independent. "The Alliance for Progress is not the saving formula for Latin American democracy," he said. "Latin American democracy must be realized by ourselves; we must carry it out and we must build it with Alliance help or with any other help."⁴³ Eventually, however, Bosch was brought around to accepting the U.S. offers and, at one point, he even said that he fully supported the objectives of the Alliance.

The U.S. had pledged to support whomever emerged as the victor in the 1962 elections and, though Bosch had been its second choice, the U.S. wholeheartedly backed his government. As had been the case during the period of the Council, the primary policy of the U.S. was to make sure that the fledgling democracy survived. To this end Ambassador John Bartlow Martin coldly rejected the intimations of Rightists that Bosch was anti-U.S. or pro-communist. As the opposition to his regime grew, U.S. officials pleaded with the armed forces not to stage a coup d'état.⁴⁴

⁴³See the reports of Bosch's statements in Miami Herald (January 6, 1963), p. 10-B and (March 11, 1963), p. 8-C. See also Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Un Informe: Seis Meses de Gobierno, 27 de Febrero-27 de Agosto, 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1963), p. 37.

⁴⁴Norman Gall, "Ferment in the Caribbean," The New Leader, XLVI (June 10, 1963), 9.

The deep involvement of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic, begun under the Council, continued and even increased under Bosch. The U.S. military mission was strengthened. More Dominicans began to tour the U.S. under USIS auspices. The Agency for International Development team in the country increased to forty members. CARE and CARITAS, the two food giveaway organizations, expanded their activities. Schools and roads were built with Alliance for Progress funds. Economic aid to the Dominican Republic was the highest per capita of any country in Latin America. So many U.S. officials were in the Dominican Republic that a housing shortage developed, and the country's major hotels were filled for the first time in their eight-year history.

In addition to the old programs, many new ones were begun. The American Legion Auxiliary made the Dominican Republic its "study country" and the first of ten schools scheduled to be built by the Auxiliary was dedicated. U.S. universities such as Harvard, Brandeis, and Michigan worked closely with the U.S. government on several projects. The Ford, Kaplan, and Parvin Foundations sent money and technical assistance. The Farmers' Union also provided technical experts to work in Dominican agriculture. Under a novel program designed to tide farmers over until they could harvest the crops of the land being distributed under the agrarian reform, the U.S. sent 10,061 tons of food. The U.S. AID mission was given virtual carte blanche power to revamp the entire Dominican bureaucracy. Other U.S. technical advisers were involved in almost every aspect of the Bosch government.

One of the most interesting aspects of the U.S. effort was the creation of the Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES). Financed

by U.S. foundations and government agencies, closely linked to the Institute for International Labor Research in New York, and headed by a U.S. citizen, CIDES served as one of the principal fronts through which U.S. money, men, materials, and influence were channelled into the country.⁴⁵

Not all U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic were so enthusiastic in their support of Bosch. Some made it clear that they would have preferred to work with another chief executive. Several U.S. congressmen expressed alarm over the alleged growth of communism in the country. There were persistent rumors that the military mission exhorted Dominican officers to stage a coup and that the CIA was instrumental in the final overthrow of the constitutional government. Even the Ambassador admitted that the military mission had a tendency to go off in its own direction independent of the overall U.S. policy.⁴⁶ Bosch himself frequently accused U.S. sugar interests and other U.S. companies of plotting and eventually financing his ouster.⁴⁷ But despite these occasional and isolated flareups, the official U.S. position continued to be the wholehearted support of Bosch. In the face of increasing internal problems, opposition, and threats of a coup in the Dominican Republic, President Kennedy reiterated the U.S. position.

I assure you . . . that the American people and government . . . will continue to lend their sympathetic interest and ready support to the Dominican government in its present task of rebuilding a sound economy within a democratic framework.⁴⁸

⁴⁵For a more complete discussion of CIDES and its activities see pp. 223-225 and 319-321. On the role of CIDES as a U.S. front see especially Lowenthal, op. cit.

⁴⁶Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, personal interview, Santo Domingo, December 8, 1964.

⁴⁷Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-go-round," Miami Herald (October 8, 1963), p. 7-A.

⁴⁸Quoted in New York Times (June 2, 1963).

All the U.S. efforts could not stem the tide. Upon Bosch's overthrow the U.S. acted quickly. Within six hours after news of the coup reached Washington, all aid was halted and diplomatic relations were suspended. U.S. Ambassador Martin, as well as the heads of the military and AID missions, were recalled and the gigantic U.S. effort in the Dominican Republic ground to a near-halt. One final try was made by the U.S. to convince the post-Bosch ruling junta that it should resign and that constitutional government should be reestablished; but this suggestion was rapidly dismissed by Dominican authorities and the U.S., for a time, practically retired from the scene.

After nearly three months the U.S. softened the hard stand it had taken with regard to the de facto Dominican government. On December 14 diplomatic relations were formally resumed. At the end of January, 1964, W. Tapley Bennett Jr. was named the new U.S. Ambassador replacing Martin, who had been a staunch supporter of Bosch. At the same time the U.S. announced its resumption of the aid program. And during 1964 the entire apparatus for U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic was cranked up again for another attempt at making the country a "Showcase."⁴⁹

The U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic had been enormous. During the last two years of Trujillo's rule the U.S. had been influential in working for his overthrow and it had allegedly conspired in his assassination. It had worked to liberalize the Ramfis-Balaguer government and had played a major role in the final overthrow of the Trujillos. The

⁴⁹Howard J. Wiarda, "Here We Go Again: Round Two in the Dominican Republic," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 1 (July, 1964), 3-4.

U.S. had been instrumental in setting up the Council of State and was the bulwark of both the Council and the Bosch governments.

The U.S. effort was so great and so diversified that it was frequently contradictory and often worked at cross-purposes. Most of the Embassy staff and Ambassador Martin, for example, supported Bosch. The labor attaché, however, regarded him as a thief and hoodlum and the labor federation of his creation criticized him for not suppressing the few communists in the country. The U.S. military mission contributed the supplies, the training, and perhaps the indoctrination to the Dominican armed forces which overthrew the President. Facing thus in at least three different directions, there was little consistency in the U.S. operation.⁵⁰ The cross purposes of U.S. policy contributed to the overall continuance of the Dominican Republic as an unintegrated and atomized society.

The Dominican Republic had received more aid per capita than any other Alliance for Progress country. The huge number of programs and personnel which the U.S. employed in the country meant that this was a priority effort. Bureaucratic red tape was cut through in both Washington and the Dominican Republic in an attempt to speed the efforts. President Kennedy himself gave the matter much personal attention. But far from demonstrating the quick and dramatic success of democratically oriented development, the aid program exemplified the severe limits on U.S. power to effect change. The role of the U.S. always remained limited. It could not induce a sovereign government to adopt a policy to which it was manifestly opposed or which

⁵⁰See Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, XXVII (September, 1963), 35-38.

it saw in a different light and with different emphasis.⁵¹ Nowhere was this limitation more clearly seen than in the overthrow of Bosch.

The rumblings of an impending coup had been plainly heard for weeks, and most U.S. officials had worked hard to head it off. Almost every day, it seemed, the Ambassador tried to demonstrate to Bosch how he might win back the at least tacit approval of the groups opposing him, but the Dominican President refused to compromise on his principles. Other officials attempted to convince armed forces officials to give the struggling and besieged democracy more time. Though the coup might have occurred weeks earlier without the U.S. intercession, in the end the U.S. was powerless to prevent it.

The overthrow of Bosch presented a difficult dilemma to Washington policy-makers. It could not simply stand by while its hoped-for model collapsed. Some U.S. senators argued that the U.S. should send in the Marines to restore Bosch in office while others, accepting the need for drastic action, called for a multilateral force. These proposals were rejected as constituting unwarranted intervention in internal Dominican affairs. The weaker policy of suspending aid and diplomatic relations was employed instead. This policy demonstrated that the U.S. had not found a way to use its immense economic and political power to enforce the principles of representative democracy in Latin America. Eventually the U.S. was forced into a position where it had to recognize the post-Bosch de facto regime.⁵²

⁵¹ Abraham Lowenthal, "Limits of American Power: The Lesson of the Dominican Republic," Harpers' Magazine, CCXXVIII (June, 1964), 87ff.

⁵² John P. Roche, "Return of the Syndicate," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 8.

The entire policy came to be known as "the lesser evil doctrine." The major tenet of this doctrine is that the military in Latin America is not really so bad an alternative to democracy. The armed forces are seen as stable, patriotic, anti-communist, and increasingly more democratically oriented as a result of associating with U.S. military missions. Given the alternatives of a wobbly and idealistic democrat--such as Bosch--and a stable and anti-communist military, it is best to accept the "lesser evil" of armed forces rule.⁵³

The overthrow of Bosch and the "lesser evil doctrine" had several implications for U.S. interests and policy in Latin America. In the first place the U.S. hopes for a "Showcase for the Alliance" in the Dominican Republic went aglimmering. Juan Bosch's regime was to be a model for representative democracy in the hemisphere, a shining example of how to achieve development and modernization without resorting to the totalitarian methods of Fidel Castro. The overthrow of the Bosch government meant that the showcase was empty.⁵⁴

The failure was an enormous blow to U.S. prestige in Latin America. It was well known that the U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic was all-pervasive and the inability to succeed despite this tremendous effort was a more damaging setback than the massive failure in the Bay of Pigs had been. Before the coup one Western diplomat reportedly asked:

⁵³Karl E. Meyer, "The Lesser Evil Doctrine," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 14.

⁵⁴Donald A. Allan, "The Empty Showcase," The Reporter, XXIX (December 5, 1963), 28-31; and N. Yegorova, "A Broken Shop Window," International Affairs [Moscow] (November, 1963), pp. 81-82.

Aren't you overplaying your hand here? Is the Dominican Republic really so important to you? I am inclined to have some doubts whether what happens here is going to make all that difference. At any rate, you are building this up for a great fall if the new government fails.⁵⁵

The U.S. emphatically disagreed. It was convinced that success in the Dominican Republic was worth as much as the U.S. was willing to spend. The U.S. felt that if the experiment succeeded, the dividend would be invaluable. But the huge investment did fail and the U.S. and the Alliance for Progress received a black eye in Latin America for it.

The failure was, by the same token, a success for Fidel Castro and like-minded elements in Latin America. It was inevitably reasoned that if the U.S.-favored way of achieving modernization could not prevent a military takeover, the only acceptable alternative would be Fidelismo. If the democratic Left could not successfully carry out needed social and economic reforms, many Latin Americans concluded, only the totalitarian Left could possibly do so. In the Dominican case the umbrella of anti-communism had been thrown over a power grab by conservative business, professional, and military elements and a sound and democratic anti-communism through reform was frustrated. The alternatives now seemed clear--Fidelista-style communism or dictatorial armed forces rule.. The U.S. hope for a middle way had been crushed when Bosch was ousted. To most Latin Americans clamoring for change, the choice was now simple.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Quotes in Evans, op. cit., p. 23.

⁵⁶Two articles by Russian communist writers have analyzed the implications of the overthrow of Bosch for U.S. policy in Latin America. See Yuri Bochkaryov, "Back to the Juntas," New Times [Moscow], No. 41 (October 16, 1963), pp. 10-11; and P. Nikolayev, "The Dominican Putsch," New Times, No. 43 (October 30, 1963), pp. 20-21.

Another implication of the Dominican putsch was that it served as an example to other Latin American militaries. Only eight days later the reformist-minded regime of Ramón Villeda Morales was overthrown in Honduras. The Dominican coup also increased the pressure on Presidents Rómulo Betancourt and later Raúl Leoni in the key country of Venezuela.⁵⁷

The ouster of Bosch, finally, threatened the entire program of the Alliance for Progress. A closed-door session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was reported to have concluded that the march of the military had pushed the Alliance to the brink of defeat. The Dominican Republic was supposed to be the "Showcase for the Alliance" and when the Showcase was emptied with the overthrow of Bosch, the entire structure was threatened. The Alliance had long been criticized as being ineffective, and the Dominican situation pointed out how correct this estimate was. The Alliance, according to the senators, had reached its zero hour. Many critics had previously considered the program dead; now they were sure of it.⁵⁸

The U.S. had refused to take decisive steps to support constitutional democracy in the Dominican Republic. The refusal was based on the proposition that to do so would have meant intervention in internal Dominican affairs. But given the extent of the U.S. involvement in the country, non-intervention was also a form of intervention. The Dominican Republic is equally affected by what the U.S. does not do as by what it does do. The U.S., many democrats argued, needed a new policy to rationalize the

⁵⁷"Caribbean Failure," Commonweal, LXXIX (October 11, 1963), 64-65.

⁵⁸The report of the closed-door session is in Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-go-round," Miami Herald (October 11, 1963), p. 7-A.

intervention which it had carried out before and which it must continue to carry out if its own interests and the interests of democracy in Latin America are to be achieved. Norman Gall, a researcher at the University of Puerto Rico's Institute for Caribbean Studies and a reporter for the San Juan Star, argued that this might be done through an international force from several democratic countries, through a regional collective security agreement among constitutional governments, or, in extreme cases, through unilateral U.S. action. Whatever the basis, Gall concluded, a policy had to be found soon or Latin America is liable to be turned into a series of frustrating encounters similar to those taking place in the Congo or Viet Nam.⁵⁹

U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic had not, of course, been an unmitigated failure. Its best results had come in the simpler area of economic development--building roads and schools, improving agricultural production, providing loans and credits. But in the more difficult area of political development, little had been accomplished. U.S.-policy-making had been posited on the assumption that economic development was the more essential of the two and that once economic change had taken place, political change would automatically follow. The assumption proved to be false. Economic change and political change cannot be separated. But many analysts would argue that too much attention was given to the relatively easy economic aid and not enough to comparatively complicated political matters. The Dominican Republic would seem to be a prime example of this. U.S. aid in the economic realm accomplished a great deal; in the political sphere it was a devastating failure.

⁵⁹ Norman Gall, "Anatomy of a Coup: The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, CXCIII (October 26, 1963), 256.

The failure was not wholly the fault of the U.S. or of its recipients. Dominican society was so fluid and atomized following the overthrow of the Trujillo regime that the U.S. could not find organization through which it could effectively channel its aid. Money and advice was poured in which simply drained off in diverse and amorphous directions rather than into the support and strengthening of the emerging political groups.

The problem with which the U.S. had to deal in attempting to convert the Dominican Republic into a model of Democracy following the overthrow of the near-totalitarian dictatorship of Trujillo was enormous. That the U.S. failed in this attempt may be largely attributed to the enormity and complexity of the issues and problems involved.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNISTS

The U.S. was not the only external force operating in Dominican affairs during this period. Communist and Fidelista elements were also active.

Communism in the Dominican Republic has never been a strong political force. Under Trujillo all communist activities and organizations were suppressed or controlled by the regime, and in the post-Trujillo years the communists did not become a powerful sector. There were some communist elements in the labor movement, in the student organizations, and in certain of the political parties; but even these were indigenous groups having no strong ties with any international communist movement and with a peculiarly Dominican orientation. Dominican communism took the form of intense nationalism, of anti-imperialism (usually anti-U.S., though not exclusively so), and of sympathy with the revolution of Fidel Castro.¹ It was not a unified cadre seeking to ally itself with Moscow or Peking; rather, it was a loose collection of diverse organizations usually advocating modernization and reform of the country through Fidelista methods.

¹On the strategy of international communism in underdeveloped countries, see John H. Kautsky, "The New Strategy of International Communism," American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 478-486; and W.Z. Laqueur, "Towards National Democracy: Soviet Doctrine and the New Countries," Survey [London], No. 37 (July-September, 1961), pp. 3-11. This strategy has often been to identify with and support anti-imperialist and often anti-colonialist "national liberation movements" in the hope of then capturing a "national democratic" government.

If communism did not have a strong popular appeal and if the communist groups were weak and disunified, the subject must nevertheless be considered. For one thing, the influence of the extreme Leftist groups in terms of propaganda, though considerably out of proportion with their actual strength, was considerable. For another, communism as an issue in politics was important. Dominican politicians and the armed forces learned to manipulate the communist issue, both for domestic and U.S. consumption, with considerable skill; the "communist menace" became a handy device for effecting political action. Communism and the activities of the various communist groups, finally, contributed to the disruption and to the continued atomization of the political society which followed the assassination of Trujillo.

Communist Organizations

One of the criticisms of dictatorships such as Trujillo's is that it often forces moderate and democratic Leftists toward the communist extreme. Frequently it appears that the communists are the only or most active or best organized group opposing the dictatorship with the result that many non-communists feel constrained to fight under the communist banner. No middle way, no moderate opposition can be formed between the two extremes.

This polarization did not occur in the Dominican case; no absolute dichotomy developed with Trujillistas in one corner and in the other all oppositionists lumped together under the communist flag. Rather, the political spectrum remained varied and wide; there was a communist group, several Fidelista groups, democratic Leftist groups, and moderate groups--all opposed to the Trujillo dictatorship. In this section the communist and Fidelista influence is analyzed in the labor movement, the political

parties, and the student organizations as it developed in the post-Trujillo years.

The labor movement

The Frente Obrero Unido Pro-Sindicatos Autónomos (FOUPSA) was the federation through which Dominican communists and Fidelista elements first attempted to secure a toe hold in the labor movement. FOUPSA had been founded after Trujillo's assassination but while his heirs were still in power.² Its founders claimed to be sympathetic to the U.S., anti-communist, and in favor of developing a democratic trade union movement.³ FOUPSA flourished; and after the last of the Trujillos had been driven from the country and the official Confederación Dominicana de Trabajadores (CDT) had collapsed, it had become the largest labor organization in the country.⁴

With predominance came disunity. The three major political organizations--the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the National Civic Union, and the 14th of June Movement--which were vying for predominance in the labor movement began to present an ever-widening range of political orientations; and these divisions were reflected in the FOUPSA leadership. It was alleged that several of the federation's officers maintained close ties with the then increasingly Left-leaning 14th of June Movement and the cry of "communist infiltration" was soon raised.⁵

²The text of FOUPSA's organizational announcement is in El Caribe (September 21, 1961), p. 17.

³FOUPSA, Nuestro Lema: Libertad, Salud, y Bienestar (Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Stell, 1961).

⁴Noticiario Obrero Interamericano, Num. 79 (December 15-31, 1961), p. 3; and La Nación (December 11, 1961), p. 2.

⁵Supra, pp. 275-278.

Of the fact that several of the FOUPSA leaders were closely associated with or sympathetic to the 14th of June Movement there could be little doubt. But to proceed from this initial premise to the conclusion that FOUPSA was communist controlled is too big a jump. The 14th of June Movement had begun as a civic patriotic movement to oppose the continued dictatorship and, as such, had attracted some of the Dominican Republic's most prominent people. It was not until later that the Movement began to veer towards Castroism. The Movement's leading members then began to object to its Fidelista orientation and resign. If the 14th of June Movement was, at the time that the first charges of "communist infiltration" were hurled communist dominated or controlled (and by implication FOUPSA also), then so was a large percentage of the Dominican upper class. This last conclusion is certainly untrue. The question of communist control or infiltration was not quite so simple in the Dominican Republic; guilt-by-association was especially risky in such a fluid society.

FOUPSA nevertheless continued to give off the appearance of Fidelismo. The issue that united many of its members was opposition to U.S. intervention in the Dominican labor movement. The federation violently opposed the activities of the U.S. labor attaché and an AFL-CIO representative who had begun a rival labor organization. Several FOUPSA leaders advocated the attaché's ouster from the country and organized anti-American riots to protest the U.S. involvement. "Anti-imperialism" (meaning anti-U.S.) was thus added to a close association with an increasingly Castro-oriented political organization.⁶

⁶Jeanne Bellamy, "First Year Was Rough for Dominican Labor," Miami Herald (November 19, 1962), p. 7-A.

From this time FOUPSA began to decline. The terroristic tactics employed by the more extremist elements in its ranks offended the moderate members and many resigned. Editorials in the newspapers attacked it for failing to hold democratic elections to determine its leadership. The labor federation was torn by internal dissensions and large blocs of affiliated labor unions split off and formed their own organizations. Most important, the U.S. now began to bolster its competitor with funds and technical aid; and the original FOUPSA found it increasingly difficult to compete.⁷

FOUPSA did not immediately disappear. It still had the prestige of being the first independent labor federation in the post-Trujillo era. Nevertheless, it was by this time a minority organization and was forced to modify its tactics. Unable any longer to compete for the allegiance of the workers, it sought to disrupt the national life through inopportune strikes and, at times, violence and sabotage. Its attacks on "Yankee imperialism" brought a favorable response from some of the workers; and, though its strength continued to decline, it remained a large enough labor federation that it could exploit discontent and strikes in enterprises assumed to be represented by more moderate labor leaders.⁸

FOUPSA's ties with the 14th of June Movement were never made explicit. The Movement's newspaper frequently defended FOUPSA's position, however,

⁷Saby Nahama, "Communist Anti-U.S. Campaign Found Losing Ground in Dominican Republic," Inter-American Labor Bulletin, XIII (May, 1962), 2.

⁸See the open letter addressed to "Arturo (McLellan and Somerford) Jaúregui," Secretary General of ORIT, denouncing the opposition to FOUPSA in the Fidelista newspaper Fogonazos (April 21, 1962), p. 2.

forcing President Miguel Soto to issue repeated statements that his labor federation was not associated, either directly or indirectly with the Movement or with any other political party. Soto reiterated that FOUPSA was only concerned with the well-being of the workers and was not organized for political purposes.

Eventually FOUPSA disappeared. It merged with another weak labor federation, CESITRADO, into the National Confederation of Dominican Workers, FOUPSA-CESITRADO. FOUPSA was never a communist or Fidelista organization, though its leadership was occasionally pro-Castro and at times closely associated with the 14th of June Movement. Rather, it was very nationalistic and sometimes resentful of U.S. interference in what it considered purely Dominican labor affairs. That these sentiments coincided with the communist line on some issues is responsible in large measure for its being branded with the oversimplified and hence misleading communist label.

With one attempt, which was never an all-out effort, at capturing the labor movement frustrated, extreme Leftist elements followed a familiar communist tactic by creating a new labor organization to compete with both the dying FOUPSA and with the other workers' federations. The Dominican Union of Syndicated Workers ("La Unión" with Marcos de Vargas as President and Héctor A. Romero as Secretary General, came into existence at the time the labor movement was torn by dissension and divisions; and its first principle was that the labor federations should cease fighting among themselves and begin working for all the workers by uniting under the La Unión banner. The new federation's initial communiqué was signed by representatives of thirteen labor unions. It was against any participation

by foreign organizations in Dominican labor. Unlike the other federations, La Unión did not claim to be a-political but promised to maintain "fraternal relations" with all "free and democratic" political parties.⁹ Its program was thus that of the popular front with the bore-from-within plan to capture the labor movement.

La Unión never became a large influence in Dominican labor. Its strongest affiliates were the labor unions in the national brewery, the wheat mill, the cement factory, textiles, and the La Romana sugar complex. The idea of a unified labor movement was attractive to many, but both the social-Christian and the ORIT-oriented labor federations wanted unity only on their own terms.¹⁰ It is significant, however, that Miguel Soto and the FOUPSA organization backed up La Unión in its call for a single federation. Soto argued that this would keep labor from fighting itself and that by this method "political opportunists" would be kept out of the labor movement.¹¹ La Unión was a hard-working organization but it steadily lost most of its meager initial support until by 1964 it was insignificant as a force in Dominican labor.

FOUPSA and CESITRADO had merged in September, 1962, and chosen Miguel Soto, one of the original founders of the old FOUPSA, as President. FOUPSA-CESITRADO became closely associated with the Dominican Revolutionary Party; indeed, the federation came out in support of Bosch and Soto himself was a

⁹The text is in El Caribe (May 30, 1962), p. 15. See also "La Unión: Auténtica Sindical," Claridad, 1 (July 7, 1962), 13.

¹⁰The text of their combined statement is in El Caribe (June 3, 1962), p. 7.

¹¹Virgilio Alcántara, "Dirigente Obrero Propugna Unidad de Confederaciones," El Caribe (June 5, 1962), p. 14.

candidate (later elected) for Congress on the PRD ticket. Angel Miolán, Bosch's campaign manager and President of the Party, was apparently attempting to line up this labor federation to serve as a counterweight to expected armed forces opposition to the PRD government.

The close ties between FOUPSA-CESITRADO and the Bosch administration meant that when Bosch was labelled a communist, the labor federation was also. Even the U.S. labor attaché went so far as to state that FOUPSA-CESITRADO was being run by the communists; its leaders are "known communists," he said.¹² When Bosch was overthrown the Police raided the labor organization's headquarters and confiscated what it called "communist propaganda."

There is some circumstantial evidence, stressed by the ultra-Rightists in the Dominican oligarchy, that FOUPSA-CESITRADO was communist-run. In the first place, its offices faced Enriquillo Park, the scene of many labor demonstrations--what the government of the Triumvirate liked to call "communist uprisings." In the second place, the sign over the offices still reads "FOUPSA," not "FOUPSA-CESITRADO" and the propaganda given out is still the old FOUPSA manifesto distributed by the discredited and sometimes Fidelista-leagued organization.

President Soto maintains, nevertheless, that FOUPSA-CESITRADO is apolitical. He was a deputy in the Congress, he claims, only to fight for the workers. Though he has no use for attaché Somerford and almost turns livid with rage at mention of his name ("We want democracy in our own way"), he remains a close friend of ORIT Secretary General Arturo Jaúregui and other non-communist and democratic labor leaders. He argues for a single

¹²Fred Anthony Somerford, personal interview, Santo Domingo, February 17, 1964.

federation and claims that the oligarchy has kept labor divided. Soto states that FOUPSA-CESITRADO had taken in many members of the disintegrating La Unión ("We will accept anyone who is against the landowners"), but that this organization had been and would remain democratic.¹³

Other FOUPSA-CESITRADO leaders claim that their organization is not politically-inspired and that it had no connections with any political party, not even the PRD. The executive committee of the labor organization is made up of National Civic Union and Revolutionary Social Christian Party members, as well as the PRD. Of the three officers who, in addition to Soto, were interviewed, two had voted for the conservative UCN and one for the PRD.¹⁴

FOUPSA-CESITRADO, like the original FOUPSA, thus was not a monolithic communist or Fidelista apparatus dedicated to subverting the Dominican labor movement. It was genuinely concerned more with raising the living standards of the workers than with using the labor movement for political purposes. Further, the fact that Soto was a PRD deputy but, in fact, politically independent, and that the executive committee contained UCN and PRSC members as well as PRD helps illustrate the fluidity and amorphousness of Dominican political groupings in the post-Trujillo years. To brand one or another organization as communist or communist-controlled was just too simple; the cases of FOUPSA and FOUPSA-CESITRADO are excellent examples of such oversimplified and hence misleading diagnoses.

¹³Miguel Soto, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 7, 1964.

¹⁴Based on personal interviews with Secretary of Social Assistance Pablo Pérez, First Commissariat Juan de la Cruz Martínez, and Secretary of Education Efraín Sánchez Oriano, Santo Domingo, August 7, 1964.

One other area of communist or Fidelista influence in the labor movement remains to be briefly mentioned, the public employees' association. The National Federation of Public Employees and of Autonomous Agencies (FENEPIA), headed by Rafael Danilo Noboa, with some 200 affiliated labor unions totaling some 20,000 members, came into existence following the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship. FENEPIA frequently went on strike at most crucial times in an effort to produce a military coup and create conditions in which extremist elements might emerge from the confusion in complete control.¹⁵ These strikes were often inspired by the Castro-oriented 14th of June Movement and the Dominican Popular Movement, both of which were strong among the rank-and-file government employees.

In this labor federation, also, communist or Fidelista strength was uncertain and tentative. It frequently appeared that FENEPIA was aligned with the extreme Left only because they might be advocating similar measures at a particular instant, though on other issues at the same time and on the same issue at different times they were likely to be far apart. Then, too, some of FENEPIA's affiliates, such as the electrical workers, were more Castro-oriented than others. Finally, the FENEPIA leadership was by no means a tightly knit group whose only aim was to deliver the Dominican Republic into communist hands. Rather, the leaders themselves often differed on a wide range of political perspectives and programs. Bosch himself all but totally destroyed the government workers' organization.¹⁶

¹⁵See Dom Bonafede, "Fear of Violence Shadows Dominicans Right to Vote," Miami Herald (November 4, 1962), p. 1.

¹⁶See Inter American Labor Bulletin, XIII (December, 1962), 1; and R. Hart Phillips, "Bosch Denies Red Influences are Rising," Gainesville Sun (October 3, 1963), p. 10.

The Political Parties

The official communist party in the Dominican Republic is the Popular Socialist Party. The PSP had been first formed in the early 1940's and its power increased rapidly. It was broken up by Trujillo in 1947 and most of its leaders allowed to go into exile. At the time Trujillo was killed, its greatest organizational strength was in Havana. The Party was later re-organized in the Dominican Republic. It had little influence or popular appeal and its activities long consisted only of painting pro-Castro and anti-U.S. signs on walls and buildings.

With the overthrow of Bosch the PSP gained more converts to its cause. The failure of a democratic government to carry out the much-needed reforms forced many to conclude that only totalitarian methods could destroy the entrenched power of the oligarchy. What the Dominican Revolutionary Party called the "radicalization of the slums" took place and the PSP's power grew.¹⁷

More important than the PSP is the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) headed by Máximo López Molina. The MPD proclaims itself a socialist party and signs its communiqués by placing "Marxist-Leninist Party" in parentheses under its name. It, among the Dominican far-Left parties, seems to be Castro's favorite and also, perhaps replacing the PSP, the Party through which Moscow officially prefers to operate.¹⁸

¹⁷ José Francisco Peña Gómez, personal interview, Santo Domingo, January 7, 1965.

¹⁸ See V. Levin, "Dominican Republic: The USA Uses the 'Big Stick,'" International Affairs [Moscow] (January, 1962), p. 95.

The MPD claims that it is "neither communist nor anarchist" and its programs call for respect for human rights, agrarian reform, industrialization, nationalization of public service industries, extermination of hunger and misery, educational reform, housing, non-intervention, democratic government, and friendly relations with all nations.¹⁹ The moderate program is counterbalanced by bitter anti-U.S. sentiment and the call for a revolution similar to that of Castro in Cuba. Its leader, López Molina, emerged as the most popular and well known of the extreme Leftist leaders. He and his Party seemingly played a three year game of hide-and-seek with the Police and with the conservative civilian authorities. López Molina was exiled by the Triumvirate and his Party made illegal. Nevertheless, it, like the PSP, increased in strength and popularity following the ouster of the Bosch government.

More important than either the PSP or the MPD is the 14th of June Movement, together with its ally, the Revolutionary Nationalist Party (PNR). The latter began functioning in the country on October 8, 1961, when a vanguard of eight members of the Party arrived in Ciudad Trujillo from exile in Venezuela. Upon arrival the PNR announced that it would not immediately publish its platform or state its principles but would wait to see what political developments took place.²⁰ It eventually became pro-Castro. The Party never developed into a powerful political force, though in alliance with the 14th of June Movement could make its voice heard.

¹⁹"MPD Expone su Programa," La Nación (July 21, 1961), p. 1. The text is on p. 23.

²⁰El Caribe (October 9, 1961), p. 1.

The 14th of June Movement ("1J4" or "Catorces") was the most important Party on the extreme Left in the first three years of the post-Trujillo period. It became identified with Fidelismo and eventually was labeled a communist party. The Movement cannot be categorized so simply and should be considered in more detail.

The Party derived its name from the June 14, 1959 invasion of the Dominican Republic by a group of Dominican exiles (and a few others) based in Cuba. It must be emphasized at once that this invasion was not a Castro-directed attempt to take over the Dominican Republic. Rather, it was almost exclusively an operation by Dominican patriots. Though the invasion failed, it served as an inspiration for other Dominicans who organized the 14th of June Movement.²¹

The Movement was converted into a non-partisan, civic action association following the death of Trujillo. As such, it was similar to the other political parties and groups which were opposing the continued Trujillo family dictatorship. Its first published platform, though claiming to be of a "revolutionary character," did not differ in any significant way from those of the National Civic Union or the Dominican Revolutionary Party. It called for moderate programs in agrarian reform, industrialization, and the establishment of a civil, representative, and democratic government.²²

Up to November, 1961, there had been little hint that there were differences between the 14th of June Movement and the UCN. When the last of the Trujillos left the country in mid-November, however, their common cause was gone and the two began to diverge. Probably the first sign of

²¹See especially the anniversary issue of the Movement's newspaper, El 1J4, 1 (June 14, 1962).

²²The text is in El 1J4, 1 (September 2, 1961), 2.

the developing split appeared when Catorce leader Manuel Tavárez Justo refused to share in a triumphal parade with UCN leader Fiallo. They immediately disagreed over more important matters. The UCN was willing to work with Balaguer while the 1J4 advocated his ouster. The 14th of June Movement insisted that the U.S. withdraw the warships which continued to cruise close to shore, while the UCN praised the role of the U.S. in preventing the reestablishment of the Trujillo dictatorship.²³

The split between the UCN and the 14th of June Movement soon widened. The UCN was instrumental in setting up the Council of State while the Catorces accused the Council of perpetuating oligarchic rule. The 1J4 accused the UCN of being reactionary and of harboring elements once closely associated with the Trujillo dictatorship. Catorce leaders accused the U.S. of imperialism with increasing frequency and called more insistently for a revolution similar to that of Castro in Cuba.²⁴

Though the Movement sounded more and more Castro-oriented and was soon pinned with the communist label, in fact it was made up of more diverse elements. The veteran journalist Mario Bobea Billini claims that the common orientation of the Party was intense nationalism, but that within this framework there were two tendencies: one faction was against only Yankee imperialism while the other was against all imperialism.²⁵ In 1962 1J4 leader Tavárez Justo was reported to have told the U.S. State Department

²³New York Times (November 23, 1961), p. 34.

²⁴These developments may be followed in El 1J4 from December, 1961, through February, 1962. See also P. Nikolayev, "The Root of the Dominican Troubles," New Times [Moscow], No. 50 (December 12, 1962), pp. 12-13.

²⁵Mario Bobea Billini, "Opinan Hay Dos Tendencias Dentro del 14 de Junio," El Caribe (February 20, 1962), p. 4.

that he was not a communist but could not admit it publicly for fear of splitting the Movement. And on June 14, 1963, at the Party's annual national rally, despite strong opposition from many of the delegates, he refused to include Castro's Cuba in a list of what he termed "the authentic Latin American revolutions."²⁶ Finally, the Catorces received little support from the Cuban dictator who preferred to work with the more consistent and manageable Dominican Popular Movement.

The increasing identification of the 14th of June Movement with Castroism or communism in the popular mind resulted in a large-scale defection from its ranks throughout 1962. The resignation of almost all the prominent personages who had joined the Party at its inception took place at this time. Its rolls were so depleted that it could no longer be ranked as a major party. Though ostensibly refusing to participate in the December elections because it felt they were fixed and that the country was not yet ready for them, the 14J, which had formerly had a strength equal to that of the PRD or UCN, realistically recognized that its popular following had sharply declined and wished not to make its weakness open knowledge by participating in a ballot count.²⁷ The Party implied in its theme of "Elections No, National Unity Government Sí!" that it preferred to work through the technique of the popular front.

The strength of the 14th of June Movement continued to decline during the Bosch regime. The PRD government had cut the underpinnings out from

²⁶Florangel Cárdenas, "Three Coups: One Successful, One Aborted, One Yet to Come," The San Juan Review, 1 (February, 1964), 6.

²⁷Antonio Duvergé, member of 14th of June Movement executive committee, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 28, 1962. See also New York Times (June 10, 1962), p. 30.

under the various communist and Fidelista groups by demonstrating that these elements did not have a monopoly on revolution, that basic social and economic reform could be achieved through democratic means. Though the Catorces were increasingly vociferous during this period, their actual popular following declined.

When Bosch was overthrown, some elements in the 14th of June Movement began guerrilla activity in support of a return to the constitutional order; but Tavárez Justo and most of his small group of followers (perhaps fifty or so) were hunted down and massacred by the armed forces. Tavárez was a popular figure, and his death turned him into a martyr. Though the Party was illegalized and many of its leaders sent into exile or forced underground by the Triumvirate, it recovered much of its lost strength.

One other political party was accused of having communist ties--the Dominican Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch. The charges stemmed largely from such things as Party President Angel Miolán's old connections with Mexico's Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL) or the "Revolutionary Poems" of Thelma Frías. It was true that the PRD had a Left wing composed largely of Trotskyites, but this faction was closely linked, rather, with democratic parties throughout the hemisphere. The PRD was anti-communist and favorable to the U.S.

As in the case of labor, communism was not a strong force in the Dominican political parties. Though the several communist- or Fidelista-oriented parties experienced a resurgence of strength following the overthrow of Bosch, they had little organization, few articulate leaders, and a relatively small following. The four Castro- or communist-leaning

parties were not unified and did not act in harmony. In an excellent article Mario Bobea Billini pointed to the differences between the "extremists" of the Popular Socialist and Dominican Popular Movement Parties, sometimes associated with the Pekin line, who rejected the December, 1962, elections as a contest between reactionaries and an "electoral farse," and the "moderates" of the Revolutionary Nationalist and 14th of June Movement Parties, sometimes associated with the Moscow line, who accepted the election of Bosch as an expression of genuinely popular sentiment.²⁸

Bosch's election meant the undermining of the argument of the Fidelistas that rapid modernization could be achieved only by totalitarian techniques. The usual strategy of the Fidelistas, in the face of such a democratic and reformist administration, is to instigate a campaign of terror and violence, as in Betancourt's Venezuela, in the hope of inducing an armed forces takeover and hence conditions in which they can pose as the only answer to a military dictatorship. But in the Dominican Republic this did not occur; the supposed "communists" or "Fidelistas" did not at all follow communist strategy. There was no guerrilla activity during Bosch's time in office. This fact again attests to the irregular, fluid, non-monolithic, and nationalistic nature of what was sometimes simply and mistakenly called "communism" in the Dominican Republic.

The students

The Dominican students, both in the high schools and the National University, were the most vociferous and at the same time most harmless of the extreme Leftist elements.

²⁸Mario Bobea Billini, "Hay Disparidad de Criterio en las Fuerzas de Izquierda?" El Caribe (January 30, 1963), p. 6.

The students receive a Leftist orientation early in their academic careers. The Federación Nacional de Maestros (FENEMA), the teachers' organization, is dominated by 14th of June Movement members or sympathizers. Though not a powerful organization, numerically, FENEMA is important for the considerable influence which the teachers have over their protegés.

The principal organization of the students is the Fragua group in the University. Often closely allied with the 14th of June Movement, Fragua was so strong in 1962 that the other student groups had to work underground.²⁹ In 1963, however, during Bosch's rule, the social-Christian Bloque Revolucionario Universitario Cristiano (BRUC) captured control. By 1964, after the overthrow of the PRD government, the Fragua group was again in command. In the 1964 elections, with 54 per cent of the student body voting, Fragua received 1,452 votes; the BRUC 1,157; and the democratic Left Frente Universitario Revolucionario Radical (FURR) only sixty six. This gave Fragua two representatives on the University Council and the BRUC one. In the student assembly Fragua won twenty-six seats, BRUC twenty-one, and FURR three. The victory for Fragua was repeated in the elections for the Federation of Dominican Students (FED). In the January, 1965, elections Fragua retained its hold on the University student body.

In addition to Fragua and the FED, Dominican students have also formed extra-curricular political organizations. One of these was the 20th of October group, founded on February 11, 1962, to help the Catorces and the FOUPSA labor federation in their struggle for control of the streets. The

²⁹Emmanuel Espinal, President of Juventud Revolucionaria Dominicana, personal interview, Santo Domingo, August 15, 1962. See also Armando Hoepelman, "Los estudiantes dominicanos: una juventud en peligro," Combate, IV (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1961), 65-71.

Group was named for the battle which the students had with the Police on October 20, 1961, during which several students were killed.³⁰ The 20th of October Group, like most of the student organizations, had only momentary appeal and little strength.

The students' activities consist of issuing propaganda sheets, painting signs on about every square inch of Santo Domingo's buildings and walls, and holding protest demonstrations. One of the Dominican Student Federation's propaganda sheets, for example, put out during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, condemned the U.S. as the aggressor, wished death on the "imperialists," and concluded with a shout of "Down with the Yankees."³¹

Prior to the build-up of the National Police during 1962, the students' demonstrations were effective. In alliance with the IJ4 or FOUPSA, they could at times gain virtual control of the downtown area. One of the favorite targets for student bricks was the large plate glass windows of the United States Information Service in the center of town. The Police soon regained control and more easily broken up. One of these occurred during Bosch's inauguration and, though on a small scale, forced the then Vice President Lyndon Johnson to retire from the reviewing stand. At another time the students demonstrated before the Inter-American Press Association, meeting in Santo Domingo, but this took the form of a peaceful parade, the most common form of student demonstrations. Occasionally the students can gather a large crowd, such as the 2,000 who massed before the National Palace following Bosch's ouster to demand the restoration of

³⁰The text of the organizational statement is in El Caribe (February 12, 1962), p. 5.

³¹Federación de Estudiantes Dominicanos, "Comunicado" (Unpublished mimeographed sheet, October, 1962).

constitutional government, but even this comparatively large demonstration was easily handled by the Police.

The student Leftists and their organizations are more political nuisances than effective agents. U.S. tourists--and frequently newspapermen--come away from Santo Domingo with wild stories, based on the number of anti-U.S. signs they see on walls and buildings, about the widespread communism in the country. But sign-painters can be hired cheaply and can paint most of the town in one night. This is not an accurate index to the strength of communism in the Dominican Republic.

In addition, the students themselves are, with few exceptions, not communists. They may be anti-U.S., but they are also against any foreign influences which they think threatens the national sovereignty. The student organizations may act in allegiance with the Castro-oriented parties or labor organizations, but this too does not necessarily mean that they are communists. They may even be pro-Castro, but this is largely because he has been able to flaunt the U.S. Once again, guilt-by-association is a risky method of determining who is or who is not a communist in the Dominican Republic. Above all, the students are intensely nationalistic; they want no part of any foreign interference, whether it be from the U.S. or from Russia or China.

Government Reactions to Communism

Trujillo's method of dealing with alleged communism was to brand all oppositionists as communists. His son Ramfis attempted to employ the same method, but it no longer worked.³² In this section the dealings of the

³²See Juan José Ayuso, "Dónde Está el Comunismo Dominicano?" Unión Cívica, I (September 23, 1961), 6; and "El Comunismo como arma defensora de los dictadores," El Radical, I (September 20, 1961), 4.

succeeding Council of State, Bosch, and the Triumvirate governments with communism is discussed.

The Council of State

The policy of the extreme Left during the period of the Council of State government was to create a condition of chaos in which the armed forces would be impelled to cancel the scheduled elections and take over the government. Upon the takeover by the military, the communists hoped to become the leaders of a new liberation movement. By continued demonstrations and riots throughout 1962 they sought to goad the armed forces in seizing power. Like they had done in numerous other cases, extreme Leftist elements might then gain ascendancy as the best-organized and most effective group opposed to military rule and thus gain control of a future revolutionary government after the induced military dictatorship had been overthrown. Indeed, just such orders were broadcast over Cuban radio to Castro-oriented forces in the Dominican Republic.³³

For a "weak" government the Council responded to these instructions with severe measures. On July 25 the President of the Council, Rafael Bonnelly, announced that his government had officially accused Cuba of "subversion and interference in Dominican affairs." Bonnelly stated that Cuban short wave radio was broadcasting daily calls to violence and that he had instructed Foreign Minister José A. Bonilla Atilas to present the Dominican case before the Organization of American States.³⁴

³³As reported by William L. Ryan, Associated Press dispatch, Miami Herald (October 22, 1962), p. 17-C.

³⁴El Caribe (July 26, 1962), p. 1.

Stronger action was soon taken. Council member Donald Reid Cabral was reported to have said, "We are going to take extreme measures without calling a state of siege. The Leftists want to break the democratic climate of the country but we know who their leaders are and we are going to take forceful action against them if they start anything. It is up to them what the future is going to bring them." The strength of the clampdown was demonstrated the next day when Máximo López Molina, head of the Dominican Popular Movement, and several of his followers were arrested. This was followed by a Police raid on the 14th of June Movement headquarters. In one three-day period, from October 31 to November 2, nineteen communist and pro-Castro agitators were deported. In a further attempt to limit subversion, the Council passed a measure prohibiting anyone considered to be a threat to the peace or security from entering or leaving the country. Previously communists and Castroites had been permitted to come and go freely.³⁵

One factor, which probably most severely hurt the Fidelista cause in the Dominican Republic, was a result of purely external forces. This was the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. It was at this time that it became apparent that Castro and Cuba were only pawns being manipulated by the two super powers. U.S. Ambassador Martin reportedly said, "Young Dominican Leftists captivated by Castro have become disillusioned by the fact Khrushchev calls the play for Cuba. Castro has lost the aura he once held for them."³⁶ The by-passing of Castro in settling the crisis forced

³⁵Maurice Bazim, "Dominican Leftists Forced into Exile--via U.S.," National Guardian, XV (November 29, 1962), 5. Reid's statement is quoted in Bonafede, op. cit., 1ff. See also New York Times (November 3, 1962), p. 8.

³⁶Quoted in Bonafede, op. cit., p. 1.

many of his followers in the Dominican Republic to rethink the implications of their positions and resulted in the defection of a large number from the Fidelista ranks.

The overall results of the Council's strong measures against extreme Leftists were that violence ceased, peaceful elections were held, and the Council successfully presided over the transition to a democratically elected government.

The Bosch government

It was during the Bosch government that the charge of communist infiltration in the government became widespread. The alleged infiltration was one of the principal reasons why he was overthrown after only seven months in office.

One aspect of this charge was that Bosch allowed communist and Fidelista groups to function freely in the country. He permitted those who had been exiled by the Council to return and to carry on their activities. The most prominent of the returnees was López Molina, who was welcomed at the airport with shouts of "Fatherland or death--we shall win." López Molina, in an airport speech to his followers, blamed "Yankee imperialism" for his deportation "because my being here was prejudicing their efforts to deceive the people."³⁷

Another aspect of the charge was that most of the extreme Left supported Bosch. Seldom did the 14th of June Movement, the Popular Socialist Party, the Dominican Popular Movement, or the Revolutionary Nationalist Party attack his government. Indeed, the outright and open support of the

³⁷New York Times (April 2, 1963), p. 95.

Catorces, for example, caused many to think that Bosch was definitely leagued with the communists. In the village of Padre Las Casas 1J4 head Tavárez Justo said "the government of the Dominican Revolutionary Party can do much good for the country because it can count on the help of a great democratic sector, including the help of the 14th of June Movement."³⁸ Statements such as these seriously frightened the moderate and conservative elements in the population.

A third aspect of the charges of communist infiltration in the Bosch government was the ring of advisers that surrounded the President. PRD President Angel Miolán's ties with Lombardo Toledano and the CTAL were revived again. The democratic Leftists from all over Latin America who staffed the Interamerican Center of Social Studies (CIDES) were viewed with equally suspicious eyes. The visits of such old U.S.-baiters as ex-Guatemalan President Juan José Arévalo caused further concern. Other PRD and government officials' ties with the early 14th of June Movement were brought up.³⁹

A fourth aspect of Bosch's alleged communism was the measures which he proposed to have enacted into law. Some elements in the Church had already accused him of being a communist even before the election; but the PRD constitution, which failed to recognize Catholicism as the official

³⁸Quoted in Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional: Estudios y Pruebas Documentales de las Causas del Movimiento Reivindicador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963 (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964), p. 46.

³⁹For "documentation" of the "communist infiltration," see ibid., pp. 67-74; Armando García Sifredo, "Juan Bosch: Pacto con el Comunismo," Patria, IV (February, 1963), 1ff.; Antoni E. Gollan, "Reds Seek Takeover in Dominican Republic," Washington World (July 8, 1963), p. 4; and Hal Hendrix "Dominican Regime Near Collapse," New York World Telegram (September 24, 1963), p. 1ff.

religion, and the law of illegitimacy, which gave equal rights to natural born children, cemented the Church's opposition. Bosch's law of confiscations resulted in the business-landowning community charging him with communism. His proposals to reduce the strength of the armed forces brought forth a like charge from that sector. The military was also frightened by the supposed creation of a PRD-directed militia and had visions of being lined up against a wall and shot en masse, just like Castro had done to many of the old Batista officers. The accusation was not usually that Bosch himself was a communist (though this was also mentioned) but that the programs he advocated were "communistic."

Fifthly, for many it was significant that at no time did Bosch state his position with regard to Castro's Cuba. During the election campaign he had assiduously avoided the issue for fear of alienating a large bloc of much-needed votes. But when he became President, Bosch still refused to condemn Castroism. Nor would he permit anti-Castro Cuban exiles to use the Dominican Republic as a base for hit-and-run attacks on the neighboring island. Though he had little use for the dictatorship established in Cuba, Bosch did not stress this publicly. He felt that the Dominican social structure was not strong enough to withstand the introduction of still another divisive controversy.

The biggest issue, however, was that Bosch refused to crack down on the avowedly communist or Fidelista elements. Castro propaganda was flooding the country and extreme Left political parties were openly advocating the violent overthrow of the oligarchy, the abolishment of the armed forces, and the ouster of the U.S. Thirty Dominicans were permitted to travel to Cuba for the 26th of July celebration and to return unmolested. Some stayed

in Cuba to study and others traveled to Iron Curtain countries. While this freedom for communists and Fidelistas might be welcome in the abstract, given the government's belief in absolute tolerance, it proved disastrous as a practical political measure.

Bosch's answer to the incessant charges of communism and communist infiltration was the argument that in a democratic society all voices should be permitted to speak, so long as they obey the law. He refused to clamp down on communist elements on the grounds that he could better observe them if their activities took place openly rather than clandestinely. He argued that communism could not be fought by jailing its leaders but by instituting a broad social reform that would undercut communist appeal. He sought to remove what he believed were the causes of communism, not to act on its effects.

Bosch believed that communism in the Dominican Republic was still in its infant stage. It had reached the level of formation, he said, of Cuba in 1925 and of Venezuela in 1945. Bosch admitted that there were several communist groups operating in the country but emphasized that they were immature and often fought among themselves. "Their political force," the President wrote, "is very far from what it is in Chile and other American countries."⁴⁰

In a lucid article entitled "Bosch and Communism" Theodore Draper has presented Bosch's views on alleged communist infiltration. On March 13, Draper reports, soon after taking office, Bosch defined his country's choice. "The dilemma is one thing only and very clear: democracy or communism, and communism means death, war, destruction, and the loss of

⁴⁰ Juan Bosch, special statement prepared for the Miami Herald (May 27, 1963), p. 8-A.

our blessings." A few days later he made it clear that he did not intend to follow the policy of President Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela. He wrote: "In our countries any attempt to suppress the native communists by direct persecution only succeeds in turning them into guerrillas."

As the fear of communist subversion in the Dominican Republic spread, certain groups became alarmed. In July Bosch was forced to confront the armed forces, who had demanded that he clamp down on the Leftists. The President refused to do so and the speech he delivered over national television in defense of his stand was eloquent and should be quoted at some length:

A democratic government cannot be democratic for some and dictatorial for others, just as a dictatorship cannot be tyrannical for some and democratic for others. If Trujillo had permitted liberties for one sector of the Dominican people, his tyranny would not have lasted. If democracy establishes a dictatorship for one Dominican sector, the others, those who remain free will be the first to accuse the democratic government of being a tyranny.

We have not returned to our country to persecute; we are affirmative, not negative. But in the last instance we say that if the armed forces persist in this, they must look for someone else to govern, because I am not willing to head a dictatorship, total or partial, in the Dominican Republic . . . While we govern in this country, liberty will not perish.

Bosch evidently felt that Dominican democracy could not withstand a large-scale anti-Castro clampdown; he refused to plunge the country into a struggle which he feared would result in a bloody civil war. He was resolved not to cut himself off from the younger generation, many of whom were attracted to the slogans of the extreme Left, by drawing a blood line between himself and them. He remained committed to a free and tolerant democracy.⁴¹

⁴¹Theodore Draper, "Bosch and Communism," The New Leader, XLVI (October 14, 1963), 9-14. See also Max Freedman, "Juan Bosch, Castro: A Study in Contrast," Miami Herald (June 16, 1963), p. 8-C.

Bosch's stand on communism, ultimately, was one of the major reasons why he was overthrown. He was probably correct in feeling that communism was not a threat to the Dominican Republic, but he was mistaken in not recognizing the issue as a political matter. This was not a question in which lofty principles would decide the winner. The communism-in-government charge was largely a smokescreen thrown up by Bosch's opponents in the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landowning elite. It served as a convenient issue to unite the opposition and to mask their deeper antipathy to the President.

Most responsible critics of Bosch did not actually believe he was a communist but felt that he had permitted communism and communist groups to pervade his government. Indeed, while such Leftist parties as the 14th of June Movement supported him, Bosch was regarded by the official communist press as a puppet of the U.S. monopolies.⁴²

The questions of whether Bosch was or was not a communist, whether his programs were communistic, or whether communism was infiltrating his government were, in the end, unimportant. The important point is that the most powerful sectors in Dominican politics--the armed forces, the Church and the elite--thought that all these things were true. These groups were convinced that their country was about to become another Cuba; and in the face of these convictions Bosch delivered idealistic speeches but failed to take any action. While tolerance may be good in the abstract and could be permitted in less critical times, it was not at this time appropriate in the Dominican Republic. This was not, then, a question of right or wrong;

⁴²S. Vishnevsky, "Behind the Scenes of Coup in Santo Domingo," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XV (October 30, 1963), 23. Reprinted from Pravda (October 4, 1963), p. 6.

it was a political problem that called for a political solution. While one may sympathize with Bosch's idealism and, indeed, may conclude that he was correct in his estimate of domestic communist weakness, it seems clear that the President might well have stayed in office had he taken some stand--almost any sop would have been sufficient--against the alleged communist infiltration. A forceful statement condemning communism or some minor restriction on communist activities would have assuaged the fears of the only groups in Dominican politics which had the power to overthrow him. Bosch failed to make this move and the result was his ouster.

The Triumvirate

Upon Bosch's overthrow the armed forces turned power over to a civilian Triumvirate which proceeded to follow a vigorous anti-communist policy. On October 8 the organization, existence, and activities of all communist parties were prohibited. The law banned government contracts with communists; the use of emblems, banners, and uniforms of a "communist character"; and the entry of foreign or domestic communists into the country. It concluded that all communist activity was "contrary to the essentially civic, republic, democratic, and representative form of government."⁴³ On November 30 the law was expanded to include all verbal, written, radio, or television "propaganda of a communist nature."⁴⁴

Equipped with these all-inclusive measures, the armed forces took action. López Molina and eight of his followers from the Dominican Popular Movement were captured in the hills where they had begun guerrilla

⁴³The text is in El Caribe (October 9, 1963), p. 17.

⁴⁴The text is in El Caribe (December 1, 1963), p. 6.

activity. Two leaders of the 14th of June Movement, Leandro Guzmán and Danilo Dario Ozuma, were arrested and their arms cache confiscated. On the same day that López Molina was captured (October 24), the offices of the 20th of October Group were raided and closed by the National Police. The central party offices of Bosch's PRD and of the 14th of June Movement were also padlocked. The President and many PRD leaders were sent into exile; while the Party's labor and peasant branches were raided, their equipment broken up, and their leaders jailed. Other members of the MPD were soon captured and jailed or deported.

The most oppressive measures were taken against the 14th of June Movement. Following Bosch's ouster, the Catorces had begun guerrilla activity in favor of a return to constitutional government. For weeks the counter-insurgency forces of the military hunted them down in the mountains to the southwest of Santiago. Tired, hungry, and sick the group decided to surrender. But as they approached unarmed and carrying a white flag, the soldiers killed all but a few and buried them without ceremony in a common grave.⁴⁵ Among those killed was 1J4 leader Tavárez Justo. The slaughter prompted the resignation of Triumvirate President Emilio de los Santos and the withdrawal of support for the government of four of the six parties which had formed the coalition in opposition to Bosch.

The Triumvirate continued its policy of vigorous anti-communism. Its criteria of who is a communist became so broad that almost all opposition was branded with this damning label. People were sometimes indiscriminantly

⁴⁵The armed forces at first reported that the guerrillas had been killed in combat, but later admitted that this story was a complete fabrication. See Norman Gall, "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again," The Nation, CXCVIII (February 17, 1964), 159-161.

rounded up for voicing criticism of the regime and periodically certain offices were raided by the National Police.⁴⁶ The overall result of the indiscriminate suppression was increased communist strength rather than its curtailment.

Communism in the Dominican Republic was a weak and divided political force. Though none of the far Left political parties participated in the 1962 elections and hence an accurate gauge of their strength is lacking, it has been authoritatively estimated that the total number of actual communists in the country constitutes roughly 1 per cent of the population.⁴⁷ There was little danger of a strong communist insurrection, let alone a communist takeover. After the small band of 14th of June Movement members were wiped out in the hills, there was no organized violence in the interior, and even in the capital city extreme Leftist elements seemed to be pathetically feeble. Radio Havana comes in loud and clear in most areas of the country, but its appeal appeared to carry little attraction. A demagogic and charismatic leader might have been able to unify the diverse communist and Castroite groups, along with the many discontented (the unemployed, the discouraged and "out" democratic Left political leaders), but such a leader did not appear. Then too, it was clear that another Cuba in the Caribbean would not be politically feasible to any administration in Washington; and should the threat ever develop, it is certain that the U.S. would intervene, even to the extent of sending in the Marines. This is precisely what happened in April, 1965.

⁴⁶Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 5-6.

⁴⁷See Arthur Daron, "Dominican Military Never Lost Power," The Militant (October 21, 1963), p. 5.

In a sense, both the intrusion of the U.S. in Dominican internal politics, considered in the last chapter, and the influence of the communists, considered in this chapter, are equally unfortunate. For the result has been that a completely extraneous, foreign, and irrelevant issue, the Cold War, has been brought to Dominican shores at a time when the country could hardly afford still another divisive conflict. This comment should not be interpreted as implying that the tensions generated in this "developing country" would not have emerged without the Cold War. What is meant, rather, is that the tensions and antagonisms arising out of the East-West struggle further complicated the effort to eliminate the legacy of atomization from the Trujillo era, to achieve a consensus, and to develop a stable and functioning democratic government. The intrusion of one more major source of deep conflict into a society already rent by irreconcilable divisions made even more complicated and difficult the process of nation-building and the problem of bridging the transition from a near-totalitarian dictatorship to a pluralist democracy in the Dominican Republic.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

What happens when a totalitarian or near-totalitarian dictatorship is overthrown? How is it possible to build a functioning democracy in the wake of such a regime. How can a pluralist system be developed in a country which had previously been under the monolithic control of one man or a small elite? These are some of the questions which this study has sought to explore.

Students of totalitarianism and of democracy have begun to stress that the lines between the two systems are more of degree than of kind. Whereas earlier scholars tended to treat totalitarianism and democracy as pure forms, some more recent studies have demonstrated that the distinction is not one of absolutes. And while there has been some study of the conversion of a democratic order into a totalitarian one, there has been almost no analysis of the reverse process--the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Particularly in an era in which the totalitarian structure of some of the communist states seems to be breaking up and in which one-man authoritarian rule, however benevolent, has become prevalent in many developing countries, this subject should be explored.

This study has sought to provide a theoretical as well as factual framework for the consideration of these questions in one country, the Dominican Republic. The regime of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina was the most nearly totalitarian of any previous dictatorships in the history of Latin America. What most characterizes such a near-total-

itarian regime is the near-total control which it exercises over all intermediate or secondary groups--i.e., those groups which stand between the government and the governed and which tend to limit the authority of the state. In the Dominican Republic of Trujillo no group, no association, no societal class was allowed to function independently of the regime; all were subordinated to the dictator's control.

While a weak intermediate group structure may lead to totalitarian control, strong intermediaries, by the same token, seem to be essential for pluralist democracy. A wide number of independent groups that are sufficiently equivalent in strength to generate wholesome competition and yet prevent any one group or organization from wholly dominating the political system is the essence of pluralist democracy. Following the overthrow of the near-totalitarian Trujillo regime, the outlines of a pluralist democracy began to emerge. The major portion of this outline was the development of a wide variety of independent and competitive intermediate groups. This study has concentrated on tracing the growth and activities of these organizations.

The Dominican armed forces emerged from the Trujillo era as the strongest political force in the country. It had been the central pillar of the Generalissimo's control and the ultimate source of his authority. Only in the last two years of his rule did some elements in the armed forces begin to turn against Trujillo, but these were few in number and isolated from the main stream of military support for the dictatorship. After the Trujillos were driven out, the armed forces continued as the strongest political group in the society. Most of the top hierarchy left with the Trujillos but the apparatus largely remained intact. The officers who commanded the armed forces in the post-Trujillo years had occupied middle

level--i.e., colonel--positions in the previous era; and the military remained, for the most part, Trujillista dominated.

Some efforts at reform of the armed forces have been made--civic action programs, education, and professionalism--but the reforms have only begun. Little has been done to reduce the size of the immense military machine; on the contrary, its strength has been increased. Some armed forces officers and enlisted men have reacted against the corruption, the irresponsibility, and the political meddling of the high command and are in favor of a democratic system in the Dominican Republic. These elements are still in a minority, however. The result has been that some division has appeared in the armed forces; certain elements were not in favor of the overthrow of the democratic government of Juan Bosch. United or divided, nevertheless, the armed forces remain the most powerful group in Dominican politics.

Trujillo's control over the Church had not been so complete as it had been over other intermediate groups. Rather, their relations were characterized by a harmonious arrangement: Trujillo granted favors and privileges to the Church and it, in turn, supported his regime. Like some elements in the armed forces, the Church began to oppose the dictatorship during its last two years. After the regime was overthrown the Church began to take an increasingly liberal stance in favor of social reform and democracy. But it steadfastly opposed the form democracy took in the Dominican Republic with the election of Bosch. The Church was among the strongest--and certainly the most unified--of the groups which began to oppose the constitutional government.

The business-professional-landowning elite was closely watched by the Trujillo regime. Though the dictator could not force the active collaboration

of many of the Dominican oligarchy, he did control their organizations. Further, in order to prosper in Trujillo's Dominican Republic, one had to go along with the regime. After the dictatorship was overthrown, these elements organized into several secondary associations. In contrast to some of the other intermediate groups springing up at about the same time, these associations were face-to-face organizations in which everyone knew everyone else or was interrelated and hence strong, unified, and well organized. From this position of strength, the elite could and did oppose the reforms advocated by Bosch and eventually were a crucial factor in his overthrow.

In contrast to the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landowning elite, the Dominican bureaucracy was among the most atomized groups in the Trujillo era. No one was allowed to hold a position long enough to build up a sizable personal following that might pose a threat to the regime; personnel were constantly shuffled up and down in the bureaucratic structure. No independent government workers' organization was permitted. Following the overthrow of the Trujillos, the bureaucracy continued much as it had before. Nepotism, speculation, lack of professionalism, purely political appointments and removals, graft were rampant. A government workers' organization sprang up but it was crushed. An effective civil service law was promised but never delivered. The de-Trujilloization campaign added to the chaos. With all this disruption and disorganization, the public service remained a relatively weak intermediate organization and its organized forays into politics were largely ineffective.

During the Trujillo dictatorship, genuine opposition political parties were not permitted to function. For almost the entire Trujillo era, only the

single, official Dominican Party was allowed. The PD, further, bore little resemblance to what is customarily thought of as a political party; it was more a political apparatus to carry out special chores for the regime. Following Trujillo's death opposition parties began to form. They grew in strength and maturity and were especially effective in enabling sectors of the population which had never before had a say in national affairs to make their voices heard. They emerged as vital factors in the political process, as essential intermediate organizations. In comparison with the armed forces, the Church, and the elite, however, they were weak. This weakness of the political parties, relative to the other groups in the society, contributed to the failure of the attempt to establish democracy in the Dominican Republic.

The labor movement was tightly controlled by the Trujillo dictatorship. Only one major strike occurred during the entire Trujillo era, and all labor activity came under the control of the official Dominican Confederation of Workers. An independent labor movement evolved after Trujillo was killed. But almost from the beginning labor was beset by disunity which divided and weakened the movement. The labor sector was thus highly fluid and amorphous. The individual unions were weakly organized and the federations were loose confederations in which the unions often shifted allegiance. Frequently the unions and the federations worked at cross purposes, both with management and among themselves. Labor became an independent force to be reckoned with in Dominican politics, but compared with some of the other organized sectors of the population, it had little strength and was not well organized.

The rural peasant has traditionally been the forgotten man of Dominican politics. He has always been atomized, with the result that the

Trujillo dictatorship paid very little attention to him. There was little effort on the part of the regime to enlist the campesino in a vast mass movement. Only after the dictatorship was overthrown was an attempt made to organize the countryside. The political parties took the lead in this organization because they realized that in a country 70 per cent rural, the peasant vote would be decisive. Cooperatives and credit unions represented other efforts to provide the campesinos with an organizational base from which they could make their views known. An agrarian reform program was launched with this end and others in mind. But the effort to organize the peasantry was only in its beginning stages. Few campesinos were enlisted in any organization and few lands were distributed under the agrarian reform. The peasantry was the weakest of all the intermediate sectors in the society.

In the area of communications, the most notable gains were made. In the Trujillo era the press, radio, and television were tightly controlled by the dictatorship; no independent opinion was allowed to be printed or broadcast. Following the ouster of the Trujillos, several free and independent newspapers provided a variety of political slants and educational services. A huge number of radio stations sprang up, and both these and the two television stations began to present a number of educational and public affairs programs along with improved news coverage. Circulation of the newspapers and the number of radio and television sets steadily increased. Though some abuses occurred, freedom of expression became the rule. Problems and difficulties of course remained. Liberty of expression was sometimes equated with license, the government at times intervened, there is a lack of trained and competent reporters. Most importantly, some

groups--notably, the peasantry--remained without any means of communicating their views. On the whole, however, the developments in the mass media contributed a strong and influential intermediary to Dominican politics which had not existed before.

Along with these internal intermediate organizations, which have played a major or minor role in Dominican political events, other external forces must be taken into consideration. At times these external forces have been as crucial or more crucial than the domestic secondary groups. The external forces played upon and used the internal groups, often reinforcing them or underlining their basic atomization and powerlessness within Dominican society. This was especially true in the country in the post-Trujillo period, for the Dominican Republic became one of the many pawns in the East-West struggle. For this reason it was necessary to consider both the role of the United States and the role of the communists. Though the activities of the U.S. have often been beneficial for the country, the intervention of the Cold War brought another divisive conflict to Dominican shores at a time when it was already beset by numerous divisions and antagonisms. This conflict further complicated the effort to build a pluralist democracy in the wake of the overthrow of the dictatorship.

The Dominican Republic after Trujillo thus saw the emergence of a wide variety of independent political groups, forces, associations, and societal differentiations. The armed forces, the Church, the business-professional-landowning elite, the bureaucracy, the political parties, labor, the peasantry, communications, the United States, and the communists all emerged as competitive sectors in post-Trujillo Dominican politics. A genuine pluralist system came into existence. But if pluralism is the essence of democracy, why did this plurality of groups not produce a functioning

democratic system? In addition to the many reasons already analyzed throughout this study, several more basic, more fundamental underlying reasons might be suggested.

In the first place, some of these groups were stronger than others. William Kornhauser states that a democracy requires the existence of a plurality of groups that are similar enough in strength to generate genuine competition and yet prevent any one group, or any alliance of groups, from wholly dominating the society.¹ In the Dominican Republic the groups were not similar enough in strength. Especially the armed forces and the business-professional-landowning elite were stronger than the labor organizations or the peasantry.

One aspect of the strength of these groups is the degree to which they are cohesive. David Truman writes that "the degree of unity in the group is probably most fundamental in determining the measure of success it will enjoy."² The most unified groups in Dominican politics were, once again, the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landowning elite; while the most disunified were the political parties, the labor organizations, and the peasantry.

Another aspect of the strength of these sectors is organizational. Once again, roughly the same lineup of forces is found. The armed forces, because of their hierarchical and orderly chain of command, are well organized. The Church, for almost equally obvious reasons, is also well organized. The business-professional-landowning elite, while not as

¹William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 236.

²David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 167.

tightly organized, has the advantage of being a small face-to-face group in which everyone knows everyone else. It is no accident, further, that the two best organized groups--the armed forces and the Church--were precisely the sectors that were least atomized during the Trujillo era.

By way of contrast, the political parties, the labor organizations, and the peasantry were extremely fluid and poorly organized. In addition, these were all distal or non-face-to-face groups whose members had never known each other before and who, unlike the elite, did not have a tradition of close and intimate contact.³ Further, it is no accident that two of the least well organized groups--the political parties and labor--were precisely the sectors that were most controlled, most "atomized," by the dictatorship; while the third--the peasantry--had been traditionally so disorganized as to not even merit Trujillo's attention.

It is not surprising that the strongest, more cohesive, best organized groups in Dominican politics--the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landowning elite--were those sectors which had long traditions in Dominican politics; while the weakest, least cohesive, and worst organized--the political parties, the labor organizations, and the peasantry--were those societal differentiations which were most new, most "modern," in the country's political system.⁴ Further, it was the traditional groups

³The literature on the distinction between face-to-face or "primal" groups and non-face-to-face or "distal" groups is endless. A good recent statement of the distinction and its implications in terms of group behavior is James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), Chapters 5 and 6.

⁴Douglas E. Ashford, "Patterns of Group Development in a New Nation: Morocco," American Political Science Review, LV (June, 1961), 321-332.

which were least controlled by Trujillo (which ultimately enabled these sectors to lead the opposition to the dictatorship during its last two years) and the modern groups that were most controlled by the regime. Finally, it was this configuration--the traditional, strong, cohesive, well organized armed forces, Church, and business-professional-landowning elite as opposed to the modern, weak, non-cohesive, poorly organized political parties, labor organizations, and peasantry--which was precisely the lineup of forces arrayed, respectively, in opposition to and in support of the constitutional and democratic government of Juan Bosch. It was no accident that strong, organized, and united forces were able to overcome weak, disorganized, and disunited forces and that the subsequent opposition to the overthrow was also only weak, sporadic, and unorganized.⁵

It is important to remember that though the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-landowning elite were the strongest groups in the society in terms of political power, numerically they were the least significant. If one considers that all the armed forces combined number approximately 30,000; that the elite, using the most inclusive criteria, total 15,000; and that there are only 390 priests, the undemocratic make-up of Dominican society becomes readily apparent. The combined numerical strength of these three groups is only 1.5 per cent of the total population; yet, measured by influence, their strength is overwhelming. The vast majority, 98.5 per cent, had relatively insignificant power.

A second major underlying reason why the Dominican Republic failed to develop into a functioning pluralist democracy was that there was little

⁵See the excellent article by Manuel Maldonado Denis, "La Caída de Juan Bosch y la Política en la República Dominicana," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 1 (November, 1963).

agreement--consensus-- among the plural groups on the basic paths the country should follow. In a functioning pluralist system there need not necessarily be a single common orientation of all its members toward the government. But pluralism does require that there be a minimum shared basis of understanding, a basic acceptance of the rules of the game.⁶

The U.S., for example, is often considered a pluralist democracy in which there is an underlying consensus. Thus, nearly everyone in such distant towns as Tallahassee, Florida, and Ann Arbor, Michigan, could agree on five basic democratic propositions.⁷ This high percentage of agreement is not found in the Dominican Republic.

One aspect of the lack of consensus is the rigid class structure existing in the country. Louis Hartz persuasively argues that one reason for the comparative consensus in the U.S. is the lack of a feudal tradition which would have tended to divide the society into rigid classes. This lack of a feudal tradition has meant, according to Hartz, that the U.S. has a comparatively narrow political spectrum in which the vast majority of the population are in the middle with only a few at either extreme.⁸ The Dominican Republic, in contrast, has a feudal tradition with a rigid class-caste system. The stratification of Dominican society tends to divide the country into horizontal as well as vertical patterns with few in the middle and most at the extremes. The result is the division of

⁶See Douglas E. Ashford, "Patterns of Consensus in Developing Countries," American Behavioral Scientist, IV (April, 1961), 7-10.

⁷James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, XXII (May, 1960), 276-294.

⁸Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1955).

the society into rigid sectors with few communications between them and little agreement on the basic directions the country should take. The class structure of Dominican society, in contrast to that of the U.S., is illustrated in Chart 4.

Chart 4

Social Spectrum of Society, The United States and the Dominican Republic

United States

Lower Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
20%	70%	10%

Dominican Republic

Lower Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
70%	20%	10%

Closely related to this aspect is the factor of the types of groups involved. In the U.S. interest groups are based more in associational patterns. In the Dominican Republic interests are organized more in non-associational ways based on broad societal differentiations of class, caste, rank, hierarchies, juridical states. Rather than being based on loose and fluid patterns which would tend to mitigate against rigidity, each of these sectors has its own rigidly defined responsibilities, privileges, duties, and behavior patterns. Each leans toward autocracy in its own respective sphere with few shared values and few contacts with the other groups in the system.⁹

⁹Ramón Grullón, "Antecedentes y perspectivas del momento político dominicano," Cuadernos Americanos, CXX (Enero-Febrero, 1962), 221-252.

Not only were many of the major sectors in the society thus highly fluid, amorphous, and atomized; but these same characteristics thus applied to the inter-group relationships. Each sector became a thing unto itself; it was "atomized" from the other groups.

A key aspect mitigating against rigidity in the group structure and for harmony is the concept of overlapping membership. In the U.S. a "joiner" could be a member of dozens of associational interest groups. The participation of an individual in a number of interest groups involves him in a situation where he may find himself a member of several associations with conflicting aims. His overlapping memberships tend to soften his commitment to either extreme and helps produce consensus. The groups are thus neither monolithic nor insulated from each other.¹⁰ In the Dominican Republic, by way of contrast, there is a paucity of interest groups and hence little possibility of overlapping memberships or cross pressures on one's loyalty. An individual, then tends to go all-out for the position of the single group to which he belongs. The groups become monolithic and insulated from each other. This produces a lack of moderation and hence a lack of consensus.

The Bosch government helped polarize the country and thus contributed to the lack of consensus. He was a Leftist who was complete anathema to the Right. He probably tried to proceed too far too fast. Had the Dominican Republic's first democratically elected president in thirty-three years been a Centrist and had he been more moderate in his approach, constitutional government might have lasted.¹¹

¹⁰Truman, op. cit., pp. 157-167; and Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and the Comparative Analysis of Elites," Social Forces, XXXV (October, 1956), 84.

¹¹Jottin Cury, "Los Dos Extremos de la Lucha," El Caribe (August 7, 1963), p. 8.

Another way to look at this lack of consensus is to consider it a crisis of legitimacy. Consensus and legitimacy are intimately related and, indeed, Seymour M. Lipset has defined legitimacy as the degree to which the political system is generally accepted by the citizens--i.e., consensus.¹² Particularly relevant to the situation in the Dominican Republic is Lipset's comment that groups regard the political system as legitimate or illegitimate in accordance with the degree that they share primary values.¹³ The sectors with which this study has been concerned did not share primary values. Important sectors of the dominant political party, the labor movement, and the peasantry rejected the Council of State because they regarded it as illegitimate; and for the same reason the armed forces, the Church, and the business-professional-land-owning elite rejected the Bosch government. In both cases the prevailing value system of the groups in power was too much at variance with that of the groups out of power.

The development of new and more "modern political groups following the fall of the Trujillo regime contributed to the Dominican Republic's legitimacy crisis. Crises of legitimacy, Lipset writes, are primarily a recent historical phenomenon produced by the emergence of new and sharp cleavages among the various sectors of the population. The newer, more modern groups, because of the nature of the changing modern world, have organized around different values than those previously considered to be

¹²Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 39.

¹³Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1960), 86-87.

the only legitimate ones in the society.¹⁴ The more modern conception of political parties, labor federations, and an organized peasantry came in conflict with the more traditional norms of Dominican politics.

"A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change," Lipset writes. He points out, with particular relevance to the Dominican case, that crises of legitimacy are most likely to occur during the transition to a pluralist democratic society, given two conditions. The first condition is that all major groups have not been able to secure access to the political system. The second is that the status of the more traditional groups is threatened.¹⁵ Both these conditions existed in the Dominican Republic in the period after the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship: new groups found accessibility limited and old groups found their status threatened. The overall result produced a breakdown in the pluralist group structure.

The problem of legitimacy was crucial during the Dominican Republic's attempt to bridge the transition from near-totalitarianism to pluralist democracy. An example will help relate this theoretical structure to the actual and real situation in the country. In the 1960 elections in the U.S., Kennedy was accepted as the legitimate president with only 50 per cent of the vote; while in the 1962 election in the Dominican Republic, Bosch, with 60 per cent, was not accepted as legitimate. The opposition in the Dominican Republic subsequently did not limit itself to the "normal" role of a loyal opposition. Rather, it refused to accept the government

¹⁴Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁵Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 78.

and, instead of waiting for the next election, did not rest until the government had been overthrown and completely destroyed.¹⁶

In the language of political science, several terms have been employed to describe a political system in which there is pluralism without consensus, in which the various centrifugal forces in the society go flying off in several different directions with no attachment to a central nucleus. The type of situation existing in the Dominican Republic may be described as one of anomie--i.e., a situation in which diversity has become so complete that it has made for a disintegrated social condition with no apparent common purpose.¹⁷ Robert Dahl in his study of New Haven described a system in which the various groups active in politics were so far apart, so fragmented, and with so little agreement or communication between them that they resembled separate nations as one of "independent sovereignties."¹⁸ David Truman employed the term "morbific politics" to describe a situation in which the conflicts between the plural groups became so extreme that the entire system broke down.¹⁹ Other scholars would call the Dominican Republic a "dysfunctional" or 'prismatic' society.

¹⁶For an application of legitimacy theory to the fall of the Bosch government see Maldonado Denis, op. cit., pp. 9-12.

¹⁷The concept of anomie is used here in the sense that it was developed by Emile Durkheim and applied to contemporary politics in Sebastian De Grazia, The Political Community: A Study of Anomie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

¹⁸Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 310.

¹⁹See especially the section entitled "Interest Groups and Morbific Politics," in Truman, op. cit., 516-524. It must be remembered, of course, that the difference between a functioning pluralist system and the breakdown into morbific politics is one of degree, for some conflict is an unavoidable result or consequence of group politics.

The concept of integration is an especially useful one to describe the situation in the Dominican Republic. Some of the major groups in the society--especially the lower class urban workers and the rural campesinos--remain almost entirely outside national decision-making. They are wholly without a say in matters that affect them most intimately. The country, in short, was still unintegrated. And when a government, the Bosch regime, attempted to integrate these elements into the national political, social, and economic life for the first time in the nation's history, it met with the concerted opposition of those groups which had long had a monopoly on political power.

Whether a nation can bridge the transition from dictatorship to pluralist democracy hinges, to a large extent, on the integration of the various groups active in its politics. The transition requires the assimilation of new values and, at the same time, the preservation of traditional values. If a happy balance between the conflicting sets of value standards of the several sectors is not maintained, the political system becomes disintegrated and will likely collapse.²⁰

The development from dictatorship to democracy entails an uneven distribution of political advantage. Traditional and vested interests are likely to be dislocated or deprived while the more modern groups receive new opportunities for advancement. The old stratification may be disrupted while new escalators for the traditionally deprived groups appear. If these changes are too rapid or too abrupt, serious splits will develop within the system and the traditional sectors may rebel. If change is too slow, new leaders may arise who urge rapid modernization

²⁰Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 46-50.

through violently revolutionary means. All this will probably impel the groups to become autonomous centers of power with little contact with the rest of the society.²¹

If consensus is to be maintained among these groups, bargaining and compromising are necessary. A feature of modern pluralist democracy is the multiplicity of interests; with political development come new social differentiations. This very multiplicity makes such balance and compromise necessary.²² Bargaining and compromising were not characteristics of the Dominican political system in the period after Trujillo, however.

The Dominican Republic following the overthrow of the dictatorship faced many of the same problems with which the "new states"--i.e., those states which have gained their independence since World War II--have confronted. While the struggle for independence goes on, the various forces active in politics have a single common cause which unites them. Once the struggle for independence ends, however, power in the new states tends to be fragmented. Much the same thing happened in the Dominican Republic. While the Trujillos maintained control, the various opposition sectors were united in their opposition. When the dictatorship was ended, they began and continued to fly off in several different directions.²³

If the Dominican Republic had a decided imbalance among the several political sectors of the population; if there was little consensus on the

²¹Max Milikan and Donald Blackmer, The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1961), p. 19.

²²See Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development," Journal of Politics, XVI (August, 1964), 624.

²³A good example of this centrifugal tendency is Bosch's own PRD which was kept united during its long opposition to Trujillo but which split into four separate and non-communicating organizations within the span of two years.

ends and means of political action; if the country resembled a system of independent sovereignties; if the situation was one of anomie and of prismatic, morbidic, and dysfunctional politics; if the society remains unintegrated; if the governments were considered illegitimate by large blocs of the population; and if power is so fragmented, what hope is there that the Dominican Republic will soon develop into a functioning, pluralist democracy?

In the first place, too much cannot be expected too soon. This was one of the major mistakes made by U.S. policy-makers. They thought that they could completely erase the legacy of the Trujillo dictatorship in two or three years. But the problems facing the Dominican Republic were too many and too complex to be completely solved in that short a span of time. A society with such a chaotic and turbulent political history, culminating in the near-totalitarian thirty-one-year Trujillo dictatorship, cannot be wholly remade overnight.

In a few words, the hope that the Dominican Republic will soon develop into a functioning pluralist democracy is very slim indeed. There have been few countries at the level of development of the Dominican Republic which have been able to build a democratic system. Costa Rica is perhaps the most notable exception that comes to mind. But Costa Rica is indeed an exception. The norm seems to be that considerably more economic development, a much higher literacy rate, and somewhat more widespread communications than has been achieved in the Dominican Republic is necessary before a country becomes a political democracy. Several scholars have pointed out that the level of political development is highly correlated with the level of

development of these other factors.²⁴ Social systems are thus indeed systems--that is, their parts are interrelated.

While there is a high correlation between economic development and the achievement of political democracy, it should not be thought this achievement is determined by economic development. This was another of the major miscalculations made by the U.S. in its dealings with the Dominican Republic. While economic aid poured in (it is a fairly simple matter to give away money), political aid (which is much more complex) was almost completely neglected. U.S. planners apparently felt that if only enough economic aid could be given away, political changes would automatically follow along. This assumption proved to be wholly without foundation.

There are, of course, connections between the two. What seems to be a most important political by-product of socio-economic development is the emergence of a middle class. In his book Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors, John J. Johnson argues that the middle sectors which have emerged in Latin America in the 20th century have been the determinants of the change from tradition to modernity which is now characterizing the area. The middle sectors have contributed to a more professional armed forces and bureaucracy, the changing and more democratic orientation of the Church, the raising of living standards for workers and peasants through the need to woo these elements at the polls, the creation of a more nationalistic and less particularistic group system, the

²⁴Lipset, "Some Social Requisites . . . ," op. cit.; Phillips Outright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII (April, 1963), 253-264; and the conclusion by Coleman in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

substitution of political parties for family allegiances and ties, the building of a consensus among all sectors of the population, the recognition of conciliation and the need to compromise, and stability in government. All these factors would seem to be necessary for the functioning of a stable pluralist democracy. The process has begun in such more developed countries of Latin America as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile, Johnson writes; and this is the route that such a less developed country as the Dominican Republic will probably follow if it is to achieve pluralist democracy.²⁵

This is not to rule out entirely the immediate achievement to political democracy in the Dominican Republic. There are sufficient exceptions, like Costa Rica, to rule out a flat prediction. But it is to say that this is the route that the overwhelming majority of countries that have developed into pluralist democracies have followed. The Dominican Republic need not necessarily follow this route, but it will most likely do so. The process will require considerable time and the path may not be straight and smooth.

The middle sectors have already begun to play an increasingly powerful role in Dominican politics. Some of their organizations--the Rotary Club, the Lawyers' Association, the Medical Associations, the Engineers and Architects Association--have become politically influential. Many of these middle class elements were strong supporters of the Bosch government. They are against continued oligarchic rule and in favor of democracy and social change. Though presently disunified and in several political parties,

²⁵John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

they are a growing force. In electoral alliance with labor and the peasantry, the middle sectors now pose a definite threat to the oligarchy.²⁶

It is largely for these reasons that the overthrow of the democratically elected and constitutional government of Juan Bosch was such a setback. Bosch, of course, had his share of faults. Most importantly, he was not the politician that a President of the caliber of Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela was. He lacked the ability to compromise, best expressed in his statement that he would not yield to any pressures. But Bosch was probably more sinned against than sinning. He had attempted to form a government of national unity. But his overtures to the opposition were rejected; the fissures in the country were too deep for such an experiment. His ouster set back the process of political development into a pluralist democracy for a good many years.

The Bosch government was the first democratically-elected regime in the Dominican Republic in thirty eight years. Not only was it democratically elected, but it was also democratically reform minded--the first in the nation's history. It attempted to lift the Dominican Republic out of its traditional morass; it marked an abrupt change from the country's history of successive dictatorships. The PRD regime attempted to bring the traditional forgotten sectors of Dominican society--urban labor and rural peasants--into the national existence for the first time; it proposed to govern for the masses and thus help create a truly pluralist democracy.

²⁶These themes are put forth by R. Vidal Martínez, "El Final de la Oligarquía," El Caribe (November 7, 1964), p. 6. Juan Bosch himself has recognized the democratic orientation of the middle class. See the text of his statement in Listín Diario (December 1, 1964), p. 3. See also Manuel de J. Troncoso de la Concha, "La clase media en Santo Domingo,"

The inauguration of Bosch represented a hope, a democratic wedge in Latin America; and on its success or failure depended many of the possibilities for the success of democracy in the rest of the hemisphere. One student of Latin America stated that the Dominican Republic under Bosch became a symbol and that its example was being closely watched by the other countries in the Americas. It was his conclusion that Latins felt that if democracy could survive in the Dominican Republic, its chances for survival elsewhere were excellent.²⁷

Because the Dominican Republic was such a closely watched example, the failure to establish democracy there was such a disaster. The overthrow of Bosch precipitated a series of crises which drove the country steadily toward chaos. One crucial crisis followed another in rapid succession. No one was sure when the next crisis would come, but there was no doubt that it would come. The political turmoil became such that the country's leading newspaper, El Caribe, commented in an editorial:

We Dominicans are suffering a kind of collective madness. Slowly but inexorably we are moving toward an absolute destruction of the liberties which we still enjoy, and all of us, absolutely all, have our share in this fatal process of decomposition.²⁸

(Footnote 26 continued from preceding page)

Materiales para el estudio de la clase media en América Latina (Washington: Unión Panamericana, IV, 1950).

²⁷"Democratic Wedge Planted," based on an interview with Harry Kantor, The Florida Alligator (March 5, 1963), p. 2. See also Ramón Yllarramendy, "Santo Domingo Mira Hacia el Futuro," Boletín Informativo Demócrata Cristiano [New York] (January, 1963), pp. 1-3; and Mauro Barrenechea, "Fresh Start in Santo Domingo," Américas, CVIII (March 16, 1963), 366-367.

²⁸El Caribe (May 5, 1964), p. 6.

The overthrow of Bosch forced an increased polarization of political forces.²⁹ Though many members of the most important pro-Castro group were massacred in the hills where they had begun guerrilla activity in favor of a return to constitutional government and though all communist or Fidelista groups were made illegal, their offices closed down, and many of their leaders deported, communist sentiment nevertheless increased. Government by decree unified many into opposition. This phenomenon was well expressed by one Dominican who said, "The communists don't have to make propaganda here. Our government does it for them with misrule, corruption, and the domination of a privileged class." Should a popular communist leader emerge who could unite all the disgruntled forces--such as the 250,00 unemployed--the country might be ripe for a Castro-style takeover.

In the anti-communist crusade which followed Bosch's ouster, many reform-minded but non-communist organizations were also persecuted. Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party offices were padlocked and many of its leaders sent into exile. The FOUPSA-CESITRADO labor federation and the FENHERCA peasant organization were raided by the Police and forced to curtail their activities. The entire CIDES operation collapsed.

Political power returned to the hands of the traditional "first families." The civilian Triumvirate which replaced Bosch was almost identical to the conservative Council of State whose representatives Bosch had beaten by a 2-1 majority in the 1962 elections. The names of Cabral, Cáceres, Tavárez, Bermúdez, Espaillet, and other again predominated. The Dominican Republic returned to rule by the small wealthy and privileged

²⁹Mario Bobea Billini, "Izquierdistas Han Polarizado Oposición contra Gobierno," El Caribe (October 21, 1963), p. 6.

class who were concerned more with the preservation of the status quo than with reform. The traditionally forgotten men of Dominican politics--the urban workers and rural campesinos--were again neglected.

Power soon drained off in several different directions. Those placed in power by the military were not able to hold the complex panorama together with the result that the centrifugal forces in Dominican politics began to fly off in even more divergent and non-communicating orbits. There were only a very few weak threads that prevented the country from degenerating into the chaos of another Haiti.

Graft and corruption became widespread. The major offenders were the near-autonomous armed forces, though the public servants also received a goodly share. Military speculation became so profitable that an officer-ship came to be regarded as one of the most lucrative of positions. A string of palatial mansions was built in the outskirts of Santo Domingo by military officers that made the homes of the traditional privileged class look almost insignificant. In the bureaucracy, graft reached the same proportions but with smaller funds involved.

Part of the terror of the Trujillo era returned. The press remained free, for the most part, but indiscriminate jailings and oppression became prevalent. Many were jailed for "preventive purposes" and held indefinitely without legal recourse. The killing of unarmed and innocent civilians became common on the part of the military--especially the Police. Others were jailed for no reason other than looking crosseyed at a policeman. Gatherings in the streets were prohibited, and out of fear people began to speak in soft voices. The underlying feeling was that the country was sliding back toward the police state of the former dictatorship.³⁰

³⁰See Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, CLI (September 19, 1964), 5-6.

Even the businessmen, who had led the opposition to Bosch, began to long for his return. The sale of all kinds of household goods, medicines, liquor, cigarettes, jewelry, etc., by the military through their duty-free canteens cut into their profits. Bribes to administration officials became necessary to ensure a continuous income. Many business leaders quietly-- and ironically--expressed hope for a restoration of the scrupulously honest constitutional government. Said one: "I can't stomach the corruption and inaction of this government any longer. And I'm one who broke out a fifth of whisky to celebrate Bosch's overthrow."

The chaos became so great that many began to urge a return to a dictatorship resembling the Trujillo regime. Order and stability were the major arguments cited by those who advocated such a return. In part this was only a nostalgic longing, but much of it reflected genuine and strong sentiment. At the celebration honoring those who had been slain for their parts in the assassination of the Generalissimo, frequent shouts of "Viva Trujillo!" were heard. This was not an isolated case. Much of the support for a return to Trujilloism may be gauged by the widespread popularity that the former Trujillo puppet President Joaquín Balaguer has amassed.³¹

More difficult to explain is the psychological impact which the overthrow of Bosch had on the populace. The people no longer had faith in the government or its leaders; they became apathetic about honest and efficient administration. Most important, they became almost entirely disillusioned with democracy. Few of the able were willing any longer

³¹ George Natanson, "Ghost Keeps Dominicans Scared," Miami Herald (March 14, 1964).

to participate in government and politics with the result that the crucial shortage of trained personnel became even more acute. As one Dominican put it, "The smartest people here are now a-political."

Uncertainty was the key characteristic in almost every aspect of Dominican politics. No one seemed willing to invest in an uncertain tomorrow. Bosch himself compared this period in Dominican history to the period of anarchy, chaos, and confusion which preceded the 1916 U.S. Marine invasion.³² The businessmen were afraid to invest. The political parties were hesitant in the face of promised but vague future elections. Political groups became even more fluid and amorphous. The government itself was almost non-existent. There was little direction and a vacuum of political leadership. The ship of state seemed to drift aimlessly with no power or authority at the helm. "This government just isn't facing the country's problems," said one political leader, "Nobody is making plans for agriculture, for the economy, for anything."

Despite all these conditions, many of which reached the proportions of the Trujillo era, there was little danger of a return to a regime resembling the former dictatorship. In the period since the Generalissimo was killed, the Dominican Republic had come a considerable distance; and the clock could not be turned back. The country had gone through three years of revolutionary tumult which had started it on the road to political modernity. Intermediate organizations such as political parties, labor federations, business associations, etc., continued to function after Bosch was overthrown and served to limit the regime. Even if the post-Bosch rulers were inclined to do so, there is little likelihood that they would

³²Juan Bosch, personal interview, Aguas Buenas, Puerto Rico, February 23, 1964.

be able to return to the near-totalitarian control of the Trujillo era.

The possibility that the Dominican Republic might return to a dictatorship of the Trujillo type cannot be ruled out entirely. The intermediate or secondary organizations which would mitigate against this possibility are still weak and fluid. And, indeed, the dysfunctional, directionless, anarchic, and chaotic era of morbid politics which followed Bosch's ouster is precisely the kind of ripe situation for a dictatorial takeover. The Dominican Republic has not yet unalterably begun the journey toward pluralist democracy; other alternative routes still beckon.³³

Here, then, is another reason why the ouster of the PRD government was unfortunate. The coup against Bosch retarded and interrupted the development of the Dominican Republic into a pluralist democracy in which all sectors of the population would be able to make their voices heard. For the first time the labor and peasant sectors had a friend in the National Palace. An attempt was being made to integrate these traditionally forgotten, ignored, or manipulated elements into the national political life on an equal footing. When the PRD government was overthrown, this attempt virtually came to an end.

The overthrow of Bosch was not only a setback for the Dominican Republic, but it was also a severe blow to U.S. prestige, to the Alliance for Progress, and to the cause of democracy in all of Latin America. The Dominican Republic, in the eyes of the U.S., was to be the "Showcase for the Alliance." The U.S. aimed to make the Dominican Republic into a model of

³³For an analysis of these alternatives see "Puny Hurricane," The Economist, CCIX (October 5, 1963), 33-34.

what the Alliance for Progress could do. The idea was to achieve social reform and economic development within the framework of a democratic system.

The Dominican Republic, further, in the U.S. view, was to be the "Alternative to Castroism in the Caribbean." In recent years the revolution of rising expectations has swept Latin America. The question was no longer whether revolution would take place in the area, but only which form the revolution would take. At issue for the U.S. and for Latin America was whether change, reform, and progress could be achieved in a democratic way. If it could not be achieved democratically, then the only alternative would seem to be a totalitarian regime of the Left, such as that of Fidel Castro in Cuba. At stake was the entire future of democracy in Latin America. Would the hemisphere remain a part of the free world or join the enslaved?³⁴

The experiment in the Dominican Republic was thus watched with great interest by the rest of Latin America. The U.S., recognizing the large issues involved, poured enormous amounts of men, money, and materials into the country. It cajoled, pleaded, threatened, urged, argued, and even sent the Atlantic Fleet to Dominican waters. Though it ^{tried} ~~tired~~ to minimize its role in the nation's affairs, the entire world knew that the U.S. was practically running the Dominican show. Its prestige, power, ideology, and programs were committed. But despite all the U.S. efforts, the attempt to build democracy in the Dominican Republic failed.

The overthrow of Bosch was thus a setback to the U.S., to the Alliance and to democracy. After the 1962 elections had launched the Dominican

³⁴Ovidio Gondi, "Una Esperanza en el Caribe," Cuadernos, Num. 73 (Junio, 1963), pp. 23-26.

Republic on the road to democracy, the U.S. basked in the glory of its successes. When the success turned to failure nine months later, the U.W. quickly tried to downplay its role and the enormous stakes involved. Its protestations that the Dominican Republic was not really so important fell on deaf ears; everyone knew what the issues were and quickly realized that despite all the U.S. efforts, a democratic system had failed in its attempt at social reform and economic development. The way for Castroism seemed wide open and waiting, not only in the Dominican Republic but also in the rest of Latin America.³⁵

The Dominican Republic eventually began a slow recovery. Under the leadership of Donald J. Reid Cabral, several halting and uncertain steps were taken toward the restoration of a pluralist system and a constitutional and democratic government. Many of the groups harrassed after the coup began to carry on their old functions, Police power was cut back, and elections were scheduled for 1965. The U.S. renewed its aid program. During Round I the Dominican Republic had come a considerable distance toward a pluralist democracy. The framwork for such a system was there. Round II had begun.³⁶

³⁵Robert J. Alexander has presented much the same arguments in his study of Venezuela. Alexander argues that Venezuela is the test case between democracy and Castro-style totalitarianism in Latin America. See his The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of Rómulo Betancourt (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964), Chapter 24. For several reasons--size, type of economy, insularity, proximity to the U.S.--the Dominican Republic seems a more appropriate case for comparison with Cuba than Venezuela.

³⁶Howard J. Wiarda, "Here We Go Again: Round Two in the Dominican Republic," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, I (July, 1964), 3-4.

It was precisely at the time when the Dominican Republic had begun to pick itself up from the rock bottom to which it had fallen following the ouster of Bosch, at a time when the country was beginning Round II, that a violent and disruptive revolution broke out. The outcome of the revolution could not be predicted with any accuracy, but it again illustrated the deep fissures that existed within the political society. After thirty one years of the Trujillo dictatorship, the groups in the system were too weak and too imbalanced to support a functioning democracy.

The Dominican Republic provides an example of a country which attempted to build a democratic system following the overthrow of a near-totalitarian dictatorship. The Dominican Republic was unique in this respect; no other country had undergone a similar transition. None of the communist states have as yet been overthrown, the end of Nazi Germany was followed by a military occupation, Italian Fascism was never a full-fledged totalitarianism, and none of the strong men in the New States have as yet been overthrown. It is for this reason that the experience of the Dominican Republic following the assassination of Trujillo may be applicable in other totalitarian, near-totalitarian, or authoritarian states.

What will happen when Stroessner in Paraguay or the Somozas in Nicaragua are forced from power? Will post-Nkrumah's Ghana, post-Nasser's Egypt, post-Sukarno's Indonesia, or post Ayub's Pakistan follow the same routes as the post-Trujillo Dominican Republic? What type of structure will emerge as the communist states become less totalitarian? It is hoped that what happened in the Dominican Republic following the collapse of the Trujillo regime may provide some lessons for these other countries.

APPENDIX I

PROBLEMS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION AND ANALYSIS IN A LATIN AMERICAN FIELD SITUATION

Prior to beginning his field research for this study of "The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship: The Emergence of a Pluralist Political System in the Dominican Republic," the author drafted a detailed preliminary research design. It was his intention to supplement the information obtained from printed materials by extensive interviewing. The original plan called for interviews with a representative sample of each group with which the study would be concerned.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to explore the questions which the author felt could not be obtained from printed materials. Some of these questions included the following: What was the relationship of rank and file to the group leader? How did the various groups react to certain political issues and to each other? How much communication was there between the several societal sectors active in politics? By what means were the political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, and interest aggregation functions carried out and to what extent had these functional processes actually changed after Trujillo was killed. To answer these and other questions, a tentative questionnaire was drawn up.

The task of constructing the questionnaire and of getting it operational followed lines laid down in the growing body of literature on the scope and method of social research.¹ The questionnaire was submitted to teachers and

¹Some of the more prominent works consulted were Paul F. Lazarsfeld

colleagues who helped clarify the questions and remove ambiguities to ensure that it would provide meaningful and worthwhile results. After several revisions the questionnaire was translated into Spanish.

The questionnaire was then submitted to a number of Dominican friends for criticism. With their help a more colloquial and more easily understood expression was given to the questions, and the entire questionnaire was brought more in harmony with the proposed interviewees' frame of reference.

A further preliminary check followed. The questionnaire was administered to a small sample of Dominicans with whom the author was not acquainted. The purposes of this check were (1) to recheck the language, wording, and content of the questions, and (2) to see if the general purpose of the questionnaire could be understood by people not used to being subjected to such procedures.² The response proved favorable, and the questionnaire was put in final form.

The author originally intended to use Dominican nationals for the actual interviewing. It was hoped that in this way a higher degree of accuracy might be maintained, particularly on questions pertaining to the role of the U.S., since it was well known that the interviewees tend to react to their interviewers. The author intended to selectively check the interviewing to make certain that the results were not falsified.

(Footnote 1 continued from preceding page)

and Morris Rosenberg (eds), The Language of Social Research (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955); Samuel A. Stouffer, Social Research to Test Ideas (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951). For specifics on interviewing the author relied heavily on Herbert H. Hyman, Interviewing in Social Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

²On the "exploratory interview," see William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 136.

The idea of employing Dominican nationals to do the interviewing, however, had to be abandoned. In the first place, unlike many of the more developed Latin American countries, the Dominican Republic had no professional (or non-professional) survey research organization through which the author could work. Nor were there any groups or individuals available who had experience in poll-taking or interviewing. The author soon discovered that the kind and extent of interviewing which he wanted to do would have required a full team of social scientists and considerably more research money and materials than were available.

Several explorations were made to see if these difficulties could be surmounted. Students and professors in the National University and teachers in the outlying areas were approached with the suggestion that they might be hired to participate in the research and to do the interviewing. The responses to these inquiries were entirely negative. Not one person with whom the author talked could see any value in the undertaking; interviewing, behavioral techniques, and the empirical testing of hypotheses were completely foreign to their intellectual training and experience. Those few who were willing to work on the project, in addition, demanded a salary which was exorbitant and which would have exhausted the limited research funds in a very short time.

A new research strategy was then formulated. Several hundred copies of the questionnaire were made. Stamped, self-addressed envelopes were also prepared. A plan was devised so that the various societal subgroups and the different areas of the country could be sampled. The author and his wife, who is a Latin American and also a political scientist, began an extensive trip around the country with the intention of distributing

the questionnaires. It was intended that this would be an exploratory trip and that only a limited number of questionnaires would be distributed. A larger number would be sampled after the results of this preliminary test had come in.³

The author found that most everyone with whom he spoke very graciously accepted the questionnaire and agreed to cooperate in the project. Not one person chased him away with a gun or machete, as has happened in other Latin American interviewing situations. Of the seventy one people who were approached, only three refused to accept the questionnaire.

It appeared, then, as though the author would have the fullest cooperation. This optimistic feeling increased when the author returned to his residence in Santo Domingo and received eight completed questionnaires the first day.

The optimism soon turned to gloom. The returned, completed questionnaires dwindled to a trickle immediately. Though the author remained at that address for the next six months, only five more filled-in questionnaires were mailed back to him. Of sixty-eight distributed, only a total of thirteen were returned. A response of 18 per cent was not sufficient to warrant a continuance of this research strategy.

Several reasons may be suggested to help explain the low rate of response. It must be emphasized that these are only suggestions and that many other reports on questionnaire administration in Latin America are required before behavioral scientists will have a full and satisfactory explanation.

³For a consideration of this type of "pilot study" see ibid., p. 146.

In the first place, the illiteracy rate in the Dominican Republic is extremely high. According to the official figures, 60 per cent of the population is illiterate; but in the countryside and small towns it may run as high as 80-90 per cent. Many of those who received the questionnaire, it might be suggested, were unable to read and understand it. The author recognized this difficulty and attempted to get around it by distributing the questionnaire only to those whom he thought would be able to read. But this admittedly unscientific technique also had its pitfalls. A barber in Pepillo Salcedo, for example, who was the local representative of the Democratic Nationalist Revolutionary Party (PNRD), studied the questionnaire upside down while the interviewer explained the procedures until his literate wife arrived, turned it right side up, and read him the questions.

In a country as poor as the Dominican Republic, in the second place, the stamp on the return envelope which the author handed out was probably too much of a temptation. This may sound trivial and insignificant, but the six cents, represented by the stamp, was more than many of those interviewed saw during a day. Undoubtedly several of the interviewees used the stamp for what they considered to be more worthwhile purposes.

In the Dominican Republic, thirdly a stranger and a foreigner is often suspect. The author had to continuously deny to those he approached that he represented either the FBI or the CIA. Suspicion of anything a foreigner might do, especially something as novel to Dominicans as filling out a questionnaire, probably also contributed to the low rate of response.

Closely related to this factor is a fourth cause which might be suggested for the 18 per cent rate of returned questionnaires. Dominicans were absolutely convinced that the interviewer was an agent of some government.

The author attempted to overcome this by putting the title "Professsor" on the return envelope and by using a non-official return address; but the interviewees, perhaps conditioned by such techniques from the Trujillo era, remained unconvinced. In a country where the government had seldom acted for anyone other than itself, the author's questionnaire was automatically subject to suspicion and no amount of argument could persuade Dominicans to believe that it was only intended for research purposes. The interviewees felt that they would have nothing to gain and probably much to lose by answering the questionnaire since, for example, they had previously had experience with their taxes going up after filling in similar forms; and they were unwilling to risk this happening again.

In the fifth place, it seems likely that the small response might have been partially due to the impersonal nature of a questionnaire. In the Dominican Republic--and in most developing countries--the style of political behavior is more personalistic. A questionnaire is merely a form to be filled out, a sheet in black and white, and has little to do with what a Dominican thinks of as the personalistic and many-colored shades of politics.

The questionnaires themselves, finally, required simple yes or no, multiple choice, or fill-in-the-blank answers. This to a Dominican is a closed system and does not give him a chance to volitile, a proverbial Latin American characteristic, on the topics.

All these six factors may help account for the low rate of return of the questionnaire. But when the interviewees were first approached, almost all agreed to cooperate. Why was there this disparity? What prompted them to change their minds? The author suggests that there is

no real disparity here and that they did not change their minds. It would not have been proper for a Dominican, who takes great pride in his hospitality, to categorically refuse to accept the researcher's request for cooperation; he would have thought it unforgivably rude. The Dominican would reason that he could be polite to the author by first accepting the questionnaire and then forgetting about it. This would avoid the embarrassment of saying no and save face for all concerned.

Not only was the rate of response very low, but the few questionnaires which were returned raised some questions as to their usefulness and validity for research purposes. Thus, though the questionnaire had no space for it and though the author made it a point to tell the interviewees that he wanted them to remain completely anonymous, many nevertheless added their names. One signed his name at the beginning, another at the end, and a third put his name and return address on the envelope which had been distributed along with the questionnaire. A more serious difficulty was that some of the questionnaires obviously became community projects. In some cases, where several questionnaires had been distributed in a single town, the more open-end, fill-in-the-blank questions were answered with exactly the same words.

The author also found that by the technique of the mailed questionnaire, it would be impossible to get a sample of some of the most important elements in the society. He learned that armed forces personnel were forbidden to answer questions with a political content and that only a few were willing to disregard this regulation.⁴ Some of the elite were

⁴The U.S. military attaché, Col. Luther Long, was able to get permission to administer a questionnaire in the armed forces. But this question-

also extremely reluctant to submit to this type of formally-structured questionnaire.

It had been hoped that the test sample would yield rich enough returns to warrant the distribution of several hundred questionnaires. In the light of the extremely low level of returns, this project was abandoned and a new tack attempted.

The author then sought to do the interviewing himself and on a personal basis. This strategy proved to be much more successful. Several changes were made in the interview schedule. In the first place, the size of the sample had to be cut down considerably. One person could not do the work of a team and could not cover as wide a sample as a mailed questionnaire. The length of the questionnaire was also reduced. This last step was justified on the grounds that in the meantime a wealth of unexpected written materials, including accurate statistical information on many of the topics which the questionnaire had been designed to explore, had been found.

There was some precedent in the Dominican Republic for this kind of interview. A professional polling organization, Caribbean Research Limited, had conducted a public attitude study in November and December, 1962. Mexican interviewers visited 1,022 homes in six cities and obtained 940 interviews. Of the eighty two failures, only thirty five (4 per cent) refused to be interviewed [the rest were either not at home (twenty-five), impossible to have the respondent understand the questions (three), no one

(Footnote 4 continued from preceding page)

naire did not deal with political matters and, according to Long, the validity of the results was questionable. Luther Long, personal interview, Santo Domingo, February 17, 1964.

of correct age or sex at home (4), or the responses were thrown out later for miscellaneous reasons (15)]. The response figure was an impressive 92 per cent.⁵

The author's interview schedule was considerably more modest. He attempted to get a representative sample of the various groups active in politics by region,⁶ by rank, by nationality, by organization, by wealth, by class, etc. Thus of thirty one armed forces members interviewed, thirteen had the rank of colonel and above while eighteen ranked below that position. Six of those interviewed were in the Navy, seven in the Air Force, ten in the Police, and eight in the Army. Of twenty clerics interviewed four were members of the hierarchy and sixteen were only priests. Three of these were native-born and the rest foreign-born. Several different orders were represented in the sample. Similarly, of thirty-five businessmen, professionals, and landholders interviewed systematically, fifteen were in what was termed "elite organizations," while twenty were in "middle class organizations." The measurement of the reaction to the Bosch government of these individuals, in terms of the organization to which they belonged almost yielded a Gutmann scale. The sample of the labor sector also included a representative number from the major labor federations. Finally, the peasants in all areas of the country with whom the author talked were not untypical.

⁵ Caribbean Research Limited, "Preliminary Tables: Public Attitude Study, Dominican Republic" (Unpublished Manuscript submitted to the U.S. Embassy, December 10, 1962).

⁶ It was found that breaking the results down by region did not yield any significant information.

The method of choosing the samples was perhaps not so "scientific" as the advocates of scientific social research would dictate. Because armed forces personnel are generally inaccessible, the author talked with as many of these elements as possible in sometimes less than ideal interview situations. Four clerics were interviewed in each of the Dominican Republic's five dioceses. One out of every seven businesses in different commercial areas of Santo Domingo and in four of the outlying cities was entered and an attempt was made to talk with the owner. The professionals interviewed were chosen at random from the phone book. Samples of the labor sector were taken at construction sites and industrial plants, in the streets, on the docks, and in laboring class residential areas. At least ten campesinos were interviewed in each department of the country. Very few of those approached in this more personalistic fashion refused to submit to the interview.

The primary aim of the interviews, as has been stated, was to obtain a representative sample of the various sectors of the political society and of the various shades of opinion within these sectors. In terms of this primary aim, the interviewing, partially by design and partially by good fortune, was a success.

But because the interviewing schedule and the method of choosing samples was not strictly "scientific," the author did not rely primarily on the interviews for his major conclusions. While he feels that his interviews provided a good cross section, he cannot be scientifically certain. The interview tables in this study are therefore presented not as absolute truth but as sidelights which seem interesting and significant and which are probably valid.

The author of this study was fortunate in finding in the National Archives and elsewhere other statistical materials which served an accurate and comprehensive substitutes for the information which could not be obtained by interviewing. Other researchers may not be so lucky.

Probably the basic problem is that the techniques, procedures, and methods of interviewing in Latin America have not yet been worked out. While there exists an extensive body of literature on public attitude surveys in the U.S., there have been almost no published reports of attempts to adapt the methodology of social research to Latin American field situations.⁷ At a time when Latin America is receiving greatly increased attention from social scientists, there is a crying need for such adaptation. This appendix has analyzed some of the difficulties encountered in the administration and analysis of a questionnaire in one of the less developed countries in the area. It is hoped that this consideration may contribute to the success of other studies of human behavior in Latin America.

Final Questionnaire

Age

Birthplace

Present residence

Education

Number of Years
In which schools

⁷See Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics--The Latin American Experience," paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, New York (September 4-7, 1963). See also Robert E. Ward and others, Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1964).

Occupation or Work

Class

Upper
Upper middle
Lower middle
Lower

Groups, Clubs, associations, organizations, federations, etc. Give their names.

Type of membership

Officer
Active
Simple member

With what people or groups do you associate? Who are your closest friends?

Religious preference

Practicing Catholic
Only baptised
Other

Do you have a radio or television?

Yes
No

If no, where do you sometimes hear or see a broadcast?

Friend's house
Store
School
Other

How often do you listen?

Every day
Each week
Rarely
Never

How often do you read a newspaper or periodical?

Every day
Each week
Rarely
Never

Which newspapers or periodicals?

Are you interested in politics?

Very much
Some
A little
Indifferent

Did you vote in the 1962 elections?

Yes
No

Ideology

Leftist
Liberal
Conservative
Rightist
Indifferent
Other
Don't know

Attitude with regard to communism

Favorable
Unfavorable
Indifferent

Attitude with regard to the United States

Favorable
Unfavorable
Indifferent

Do any of the existing political parties closely reflect your thinking and philosophy?

Yes
No

If so, which party

If not, which would be the closest

For whom did you vote in the 1962 presidential elections?

With whom do you discuss politics

- Family
- Friends
- Fellow workers
- Politicians
- Fellow association or group members
- Employer

Degree of political activity

- Vote only
- Sympathizer of a party only
- Attend meetings and discussions
- Affiliated as member
- Occupy a party post
- Political leader

What is the major problem of the country

- Agrarian reform
- Development of Democracy
- A Church that is not a-political
- Communism
- Labor unions
- Yankee imperialism
- The lack of education
- Economic development
- Armed forces in politics
- Lack of food
- Other

What has been the best government of the country

- Ramfis regime
- Council of State
- Trujillo
- Balaguer
- Bosch
- Rodríguez Echavarría
- Triumvirate

Attitude toward the Bosch government

- Favorable
- Unfavorable
- Indifferent

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Howard J. Wiarda was born in Grosse Pointe, Michigan, on November 30, 1939. He attended grammar and secondary schools in Gran Rapids, Michigan, and has received degrees from the University of Michigan (B.A., 1961) and the University of Florida (M.A., 1962 and Ph.D., 1965). He is married to the former Iêda Siqueira and has one child.

Mr. Wiarda has taught at the University of Florida and Florida Atlantic University and has accepted a position at the University of Massachusetts beginning in September, 1965. He is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha and Phi Kappa Phi honoraries and of the American Political Science Association and the Southern Political Science Association. He has published a number of articles on Latin American politics and has served as a consultant to the Peace Corps and the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems. He has held a Fulbright-Hays fellowship and other fellowships from the University of Florida, the Caribbean Research Institute, and the National Defense Education Association.

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